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????伯克希爾哈撒韋（Berkshire Hathaway）上周六公布，2011年每股賬面價值增長了4.6%——這樣的增幅雖不算大，但對于公司董事長沃倫?巴菲特而言已經夠了，因為他已經達到了每年超越標準普爾500指數總回報率的目標。2011年標準普爾500指數僅上漲了2.1%。

????這是巴菲特掌管伯克希爾哈撒韋47年來公司每股賬面價值增幅跑贏標準普爾500指數的第39個年頭。

????盡管如此，在這第四十七年，巴菲特長期以來保持的一項驕人紀錄卻畫上了句號。此前，公司每股賬面價值平均年增長超過20%，但今年增幅只有19.8%，首次跌至20%以下。

????巴菲特當然也想讓每股賬面價值的增幅保持在20%以上，但這么多年來，他知道這個紀錄終有結束的一天。他曾多次警告伯克希爾的股東們，公司龐大的資本基礎將不可避免地放緩每股賬面價值的增長。截至2011年底，公司的資本基礎已經高達1,650億美元。

????巴菲特在向股東匯報業績時通常采用每股賬面價值，因為這一方法能反映伯克希爾已實現和未實現的所有資本損益。由于伯克希爾持有龐大的普通股組合（截至年底770億美元），并積累了巨大的未實現收益，它們的變動對業績影響重大。

????若采用最常見的會計標準（不反映未實現利潤，只反映未實現損失），2011年伯克希爾A類股每股收益6,215美元，低于2010年的7,928美元。

????凈利潤下降（以及每股賬面價值增幅相對溫和）的一個重要原因是2011年伯克希爾核心的保險業務經歷了困難的一年。巨災險損失高達26億美元，而且定價不高。

????總體而言，伯克希爾的保險業務2011年僅實現保險利潤2.48億美元，遠遠低于2010年，當時的數字略高于20億美元。保單額龐大的再保險業務在新西蘭和日本地震中損失高達8億美元，2011年虧損了7.14億美元。

????但在致股東的公開信中，巴菲特重點關注的不是這一年的利潤水平，而是2011年是伯克希爾保險業務連續第九年實現保險利潤。與之形成鮮明對比的是保險界大部分公司都出現了保險損失。

????在伯克希爾實現保險利潤的九年里，公司“浮存金”（即不屬于伯克希爾，但可用于投資并享受收益的資金）已從410億美元增至700億美元。巴菲特在致股東的公開信中稱，他預計浮存金在這個基礎上不會出現太大的增長，因為這一數額與伯克希爾的保費收入相比已經顯得特別龐大。

????Berkshire Hathaway reported today that its book value per share rose 4.6% in 2011—hardly a mighty leap but enough for the company's chairman, Warren Buffett, to meet his annual goal of beating the total return of the S&P 500 index, which rose only 2.1%.

????That was the 39th year out of the 47 years in which Buffett has run Berkshire that the company's performance was better than the S&P's.

????Even so, this 47th year brought an end to Buffett's remarkable long-term record of averaging a better-than-20% annual gain in Berkshire's book value per share. For the first time, the average dropped into the teens, hitting 19.8%.

????Much as Buffett would have liked to maintain an average above 20%, he had for years known it would slip away. He has repeatedly warned Berkshire's shareholders that the company's huge capital base--$165 billion at the end of 2011--would inevitably slow gains in per-share book value.

????Per-share book value changes are the customary way that Buffett reports shareholder results because this method incorporates all of Berkshire's capital gains and losses whether these are realized or unrealized. Because Berkshire (BRKA) holds such a giant portfolio of common stocks ($77 billion at yearend) and has accumulated large unrealized gains, changes in their level can be important to results.

????Under the more commonly used financial standard of earnings (which reflect no unrealized gains and only certain unrealized losses), Berkshire reported Class A per-share results for 2011 of $6,215 versus $7,928 in 2010.

????An important reason for the decline in earnings (and also for the relatively modest gain in book value per share) is that 2011 was a difficult year for Berkshire's core insurance business. Catastrophe losses were high--$2.6 billion in total--and pricing was not generous.

????Overall, Berkshire's insurance businesses had an underwriting profit in 2011 of only $248 million against just over $2 billion in 2010. The company's reinsurance business, which writes very large policies and suffered $800 million of losses from earthquakes in New Zealand and Japan, was in the red, showing losses of $714 million.

????In his chairman's letter, Buffett focused not on the level of profits in this one year, but on the fact that 2011 was the ninth consecutive year in which Berkshire's insurance operations produced an underwriting profit. In most other corners of the insurance world, by sharp contrast, underwriting losses are common.

????In Berkshire's nine years of underwriting profits, its "float" -- money that doesn't belong to Berkshire, but that it gets to invest for its own benefit -- has grown from $41 billion to $70 billion. Buffett said in his letter that he does not expect float to grow much beyond that, because the amount is already outsized in relation to Berkshire's premium volume.