??? 為什么會有這樣的不同？原因并不是因為雙方獲得的信息不同。正如庫迪斯和沃斯所指，荷蘭金融圈里的每個人都知道和了解所發(fā)生事件的嚴重程度。也不是因為Seppenwolde的貸款機構(gòu)不得不重建自身財務(wù)。違約幾周后，貸款機構(gòu)就知道他們沒有損失一毛錢。

????但是折幅差異持續(xù)了整整兩年。事實上，Seppenwolde貸款機構(gòu)的悲觀和避險情緒降低了阿姆斯特丹總體可用杠桿。

????庫迪斯和沃斯在孜孜不倦分析荷蘭金融記錄的過程中得出了結(jié)論，悲觀者和樂觀者之間真正的區(qū)別在于他們是否親身經(jīng)歷過這樣的痛苦過程。庫迪斯認為，可以類比的是那些經(jīng)歷過大蕭條的人們的行為：這些人在大蕭條夢魘過去后的幾十年里，一直回避金融風險。

????荷蘭危機牽涉到成熟的金融專業(yè)人士，那些慣于分析金融和經(jīng)濟趨勢的人們。但是，他們過于看重個人經(jīng)驗。

????“它說明人們看重個人經(jīng)驗，勝過其他可用信息，”庫迪斯表示。人們離一個重要事件的中心越遠，此事對他們的風險胃口影響就越小。

????不清楚到底是荷蘭哪一方貸款機構(gòu)錯了。有可能Seppenwolde的貸款機構(gòu)忽略了更大范圍內(nèi)的金融狀況，過于悲觀。有可能另一方貸款機構(gòu)在忽略東印度危機的沖擊意義時過于隨意。無論是哪一種情況，荷蘭危機都說明，即使是成熟的投資者也會因為個人原因而變得樂觀或悲觀。

????庫迪斯認為，這一點在預(yù)防21世紀的泡沫和破滅方面具有重要的監(jiān)管意義。

????“如果貸款機構(gòu)在市場繁榮時過于樂觀，而在市場下行時過于悲觀，這或許是當局設(shè)定保守的資本金要求的一個最好理由，”他說。“加大折幅可能會抑制最初的漲幅，但當市場轉(zhuǎn)向，它們也能抑制隨后的跌幅?！保ㄘ敻恢形木W(wǎng)）

????本文作者彼得?庫迪斯是斯坦福大學商學院助理金融教授。

????譯者：早稻米

???Why the difference? It wasn’t because of a difference in the available information. As Koudijs and Voth point out, everybody in Dutch financial circles knew and understood the magnitude of what had happened. Nor was it because the Seppenwolde lenders had to rebuild their own finances. Within weeks of the default, the lenders knew they hadn’t lost any money.

????Yet, the disparity in haircuts lasted for almost two years. In fact, the pessimism and risk-aversion of the Seppenwolde lenders reduced the overall availability of leverage in Amsterdam.

????In a rigorous analysis of Dutch financial records, Koudijs and Voth conclude that the only real difference between the pessimists and the optimists was whether they had gone through a harrowing personal experience. Koudijs compares it to the behavior of people who lived through the Great Depression, and who avoided financial risk for decades after trauma had passed.

????The Dutch case involved sophisticated financial professionals, people accustomed to analyzing financial and economic trends. Yet, they too focused on their personal experience.

????“It suggests that people put more weight on what happened to themselves and less weight on other information that might be available,”Koudijs says. The more personally removed people are from an important event, the less it is to affect their appetite for risk.

????It’s not clear which group of Dutch lenders was wrong. It’s possible that the Seppenwolde lenders ignored the evidence about broader financial conditions and were too pessimistic. It’s also possible that the other lenders were too casual in brushing off the implications of the East India mess. Either way, the Dutch episode suggests that even sophisticated investors become optimistic or pessimistic for myopic reasons.

????To Koudijs, this has important regulatory implications for heading off 21st-century bubbles and busts.

????“If lenders are too optimistic during market booms and too pessimistic in downturns, that could be a good reason for authorities to set conservative capital requirements,” he suggests. “Higher haircuts might dampen the initial run-ups, but they could also dampen the subsequent fallouts when tides turn.”

????Peter Koudijs is an assistant professor of finance at Stanford Graduate School of Business.