????它曾經(jīng)是一家傲視業(yè)界、富可敵國的投資公司，能從世界一流的金融機(jī)構(gòu)源源不斷地獲得貸款。它用借來的錢大把大把地押注,購買資產(chǎn)，獲得更高的回報(bào)。但當(dāng)這些資產(chǎn)的市值下跌，貸款機(jī)構(gòu)開始要求更多的抵押品，最后這家公司竟然轟然倒塌。很多驚魂未定的貸款機(jī)構(gòu)全面收緊貸款要求，造成整體的信貸緊縮。

????這里說的是2007年倒閉的那家巨型次貸公司嗎?是2008年破產(chǎn)的雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)嗎？

????都不是。1772年,一場空前的危機(jī)擊中了阿姆斯特丹：一家受人尊敬的荷蘭投資銀團(tuán)對(duì)不列顛東印度公司(British East India Company)股票的投資變成了一場災(zāi)難。

????日前，斯坦福大學(xué)商學(xué)院(Stanford Graduate School of Business)教授彼得?庫迪斯基于這場荷蘭危機(jī)共同撰寫了一篇文章，圍繞“個(gè)人經(jīng)驗(yàn)（而非市場信息）決定樂觀、悲觀以及信貸的獲得與否”這種不那么科學(xué)的方法給出了現(xiàn)代經(jīng)驗(yàn)。

????毫不奇怪，信貸具有“助周期性”。當(dāng)資產(chǎn)價(jià)格一片繁榮時(shí)，樂觀的貸款機(jī)構(gòu)傾向于發(fā)放更多貸款，進(jìn)而加劇市場的狂歡。當(dāng)資產(chǎn)價(jià)格下跌時(shí)，貸款機(jī)構(gòu)會(huì)控制風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，有時(shí)這種做法會(huì)加速下跌。

????但是，是什么推動(dòng)了樂觀或悲觀情緒呢？庫迪斯與巴塞羅那龐培法布拉大學(xué)(Universitat Pompeu Fabra)的漢斯-喬亞吉姆?沃斯發(fā)現(xiàn)了一些令人意外的答案。

????當(dāng)年的荷蘭金融市場固然沒有今天的任何科技，但他們的很多做法都和今天的交易員一樣。投資者們買入證券，有時(shí)會(huì)用買入的股票質(zhì)押獲得貸款。用今天的話說，他們基于保證金買入股票。貸款機(jī)構(gòu)為了自身安全，會(huì)要求一個(gè)超出貸款金額一定百分比的“折幅”，質(zhì)押現(xiàn)金或證券。如果證券價(jià)格下跌超過一定幅度，貸款機(jī)構(gòu)會(huì)要求投資者交出更多資金，與“折幅”保持一致。如果投資者拿不出追加保證金，貸款機(jī)構(gòu)有權(quán)將證券平倉，收回貸款額。

????阿姆斯特丹危機(jī)始于荷蘭Seppenwolde銀團(tuán)對(duì)東印度公司的股價(jià)做出了巨額的反向下注。這只股票在1771年早已大跌，主要是因?yàn)槊霞永膿p失。但這家公司靠借錢繼續(xù)支付高股息，掩蓋了問題。Seppenwolde深信東印度股價(jià)會(huì)很快反彈，基于保證金大舉買入該股。但它的股價(jià)并未反彈，在東印度公司降低了股息后，股價(jià)甚至進(jìn)一步走低。

????長話短說，1772年圣誕節(jié)后，Seppenwolde很快就破產(chǎn)了。這場災(zāi)難是當(dāng)時(shí)荷蘭報(bào)紙的頭條新聞。它徹底毀了阿姆斯特丹一批商人和銀行家。為了防止出現(xiàn)全面的信貸崩潰，阿姆斯特丹市只能作為最后貸款人暫時(shí)介入。這種情形是不是似曾相識(shí)？

????事實(shí)上，貸款給Seppenwolde的那些機(jī)構(gòu)一個(gè)荷蘭盾都沒損失。他們在幾周內(nèi)就清空了全部的東印度股票，收回了所有貸款。

????然后，事情峰回路轉(zhuǎn)。庫迪斯和沃斯發(fā)現(xiàn)，荷蘭貸款機(jī)構(gòu)對(duì)于Seppenwolde的倒閉做出的反應(yīng)截然不同。那些曾經(jīng)貸款給Seppenwolde、但一毛錢也沒損失的貸款機(jī)構(gòu)變得越發(fā)悲觀，要求所有新借款人都提供更多的“折幅”。而那些從未貸款給Seppenwolde、因而躲過一劫的貸款機(jī)構(gòu)則根本沒有提高要求。事實(shí)上，這些貸款機(jī)構(gòu)可能還略略降低了對(duì)借款人的“折幅”要求，至少表明他們和過去一樣樂觀。

????It was a confident, high-powered investment firm with credit lines at top financial institutions. It made big bets using borrowed money to buy assets and generate higher returns. But when the market for those assets went south, lenders demanded more collateral until the firm suddenly collapsed. Many frightened lenders clamped down on all borrowers, setting off an overall credit crunch.

????The implosion of a giant subprime mortgage lender in 2007?The collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008?

????No. This crisis hit Amsterdam in 1772, after a respected Dutch investment syndicate made a disastrous bet on shares of the British East India Company.

????A new paper on the Dutch debacle, coauthored by Peter Koudijs at Stanford Graduate School of Business, turns up modern-day lessons about the not-so-scientific ways in which personal experience rather than market information can determine optimism, pessimism, and access to credit.

????It’s no surprise that credit is “pro-cyclical.” When asset prices are booming, optimistic lenders tend to make more loans and often feed the euphoria. When markets sink, lenders rein in risk and sometimes make the downturn worse.

????But what drives the underlying optimism or pessimism? Koudijs, working with Hans-Joachim Voth at the UniversitatPompeuFabra in Barcelona, found surprising answers.

????Though the Dutch financial markets then had none of today’s technology, they employed many of the same practices that traders use today. Investors bought securities, sometimes borrowing money with loans secured by the shares they were buying. In today's language, they bought shares on margin. Lenders protected themselves by demanding a “haircut” – collateral in cash or securities that exceeded the loan amount by a specified percentage. If the value of the securities dropped below that specified percentage, the lender would demand that the investor put up additional money to stay in line with the haircut. If the investor couldn’t come up with the added margin, the lender was entitled to liquidate the securities and recoup the loan amount.

????The Amsterdam crisis began when a Dutch group known as the Seppenwolde syndicate made a big, contrarian bet on the shares of East India Company. Those shares had plunged in 1771 mainly because of losses in Bengal, but the company kept paying high dividends and covered up its shortfalls by borrowing money. Convinced that East India shares would quickly rebound, the Seppenwolde group aggressively bought them on margin. But instead of rebounding, the shares fell even further after the company slashed its dividend.

????To make a long story short, the Seppenwolde group went bankrupt shortly after Christmas of 1772. The disaster was a top story in Dutch newspapers. It ruined some of Amsterdam’s merchants and bankers. To prevent a general credit collapse, the city of Amsterdam stepped in temporarily as a lender of last resort. Sound familiar?

????As it happened, the lenders to Seppenwolde never lost a guilder. Within weeks, they had liquidated all the East India shares and had recovered the money they had loaned.

????But then the story took a strange turn. Koudijs and Voth found that Dutch lenders reacted to the Seppenwolde collapse in strikingly different ways. Those who had made loans to Seppenwolde but hadn’t actually lost money became far more pessimistic and demanded much bigger haircuts from all new borrowers. But those who had dodged the bullet by not lending to Seppenwolde didn’t tighten their requirements at all. In fact, those lenders slightly reduced haircuts to their borrowers – a sign they were at least as sanguine as before.