????穆拉利上任才幾個(gè)月，坊間流傳已久的福特家族內(nèi)部矛盾就開始浮出水面。對(duì)此霍夫曼也做了深入刻畫。當(dāng)時(shí)，持不同意見的家族成員——尤其是比爾?福特的姐姐和姐夫面臨危機(jī)：他們一時(shí)無法支取股票紅利，家族視為珍寶的兩大品牌——捷豹（Jaguar）和路虎（Land Rover）也即將面臨被拍賣的命運(yùn)。因此，他們開始與精品投資銀行佩雷拉?溫伯格公司（Perella Weinberg）探討將股份套現(xiàn)的途徑，包括出售公司的控制權(quán)。

????比爾和他的表親埃德塞爾挫敗了這一企圖，并對(duì)穆拉利給予了充分信任。由此他們獲得了豐厚回報(bào)：福特最終迎來了讓人嘆為觀止的全面復(fù)興。2008年福特虧損高達(dá)146億美元，2011年卻打了個(gè)漂亮的絕地反擊，利潤高達(dá)78億美元。

????通過長時(shí)間相處所獲得的深入了解，霍夫曼刻畫了一位少有瑕疵、近乎完美的穆拉利。他唯一的問題是，自己會(huì)在早上5點(diǎn)半就趕到公司，讓所有人都不得不早早上班。但是這本書并不是什么圣人傳記。霍夫曼并沒有試圖美化穆拉利所獲得的豐厚薪酬，這已成為勞工合同談判中一個(gè)扎眼的問題。【2011年，穆拉利的年薪高達(dá)2,950萬美元——這是自從1986年李?艾柯卡在克萊斯勒公司（Chrysler）掙得2,360萬美元年薪以來底特律最高的年薪。】霍夫曼還充分利用了自己獲準(zhǔn)深入公司的特權(quán)，挖掘了此前曾被忽視的主題，比如2009年那場曠日持久的談判，當(dāng)時(shí)公司方要求聯(lián)合汽車工會(huì)（United Auto Workers）做出讓步。

????霍夫曼善于記錄談話，對(duì)汽車業(yè)擁有豐富透徹的了解。不過在處理他不太熟悉的主題時(shí)，有時(shí)也會(huì)流于俗套。比如，在描寫比爾?福特的背景時(shí)他寫道，福特在一片“時(shí)髦的專有領(lǐng)地”內(nèi)長大成人，就讀的是一所“名校”，但他卻能“低調(diào)務(wù)實(shí)”，與“普通子弟打成一片”。

????美國汽車公司的財(cái)運(yùn)往往會(huì)隨著GDP的起伏而起伏，而福特汽車也遵循著自己特有的豐年和荒年相交替的發(fā)展周期。霍夫曼寫道：“在福特歷史的長長清單上，超凡絕倫的成功與規(guī)模空前的失敗輪番上演。排除萬難、恢復(fù)元?dú)夂螅謺?huì)滑入潰敗，回到平庸、管理不善的老路上。”

????而福特汽車仍然存在短板。它沒有及時(shí)布局中國市場，在美國市場的份額正在下降，而其首批兩款全球車型嘉年華（Fiesta）和福克斯（Focus）也沒能給市場帶來驚喜。實(shí)際上，穆拉利任期中真正的考驗(yàn)將是，他已實(shí)施的一系列變革，包括數(shù)據(jù)化管理，持續(xù)應(yīng)用達(dá)成共識(shí)的各項(xiàng)原則和團(tuán)隊(duì)合作等是否能在他卸任后還保持活力。如果穆拉利打算退休，比如說到2015年左右，那么我期待著霍夫曼能為本書寫出續(xù)篇，供我珍藏。

????譯者：清遠(yuǎn)

????Hoffman also provides a full account of a long-rumored rift in the Ford family that surfaced in the early months of Mulally's tenure. With their dividends suspended and family jewels Jaguar and Land Rover headed for the auction block, dissidents members -- notably Bill Ford's sister and brother-in-law -- consulted with the boutique investment bank Perella Weinberg about ways to monetize their holdings, which included selling control of the company.

????Bill and his cousin Edsel beat back the effort and placed their faith in Mulally. They were rewarded with a spectacular turnaround. After losing $14.6 billion in 2008, Ford snapped back and went on to make a $7.8 billion profit in 2011.

????The long hours that Hoffman evidently spent with Mulally reveal a man with few flaws, except that he likes to beat everybody into the office by arriving at 5:30 a.m. But this is not hagiography. Hoffman doesn't try to finesse Mulally's ample compensation, which became an issue in labor contract negotiations. (Mulally made $29.5 million in 2011 -- the biggest Detroit payday since Lee Iacocca got $23.6 million from Chrysler in 1986). He's also made good use of his access to dig into previously neglected topics, like the protracted 2009 negotiations required to extract concessions from the United Auto Workers.

????Hoffman has a good ear for dialogue and a thorough knowledge of the industry, though he sometimes resorts to clichés when dealing with less familiar topics. Describing Bill Ford's background, for instance, he writes that Ford grew up in a "posh enclave" and attended a "prestigious" school, yet was "down-to-earth" enough to "rub elbows with the common man."

????The fortunes of American auto companies tend to rise and fall with the GDP, and Ford follows its own cycle of good and lean years. "Ford's history is a long list of stunning successes followed by epic failures, of against -- all -- odds comebacks that turn into retreats back into mediocrity and mismanagement," writes Hoffman.

????The company still has weak spots. Ford has been slow getting to China, U.S. market share is falling, and its first two global cars (Fiesta and Focus) have failed to excite. The true test of Mulally's tenure will be whether the changes he has put in place -- data-driven management, consistent application of agreed-upon principles, teamwork -- survive him. If Mulally ever gets around to retiring -- say around 2015 -- I look forward to adding Hoffman's sequel to my bookshelf.