私募股權(quán)募集資金步伐放緩
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????“他們約談我們的首席財(cái)務(wù)官和財(cái)務(wù)主管，詢(xún)問(wèn)我們的內(nèi)部控制、現(xiàn)金管理以及財(cái)務(wù)后勤職員的教育背景……他們還希望了解我們的人力資本政策，比如證券交易和政治捐款。” |
????"They came in to interview our CFO and controller, to ask about our internal controls, how we manage cash and the educational background of our financial back-office employees… They also wanted to know about our human capital policies, like securities trading and political donations." |
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????說(shuō)這番話(huà)的可不是一家受到財(cái)務(wù)調(diào)查的公司的首席執(zhí)行官，而是私募股權(quán)公司GTCR的負(fù)責(zé)人菲利普?坎菲爾德，他說(shuō)的是像他們這樣的公司正日益受到潛在投資者的調(diào)查。 ????“我們預(yù)見(jiàn)到了如今盡職調(diào)查會(huì)變得更嚴(yán)格，但其深度仍讓我們感到意外，”坎菲爾德補(bǔ)充稱(chēng)，“對(duì)那些過(guò)去假定存在競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的領(lǐng)域也有深入核查。” ????也難怪坎菲爾德吃驚。其位于芝加哥的公司已有30多年歷史，回報(bào)率高于行業(yè)均值；在其他人隨波逐流之時(shí)，該公司恪守“基于平臺(tái)的”投資策略。同時(shí)在業(yè)內(nèi)，GTCR也以提供一些對(duì)投資者最友好的基金條款而著稱(chēng)，比如不攫取所謂的“交易費(fèi)”。 ????最后，GTCR是成功的。其第10支基金募資32.5億美元，明顯高于僅30億美元的目標(biāo)。但過(guò)去一年大多數(shù)時(shí)候，當(dāng)投資者說(shuō)“跳”的時(shí)候，坎菲爾德和公司都感覺(jué)不得不問(wèn)一聲“多高”。 ????這些投資者中就有波士頓“基金中的基金”(FOF)管理公司HarbourVest的董事總經(jīng)理約翰?莫里斯。 ????莫里斯承認(rèn)，過(guò)去一年盡職調(diào)查已變得更為嚴(yán)格，像他們這樣的公司不再有必須快速?zèng)Q定的壓力。 ????“現(xiàn)在我們對(duì)未實(shí)現(xiàn)投資進(jìn)行大量分析，并能觀察幾個(gè)季度的表現(xiàn)后再做決定，” 莫里斯表示，“我們不再擔(dān)心如果我們不立即投資，就會(huì)被某支基金拒之門(mén)外。” ????其他基金投資者談到了約談私募股權(quán)公司上支基金支持的每位首席執(zhí)行官，了解這些首席執(zhí)行官所在公司的成敗有多少可歸因于私募股權(quán)公司(而不是整個(gè)市場(chǎng)的力量或公司管理層)。或者試圖弄清私募股權(quán)公司對(duì)各宗交易負(fù)責(zé)的是哪些雇員，而不僅僅是關(guān)注表現(xiàn)最好和最差的交易。 ????所有這些都反映了私募股權(quán)業(yè)力量天平的偏移，過(guò)去基金經(jīng)理對(duì)投資者頤指氣使(“如果今天你不愿照我們的條款投資，有的是人愿意”)。如今，掌握主動(dòng)權(quán)的變成了投資者——這很大程度上是因?yàn)槌掷m(xù)的流動(dòng)性緊張，促使投資者放緩了新投資步伐，并回過(guò)頭來(lái)認(rèn)真地審視現(xiàn)有關(guān)系。 ????例如，研究公司Preqin的報(bào)告顯示，2010年關(guān)閉募集的私募股權(quán)基金平均募集期為18個(gè)月，較2008年初延長(zhǎng)了50%。GTCR是例外，只有8個(gè)月募集期，但很多私募股權(quán)基金的募集期超過(guò)了兩年。 ????對(duì)于今年試圖募集新資本的幾百家私募股權(quán)公司而言，這樣漫長(zhǎng)而繁復(fù)的流程將是常態(tài)，雖然未來(lái)可能會(huì)有所改變。 ????“我認(rèn)為一切都是周而復(fù)始的，”莫里斯表示，“我確信在未來(lái)的某個(gè)時(shí)點(diǎn)基金募集速度將加快，投資者提出的問(wèn)題也會(huì)減少。但我想，我們誰(shuí)都不知道這種情況何時(shí)會(huì)出現(xiàn)。” |
????That isn't the CEO of a company under investigation for financial irregularities. It's Philip Canfield, principal of private equity firm GTCR, describing the increased scrutiny that groups like his are facing from prospective investors. ????"We anticipated that due diligence would be more rigorous this time around, but the depth of it still managed to surprise us," Canfield adds. "There was deep probing into areas where, in the past, there was an assumed level of competence." ????It's hard to blame Canfield for being taken aback. His Chicago-based firm has been around for more than 30 years, has produced above-average returns and has stuck to its "platform-based" investment strategy when those around it were chasing fads. Moreover, GTCR was known to have some of the industry's most investor-friendly fund terms, such as not hogging so-called "deal fees." ????Ultimately, GTCR was successful. The firm raised $3.25 billion for its tenth fund, compared to a target of just $3 billon. But for most of the past year, Canfield and company felt compelled to ask "how high" when its investors said "jump." ????One of those investors is John Morris, a managing director with Boston-based fund-of-funds manager HarbourVest. ????Morris acknowledges that due diligence has gotten more stringent over the past year, and that firms like his no longer feel pressure to make quick decisions. ????"We are now doing a lot more analysis of unrealized investments, and have the flexibility to take a wait-and-see approach with how they perform over a couple of quarters," Morris says. "We are no longer concerned about getting shut out of a fund if we refuse to commit immediately." ????Other fund investors talk about interviewing every CEO that a private equity firm backed in its last fund, to understand how much of that company's success or failure is attributable to the firm (as opposed to larger market forces or company management). Or how they try to figure out which PE firm staffers are responsible for each and every deal, rather than just focusing on the best and worst performing transactions. ????All of this is part of a larger power shift within private equity, where fund managers traditionally have lorded over their own investors ("If you don't want to invest today on our terms, we can easily find someone else who will"). Today, it's the investors who are in charge – largely due to prolonged liquidity challenges that caused them to slow down new commitments and seriously reexamine existing relationships. ????For example, research firm Preqin reports that the average private equity fund closed in 2010 had been in market for 18 months, up 50% from early 2008. GTCR was an exception to this trend with just an 8-month fundraise, but there are plenty of shops that have been at it for more than two years. ????Such lengthy and detailed processes will be the norm for the hundreds of private equity firms that try to raise new capital this year. The more interesting fundraisings, however, may come later. ????"I think these things are cyclical," Morris says. "At some point in the future, I'm sure funds will get raised faster with fewer questions asked. But I don't think any of us know when that future will begin." |
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