最近一年,歐美國家的通脹問題基本上都得到了有效控制,只有政客們還在把它當作一個選舉議題來操弄。但這也給我們帶來了一個教訓,那就是對于選民以及國民經濟來說至關重要的通脹調節(jié)工具來說,已經到了亟需改革的地步了。
在歐洲和美國,通脹和高生活成本一直是選民最關心的問題。執(zhí)政者一旦放任它們發(fā)生,就很有可能被選民選下去。所以不管多數(shù)國家的通脹率是否已經恢復正常了,也不管控制物價是不是央行的職責,對于需要直面選民不滿情緒的政客來說,他們很容易得出這樣的結論——在貨幣政策上,政府應該有更多的話語權。反正物價只要出了問題,背鍋的就是政府,那么政府為什么不主動爭取在貨幣政策上的更大話語權呢?
阿根廷總統(tǒng)米萊在競選期間曾揚言要“炸掉”央行,當然,他真的當上總統(tǒng)以后并沒有這么干。美國前總統(tǒng)特朗普表也表示,他希望對利率的走向“至少有一定的話語權”,并表示他更懂怎樣操縱利率。但是削弱美聯(lián)儲的獨立性很可能會適得其反,它有可能會給投資者發(fā)出這樣一個信號,即美聯(lián)儲會變得更加政治化,對通脹的態(tài)度也會變得更寬松。這將導致的美國的債務風險進一步上升,而且隨著時間的推移,利率可能會變得更高,而不是更低。
但是,特朗普今年夏天也曾向中《彭博商業(yè)周刊》表示,他有一個降低生活成本的計劃。因為“如果你能降低成本,你就能降低利率?!痹谶@一點上,他是有一定道理的。政府可以而且也應該采取更多措施來應對供給側的價格沖擊,因為在歐美國家,將來這種供給側沖擊可能還會經常發(fā)生,而歐美國家目前的應對方法遠遠不夠理想。
目前,氣候變化、貿易戰(zhàn)和地緣政治沖突愈演愈烈,未來的物價沖擊也更有可能類似過去幾年的情況,而不是像上世紀八九十年代那樣,是單純由需求過快上漲而引起的通脹。所以,如果單純依靠利率工具來應對這種“沖擊式通脹”,不僅在政治上有害,而且代價也是高昂的。這意味著一個市場沖擊就會推高整個經濟的物價。更有害的是,近期提交給歐洲議會的一份文件指出,如果長期保持高利率,這會提高長期投資成本,哪怕這些投資本來可以降低未來產生價格沖擊的可能性(比如用于應對氣候變化的投資)。
盡管緊縮貨幣政策從來都不受歡迎,但當通脹受到過度需求推動時,利率上漲至少會在一段時間的收入增長之后才出現(xiàn)。而相比之下,一國央行如果在供應側沖擊出現(xiàn)后立即加息——比如在俄烏沖突爆發(fā)后,則無異于讓老百姓感到雪上加霜。因為這時不光能源和食品價格上漲了,連房貸也在上漲。這就是為什么2021年和2022年,各國央行都在加息這條路上行走得很緩慢。供給側沖擊還意味著貨幣和財政政策可能會朝著不同的方向拉扯。一方面是央行通過高利率拼命擠壓家庭支出,另一方面,則是政府耗費巨資搞一些項目,以便緩沖生活成本過高帶來的風險隱患。
如果我們足夠幸運的話,那么最近一段時期的惡性通脹,有可能只是歷史上的一次例外事件——畢竟我們還可以把鍋扣到全球疫情和俄烏戰(zhàn)爭頭上。不過隨著氣候變化愈演愈烈,加之全球都在搞能源轉型,能源和食品恰恰有可能成為出問題的行業(yè)。另外,全球地緣政治格局的分裂,也意味著供應鏈有可能出現(xiàn)更頻繁、更不可預測的斷供。而且近年來的歷史也告訴我們,央行不能將由此產生的通脹視為“暫時性”的。
對于每個政府來說,他們都應該考慮下一次出現(xiàn)這種問題時如何能做得更好。目前,我們手中的工具還不充分,各國的最佳政策選擇也各有不同。不過在這個問題上,還是有三條法則可供提早著手。
首先,要防止通脹沖擊的蔓延,就意味政府要進行更多干預。這一點可能與我們在新自由主義經濟學課上學到的有所沖突。但是我們不能完全忽視價格信號。比如2022年,面對歐洲天然氣價格的大幅上漲,很多市場派政客認為應該讓市場這只“看不見的手”自己去操控,然后再看看老百姓到底需要多少幫助。但是這種態(tài)度卻導致了問題的惡化。從2021年初到2022年年中,歐元區(qū)的通脹上漲有一半以上是能源問題造成的。另一個問題是,它讓一群未受影響的天然氣生產商獲得了暴利,放大了價格沖擊,從而進一步升高了老百姓的生活成本。
法國等其他一些國家最終采用的另一種方法是,阻止能源公司將天然氣批發(fā)價格的上漲轉嫁給消費者。這既保護了普通老百姓,也限制了能源通脹向整體通脹的蔓延。但這種做法對緩解能源短缺本身沒有任何作用,因為普通老百姓沒有任何動力去減少天然氣的消費。它也不能避免能源生產商的暴利。雖然后來他們賺的一些差價被以暴利稅的形式追回了。
德國則可能找到了一種更好的辦法。德國在2022年底實施了“天然氣價格剎車”機制。政府對普通家庭80%的天然氣消費設置了遠低于市場水平的價格帽。超過80%的部分則必須按市價支付,所以老百姓有動力去節(jié)約用氣。這件事給我們的經驗是,面對市場環(huán)境的重大變化,要限制沖擊的規(guī)模,但要保持價格上漲的信號能力。
第二條規(guī)則是:政府必須預料到,有的企業(yè)會以價格沖擊為借口提高利潤,特別是在一個行業(yè)由少數(shù)企業(yè)主導的情況下。比如根據(jù)歐盟委員會的數(shù)據(jù),2022年歐元區(qū)國家的物價上漲,有55%的國內因素是由于企業(yè)提高了利潤所致。馬薩諸塞大學的研究顯示,總體來看,在美國,企業(yè)趁機提高利潤對通脹的影響不如歐洲那么大。但是從2020年年中到2022年年中,美國國內物價水平上漲約14%,企業(yè)因素也在其中占據(jù)了9個百分點。
作為民主黨的喉舌,美國副總統(tǒng)哈里斯曾誓言要禁止“哄抬物價”,但企業(yè)之所以能趁通脹之機抬高利潤,歸根結底是因為市場集中度的升高為這種做法創(chuàng)造了條件。所以說逆轉市場集中度的升高,不僅能促進長期增長和生產率,還有利于降低下次供給側沖擊給老百姓生活造成的影響。
第三條法則:如果你想解決通脹問題,就要避免出臺會導致問題進一步惡化的政策。據(jù)《彭博經濟學》估算,如果按照特朗普的計劃對中國加征60%的關稅,對其他國家加征20%的關稅,那么這將使美國經濟3年內縮水0.9%,并將物價抬高4.4%。那么到2025年,美聯(lián)儲又得為了將通脹目標降至3.7%而努力奮斗。而且如果相關國家對此做出反應,則造成的實際損害還要大得多。
特朗普還建議,這筆關稅收入可以用來減輕老百姓在兒童保育等領域的負擔。很難想象,美國政府如何能夠一邊多征收數(shù)萬億美元的關稅,一邊還能促進就業(yè)和國內競爭企業(yè)的收入??傊还茉鯓?,高關稅都不可能降低生活成本。
美國副總統(tǒng)哈里斯曾建議降低住房成本,包括對首次購房者提供2.5萬美元的購房補貼,這個計劃也有可能掉入一個類似的陷阱。就該計劃本身而言,它通過刺激需求,給租金和房價帶來了上行壓力。但是自2020年以來,美國通脹有三分之一的上行壓力是租金和住房成本導致的。哈里斯還計劃花費400億美元用于直接激勵,以增加房地產建設和新房供給。不過哈里斯的顧問最近明智地建議道,在為購房者提供額外幫助之前,必須先增加房屋建設。
總之,面臨由疫情和戰(zhàn)爭等因素引發(fā)的通脹激增,各國央行反應得太晚了,使用的響應工具也不是最優(yōu)的。選民們想要有人為此負責任,而政客們也忙著找人背鍋。但作為政策制定者來說,我們應該尋找更明智的方法,從源頭上解決這些沖擊。(財富中文網)
本專欄不代表彭博社及其所有者的觀點。
譯者:樸成奎
最近一年,歐美國家的通脹問題基本上都得到了有效控制,只有政客們還在把它當作一個選舉議題來操弄。但這也給我們帶來了一個教訓,那就是對于選民以及國民經濟來說至關重要的通脹調節(jié)工具來說,已經到了亟需改革的地步了。
在歐洲和美國,通脹和高生活成本一直是選民最關心的問題。執(zhí)政者一旦放任它們發(fā)生,就很有可能被選民選下去。所以不管多數(shù)國家的通脹率是否已經恢復正常了,也不管控制物價是不是央行的職責,對于需要直面選民不滿情緒的政客來說,他們很容易得出這樣的結論——在貨幣政策上,政府應該有更多的話語權。反正物價只要出了問題,背鍋的就是政府,那么政府為什么不主動爭取在貨幣政策上的更大話語權呢?
阿根廷總統(tǒng)米萊在競選期間曾揚言要“炸掉”央行,當然,他真的當上總統(tǒng)以后并沒有這么干。美國前總統(tǒng)特朗普表也表示,他希望對利率的走向“至少有一定的話語權”,并表示他更懂怎樣操縱利率。但是削弱美聯(lián)儲的獨立性很可能會適得其反,它有可能會給投資者發(fā)出這樣一個信號,即美聯(lián)儲會變得更加政治化,對通脹的態(tài)度也會變得更寬松。這將導致的美國的債務風險進一步上升,而且隨著時間的推移,利率可能會變得更高,而不是更低。
但是,特朗普今年夏天也曾向中《彭博商業(yè)周刊》表示,他有一個降低生活成本的計劃。因為“如果你能降低成本,你就能降低利率?!痹谶@一點上,他是有一定道理的。政府可以而且也應該采取更多措施來應對供給側的價格沖擊,因為在歐美國家,將來這種供給側沖擊可能還會經常發(fā)生,而歐美國家目前的應對方法遠遠不夠理想。
目前,氣候變化、貿易戰(zhàn)和地緣政治沖突愈演愈烈,未來的物價沖擊也更有可能類似過去幾年的情況,而不是像上世紀八九十年代那樣,是單純由需求過快上漲而引起的通脹。所以,如果單純依靠利率工具來應對這種“沖擊式通脹”,不僅在政治上有害,而且代價也是高昂的。這意味著一個市場沖擊就會推高整個經濟的物價。更有害的是,近期提交給歐洲議會的一份文件指出,如果長期保持高利率,這會提高長期投資成本,哪怕這些投資本來可以降低未來產生價格沖擊的可能性(比如用于應對氣候變化的投資)。
盡管緊縮貨幣政策從來都不受歡迎,但當通脹受到過度需求推動時,利率上漲至少會在一段時間的收入增長之后才出現(xiàn)。而相比之下,一國央行如果在供應側沖擊出現(xiàn)后立即加息——比如在俄烏沖突爆發(fā)后,則無異于讓老百姓感到雪上加霜。因為這時不光能源和食品價格上漲了,連房貸也在上漲。這就是為什么2021年和2022年,各國央行都在加息這條路上行走得很緩慢。供給側沖擊還意味著貨幣和財政政策可能會朝著不同的方向拉扯。一方面是央行通過高利率拼命擠壓家庭支出,另一方面,則是政府耗費巨資搞一些項目,以便緩沖生活成本過高帶來的風險隱患。
如果我們足夠幸運的話,那么最近一段時期的惡性通脹,有可能只是歷史上的一次例外事件——畢竟我們還可以把鍋扣到全球疫情和俄烏戰(zhàn)爭頭上。不過隨著氣候變化愈演愈烈,加之全球都在搞能源轉型,能源和食品恰恰有可能成為出問題的行業(yè)。另外,全球地緣政治格局的分裂,也意味著供應鏈有可能出現(xiàn)更頻繁、更不可預測的斷供。而且近年來的歷史也告訴我們,央行不能將由此產生的通脹視為“暫時性”的。
對于每個政府來說,他們都應該考慮下一次出現(xiàn)這種問題時如何能做得更好。目前,我們手中的工具還不充分,各國的最佳政策選擇也各有不同。不過在這個問題上,還是有三條法則可供提早著手。
首先,要防止通脹沖擊的蔓延,就意味政府要進行更多干預。這一點可能與我們在新自由主義經濟學課上學到的有所沖突。但是我們不能完全忽視價格信號。比如2022年,面對歐洲天然氣價格的大幅上漲,很多市場派政客認為應該讓市場這只“看不見的手”自己去操控,然后再看看老百姓到底需要多少幫助。但是這種態(tài)度卻導致了問題的惡化。從2021年初到2022年年中,歐元區(qū)的通脹上漲有一半以上是能源問題造成的。另一個問題是,它讓一群未受影響的天然氣生產商獲得了暴利,放大了價格沖擊,從而進一步升高了老百姓的生活成本。
法國等其他一些國家最終采用的另一種方法是,阻止能源公司將天然氣批發(fā)價格的上漲轉嫁給消費者。這既保護了普通老百姓,也限制了能源通脹向整體通脹的蔓延。但這種做法對緩解能源短缺本身沒有任何作用,因為普通老百姓沒有任何動力去減少天然氣的消費。它也不能避免能源生產商的暴利。雖然后來他們賺的一些差價被以暴利稅的形式追回了。
德國則可能找到了一種更好的辦法。德國在2022年底實施了“天然氣價格剎車”機制。政府對普通家庭80%的天然氣消費設置了遠低于市場水平的價格帽。超過80%的部分則必須按市價支付,所以老百姓有動力去節(jié)約用氣。這件事給我們的經驗是,面對市場環(huán)境的重大變化,要限制沖擊的規(guī)模,但要保持價格上漲的信號能力。
第二條規(guī)則是:政府必須預料到,有的企業(yè)會以價格沖擊為借口提高利潤,特別是在一個行業(yè)由少數(shù)企業(yè)主導的情況下。比如根據(jù)歐盟委員會的數(shù)據(jù),2022年歐元區(qū)國家的物價上漲,有55%的國內因素是由于企業(yè)提高了利潤所致。馬薩諸塞大學的研究顯示,總體來看,在美國,企業(yè)趁機提高利潤對通脹的影響不如歐洲那么大。但是從2020年年中到2022年年中,美國國內物價水平上漲約14%,企業(yè)因素也在其中占據(jù)了9個百分點。
作為民主黨的喉舌,美國副總統(tǒng)哈里斯曾誓言要禁止“哄抬物價”,但企業(yè)之所以能趁通脹之機抬高利潤,歸根結底是因為市場集中度的升高為這種做法創(chuàng)造了條件。所以說逆轉市場集中度的升高,不僅能促進長期增長和生產率,還有利于降低下次供給側沖擊給老百姓生活造成的影響。
第三條法則:如果你想解決通脹問題,就要避免出臺會導致問題進一步惡化的政策。據(jù)《彭博經濟學》估算,如果按照特朗普的計劃對中國加征60%的關稅,對其他國家加征20%的關稅,那么這將使美國經濟3年內縮水0.9%,并將物價抬高4.4%。那么到2025年,美聯(lián)儲又得為了將通脹目標降至3.7%而努力奮斗。而且如果相關國家對此做出反應,則造成的實際損害還要大得多。
特朗普還建議,這筆關稅收入可以用來減輕老百姓在兒童保育等領域的負擔。很難想象,美國政府如何能夠一邊多征收數(shù)萬億美元的關稅,一邊還能促進就業(yè)和國內競爭企業(yè)的收入??傊还茉鯓?,高關稅都不可能降低生活成本。
美國副總統(tǒng)哈里斯曾建議降低住房成本,包括對首次購房者提供2.5萬美元的購房補貼,這個計劃也有可能掉入一個類似的陷阱。就該計劃本身而言,它通過刺激需求,給租金和房價帶來了上行壓力。但是自2020年以來,美國通脹有三分之一的上行壓力是租金和住房成本導致的。哈里斯還計劃花費400億美元用于直接激勵,以增加房地產建設和新房供給。不過哈里斯的顧問最近明智地建議道,在為購房者提供額外幫助之前,必須先增加房屋建設。
總之,面臨由疫情和戰(zhàn)爭等因素引發(fā)的通脹激增,各國央行反應得太晚了,使用的響應工具也不是最優(yōu)的。選民們想要有人為此負責任,而政客們也忙著找人背鍋。但作為政策制定者來說,我們應該尋找更明智的方法,從源頭上解決這些沖擊。(財富中文網)
本專欄不代表彭博社及其所有者的觀點。
譯者:樸成奎
Inflation has been defeated virtually everywhere except at the ballot box. That’s one lesson of a year of hard-fought elections on both sides of the Atlantic. Here’s another: Our standard toolkit for responding to big swings in the prices that matter most to voters, and the economy, needs an overhaul.
In Europe and the US, inflation and the high cost of living have been top concerns for voters who’ve been eager to punish incumbents for letting them happen. No matter that the headline rate of inflation in most countries is now back to normal or that controlling prices is supposed to be the central banks’ job. For politicians at the sharp end of this discontent, it’s tempting to conclude that when it comes to monetary policy, elected governments need more of a say. Why not, if they’re going to be blamed when it goes wrong?
Argentine President Javier Milei famously promised on the campaign trail to “blow up” the central bank, though he hasn’t shown any sign of doing so since taking office. Former President Donald Trump, the Republican nominee for the White House, wants to “have at least a say” in where interest rates go and thinks he’d do a better job in steering them. Diluting the Federal Reserve’s independence would be counterproductive, sending a signal to investors that the central bank would be more political and potentially more relaxed about inflation. That would translate into an increased risk premium on US debt and probably higher—not lower—interest rates over time.
But Trump also told Bloomberg Businessweek this summer that he had a plan to lower costs, “because if you could lower costs, you could then lower interest rates.” Here he has a point. Governments can and should be doing more to tackle supply-side price shocks, because we’re going to see plenty more of them and the current approach is far from ideal.
With climate change, trade wars and geopolitical conflict all on the rise, the price shocks of the future are more likely to resemble the inflationary ups and downs of the past few years than the bouts of inflation in the 1980s and ’90s that were caused by excess demand. Relying solely on interest rates to tackle this kind of “shockflation” isn’t just politically corrosive, it’s costly. It means waiting until a shock in one market has pushed up prices across the economy. Worse, as a recent paper for the European Parliament pointed out, by keeping interest rates higher, it becomes even more expensive to make long-term investments—in combating climate change, for example—that would make future price shocks less likely.
While tightening monetary policy is never popular, when inflation is fed by excessive demand, those higher rates at least happen after a period of rising incomes. By contrast, a central bank that raises interest rates after a supply-side shock, such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, kicks people when they’re down. Mortgage payments rise just as energy and food bills are also going through the roof. No wonder central banks in 2021 and 2022 were slow to get started on that path. Supply shocks also mean monetary and fiscal policy are likely to be pulling in different directions. The central bank ends up squeezing household spending with higher rates just as governments are spending billions on programs to cushion the cost-of-living crisis.
If we’re lucky, the recent period—with a global pandemic and a European war—will turn out to have been exceptional. But energy and food are precisely the sectors that could be a problem in the context of both climate change and the global effort to transition away from carbon. A more geopolitically fragmented world is also likely to mean more frequent and unpredictable disruptions in supply chains. And recent history has taught us that central banks can’t afford to dismiss the resulting inflation as “transitory.”
The bottom line is that every government ought to be thinking about how to do better the next time. We don’t have a full toolkit yet, and the best mix of policies will vary by country. But here are three early rules of the road.
First, preventing shocks from spreading means more intervention than we were taught in neoliberal Economics 101. But don’t turn off price signals altogether. In response to the jump in European gas prices in 2022, the early instinct of many market-?oriented politicians was to let prices find their level and then see how much help households needed. This ended up generalizing the problem: Energy accounted for more than half of the rise in euro zone inflation from the start of 2021 to mid-2022. Another snag was it let a bunch of unaffected producers earn windfall profits, amplifying the shock and making help for households yet more expensive.
Another approach, which France and some others ultimately followed, was to prevent energy companies from passing on the increase in wholesale gas prices to customers. This shielded households and limited the pass-through to overall inflation. But it did nothing to ease the energy shortage itself, since households had little incentive to cut consumption. Nor did it avoid windfall profits for energy producers, who were compensated for the difference between the market price and the household cap. (Some of those were later clawed back through windfall taxes.)
Germany may have found a better way with its “gas price brake” in late 2022. This involved the government setting a price cap on energy well below the market level on 80% of the average household’s gas consumption of the previous year. Consumption above 80% had to be paid at full market prices, providing an incentive to conserve. The takeaway: Faced with a major change in market conditions, limit the size of the shock but keep the signaling power of higher prices in place.
A second rule: Governments must expect companies to use price shocks as an excuse to raise margins, especially if a few dominate an industry. According to the European Commission, 55% of the rise in domestic prices in the euro zone in 2022 was due to firms raising their markups. In the US, higher corporate profits played a smaller role overall, but accounted for 9 percentage points of the roughly 14% increase in the domestic price level from mid-2020 to mid-2022, according to research by the University of Massachusetts.
Vice President Kamala Harris, the Democratic standard bearer, has vowed to ban “price gouging,” but the root problem is the increased market concentration that allows it. Reversing this would not only boost long-term growth and productivity, it should also make the next supply shock less expensive for voters.
The third rule: If you want to tackle high costs for consumers, avoid policies that make the problem worse. Bloomberg Economics estimates that Trump’s plan to impose 60% tariffs on China and 20% tariffs on the rest of the world would shrink the US economy by 0.9% and push up prices by 4.4% over three years, propelling the Fed’s target measure of inflation back up to 3.7% in 2025. If other markets react, the damage would be that much greater.
The former president has suggested the revenue could be used to ease the burden on households in other areas such as child care. It’s difficult to see how the government could raise trillions of dollars from tariffs while also boosting employment and revenue for import-competing businesses. But whatever happens, these higher tariffs aren’t going to lower costs.
Harris risks falling into a similar trap with her plan to reduce housing costs, which leads with a promise of $25,000 in down -payment support for first-time homebuyers. On its own, by stimulating demand, this would add to the upward pressure on rent and housing costs that has accounted for a third of the rise in US inflation since 2020. The rest of her plan would spend $40 billion on direct incentives to increase homebuilding and new home supply. Wisely, her advisers have recently suggested the extra building would have to come before the extra help for buyers.
Faced with a sharp spike in inflation induced by Covid-19 and war, central banks responded too late, and then with ?second-best, reactive tools. Voters want someone to blame for their higher bills, and so do politicians. What policymakers should be looking for instead are smarter ways to tackle these shocks at source.
This column doesn’t necessarily reflect the opinion of Bloomberg LP and its owners.