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巴菲特經(jīng)典投資案例:美國(guó)運(yùn)通

伯克希爾·哈撒韋公司(Berkshire Hathaway)首席執(zhí)行官沃倫·巴菲特(Warren Buffett)發(fā)現(xiàn)了遭受重創(chuàng)的美國(guó)運(yùn)通(Amex)的價(jià)值。

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以下改編內(nèi)容節(jié)選自斯蒂芬·R·福斯特(Stephen R. Foerster)的著作《開拓者、英雄和騙子:讓你成為更睿智的投資者的故事》(Trailblazers, Heroes, and Crooks: Stories to Make You a Smarter Investor》(約翰威立國(guó)際出版集團(tuán)(Wiley)2024年出版)。

這個(gè)故事匯集了舉報(bào)者、惡棍、有遠(yuǎn)見的人和沃倫·巴菲特(可以說是有史以來最偉大的投資者)。故事還涉及色拉油。

惡棍

蒂諾·德安吉利斯(Tino DeAngelis)很早就開始從事肉類行業(yè)。據(jù)稱他在二戰(zhàn)期間參與了黑市交易。他因向南斯拉夫出口不達(dá)標(biāo)烹調(diào)用油而被罰款10萬美元。在收購了一家公共肉類加工廠后,他又因產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量問題被要求支付10萬美元的賠償金。隨后,他的另一家公司被指控向德國(guó)出口劣質(zhì)豬油,結(jié)果“照例”要賠償10萬美元。德安吉利斯后來創(chuàng)立了Allied Crude Vegetable Oil Refining Corporation(Allied)。關(guān)于他欺詐和與黑社會(huì)有染的指控接踵而至。

有遠(yuǎn)見的人

美國(guó)運(yùn)通公司在旅游和金融服務(wù)領(lǐng)域占據(jù)主導(dǎo)地位。1960年,霍華德·克拉克(Howard Clark)成為首席執(zhí)行官。他的首要任務(wù)是解決虧損的美國(guó)運(yùn)通信用卡的盈利問題。隨后,他專注于美國(guó)運(yùn)通的四家利潤(rùn)微薄的子公司。其中一個(gè)是獨(dú)立運(yùn)營(yíng)的American Express Field Warehousing Company(AEFW)。在過去的19年里,該公司只有10年盈利,累計(jì)虧損。在20世紀(jì)50年代末,AEFW擁有500個(gè)客戶賬戶,但所有利潤(rùn)都來自兩家公司,它們的所有者都是同一個(gè)人:德安吉利斯。其中一家公司是Allied。

先知的誕生

1956年,時(shí)年25歲的沃倫·巴菲特創(chuàng)辦了他的第一家投資合伙公司。1962年,他解散了所有合伙企業(yè),共計(jì)11家,將其合并為巴菲特合伙有限公司(Buffett Partnership Ltd., BPL),凈資產(chǎn)為720萬美元。當(dāng)時(shí)巴菲特已經(jīng)是百萬富翁了。巴菲特合伙有限公司業(yè)績(jī)強(qiáng)勁。巴菲特延續(xù)了本杰明·格雷厄姆(Benjamin Graham)的價(jià)值投資風(fēng)格。巴菲特認(rèn)為股票投資類似于擁有一家企業(yè),但前提是價(jià)格合理。巴菲特1964年對(duì)美國(guó)運(yùn)通的投資開啟了與眾不同的投資方式。

在收購美國(guó)運(yùn)通之前,巴菲特曾爭(zhēng)取獲得董事會(huì)席位或控制權(quán),就像他對(duì)登普斯特爾機(jī)械制造廠(Dempster Mill Manufacturing Company)的投資一樣。巴菲特敦促管理層增加利潤(rùn),但未能如愿。因此,他任命了一位新管理者來扭轉(zhuǎn)局面,但這讓巴菲特聲譽(yù)受損。新管理團(tuán)隊(duì)解雇了鎮(zhèn)上唯一一家工廠的100名工人。巴菲特在當(dāng)?shù)貓?bào)紙上受到詆毀。從美國(guó)運(yùn)通開始,巴菲特的方法是首先發(fā)現(xiàn)那些價(jià)值被低估的公司,這些公司本質(zhì)上是實(shí)力雄厚企業(yè),擁有能干的管理者,然后讓他們各司其職。

聲音

1960年6月,AEFW的首席執(zhí)行官唐納德·米勒(Donald Miller)接到了一個(gè)自稱“聲音”的線人打來的電話。他聲稱在新澤西州貝永的Allied上夜班。他警告米勒:“有史以來最大的騙局正在美國(guó)運(yùn)通上演,因?yàn)閷?shí)際上油罐里裝的是水,而我們卻把它算作豆油。每當(dāng)去油罐盤點(diǎn)時(shí),我們都會(huì)把砝碼扔進(jìn)這個(gè)裝滿大豆油的金屬艙,但油罐連接的天平卻溢出了水。”

米勒下令對(duì)Allied進(jìn)行突擊檢查。檢查人員發(fā)現(xiàn),除了測(cè)量艙口外,所有油罐的開口都被焊死了。隨后,他們?cè)谀軌驒z查的五個(gè)油罐中發(fā)現(xiàn)了水。然而,當(dāng)他們?cè)谥苣┖蠓祷貢r(shí),其他油罐并沒有任何可疑之處。后來的一份報(bào)告將進(jìn)水歸因于“蒸汽管道破裂”。Allied和AEFW之間的業(yè)務(wù)照常進(jìn)行。

調(diào)查人員不知道的是,德安吉利斯精心設(shè)計(jì)了一個(gè)管道網(wǎng)絡(luò),其中有虛假的隔室和特殊的采樣管,其中含有真正的豆油。三年后,當(dāng)欺詐行為最終被發(fā)現(xiàn)時(shí),當(dāng)一個(gè)油罐的水龍頭終于被打開時(shí),流出的不是價(jià)值400萬美元的大豆油,而是海水,整整持續(xù)了12天。

騙局和垮臺(tái)

1961年,Allied開始在豆油期貨市場(chǎng)大舉買入。到1963年,德安吉利斯一直在推高豆油期貨價(jià)格,原因是他預(yù)計(jì)外國(guó)會(huì)有大量需求。有傳言稱,俄羅斯的農(nóng)作物歉收,俄羅斯將很快購買美國(guó)的植物油。事實(shí)上,外國(guó)農(nóng)作物大豐收,因此高昂的期貨價(jià)格難以為繼。

隨著油價(jià)的每一次下跌,Allied都需要在保證金賬戶中提供更多資金。到1963年11月,交易所和政府大宗商品機(jī)構(gòu)終于意識(shí)到,Allied正在抬高期貨價(jià)格。當(dāng)一名商品交易所調(diào)查員要求查看Allied的記錄時(shí),事情敗露了。Allied申請(qǐng)破產(chǎn),期貨價(jià)格暴跌。AEFW倉庫收據(jù)上的植物油總量是全美植物油總量的兩倍

品牌

美國(guó)運(yùn)通是一家股份公司,是美國(guó)最后一家擁有無限責(zé)任的大型上市公司。到1963年,美國(guó)運(yùn)通正在考慮合并,成為一家有限責(zé)任公司,就像幾乎所有其他上市公司一樣。

在Allied破產(chǎn)后不久,AEFW遭到的索賠超過了1.5億美元,接近美國(guó)運(yùn)通公司1.62億美元的年終股票價(jià)值。由于AEFW是一家獨(dú)立運(yùn)營(yíng)的子公司,美國(guó)運(yùn)通可能無需對(duì)其債務(wù)負(fù)責(zé)。但有一些法律規(guī)則可能會(huì)推翻這種分離。這給美國(guó)運(yùn)通的潛在責(zé)任帶來了不確定性。

無論如何,克拉克都在考慮美國(guó)運(yùn)通是否應(yīng)該賠償AEFW的損失。他從不同的角度考慮重要的利益相關(guān)者。如果美國(guó)運(yùn)通拒絕承擔(dān)AEFW的責(zé)任,銀行將蒙受損失。鑒于銀行在美國(guó)運(yùn)通的旅行支票業(yè)務(wù)中發(fā)揮著巨大作用,這可能會(huì)扼殺銀行給美國(guó)運(yùn)通帶來的所有業(yè)務(wù)。

相反,讓銀行家滿意可能會(huì)讓股東感到沮喪。克拉克還必須考慮騙局對(duì)客戶的影響。他們會(huì)停止使用美國(guó)運(yùn)通的產(chǎn)品嗎?經(jīng)董事會(huì)同意,1963年11月27日,克拉克公開宣布:“如果我們的子公司需要對(duì)超出其保險(xiǎn)范圍和其他資產(chǎn)的金額承擔(dān)責(zé)任,美國(guó)運(yùn)通認(rèn)為在道義上有義務(wù)盡其所能,與其總體責(zé)任相一致,確保這些超額債務(wù)得到清償。”

沃倫·巴菲特投資

1963年11月20日,這場(chǎng)騙局開始見諸報(bào)端,但幾乎沒報(bào)道什么細(xì)節(jié)。兩天后,約翰·肯尼迪(John F. Kennedy)總統(tǒng)被暗殺。在紐約證券交易所緊急關(guān)閉前的半小時(shí)內(nèi),股東價(jià)值蒸發(fā)了110億美元。肯尼迪的離世使“色拉油大騙局”退居次要地位。巴菲特對(duì)購買該公司廉價(jià)股票的可能性很感興趣,于是跟蹤了美國(guó)運(yùn)通的股價(jià)。即使在市場(chǎng)重新開盤后,該股也沒有反彈,而是繼續(xù)下跌。根據(jù)市場(chǎng)的反應(yīng),美國(guó)運(yùn)通的生存前景堪憂。從11月20日到12月2日,其股價(jià)從61.81美元跌至40美元,并在1964年6月2日跌至35.31美元的谷底,在丑聞爆發(fā)后不到8個(gè)月的時(shí)間里下跌了43%。

巴菲特想知道這樁丑聞會(huì)對(duì)美國(guó)運(yùn)通的聲譽(yù)造成什么影響。對(duì)于旅行支票和信用卡而言,信任至關(guān)重要。巴菲特需要事實(shí)依據(jù)。因此,他和一位熟人走訪了接受美國(guó)運(yùn)通卡和支票的餐館和其他場(chǎng)所。他們與銀行出納員、銀行職員、信用卡用戶、酒店員工和餐館工作人員進(jìn)行了交談,以了解使用率是否有所下降。根據(jù)這項(xiàng)研究,巴菲特得出的結(jié)論是,雖然華爾街通過打壓美國(guó)運(yùn)通的股價(jià)來懲罰該公司,但美國(guó)運(yùn)通在典型的美國(guó)中產(chǎn)階級(jí)中的聲譽(yù)并沒有受到損害。

到1964年初,巴菲特合伙有限公司從利潤(rùn)和新資金中獲得了充足的現(xiàn)金,資本達(dá)到1750萬美元。在一只股票上冒險(xiǎn)投入巨額資金,既需要堅(jiān)定的信念,也需要鋼鐵般的意志。但巴菲特就是這么做的。到1964年6月,他在巴菲特合伙有限公司持有的最大一只股票美國(guó)運(yùn)通上投資了300萬美元,持股比例為17%。

股東對(duì)股東

在與債權(quán)人達(dá)成最終解決方案之前,一些股東對(duì)該公司采取了行動(dòng),認(rèn)為美國(guó)運(yùn)通沒有法律義務(wù)解決AEFW的債務(wù)問題。他們認(rèn)為,任何和解都將損害美國(guó)運(yùn)通的股東價(jià)值。他們尤其擔(dān)心德安吉利斯許多偽造的倉庫收據(jù)的持有者會(huì)得到賠償。

巴菲特認(rèn)為管理層的做法是正確的,并擔(dān)心任何試圖破壞和解的行動(dòng)都會(huì)損害品牌。巴菲特給克拉克寫了一封信,贊揚(yáng)了管理層,并懇求他們?yōu)榱寺曌u(yù)達(dá)成和解。巴菲特將這種情況比作一場(chǎng)臺(tái)風(fēng),很快就會(huì)過境。他甚至愿意自費(fèi)出庭作證,支持管理層的行為。這是巴菲特的另一個(gè)關(guān)鍵時(shí)刻,他著眼于長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn),愿意犧牲短期利潤(rùn)。巴菲特對(duì)美國(guó)運(yùn)通未來的評(píng)估是準(zhǔn)確的。近60年后,巴菲特仍持有美國(guó)運(yùn)通的股票。

巴菲特買入美國(guó)運(yùn)通股票的時(shí)間是1964年4月中旬至6月。其平均價(jià)格為41.22美元。兩年半后,美國(guó)運(yùn)通的股價(jià)漲到了92.50美元,漲幅達(dá)124%。道瓊斯指數(shù)在此期間下跌了6%。考慮到所冒的資金風(fēng)險(xiǎn),巴菲特在接近谷底時(shí)買入的能力,以及在如此短的時(shí)間內(nèi)獲得的巨大收益,可以說這是有史以來最好的投資之一,對(duì)巴菲特和他的合伙公司來說無疑是如此。

貪婪與恐懼

到1967年,美國(guó)運(yùn)通與債權(quán)人達(dá)成了6000萬美元的和解協(xié)議。稅后為3160萬美元。從丑聞爆發(fā)到和解期間的利潤(rùn)超過了這一數(shù)額。到1964年底,美國(guó)運(yùn)通已將丑聞拋之腦后。

美國(guó)運(yùn)通高管后來意識(shí)到,這起騙局是該公司歷史上最大的公關(guān)事件。媒體的報(bào)道是正面的,公眾也看到美國(guó)運(yùn)通履行了自己的義務(wù)。1964年旅行支票的銷售額增長(zhǎng)了12%。后來克拉克被問及每隔幾年就發(fā)生一次色拉油騙局是否是個(gè)好主意。他回答說:“我認(rèn)為自己沒有足夠的大好年華浪費(fèi)在另一個(gè)騙局上。”

這樁丑聞?wù)f明了為什么品格和聲譽(yù)很重要。德安吉利斯長(zhǎng)期以來肆無忌憚,從未真正改過。繳納罰款只是做生意的成本。然而,這并沒有阻止其他公司與他打交道,直到他的帝國(guó)垮臺(tái)。

為什么銀行和大宗商品出口商越來越多地貸款給德安吉利斯的企業(yè)?在他倒臺(tái)之前,多年來一直有傳言稱Allied正在進(jìn)行欺詐。部分原因是“隧道視野”。一位貸款人評(píng)論道:“我們沒有和這個(gè)叫蒂諾的人打交道,而是和美國(guó)運(yùn)通打交道。”你自己的分析是無可替代的。巴菲特在投資美國(guó)運(yùn)通之前做了大量的外出搜集情況工作。他并不是僅僅依靠直覺。

克拉克做出了一個(gè)大膽的決定,宣布運(yùn)通“在道義上有義務(wù)”承擔(dān)AEFW的責(zé)任。他認(rèn)識(shí)到了品牌聲譽(yù)的重要性。他也沒有讓一場(chǎng)能夠完美應(yīng)對(duì)的危機(jī)付之東流。克拉克和巴菲特都認(rèn)識(shí)到,長(zhǎng)期價(jià)值高于短期利潤(rùn)。

丑聞的根源是什么?激勵(lì)和動(dòng)機(jī)很重要。為了生存,AEFW需要持續(xù)盈利。這可能導(dǎo)致唐納德·米勒忽視了德安吉利斯的性格缺陷,因?yàn)樗cAllied的交易是有利可圖的。正如作者諾曼·梅勒(Norman Miller)總結(jié)的那樣:“蒂諾之所以成功是因?yàn)殂y行家、經(jīng)紀(jì)人和商界人士,盡管有明顯的跡象表明他們是在與一個(gè)騙子打交道,但他們還是無法抵擋巨額利潤(rùn)的誘惑......他們之所以相信蒂諾的交易是好的,原因可以用一個(gè)詞來概括——貪婪。”

那些銀行家、經(jīng)紀(jì)人和商界人士都很貪婪,直到他們擔(dān)心自己會(huì)失去一切。巴菲特顛覆了這一前提,他宣布了自己著名的投資目標(biāo):“就是當(dāng)別人貪婪的時(shí)候我們感到恐懼,別人恐懼的時(shí)候我們會(huì)變得貪婪。”當(dāng)人人都想投資股票時(shí),股票可能會(huì)被高估;當(dāng)無人問津時(shí),股票可能被低估。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))

斯蒂芬·R·福斯特,作家兼加拿大安大略省倫敦市韋仕敦大學(xué)毅偉商學(xué)院(Ivey Business School at Western University in London)金融學(xué)教授。他擁有賓夕法尼亞大學(xué)沃頓商學(xué)院(Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania)博士學(xué)位和特許金融分析師稱號(hào)。

經(jīng)出版商威利許可,改編自斯蒂芬·R·福斯特的《開拓者、英雄和騙子:讓你成為更睿智的投資者的故事》。版權(quán)所有?2024斯蒂芬·R·福斯特。保留所有權(quán)利。

譯者:中慧言-王芳

以下改編內(nèi)容節(jié)選自斯蒂芬·R·福斯特(Stephen R. Foerster)的著作《開拓者、英雄和騙子:讓你成為更睿智的投資者的故事》(Trailblazers, Heroes, and Crooks: Stories to Make You a Smarter Investor》(約翰威立國(guó)際出版集團(tuán)(Wiley)2024年出版)。

這個(gè)故事匯集了舉報(bào)者、惡棍、有遠(yuǎn)見的人和沃倫·巴菲特(可以說是有史以來最偉大的投資者)。故事還涉及色拉油。

惡棍

蒂諾·德安吉利斯(Tino DeAngelis)很早就開始從事肉類行業(yè)。據(jù)稱他在二戰(zhàn)期間參與了黑市交易。他因向南斯拉夫出口不達(dá)標(biāo)烹調(diào)用油而被罰款10萬美元。在收購了一家公共肉類加工廠后,他又因產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量問題被要求支付10萬美元的賠償金。隨后,他的另一家公司被指控向德國(guó)出口劣質(zhì)豬油,結(jié)果“照例”要賠償10萬美元。德安吉利斯后來創(chuàng)立了Allied Crude Vegetable Oil Refining Corporation(Allied)。關(guān)于他欺詐和與黑社會(huì)有染的指控接踵而至。

有遠(yuǎn)見的人

美國(guó)運(yùn)通公司在旅游和金融服務(wù)領(lǐng)域占據(jù)主導(dǎo)地位。1960年,霍華德·克拉克(Howard Clark)成為首席執(zhí)行官。他的首要任務(wù)是解決虧損的美國(guó)運(yùn)通信用卡的盈利問題。隨后,他專注于美國(guó)運(yùn)通的四家利潤(rùn)微薄的子公司。其中一個(gè)是獨(dú)立運(yùn)營(yíng)的American Express Field Warehousing Company(AEFW)。在過去的19年里,該公司只有10年盈利,累計(jì)虧損。在20世紀(jì)50年代末,AEFW擁有500個(gè)客戶賬戶,但所有利潤(rùn)都來自兩家公司,它們的所有者都是同一個(gè)人:德安吉利斯。其中一家公司是Allied。

先知的誕生

1956年,時(shí)年25歲的沃倫·巴菲特創(chuàng)辦了他的第一家投資合伙公司。1962年,他解散了所有合伙企業(yè),共計(jì)11家,將其合并為巴菲特合伙有限公司(Buffett Partnership Ltd., BPL),凈資產(chǎn)為720萬美元。當(dāng)時(shí)巴菲特已經(jīng)是百萬富翁了。巴菲特合伙有限公司業(yè)績(jī)強(qiáng)勁。巴菲特延續(xù)了本杰明·格雷厄姆(Benjamin Graham)的價(jià)值投資風(fēng)格。巴菲特認(rèn)為股票投資類似于擁有一家企業(yè),但前提是價(jià)格合理。巴菲特1964年對(duì)美國(guó)運(yùn)通的投資開啟了與眾不同的投資方式。

在收購美國(guó)運(yùn)通之前,巴菲特曾爭(zhēng)取獲得董事會(huì)席位或控制權(quán),就像他對(duì)登普斯特爾機(jī)械制造廠(Dempster Mill Manufacturing Company)的投資一樣。巴菲特敦促管理層增加利潤(rùn),但未能如愿。因此,他任命了一位新管理者來扭轉(zhuǎn)局面,但這讓巴菲特聲譽(yù)受損。新管理團(tuán)隊(duì)解雇了鎮(zhèn)上唯一一家工廠的100名工人。巴菲特在當(dāng)?shù)貓?bào)紙上受到詆毀。從美國(guó)運(yùn)通開始,巴菲特的方法是首先發(fā)現(xiàn)那些價(jià)值被低估的公司,這些公司本質(zhì)上是實(shí)力雄厚企業(yè),擁有能干的管理者,然后讓他們各司其職。

聲音

1960年6月,AEFW的首席執(zhí)行官唐納德·米勒(Donald Miller)接到了一個(gè)自稱“聲音”的線人打來的電話。他聲稱在新澤西州貝永的Allied上夜班。他警告米勒:“有史以來最大的騙局正在美國(guó)運(yùn)通上演,因?yàn)閷?shí)際上油罐里裝的是水,而我們卻把它算作豆油。每當(dāng)去油罐盤點(diǎn)時(shí),我們都會(huì)把砝碼扔進(jìn)這個(gè)裝滿大豆油的金屬艙,但油罐連接的天平卻溢出了水。”

米勒下令對(duì)Allied進(jìn)行突擊檢查。檢查人員發(fā)現(xiàn),除了測(cè)量艙口外,所有油罐的開口都被焊死了。隨后,他們?cè)谀軌驒z查的五個(gè)油罐中發(fā)現(xiàn)了水。然而,當(dāng)他們?cè)谥苣┖蠓祷貢r(shí),其他油罐并沒有任何可疑之處。后來的一份報(bào)告將進(jìn)水歸因于“蒸汽管道破裂”。Allied和AEFW之間的業(yè)務(wù)照常進(jìn)行。

調(diào)查人員不知道的是,德安吉利斯精心設(shè)計(jì)了一個(gè)管道網(wǎng)絡(luò),其中有虛假的隔室和特殊的采樣管,其中含有真正的豆油。三年后,當(dāng)欺詐行為最終被發(fā)現(xiàn)時(shí),當(dāng)一個(gè)油罐的水龍頭終于被打開時(shí),流出的不是價(jià)值400萬美元的大豆油,而是海水,整整持續(xù)了12天。

騙局和垮臺(tái)

1961年,Allied開始在豆油期貨市場(chǎng)大舉買入。到1963年,德安吉利斯一直在推高豆油期貨價(jià)格,原因是他預(yù)計(jì)外國(guó)會(huì)有大量需求。有傳言稱,俄羅斯的農(nóng)作物歉收,俄羅斯將很快購買美國(guó)的植物油。事實(shí)上,外國(guó)農(nóng)作物大豐收,因此高昂的期貨價(jià)格難以為繼。

隨著油價(jià)的每一次下跌,Allied都需要在保證金賬戶中提供更多資金。到1963年11月,交易所和政府大宗商品機(jī)構(gòu)終于意識(shí)到,Allied正在抬高期貨價(jià)格。當(dāng)一名商品交易所調(diào)查員要求查看Allied的記錄時(shí),事情敗露了。Allied申請(qǐng)破產(chǎn),期貨價(jià)格暴跌。AEFW倉庫收據(jù)上的植物油總量是全美植物油總量的兩倍

品牌

美國(guó)運(yùn)通是一家股份公司,是美國(guó)最后一家擁有無限責(zé)任的大型上市公司。到1963年,美國(guó)運(yùn)通正在考慮合并,成為一家有限責(zé)任公司,就像幾乎所有其他上市公司一樣。

在Allied破產(chǎn)后不久,AEFW遭到的索賠超過了1.5億美元,接近美國(guó)運(yùn)通公司1.62億美元的年終股票價(jià)值。由于AEFW是一家獨(dú)立運(yùn)營(yíng)的子公司,美國(guó)運(yùn)通可能無需對(duì)其債務(wù)負(fù)責(zé)。但有一些法律規(guī)則可能會(huì)推翻這種分離。這給美國(guó)運(yùn)通的潛在責(zé)任帶來了不確定性。

無論如何,克拉克都在考慮美國(guó)運(yùn)通是否應(yīng)該賠償AEFW的損失。他從不同的角度考慮重要的利益相關(guān)者。如果美國(guó)運(yùn)通拒絕承擔(dān)AEFW的責(zé)任,銀行將蒙受損失。鑒于銀行在美國(guó)運(yùn)通的旅行支票業(yè)務(wù)中發(fā)揮著巨大作用,這可能會(huì)扼殺銀行給美國(guó)運(yùn)通帶來的所有業(yè)務(wù)。

相反,讓銀行家滿意可能會(huì)讓股東感到沮喪。克拉克還必須考慮騙局對(duì)客戶的影響。他們會(huì)停止使用美國(guó)運(yùn)通的產(chǎn)品嗎?經(jīng)董事會(huì)同意,1963年11月27日,克拉克公開宣布:“如果我們的子公司需要對(duì)超出其保險(xiǎn)范圍和其他資產(chǎn)的金額承擔(dān)責(zé)任,美國(guó)運(yùn)通認(rèn)為在道義上有義務(wù)盡其所能,與其總體責(zé)任相一致,確保這些超額債務(wù)得到清償。”

沃倫·巴菲特投資

1963年11月20日,這場(chǎng)騙局開始見諸報(bào)端,但幾乎沒報(bào)道什么細(xì)節(jié)。兩天后,約翰·肯尼迪(John F. Kennedy)總統(tǒng)被暗殺。在紐約證券交易所緊急關(guān)閉前的半小時(shí)內(nèi),股東價(jià)值蒸發(fā)了110億美元。肯尼迪的離世使“色拉油大騙局”退居次要地位。巴菲特對(duì)購買該公司廉價(jià)股票的可能性很感興趣,于是跟蹤了美國(guó)運(yùn)通的股價(jià)。即使在市場(chǎng)重新開盤后,該股也沒有反彈,而是繼續(xù)下跌。根據(jù)市場(chǎng)的反應(yīng),美國(guó)運(yùn)通的生存前景堪憂。從11月20日到12月2日,其股價(jià)從61.81美元跌至40美元,并在1964年6月2日跌至35.31美元的谷底,在丑聞爆發(fā)后不到8個(gè)月的時(shí)間里下跌了43%。

巴菲特想知道這樁丑聞會(huì)對(duì)美國(guó)運(yùn)通的聲譽(yù)造成什么影響。對(duì)于旅行支票和信用卡而言,信任至關(guān)重要。巴菲特需要事實(shí)依據(jù)。因此,他和一位熟人走訪了接受美國(guó)運(yùn)通卡和支票的餐館和其他場(chǎng)所。他們與銀行出納員、銀行職員、信用卡用戶、酒店員工和餐館工作人員進(jìn)行了交談,以了解使用率是否有所下降。根據(jù)這項(xiàng)研究,巴菲特得出的結(jié)論是,雖然華爾街通過打壓美國(guó)運(yùn)通的股價(jià)來懲罰該公司,但美國(guó)運(yùn)通在典型的美國(guó)中產(chǎn)階級(jí)中的聲譽(yù)并沒有受到損害。

到1964年初,巴菲特合伙有限公司從利潤(rùn)和新資金中獲得了充足的現(xiàn)金,資本達(dá)到1750萬美元。在一只股票上冒險(xiǎn)投入巨額資金,既需要堅(jiān)定的信念,也需要鋼鐵般的意志。但巴菲特就是這么做的。到1964年6月,他在巴菲特合伙有限公司持有的最大一只股票美國(guó)運(yùn)通上投資了300萬美元,持股比例為17%。

股東對(duì)股東

在與債權(quán)人達(dá)成最終解決方案之前,一些股東對(duì)該公司采取了行動(dòng),認(rèn)為美國(guó)運(yùn)通沒有法律義務(wù)解決AEFW的債務(wù)問題。他們認(rèn)為,任何和解都將損害美國(guó)運(yùn)通的股東價(jià)值。他們尤其擔(dān)心德安吉利斯許多偽造的倉庫收據(jù)的持有者會(huì)得到賠償。

巴菲特認(rèn)為管理層的做法是正確的,并擔(dān)心任何試圖破壞和解的行動(dòng)都會(huì)損害品牌。巴菲特給克拉克寫了一封信,贊揚(yáng)了管理層,并懇求他們?yōu)榱寺曌u(yù)達(dá)成和解。巴菲特將這種情況比作一場(chǎng)臺(tái)風(fēng),很快就會(huì)過境。他甚至愿意自費(fèi)出庭作證,支持管理層的行為。這是巴菲特的另一個(gè)關(guān)鍵時(shí)刻,他著眼于長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn),愿意犧牲短期利潤(rùn)。巴菲特對(duì)美國(guó)運(yùn)通未來的評(píng)估是準(zhǔn)確的。近60年后,巴菲特仍持有美國(guó)運(yùn)通的股票。

巴菲特買入美國(guó)運(yùn)通股票的時(shí)間是1964年4月中旬至6月。其平均價(jià)格為41.22美元。兩年半后,美國(guó)運(yùn)通的股價(jià)漲到了92.50美元,漲幅達(dá)124%。道瓊斯指數(shù)在此期間下跌了6%。考慮到所冒的資金風(fēng)險(xiǎn),巴菲特在接近谷底時(shí)買入的能力,以及在如此短的時(shí)間內(nèi)獲得的巨大收益,可以說這是有史以來最好的投資之一,對(duì)巴菲特和他的合伙公司來說無疑是如此。

貪婪與恐懼

到1967年,美國(guó)運(yùn)通與債權(quán)人達(dá)成了6000萬美元的和解協(xié)議。稅后為3160萬美元。從丑聞爆發(fā)到和解期間的利潤(rùn)超過了這一數(shù)額。到1964年底,美國(guó)運(yùn)通已將丑聞拋之腦后。

美國(guó)運(yùn)通高管后來意識(shí)到,這起騙局是該公司歷史上最大的公關(guān)事件。媒體的報(bào)道是正面的,公眾也看到美國(guó)運(yùn)通履行了自己的義務(wù)。1964年旅行支票的銷售額增長(zhǎng)了12%。后來克拉克被問及每隔幾年就發(fā)生一次色拉油騙局是否是個(gè)好主意。他回答說:“我認(rèn)為自己沒有足夠的大好年華浪費(fèi)在另一個(gè)騙局上。”

這樁丑聞?wù)f明了為什么品格和聲譽(yù)很重要。德安吉利斯長(zhǎng)期以來肆無忌憚,從未真正改過。繳納罰款只是做生意的成本。然而,這并沒有阻止其他公司與他打交道,直到他的帝國(guó)垮臺(tái)。

為什么銀行和大宗商品出口商越來越多地貸款給德安吉利斯的企業(yè)?在他倒臺(tái)之前,多年來一直有傳言稱Allied正在進(jìn)行欺詐。部分原因是“隧道視野”。一位貸款人評(píng)論道:“我們沒有和這個(gè)叫蒂諾的人打交道,而是和美國(guó)運(yùn)通打交道。”你自己的分析是無可替代的。巴菲特在投資美國(guó)運(yùn)通之前做了大量的外出搜集情況工作。他并不是僅僅依靠直覺。

克拉克做出了一個(gè)大膽的決定,宣布運(yùn)通“在道義上有義務(wù)”承擔(dān)AEFW的責(zé)任。他認(rèn)識(shí)到了品牌聲譽(yù)的重要性。他也沒有讓一場(chǎng)能夠完美應(yīng)對(duì)的危機(jī)付之東流。克拉克和巴菲特都認(rèn)識(shí)到,長(zhǎng)期價(jià)值高于短期利潤(rùn)。

丑聞的根源是什么?激勵(lì)和動(dòng)機(jī)很重要。為了生存,AEFW需要持續(xù)盈利。這可能導(dǎo)致唐納德·米勒忽視了德安吉利斯的性格缺陷,因?yàn)樗cAllied的交易是有利可圖的。正如作者諾曼·梅勒(Norman Miller)總結(jié)的那樣:“蒂諾之所以成功是因?yàn)殂y行家、經(jīng)紀(jì)人和商界人士,盡管有明顯的跡象表明他們是在與一個(gè)騙子打交道,但他們還是無法抵擋巨額利潤(rùn)的誘惑......他們之所以相信蒂諾的交易是好的,原因可以用一個(gè)詞來概括——貪婪。”

那些銀行家、經(jīng)紀(jì)人和商界人士都很貪婪,直到他們擔(dān)心自己會(huì)失去一切。巴菲特顛覆了這一前提,他宣布了自己著名的投資目標(biāo):“就是當(dāng)別人貪婪的時(shí)候我們感到恐懼,別人恐懼的時(shí)候我們會(huì)變得貪婪。”當(dāng)人人都想投資股票時(shí),股票可能會(huì)被高估;當(dāng)無人問津時(shí),股票可能被低估。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))

斯蒂芬·R·福斯特,作家兼加拿大安大略省倫敦市韋仕敦大學(xué)毅偉商學(xué)院(Ivey Business School at Western University in London)金融學(xué)教授。他擁有賓夕法尼亞大學(xué)沃頓商學(xué)院(Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania)博士學(xué)位和特許金融分析師稱號(hào)。

經(jīng)出版商威利許可,改編自斯蒂芬·R·福斯特的《開拓者、英雄和騙子:讓你成為更睿智的投資者的故事》。版權(quán)所有?2024斯蒂芬·R·福斯特。保留所有權(quán)利。

譯者:中慧言-王芳

The following is an adapted excerpt from Stephen R. Foerster’s book Trailblazers, Heroes, and Crooks: Stories to Make You a Smarter Investor (Wiley 2024).

This story brings together a tipster, a villain, a visionary, and Warrren Buffett, arguably the greatest investor of all time. And it’s mixed with salad oil.

The villain

Tino DeAngelis had an early business start in the meat industry. He was allegedly involved in black market sales during World War II. He paid $100,000 in damages for exporting substandard cooking fat to Yugoslavia. After acquiring control of a public meatpacker, he was required to pay new damages of $100,000 because of inferior products. Then another one of his companies was accused of exporting inferior lard to Germany, resulting in “the usual” $100,000 in damages. DeAngelis later created Allied Crude Vegetable Oil Refining Corporation (Allied). Allegations of fraud and underworld connections followed him.

The visionary

American Express Company (Amex) was dominant in travel and financial services. In 1960, Howard Clark became chief executive. His priority was focusing on the viability of the money-losing American Express credit card. He then focused on four marginally-profitable Amex subsidiaries. One was the separately incorporated American Express Field Warehousing Company (AEFW). It had made money in only 10 of the past 19 years and had a cumulative loss. In the late 1950s, AEFW had 500 client accounts, but all the profits were from two companies, with the same owner: DeAngelis. One company was Allied.

Birth of the Oracle

In 1956, Warren Buffett, age 25, started his first investment partnership. In 1962, He dissolved all eleven partnerships and brought them into Buffett Partnership Ltd. (BPL). Net assets were $7.2 million. Buffett was already a millionaire. BPL had strong performance. Buffett inherited his value-investing style from Benjamin Graham. Buffett viewed stock investing akin to owning a business, but only at a reasonable price. Buffett’s 1964 investment in Amex would begin a different investing approach.

Prior to Buffett’s Amex acquisition, he pushed for board representation or control, like with his Dempster Mill Manufacturing Company investment. Buffett pushed management to increase profits but was unsuccessful. So, he installed a new manager who turned things around, but at a reputational cost to Buffett. The new management team laid off one hundred workers from the only town factory. Buffett was vilified in the local newspaper. Starting with Amex, Buffett’s approach was to first uncover undervalued firms that were fundamentally good businesses with capable managers, then let them do their jobs.

The voice

In June 1960, Donald Miller, chief executive of AEFW, received a phone call from a tipster, “the Voice.” He claimed to work the night shift at Allied in Bayonne, New Jersey. He warned Miller, “The biggest hoax ever pulled is being pulled on American Express because there is in fact water in the tanks, and we are counting it as oil. Whenever we went to take inventory at the tank, we would be dropping the weight into this metal chamber, which was filled with soybean oil, but the balance of the tank had water in it.”

Miller ordered a surprise inspection at Allied. Inspectors found all the tank openings were welded shut except for the measuring hatch. They then found water in the five tanks they were able to check. However, when they returned after the weekend, there was nothing suspicious in the other tanks. A report later attributed water to “broken steam pipes.” Business between Allied and AEFW continued as usual.

Unbeknownst to investigators, DeAngelis had created an elaborate network of pipes with false compartments and special sampling tubes that held actual oil. Three years later, when the fraud was finally detected, when the tap on one tank was finally opened, instead of $4 million of soybean oil, seawater poured out for 12 days.

Scams and the downfall

In 1961, Allied started buying heavily in the oil futures market. By 1963, DeAngelis was pushing up the prices of oil futures in anticipation of heavy demand by foreign countries. Rumors swirled that Russia’s crops had failed, and Russia would soon be buying U.S. vegetable oil. Actually, there were bumper foreign crops, so high futures prices weren’t sustainable.

With each subsequent oil price decline, Allied needed to provide more money in margin accounts. By November 1963, the exchanges and government commodities agencies finally realized that Allied was driving up futures prices. When a commodities exchange investigator demanded to see Allied’s records, the gig was up. Allied filed for bankruptcy. Futures prices plummeted. AEFW’s warehouse receipts had totaled twice as much vegetable oil as all the oil in the U.S.

The brand

Amex was a joint stock company, the last large U.S. public company with unlimited liability. By 1963, Amex was considering incorporating, becoming a limited liability company like almost all other public companies.

Soon after Allied went bankrupt, claims against AEFW were more than $150 million, close to the year-end value of Amex’s stock of $162 million. Since AEFW was a separately incorporated subsidiary, Amex probably wasn’t responsible for its liabilities. But there were legal rules that might have overridden the separation. This created uncertainty about Amex’s potential liability.

Regardless, Clark pondered whether Amex should compensate losses at AEFW. He considered important stakeholders with different perspectives. If Amex denied liability for AEFW, banks would suffer losses. Given the huge role banks played in Amex’s travelers cheques business, that might kill all the business banks brought to Amex.

Conversely, satisfying bankers might upset shareholders. Clark also had to consider how the swindle would affect customers. Would they stop using Amex products? With permission of the board, on November 27, 1963, Clark publicly announced: “If our subsidiary should be liable for amounts in excess of its insurance coverage and other assets, American Express Company feels morally bound to do everything it can, consistent with its overall responsibilities, to see that such excess liabilities are satisfied.”

Warren Buffett invests

The swindle started featuring in the press on November 20, 1963, with few details. Two days later, President John F. Kennedy was assassinated. $11 billion in shareholder value was destroyed in the half hour before an emergency closure of the NYSE. Kennedy’s death relegated the Great Salad Oil Swindle to the back pages. Intrigued by the possibility of buying the stock cheaply, Buffett tracked Amex’s stock price. Even after markets reopened, the stock never recovered and continued to drop. Based on the market’s reaction, the survival of Amex was in doubt. Between November 20 to December 2, its price dropped from $61.81 to $40.00 and would bottom on June 2, 1964, at $35.31, a drop of 43 percent in less than eight months since the scandal broke.

Buffett wondered what impact the scandal would have on Amex’s reputation. With travelers cheques and credit cards, trust mattered. Buffett needed facts. So he and an acquaintance visited restaurants and other places that accepted Amex cards and cheques. They talked to bank tellers, bank officers, credit-card users, hotels employees, and restaurants workers to get a feel for whether usage had fallen off. Based on that research, Buffett concluded that while Wall Street had punished Amex by battering the stock price, Amex’s reputation hadn’t been tarnished on Main Street.

By early 1964, BPL was flush with cash from both profits and new money, with capital of $17.5 million. It takes both strong conviction and nerves of steel for to risk huge amounts of capital on one stock. But that’s what Buffett did. By June 1964, he had invested $3 million in Amex, BPL’s largest single holding, at 17 percent.

Shareholder versus shareholders

Before an eventual resolution with creditors, some shareholders took action against the firm, arguing Amex had no legal obligation to settle liabilities of AEFW. They felt any settlement would hurt Amex’s shareholder value. They were particularly concerned that holders of many forged warehouse receipts that DeAngelis invented would be compensated.

Buffett felt management was doing the right thing and was concerned that trying to derail any settlement would damage the brand. Buffett sent a letter to Clark, praising management, and imploring them to settle for the sake of reputation. Buffett likened the situation to a typhoon that would soon pass. He even offered to testify, at his own expense, supporting management’s actions. This was another pivotal moment for Buffett, taking a long-term perspective, willing to sacrifice short-term profitability. Buffett’s assessment of Amex’s future was accurate. Almost six decades later, Buffett still owned Amex stock.

The period when Buffett was buying Amex’s stock was mid-April to June 1964. Its average price was $41.22. Two-and-a-half years later, Amex’s stock was $92.50, a gain of 124 percent. The Dow lost 6 percent over that period. Given the amount of capital risked, Buffett’s ability to buy near the bottom, and the huge gains in such a brief period, arguably this was one of the best investments ever, certainly for Buffett and his partnership.

Greed and fear

By 1967, Amex negotiated a $60 million settlement with creditors. After-tax, that was $31.6 million. Profits between the time the scandal broke and the settlement exceeded that amount. Amex was able to put the scandal behind it by late 1964.

Amex executives later realized the swindle was the greatest public-relations event in its history. Press coverage was favorable, and the public saw that Amex stood behind its obligations. In 1964 travelers cheques sales increased by 12 percent. Later Clark was asked if a salad oil swindle every few years might be a clever idea. He replied: “I don’t think I have enough good years of my life to give away for another swindle.”

The scandal showed why character and reputation matter. DeAngelis had a long record of unscrupulous behavior and never really changed. Paying fines was just a cost of doing business. Yet it didn’t deter other companies from dealing with him, until his empire came crashing down.

Why did banks and commodity exporters increasingly lend to DeAngelis’s businesses? Before his downfall, rumors had swirled for years that a swindle was happening at Allied. Partly, it was tunnel vision. One lender commented, “We didn’t deal with this Tino character. We dealt with American Express.” There’s no substitute for your own analysis. Buffett did a lot of legwork before investing in Amex. He didn’t simply rely on a hunch.

Clark made a bold decision by pronouncing that Amex was “morally bound” to cover AEFW’s liability. He recognized the importance of a brand’s reputation. He also didn’t let a good crisis go to waste. Both Clark and Buffett recognized that long-term value trumped short-term profit.

What was the root cause of the scandal? Incentives and motives matter. To survive, AEFW needed to show consistent profits. This may have caused Donald Miller to overlook DeAngelis’s character flaws, since his dealings with Allied were profitable. As author Norman Miller concluded, “Tino succeeded because bankers, brokers and business[people], despite the glaring indications that they were dealing with a crook, could not resist the bait of big profits…The reason they were convinced that Tino’s deals were good can be stated in one word—greed.”

Those bankers, brokers, and businesspeople were all greedy until they feared they would lose it all. Buffett turned that premise on its head when he famously proclaimed his investing goal: “We simply attempt to be fearful when others are greedy and to be greedy only when others are fearful.” Stocks may become overvalued when everyone wants to invest in them, and undervalued when no one wants them.

Stephen R. Foerster is an author and finance professor at the Ivey Business School at Western University in London, Ontario, Canada. He has a PhD from the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania and a Chartered Financial Analyst designation.

Adapted with permission from the publisher, Wiley, from Trailblazers, Heroes, and Crooks: Stories to Make You a Smarter Investor by Stephen R. Foerster. Copyright ? 2024 by Stephen R. Foerster. All rights reserved.

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