????對于奧特里尼來說，努力發展無線業務不僅僅是為了使收入多樣化，也不僅僅是為了要讓公司進入一個正在成長的市場（當然這也是其中的一部分原因），而是為了救贖。2005年成為CEO后，奧特里尼一直固執地堅持英特爾可以基于公司歷史上著名的x86架構開發自己的芯片，而不是像大多數競爭對手一樣使用英國ARM公司授權的芯片技術。但直到現在，他的賭注還沒有見到成效。英特爾曾宣稱它的Moorestown芯片將在2011年初植入智能手機，但現在這種芯片主要只是用于機器人技術和上網本。

????諷刺的是，英特爾以前也曾為早期的智能手機和Palm Treo等PDA設備生產ARM處理器。但2006年，奧特里尼卻把整條移動產品生產線（稱做Xscale）以6億美元的價格賣給了邁威科技（Marvell Technology Group），從事實上切斷了英特爾進軍移動設備領域的通道。英特爾在移動領域的失策之舉還不止這一件。2010年，奧特里尼決定與諾基亞（Nokia）合作，開發基于Linux的MeeGo操作系統。不過一年后，諾基亞就拋棄了這個項目，轉而選擇了微軟（Microsoft）的Windows Phone。而英特爾也改弦更張，在九月份選擇了一個新的合作伙伴——谷歌（Google）。英特爾的軟件開發者們付出了大量努力，以確保谷歌的安卓（Android）系統可以在英特爾芯片上完美運行。

????與世界上增長最快的手機操作系統合作，這的確是奧特里尼一個明智之舉（奧特里尼從2004年起就是谷歌董事會的成員），但英特爾的欠帳顯然還有很多。高宏樂通集團（Cowen Group）分析師拉杰?希思指出：“英特爾讓人感覺他們承諾的太多，做到的太少。”

????與此同時，行業內的其他公司也在不斷進步。目前，市場上90%的智能手機使用的是依托于ARM架構的微處理器。其中高通公司（Qualcomm）獨自攬下了51%的市場份額。

????奧特里尼堅稱，MeeGo系統的失敗只讓英特爾耽誤了兩個月的時間而已，而在芯片生產技術方面，英特爾要領先競爭對手大概三年。

????英特爾的9個半導體工廠加在一起，每秒鐘可生產100億個晶體管。英特爾最新、最大的加工工廠名叫D1X，座落于俄勒岡州的希斯波洛，位于波特蘭以西約20英里處。D1X也是俄勒岡州有史以來最大的建設項目之一。這座先進的工廠將于明年開工，屆時它也將成為全球第一家生產14納米芯片的工廠。該廠投資將達到50億美元以上。

????根據摩爾定理，一個芯片的晶體管數量大約每24個月就會翻一番。這說明芯片生產是一項耗資巨大的業務，需要英特爾不斷投資新的生產技術，建設新的生產設施。但是除了PC領域之外，英特爾的生產技術優勢能幫上它多少忙，現在還不清楚。比如，說起先進程度，那些生產ARM處理器的廠商所使用的生產技術并不如英特爾Medfield芯片的生產技術，但這并不妨礙他們從英特爾的碗里搶飯吃。投資銀行Piper Jaffray的分析師古斯?理查德指出：“英特爾試圖把過去在PC領域給它帶來過成功的那套工具原封不動地搬到移動業務上，但是這并不起作用。”

????For Otellini, getting it right in wireless isn't just about diversifying revenue or driving the company into growing markets (though that's part of it). Otellini's mobile gambit is about redemption. Since becoming CEO in 2005, Otellini has stubbornly insisted that Intel could develop its own chips based on x86, the company's historic microprocessor design standard, instead of licensing technology from the British company ARM Holdings, as most of his competitors have. So far his bet hasn't paid off. The company proclaimed that its Moorestown system-on-a-chip would be in smartphones in early 2011, but instead it is mostly used in robotics and netbooks.

????Ironically, Intel used to manufacture ARM processors for early smartphones and PDAs like the Palm Treo. But in 2006, Otellini sold its entire mobile product line, called XScale, to Marvell Technology Group for $600 million, essentially cutting off its access to mobile devices. And that wasn't Intel's only questionable move in mobile. In 2010, Otellini decided to partner with Nokia to develop MeeGo, a Linux-based operating system. A year later Nokia (NOK) ditched the project and opted to adopt Microsoft's (MSFT) Windows Phone instead. Intel changed course and in September picked a new partner: Google (GOOG). Intel software developers worked to make sure that Android could run on the company's chips without a glitch.

????Pairing up with the world's fastest-growing operating system is a smart move for Otellini (who has been on Google's board since 2004). But there's little question Intel has a lot of catching up to do. "The perception is that they've overpromised and underdelivered," says Raj Seth, an analyst with Cowen Group.

????Meanwhile the rest of the industry has moved ahead. Processors designed using ARM Holdings' technology now power 90% of smartphones. Qualcomm (QCOM) leads the pack with 51% market share (see chart below).

????Otellini insists the MeeGo debacle put Intel behind schedule by just two months. And when it comes to chip-manufacturing technology, he contends that Intel is about three years ahead of the competition.

????Intel's nine semiconductor factories churn out a collective 10 billion transistors per second. Its latest and greatest fabrication plant, called D1X, is in Hillsboro, Ore., about 20 miles west of Portland. D1X is one of the biggest construction projects in Oregon's history. When the state-of-the-art facility opens next year, it will be the first 14-nanometer factory in the world. And it will have cost Intel upwards of $5 billion.

????Keeping up with Moore's law, which states that the number of transistors incorporated in a chip will approximately double every 24 months, is an expensive business that requires Intel to constantly invest in new manufacturing technologies and build new plants. But beyond the PC, it's not clear how much that manufacturing lead is helping. The biggest facilities making ARM-designed processors today are based on a less advanced process than the one Intel uses to make its Medfield chip, for example, yet that hasn't stopped the competition from eating Intel's lunch. "Intel has tried to bring the same tools that have made it successful in the past to mobile, and it's not working," says Piper Jaffray analyst Gus Richard.