????從建立之初，谷歌就決定不只做搜索業務。谷歌的業務結構有不少可取之處，其中最了不起的一個是其分散化管理：經過深思熟慮，谷歌決定放棄協同作業，放權給各產品小組，使其擁有充分的思考和行動的自由；正是本著這種管理理念，無論在產品變化還是產品創新上它都取得了巨大的成功。在谷歌，不僅各產品小組定位清晰，而且公司重視并鼓勵新穎獨特的思維方式，并因此開發出了Gmail、谷歌應用（Google Apps）、和谷歌地圖（Google Maps）等杰出的產品。即使用戶開始并不認同各大公司鼓吹的協同作業的價值，他們卻由衷地喜愛這些谷歌產品。

????但是，谷歌高層卻日漸無法抵御強烈的誘惑，而將產新品開發納入龐大的“協同”共同體中。按理說，將新產品集成到現有產品中，可以充分利用現成的用戶群和產品現有營銷計劃，對新產品來說這些優勢不言而喻，更不用說，這么做還相應增強了“戰略”和“平臺”價值，實際上就意味著鎖定了客戶。

????我理解這種做法的魅力所在，而且原則上說也合情合理。但是，谷歌改變管理模式的趨勢令人擔憂，原因在于此舉犧牲的恰是谷歌最了不起的精髓所在：專注于以盡可能簡單的產品滿足用戶需求。事實上，越來越多的谷歌產品正以附加功能包的形式，被整合到大型產品中。

????這種做法的弊端在于：新產品從一開始就始終生存在核心產品的影響之下，有時這種影響并不恰當；有些新產品原本可以成為絕佳的的獨立產品，最終卻在集成模式下卻被淹沒了。因此，在如今的谷歌，原本杰出的思想最終產生結果往往只能算的上差強人意。如果延續這種削弱新產品的做法，谷歌的創新將難以為繼，谷歌在新興的社交網絡領域取得成功的難度也將日益增大。

????這方面的一個經典案例是Google Buzz：它從誕生之初就沒有滿足互聯網用戶的實際需求。MG? 西格勒在科技博客TechCrunch上撰文稱：“Google Buzz跟Gmail同根生，恰是這種方式令人感到不舒服。”我母親教導我，對于擁有高級學位的人要有崇敬之心，因此，眼見得無數谷歌博士們將Buzz集成到Gmail中而錯失良機，我只有目瞪口呆的份兒了。谷歌忘了多數在線的的人其實根本不會保持Gmail的登錄狀態，這雖然聽起來有些遺憾，但卻完全屬實。既然多數人并不時時在線，那Buzz的價值也隨之一落千丈。因此，它非但沒有成為了不起的、定位明確的社交產品，反而成為附加在Gmail上的一個目的不明且頗具爭議的特性而已。

????隨著谷歌正式推出Google+項目，這類產品集成、協同、以及既有用戶群優勢等問題會比以往任何時候都更為突出。

????僅僅依托谷歌搜索產品，Google+無法取得成功。無論它能引得多少用戶趨之若鶩，到頭來仍會像Buzz和SearchWikis等谷歌搜索的其它特性一樣胎死腹中。谷歌首款新社交產品發布僅一個月，據報道就已經有2,000多萬注冊用戶，因而很容易被認為已經是個成功的開始。但是，幾乎所有用戶之所以選擇使用該產品，原因都在于他們本身已經是谷歌的用戶，而不是因為借助Google+，他們可以利用朋友網絡中的內容改變自己的生活。

????盡管發揮現有業務和搜索用戶群的優勢看似明智，但這種優勢轉移戰略帶來的結果將極為有限。為了爭奪迅猛增長的消費者在線注意力，眼下一場社交網絡戰爭正在如火如荼地展開。企圖將用戶的搜索體驗延伸到社交領域的做法既不會有助于在Facebook即將發起的反擊中捍衛谷歌已經取得的地位，亦不會為谷歌捕獲各種新機會。因此，“發揮并增強核心產品優勢”的戰略雖然執行起來很容易，而且初期效果顯著，但著實短視。

????谷歌的這種模式并不新鮮，過去10年中，我在家鄉西雅圖，還曾在微軟（Microsoft）王國中親身體驗過。雖然我在微軟的朋友們供職于不同的部門，但他們知道自己每周都能按時領取薪水，而這均得益于Windows和Office產品的巨大銷量。無論他們開發的是什么產品，無論是機頂盒還是手機操作系統，所有目標都必須讓位于刺激Windows和Office銷量這一需求。在微軟的各類會議上，10幾名與會者的唯一目標就是將自己的產品最大程度地成到Windows 和Office中。如今這已經是無人不曉的事實。Office Web Apps和Windows Live SkyDrive等杰出的產品非但沒能獨立銷售，反而注定要成為那些賺錢的核心品牌的影子，也就是馬特?羅索夫最近所言的“戰略稅收”的犧牲品。

????隨著谷歌日漸成熟壯大，它是否愈來愈像微軟了？頗具諷刺意味的是，正是由于微軟彼時專注于協同，從而給谷歌和蘋果（Apple）等后來者留下了巨大的可乘之機，并進而獨占了應用、音樂和設備等領域。微軟這一失敗綜合癥尤其令人不解，因為很明顯，它當時擁有足夠的人才和經驗，能更快更好地在這些領域有所建樹，除非如果甘愿脫離于時代。

????如果谷歌不重新解放自己，與外部現實世界展開競爭，很快它便會發現，自己已心甘情愿地成了微軟綜合癥的犧牲品。很長時間內，其業務可能依然龐大無比，但是從戰略上看，卻沒有出路可言；另一方面，它也可能發現自己正與下一波互聯網洪流——社交——失之交臂。

????谷歌需要做的是絕不僅僅是提供一套搜索引擎的附屬產品，相反，現在它恰恰需要發揮寬廣、深遠、且分散的創新性，利用新興的社交網絡來滿足人們的潛在需求。谷歌需要確保，與之前的谷歌應用、谷歌搜索、Gmail、以及谷歌地圖一樣，Google+項目也是個完整的、獨立的產品，有能力在開放的網絡上與其他產品展開競爭，并開創出一片新天地。Facebook在社交領域占有絕對優勢，這點固然不假，但只要谷歌迅速采取行動，避免重蹈微軟覆轍，它在這一領域仍然有機會。

????艾羅維茲是媒體公司Wetpaint的聯合創始人兼首席執行官。

????譯者：大海

????From early on, Google seemed determined to be more than a search company. And one of the most admirable traits of Google's structure has been its decentralization: The company's deliberate decision to forego synergies to give product groups the freedom of independent thought and action has created tremendous product variation and innovation. Distinct product groups and a culture that prized fresh original thinking created great products like Gmail, Google Apps, and Google Maps; and all of these products delighted users even as they initially passed up the value of synergies that big companies often tout.

????And yet, it seems that those at the Googleplex are increasingly giving in to the temptation to integrate new product development into a "synergistic," if monstrous, whole. Integrating new products into existing ones, the story goes, should give a new product a boost with a built-in user base and in-product feature merchandising, not to mention enhanced "strategic" and "platform" value, which basically translates to customer lock-in.

????I understand the attraction of this. And it makes sense in principle. But the trend is concerning, because it sacrifices the essence of Google's (GOOG) greatness: its focus on the simplest possible product to meet user needs. Instead, products are increasingly being morphed into tack-on feature sets of bigger products.

????But the downside here is that the influence of the core product consistently invades – even where it shouldn't – and this overwhelms what could be a terrific new stand-alone product. As a result, great now too often becomes good at Google. And, if this new-product dilution and diminution continues, it will be increasingly difficult for the company to successfully innovate and take advantage of the burgeoning social Web.

????One classic example: instead of solving a real need for all the Web's users, Google Buzz was, as MG Siegler noted at TechCrunch, "shoved in everyone's face by way of its somewhat unnatural home in Gmail." My mother has taught me to put people with advanced degrees on pedestals, so I can't help but be stunned that legions of Googly Ph.D.'s missed this by integrating Buzz into Gmail. It's pathetic, but true: Google forgot that most connected people aren't even on Gmail. And, obviously, the value of the network is far lower when most people aren't on it. So, instead of being a great social product with a clear use case, Google Buzz became a controversial feature with ambiguous purpose that was added on as an appendage to Gmail.

????With the launch of the Google+ Project, these questions of product integration, synergy, and installed-base leverage are more crucial than ever.

????Google+ will not succeed on the back of Google's search product alone. No matter how many users it may garner, it will turn out like the other stillborn features in Google's search, e.g. Buzz and SearchWikis. Already, it would be easy to consider Google's first new social product launch a success, based on the 20 million or more reported users who have signed up for it. But nearly all of those users have joined on the basis of their existing relationship with Google, rather than for the sake of any life-altering content from their friend networks.

????And, while leveraging its existing business and user base in search may sound like a smart corporate strategy, the results of such migration will be limited. The battle for the social Web is being waged for a prize of exploding consumer attention online. Adding line extensions to users' search experience will neither defend Google from Facebook's coming attack, nor offensively capture new and emerging opportunities for Google. So, the "leverage-and-enhance-the-core-product" strategy is an easy reach to execute, and offers appealing initial momentum, but it is short-sighted.

????We've all seen this pattern before; and I've lived it as part of the Microsoft (MSFT) world here in my home of Seattle for the last decade. No matter what part of the company they work in, my friends at Microsoft know their paycheck comes every week, thanks to product sales of Windows and Office. And no matter what product they work in, whether it's set-top boxes or mobile phones, their objectives are overwhelmed by the need to sell more copies of Windows and Office. Meetings at Microsoft have become famous for having a dozen-plus attendees – all in order to maximize integration with, you guessed it, Windows and Office. Rather than being marketed independently, great products like Office Web Apps and Windows Live SkyDrive seem destined to become mere shadows of their moneymaking core brands, victims of what Matt Rosoff recently referred to as the "strategy tax."

????As Google matures, is it becoming more and more like its original nemesis? Ironically, it's Microsoft's focus on synergy that has left such huge room for entrants like Google and Apple to come in and dominate sectors including apps, music and devices. Microsoft's failure syndrome was especially perplexing because it clearly had the talent and experience to build these categories better and faster – if it had been willing to obsolete itself.

????If Google doesn't give itself back the freedom to compete with the reality of the outside world, it will quickly find itself a self-imposed victim of the Microsoft Syndrome. It may ride its own large, but strategically dead-ending, business for a long time; but it could also find itself missing out on the huge next wave of the Internet -- social.

????The required response from Google is not just a set of adjunct products that build on search. Instead, this is exactly the time that Google needs broad, far-reaching, and decentralized creativity to solve real people's still-latent needs via the emerging social Web. Google needs to make sure its Google+ Project is a complete stand-alone product that – like Google Apps, Google Search, Gmail, and Google Maps before it – can compete on the open Web and break new ground. Facebook has outsize traction in the social sphere, but it's not too late for Google, as long as the company quickly takes action to avoid falling into the trap that has caught its first major rival.

????-- Elowitz is co-founder and CEO of media company Wetpaint.