????華為公司（Huawei）是世界第二大電信與互聯網設備制造商，公司在全球的業務開展得非常順利。這家中國公司的客戶遍及130個國家，全球排名前50的電信公司中，有45家采用了華為的產品。2010年，華為的年收入達到270億美元，在《財富》全球500強（Fortune's Global 500）中名列第352名。今年，華為的銷售額預計將增長10%，或許它很快就將超過瑞典的愛立信公司（Ericsson），成為全球第一大通信設備制造商。

????但在全球最大的電信市場——美國，華為卻始終未能打開局面。從十年前初次登陸美國市場，華為便屢次參與投標，卻始終未能獲得美國主要運營商的大額合約，這些運營商包括，美國電話電報公司（AT&T）、斯普林特公司（Sprint）、T-Mobile公司和威瑞森通訊公司（Verizon）。

????原因很明顯。美國的電信公司與朗訊（Lucent）（目前已被法國阿爾卡特公司（Alcatel）收購）、摩托羅拉（Motorola）和思科（Cisco）等本土公司建立了長期的合作關系。同時，華為的產品多年來確實存在一定的質量問題——雖然適合新興市場，但對于美國的網絡來說，無法滿足全天候服務與可靠性的要求。但現在，華為推出了業內最卓越、最具創新性和運行速度最快的設備。質量不再是個問題。在近期的一次會議中，尖端技術投資銀行家弗蘭克?奎特隆稱華為公司已成為行業的新晉領袖。

????但華為所面臨的阻力，并不僅僅來自同行的正當競爭。包括即將擔任美國駐華大使的美國商務部長駱家輝在內，多位美國國會議員極力游說國會抵制華為進入美國市場。同時，美國監管部門此前已經駁回了華為在美國的三次收購，并在今年早些時候，迫使華為剝離其收購的3Leaf公司資產。目前這家位于加利福尼亞州的云計算公司已經倒閉。

????美國政界和民間均強烈排斥華為，原因何在？簡而言之，就是恐懼。

????作為中國首批國際化大公司之一，華為認為自己只不過被當作發泄憤怒的出氣筒。由于美國人對中國崛起的擔憂，以及對網絡安全和竊取知識產權等問題的憂慮，華為成了名副其實的替罪羊。而隨著經濟衰退以及隨之而來的國內焦慮情緒的蔓延，美國人的擔憂日益加劇。政客們認為，愈加強硬的中國在國際社會中的地位得到了進一步提升，而華為則是中國的代言人，因此，打擊華為可以為自己輕松加分。而另外一個原因是根深蒂固的保護主義在作祟，一些公司擔心華為的進入會壓縮他們的利潤，正如華為進入歐洲市場時的情形。

????最令華為苦惱的是，美國暗示華為可能為中國政府所用，從事間諜活動。關于華為有中國軍方背景的傳言經常見諸報端。這種傳言很大程度上是因為，極少在媒體前露面的華為公司創始人兼CEO任正非先生曾是中國人民解放軍的一名通訊兵，而且華為也是中國軍方和政府的承包商（這一點與AT&T、斯普林特和威瑞森在美國的情形類似）。華盛頓特區戰略與國際研究中心（Center for Strategic and International Studies）專家詹姆斯?劉易斯表示：“這種傳言的背景是，中國在積極開展間諜活動，其實我們也是如此。”劉易斯認為，至少，華為在網絡領域還存在形象問題。他表示：“美國的國家安全部門在抵制華為的問題上態度非常一致。”

????當然，關于安全問題的擔憂并非空穴來風——凡是涉及網絡安全領域的任何人都明白，即便是華為自己也承認這一點。畢竟在黑客活動日益猖獗的網絡世界，沒有一家公司或政府部門敢于冒風險，購買不堪一擊的設備，為潛在的對手訪問其網絡大開方便之門。但是由中國公司銷售的網絡設備真的會帶來如此巨大的安全風險嗎？華為聲稱，自己與通用公司（GE）或者IBM公司一樣，只是一家普通的跨國公司而已。它的產品遭到黑客入侵的風險并不比其他私營企業的產品更高。而且它還指出，由華為的主要競爭對手——愛立信、阿爾卡特-朗訊和諾基亞西門子（Nokia Siemens）推出的大部分設備其實也都是在中國制造的。如果真的有間諜存在的話，那該拿什么來阻止他們對這些企業下手呢？

????盡管阻礙重重，但華為并未表示放棄爭取美國消費者的努力。為了與運營商建立良好的合作關系，并生產適合美國市場的產品，華為公司從思科（Cisco）、愛立信、英特爾（Intel）、北電網絡（Nortel）和Sun公司等西方公司聘請了大量高管。華為全球首席技術官馬特?布羅斯是第一位進入華為管理層的西方人，他之前曾在英國電信（British Telecom）任職。而且，為了改善公司在美國政府眼中的形象，它還雇傭了由美國前國防部長威廉?科恩領導的游說公司。今年2月份，華為還發表了一份公開信，要求包括美國政府在內的所有人對公司的商業運行進行調查。

????既然面臨重重阻撓，那么，退出美國市場，享受其在美國之外其他地區的驕人成績不是更容易嗎？或許吧。但是，美國公司每年在電信設備上的投入高達300億美元，而且，隨著整個行業網絡升級到4G技術，這一投入將大幅上升。如果華為能夠讓懷疑者改變態度，它將在美國獲得巨大的利潤。讓華為退出美國市場？絕無可能。

華為在華盛頓的代言人

????威廉?普盧默是華為公司負責美國政府關系事務的負責人，他衣冠楚楚，處事圓滑，是一位狂熱的“推銷員”。普盧默是8個孩子的父親。去年，47歲的普盧默加入華為公司，在此之前，他在諾基亞公司（Nokia）工作了12年，負責同樣的事務。現在，他有大把的機會展示自己的韌勁。依靠17張幻燈片，普盧默已經與美國政府中所有愿意傾聽華為方面信息的人員進行過接觸。而且，他還總結出一句精煉的說法：“華為就是華為，它不是中國政府。”

????今年3月，就在美國監管部門強行要求華為剝離其對3Leaf公司的收購之后不久，普盧默便拜訪了國會委員會中負責國家安全問題的幾位“冷臉”委員。在談到那次會面時，普盧默明顯非常激動。據他回憶，那些人都暗示華為需要聽從中國政府的意愿。普盧默卻告訴他們：“當然不是。”他強調華為并不是一家國有企業。“今年，通用公司還向巴基斯坦出售了150列火車頭。按照這種邏輯，如果美國與巴基斯坦開戰，是不是通用公司就會讓火車脫軌？這種邏輯非常愚蠢。跨國公司不可能拿自己的未來冒險。”

????華為從一家創業公司成長為跨國集團的速度讓人瞠目結舌。公司創始人兼CEO任正非曾在中國軍隊中服役10年，他所服役的軍隊相當于美國的陸軍工程兵團（Army Corps of Engineers）。1983年，其所在部隊解散，任正非在那次大裁軍中被迫復員。公司表示，任正非憑借2,500美元積蓄，以及從親戚那里籌來的資金，于1987年成立華為。（任正非幾乎從不接受采訪，對于本文內容也未做出任何評論。）

????華為聲稱公司沒有任何政府背景。正如普盧默經常強調的那樣，公司的總部位于深圳，毗鄰香港，遠離北京。華為在國內的收入僅占公司總收入的36%。華為方面表示，政府在公司未持有任何股權，公司為100%集體所有。任正非持有公司1.42%的股份。華為表示，公司不能進行公開招股，因為中國規定，禁止大型集體所有制企業上市。魏尚進在紐約哥倫比亞商學院（Columbia Business School）負責中國商業與經濟研究。他指出，如果進行IPO，將使公司的管理層一夜之間成為億萬富翁。但如果這樣，這些高管可能會離開公司，并帶走數十年的經驗和專業知識。

????外界通常認為華為擁有中國軍方背景。但普盧默認為，這種誤解是因為將華為與另外一家公司弄混了。他指出有另外一家名字類似的中國公司，實際上確實是由中國人民解放軍軍官領導，并在薩達姆?侯賽因統治時期，向伊拉克出售過光纖通訊設備。普盧默表示，2001年，《亞洲華爾街日報》（Wall Street Journal Asia）的一篇文章中錯誤地混淆了這兩家公司，之后該文章在被《2006年蘭德報告》（Rand Report）引用——從此之后，這種錯誤的說法便以訛傳訛地流傳開來。普盧默表示：“這里面存在混淆。華為在當時從來沒有提供過任何軍用技術。”

????美國對外關系委員會（Council on Foreign Relations）的中國問題專家，以及反恐與國家安全問題資深研究員亞當?西格爾表示，聲稱中國政府與中國的私營企業完全沒有關系，并不足以說服美國的網絡安全部門。去年，中國政府便強制要求所有政府供應商提交其加密代碼。中國政府還動不動就以進行腐敗調查為威脅，甚至對被判貪污的公司高管處以極刑，以此保持對公司的有效控制。西格爾表示：“中國的私營企業通常需要揣摩，政府下一步想要做什么。”

????為了減緩美國社會對安全問題的擔憂，華為公布了其源代碼，并允許一家名為電子沖突協會（Electronic Warfare Associates）的公司對其進行持續監控。這一舉措在印度和英國已經獲得成功。EWA公司負責基礎設施技術部的總裁兼CEO約翰?林奎斯特表示，華為公司接受了國防部和情報機構最高級別的安全調查，因此可以同步所有已知的網絡風險。華為的客戶都可以利用EWA的調查，放心購買華為的設備。但林奎斯特也承認：“沒有任何產品敢保證100%無故障。”但安全專家認為，真正的缺陷通常不會在交付時顯現，或許會在六個月之后，當需要補丁或更新時才會出現。但林奎斯特表示，持續監控的對象將包括后續補丁。他表示：“任何問題都不會逃過我們的眼睛，這一點我非常自信。”

????Huawei, the world's second-largest supplier of telecom and Internet gear, has little trouble garnering business around the globe. The Chinese company has customers in 130 countries, sells equipment to 45 of the world's top 50 telcos, and brought in $27 billion in revenue in 2010 -- enough to rank No. 352 on Fortune's Global 500 list. With sales on pace to grow another 10% this year, it's likely that Huawei (pronounced "HWAH-way") will soon race past Sweden's Ericsson and take over as the globe's No. 1 manufacturer of communications equipment.

????Yet success in the world's biggest telecom market, the U.S., has been hard to come by. Despite bidding again and again since it first entered America a decade ago, the company has yet to win a single big contract from the top-tier U.S. carriers, AT&T (T), Sprint (S), T-Mobile, and Verizon (VZ).

????There are some good reasons for that. U.S. telecom companies have long relationships with home-grown suppliers like Lucent (now part of France's Alcatel), Motorola (MMI), and Cisco (CSCO). It's also true that for many years Huawei's gear just wasn't that good -- fine for emerging markets, perhaps, but not for the 24/7 service and reliability required by U.S. networks. Today, however, Huawei is building some of the best, most innovative, and fastest equipment in the industry. Quality is no longer an issue. Uber tech investment banker Frank Quattrone recently cited Huawei as one of the industry's new leaders in remarks to a conference crowd.

????But Huawei is facing resistance that goes beyond pure competition with its peers. Several members of Congress, joined by Gary Locke, the U.S. Commerce Secretary soon headed to Beijing as the next U.S. ambassador, have lobbied hard against Huawei. Meanwhile, U.S. regulators have blocked it from three acquisitions, and earlier this year forced it to unravel its purchase of a defunct California cloud-computing company called 3Leaf.

????What's behind the groundswell of public and private opposition? In a word, fear.

????As one of the first Chinese companies to emerge as a global powerhouse, Huawei contends that it's a punching bag, a victim of worries about an ascendant China and growing concerns about cybersecurity and intellectual-property theft. This concern is deepened by American anxieties caused by the Great Recession and the accompanying mood of U.S. declinism. For politicians, hitting out at an increasingly assertive China taking on new prominence in the world -- and at Huawei as its proxy -- is an easy way to score political points. Another factor is protectionism by entrenched players that fear having their margins pinched, as happened in Europe when Huawei entered the market there.

????Particularly vexing for Huawei is the suggestion that the company could be used to spy on behalf of the government in Beijing. Unverified assertions that the company is "linked" to the Chinese military appear regularly in news articles. The charges are largely based on the fact that Huawei's media-shy founder and CEO, Ren Zhengfei, once served in the People's Liberation Army as a telecom technician, and that the company (like AT&T, Sprint, and Verizon in the U.S.) is a military and government contractor in its home country. "The context of all this is, China is very active in espionage, as are we," says James Lewis of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.? At a minimum, says Lewis, Huawei has an image problem in cyber circles. "The national security community in the U.S. is united in its opposition to Huawei," he says.

????Certainly there are very real security concerns to consider -- a fact that virtually everyone in the cybersecurity world is quick to state and that Huawei itself concedes. In a world in which hacking is proliferating, no company or government agency wants to risk giving potential enemies the means to access its network by buying vulnerable equipment. But is the security risk really greater if the network's parts were sold by a Chinese company? Huawei argues that it's a multinational just like GE (GE) or IBM (IBM), and is only as vulnerable to intrusion as any other private corporation. It also points out that most equipment made by its main competitors -- Ericsson, Alcatel-Lucent, and Nokia Siemens -- is manufactured in China. What's to stop Chinese spies from infiltrating those operations?

????Despite those barriers, Huawei shows no sign of giving up on its efforts to win over U.S. customers. To build relationships with carriers and develop products for the U.S. market, it has hired a slew of executives from Western companies such as Cisco (CSCO), Ericsson, Intel (INTC), Nortel, and Sun. Matt Bross, Huawei's global chief technology officer and the first Westerner to reach Huawei's c-suite, joined from British Telecom. To work on its image in Washington, it engaged the lobbying firm of former Defense Secretary William Cohen. And in February, Huawei published an open letter inviting anyone, including the U.S. government, to investigate its business practices.

????Rather than jump through hoop after hoop, wouldn't it be easier for Huawei just to retreat and be happy with its impressive growth everywhere outside America? Perhaps. But U.S. companies spend some $30 billion a year on telecom equipment, a figure that is set to rise as an industrywide network upgrade to 4G technology continues. If Huawei can convert its doubters, there are huge profits to be made in America. Give up? No way.

Huawei's man in Washington

????William Plummer, Huawei's trim and very polished government-relations point man, is an avid runner. Since he joined the company last year, the 47-year-old father of eight, who spent 12 years in a similar role at Nokia, has had ample opportunity to demonstrate his endurance. Plummer has been meeting with virtually anyone in government willing to listen to Huawei's side of the story (bolstered by a 17-slide PowerPoint pitch). He's also developed a mantra that encapsulates his message: "Huawei is Huawei, not the Chinese government."

????This past March, just after regulators forced Huawei to unravel its 3Leaf acquisition, Plummer met with a half-dozen stern-faced members of a congressional committee focused on national security. Recounting the episode, Plummer gets visibly agitated as he recalls how the staffers suggested that Huawei was beholden to the wishes of Beijing. "Well, no," Plummer says he told them, emphasizing that Huawei is not a state-owned enterprise. "This year GE sold 150 locomotives to Pakistan. Following that logic, if the U.S. went to war with Pakistan, then GE would derail the trains? That's just silliness. That's not how a multinational company would want to risk its future."

????Huawei's rise from startup to international powerhouse happened remarkably fast. Ren, the founder and CEO, served for 10 years in China's equivalent of the Army Corps of Engineers. In 1983 the corps was disbanded, and he was let go as part of a mass demobilization. The company says Ren founded Huawei in 1987 with $2,500 in savings plus funds collected from family members. (Ren almost never gives interviews and would not comment for this article.)

????Huawei argues that it has no ties to the Chinese government. As Plummer likes to point out, the company is headquartered in Shenzhen, across the border from Hong Kong and far from Beijing. Huawei derives just 36% of its revenue inside China. The government has never taken any ownership stake, says Huawei, and the company is 100% employee-owned; Ren holds 1.42%. Huawei says it cannot launch a public stock offering because of Chinese rules that prevent companies with large employee ownership from going public. An IPO would also make much of the company's top management instant billionaires, points out Shang-Jin Wei, who chairs Chinese Business and Economy studies at Columbia Business School in New York. Those executives would likely leave, lopping decades of experience and expertise off the top of the company.

????Huawei is often mentioned as having links with the People's Liberation Army (PLA). But Plummer says that it's a case of mistaken identity. He points to another Chinese company with a similar name which was in fact headed by a PLA officer and may have sold optical communications gear to Iraq under Saddam Hussein. The mix-up, Plummer says, erroneously became part of a Wall Street Journal Asia article in 2001, then was referenced in a 2006 Rand Report -- and has been falsely repeated ever since. "There was some confusion there," says Plummer. "Huawei has never delivered any military technologies at any time."

????But the assertion of a complete separation between the Chinese government and private Chinese companies is not terribly convincing to the cybersecurity community, according to Adam Segal, a China expert and senior fellow for counterterrorism and national security at the Council on Foreign Relations. Beijing last year forced all government suppliers to turn over their encryption codes. Beijing also dangles the threat of corruption investigations to keep companies in line, even executing executives convicted of graft. "Private companies in China are always wondering what the government is going to want next," Segal says.

????To alleviate security concerns, Huawei has volunteered to reveal its source code -- as it has done with success in countries such as India and the U.K. -- and allow ongoing monitoring through a company called Electronic Warfare Associates (EWA). The company has top security clearance with defense and intelligence agencies and therefore can stay abreast of all known cyber risks, says John Lindquist, president and CEO of EWA's infrastructure technologies group. Any Huawei customer can take advantage of EWA's vetting as part of a "trusted delivery" purchase of Huawei equipment. Still, Lindquist concedes, "nothing is 100% fail-safe." While security experts say the real vulnerabilities come not when the equipment is delivered but perhaps six months later when a patch or update is required, Lindquist says ongoing monitoring looks in on patches after the fact. "I'm very confident we'll find anything that's there," he says.