經歷退市和破產危機，中國咖啡“滅霸”瑞幸打算卷土重來
麥甘云（Grady McGregor）
2022-06-01
2020年夏天，中國咖啡連鎖店瑞幸咖啡看起來奄奄一息，不久于世。當年4月，瑞幸承認虛假夸大銷售額超過3億美元。中國執法人員突擊調查瑞幸總部。債券和股票投資者以欺詐罪起訴了該公司。瑞幸董事會罷免公司高管。在納斯達克（Nasdaq）上市的瑞幸股價暴跌超過90%。2020年7月，納斯達克的官員將瑞幸踢出美國交易所。“這是一場大規模欺詐。”總部位于北京的研究公司Asia Waypoint的創始人亨里克·博克表示。“賬目都是假的。人人都覺得瑞幸要完了。”
但現在還不到兩年，瑞幸咖啡正在努力打企業史上最大膽的翻身仗。最近，瑞幸超過星巴克（Starbucks），成為中國最大的咖啡連鎖店。目前，瑞幸在中國的門店有6024家，星巴克只有5654家。5月22日，瑞幸公布2022年第一季度財報，財報顯示，今年第一季度，瑞幸總凈收入同比增長89.5%，季度經營利潤首次轉正。最近，瑞幸聘請中國滑雪運動員和奧運明星谷愛凌作為新任廣告代言人，多家媒體報道稱，公司正醞釀在中國香港上市，甚至在納斯達克重新上市。瑞幸否認希望在香港上市，但表示還是“主要關注美國資本市場”，其美國存托憑證（ADR）仍然在場外交易。
瑞幸居然考慮重返華爾街，讓人意想不到。
在美國國會，瑞幸的造假行為引發了關于對中國在美上市公司監管松懈的激烈辯論，批評人士譴責中國和香港公司的審計和披露標準比來自其他市場的公司寬松。令人震驚的瑞幸造假案曝光后，2020年《外國公司擔責法案》（Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act）在美國的參眾兩院迅速一致通過，該法案規定如果美國上市公司會計監督委員會（U.S. Public Accounting Oversight Board）無法審核所有文檔，對相關公司在美國以外的業務進行審計，那么未來三年，200多家中國公司就可能被迫從美國交易所退市。
在瑞幸爭取華爾街原諒之際，中國的一些金融高層決策者也在廣泛推動全球投資者恢復對中國企業的信心。近幾周，國務院副總理劉鶴領導的一群頂尖經濟規劃師努力安撫國內外行業高管，表示兩年來政府針對瑞幸、打車平臺滴滴、電商巨頭阿里巴巴，以及移動游戲和信息領袖騰訊控股等公司的閃電行動已經結束。
5月17日，在北京與數十位高管和行業專家高調舉行的會議上，劉鶴重申中國政府“必須支持平臺經濟，保障民營經濟健康發展”。他補充道，中國要“處理好政府和市場的關系，支持數字企業在國內外資本市場上市”。
但政策的利好對瑞幸有多大提振作用，專家們意見不一。華爾街傳統觀點仍然認為，名譽掃地的瑞幸不可能在納斯達克重新上市。不過一些反對者認為瑞幸能夠成功翻身，理由是公司的新管理團隊得力，推出一系列創新產品，以及“消費者民族主義”在中國興起，哪怕只是一杯咖啡。
瑞幸咖啡邀請奧運明星谷愛凌為新推廣活動的代言人。圖片來源：Getty Images
崩塌
2018年，星巴克在北京前門南郊開設了1000平方米的臻選店。旗艦店三層，位于中國最繁華的旅游景點之一故宮正南的歷史街區，地理位置優越。商店一層有“互動咖啡吧”，銅質天花板，墻上裝飾著專門委托制作的咖啡豆藝術品。二樓是星巴克的高端茶品牌茶瓦納（Teavana），而三樓則供應咖啡味酒精飲料。
瑞幸咖啡前門店就在星巴克的對面，店面里只有單調的柜臺，四周放著幾張簡單的桌椅，一群顧客和送貨司機擠著取訂單，跟美國競爭對手的大店面簡直毫無相同之處。
上海中歐國際商學院營銷學助理教授陳林表示，裝修簡陋的瑞幸前門店在數千家門店中很典型，沒有高檔物業和高級裝潢，專門在不起眼的地點經營，主要將門店當作取貨中心。
瑞幸重技術和低成本的商業模式正是錢治亞的愿景，她曾經在中國最大的汽車租賃公司神州租車擔任高管，認為租車行業的成功策略可以復制到咖啡行業，打破星巴克的主導地位。2017年，瑞幸在南部沿海城市廈門推出，價格遠低于競爭對手：星巴克美式咖啡售價約為30元，瑞幸則是15元左右，甚至更低。瑞幸的資金主要來自錢治亞在神州租車的老板，身價不菲的億萬富翁陸正耀，他最出名的是帶領2007年成立的神州租車，還有2015年在深圳成立的網約車公司神州優車迅速增長。陸正耀曾持有瑞幸30%的股份，他的妹妹持有12%股份，他擔任董事長后公司快速擴張。第一年瑞幸便開設了2000多家門店，2019年又增加了2500家門店。
遠在華爾街的投資者也聞到了咖啡飄香。瑞幸上市之前的幾輪融資中，陸正耀和錢治亞從貝萊德（Blackrock）、新加坡政府投資公司（GIC）和路易達孚（Louis Dreyfus）等行業巨頭募集到5億多美元。2019年5月，瑞幸在納斯達克上市時，共募集了6.51億美元，成立兩年的公司估值超過50億美元。瑞幸股價達到頂峰時，市值一度超過130億美元。
然而一些分析人士開始懷疑，瑞幸的一夜成功有些咖啡因過量。
2020年1月，總部位于美國舊金山的做空方渾水研究（Muddy Waters Research）發布了一份89頁的報告，稱報告作者為從事私下調查業務的外部研究實體。渾水拒絕透露研究公司的名字，但聲稱報告結果來自1500多名調查人員在600多家瑞幸零售店跟蹤銷售額并錄制的數千小時視頻。該報告稱，瑞幸在納斯達克上市后接連夸大銷售額。后來《華爾街日報》（Wall Street Journal）報道稱，調查方是中國對沖基金雪湖資本（Snow Lake Funds）。雪湖拒絕就是否參與調查發表評論。
剛開始，瑞幸“明確否認”報告結果。但隨后債務和股權投資者以欺詐罪將公司告上法庭，瑞幸才同意內部審計。當年4月，瑞幸公開承認首席運營官劉劍及下屬2019年虛增了3.37億美元銷售額，約占當年業務的四分之一。5月，公司罷免了錢治亞和劉劍。到6月中旬，瑞幸股票暴跌90%，市值縮水110億美元。納斯達克當月宣布將瑞幸摘牌。7月，瑞幸董事會罷免了陸正耀董事長一職，由瑞幸早期員工郭謹一接替，郭謹一也接替了錢治亞，擔任首席執行官。
中國市場監管機構單獨調查了瑞幸，2020年9月得出結論稱公司確實偽造財務記錄誤導了消費者和投資者。中國監管機構對瑞幸等45家涉案公司處以6100萬元的罰款。四個月后，美國證券交易委員會（U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission）嚴厲批評了瑞幸的不當行為，并決定再罰1.8億美元。2021年2月，瑞幸根據《破產法》第15章，即允許外國債務人在美國法院系統爭取債權人保護的法律文件申請破產保護。
億萬富翁陸正耀。圖片來源：Victor J. Blue—Bloomberg/Getty Images
東山再起？
身處動蕩中，郭謹一、新管理團隊和一些關鍵的財務支持者都在努力維持瑞幸生存并謀劃復蘇。2021年4月，瑞幸向私募股權公司大鉦資本（Centurium Capital）募集了2.4億美元。大鉦資本總部位于北京，負責人為華平投資（Warburg Pincus）的前高管黎輝。黎輝在華平期間，曾經負責向神州租車和神州優車投資，還曾經短暫擔任神州優車的副總裁。但在瑞幸欺詐事件曝光后，黎輝與陸正耀斷絕了關系。今年早些時候，黎輝告訴《華爾街日報》，他認為瑞幸財務造假行為是“巨大的背叛”。
大鉦資本是瑞幸最早期的投資者之一，一直積極幫助公司重組清算會計問題。今年1月，大鉦資本宣布組織財團收購兩位聯合創始人之前持有的股份，成為瑞幸控股的股東。
瑞幸正在以驚人速度走出破產程序。2021年10月，申請破產保護僅8個月后，瑞幸就投資者提出的1.75億美元集體訴訟索賠達成和解。
同樣令人驚訝的是，在丑聞籠罩下以及新冠疫情期間，瑞幸的基本業務表現得十分出色。該公司表示，2019年12月至2020年12月，門店虧損僅12%。瑞幸上市之前和期間從投資者募集了16億美元，現在仍然有7.8億美元現金儲備，推動了公司的發展。
分析人士指出，瑞幸財務騙局對中國消費者沒有多大影響。“中國消費者向來非常務實，瑞幸沒有食品安全問題，他們就不認為是騙局。”陳林說。消費者認為瑞幸的問題“與會計有關”，“不會像投資者一樣感覺被出賣”。
陳林表示，在今年的冬奧會期間，瑞幸決定簽下中國滑雪運動員谷愛凌作為發言人，也是吸引愛國消費者的“聰明之舉”。
很多中國消費者并不知道這起丑聞。上海博圣軒咨詢公司的副總監胡宇萬表示，瑞幸欺詐是“大新聞”，但在上海和北京以外的小城市“不算什么大事”。
丑聞發生后，瑞幸還以其他方式自我調整。胡宇萬指出，瑞幸放棄了跟星巴克競爭，轉而選擇關注較低層次的消費者。“瑞幸（針對）大眾市場且價格非常實惠，該策略很有幫助。”她說。
分析師稱，瑞幸結合了大幅折扣與創新產品。“他們發現中國人并沒有那么喜歡傳統的美式咖啡。”陳林說。他指出，現在瑞幸的“熱門產品”是椰云拿鐵和紅絲絨拿鐵，比起星巴克拿鐵更像中式奶茶。
瑞幸咖啡的員工在制作飲品。圖片來源：Getty Images
救贖
雖然瑞幸努力安撫投資者和監管機構，但與外部會計師事務所關系緊張造成了一些影響。瑞幸退市之前，由四大會計師事務所中安永華明會計師事務所（Ernst & Young Hua Ming）負責審計。安永拒絕對瑞幸的欺詐銷售行為負責。2020年9月，瑞幸找紐約的麥楷博平會計師事務所（Marcum Bernstein & Pinchuk）代替了安永。但沒到幾個月麥楷博平便選擇退出，抱怨無法收集“足夠的第三方數據”完成審計。2021年4月，香港的中正達會計師事務所（Centurion ZD CPA）接替麥楷博平作為瑞幸的獨立審計師。
前任審計師“顯然無法完成工作，要么是不愿做。”中正達會計師事務所接手瑞幸審計業務時，Quo Vadis Capital的分析師約翰·佐利迪斯在一份報告中表示。“瑞幸是資本市場最罕見的案例之一……到現在也仍然如此。”
至于瑞幸宣稱的業績，位于上海的咨詢機構AgencyChina的高級研究分析師邁克爾·諾里斯仍然持謹慎態度。他指出，去年四季度，瑞幸公布的同店銷售增長率為44%，而星巴克為-14%。諾里斯說，差距如此之大“令人驚訝”。“我也不相信瑞幸新管理層……已經杜絕了欺詐行為。”瑞幸拒絕了《財富》雜志的置評請求。
5月19日，瑞幸咖啡的股價為8.20美元，較丑聞后的低點1.40美元有所回升，但仍然遠低于2020年1月50.02美元的峰值。
博克表示，現在判斷瑞幸翻身成功與否還為時過早。但他認為，瑞幸可能有機會迎來救贖。
“就像從監獄獲釋的罪犯一樣，”博克說，“也許應該給瑞幸第二次機會。”（財富中文網）
譯者：夏林
2020年夏天，中國咖啡連鎖店瑞幸咖啡看起來奄奄一息，不久于世。當年4月，瑞幸承認虛假夸大銷售額超過3億美元。中國執法人員突擊調查瑞幸總部。債券和股票投資者以欺詐罪起訴了該公司。瑞幸董事會罷免公司高管。在納斯達克（Nasdaq）上市的瑞幸股價暴跌超過90%。2020年7月，納斯達克的官員將瑞幸踢出美國交易所。“這是一場大規模欺詐。”總部位于北京的研究公司Asia Waypoint的創始人亨里克·博克表示。“賬目都是假的。人人都覺得瑞幸要完了。”
但現在還不到兩年，瑞幸咖啡正在努力打企業史上最大膽的翻身仗。最近，瑞幸超過星巴克（Starbucks），成為中國最大的咖啡連鎖店。目前，瑞幸在中國的門店有6024家，星巴克只有5654家。5月22日，瑞幸公布2022年第一季度財報，財報顯示，今年第一季度，瑞幸總凈收入同比增長89.5%，季度經營利潤首次轉正。最近，瑞幸聘請中國滑雪運動員和奧運明星谷愛凌作為新任廣告代言人，多家媒體報道稱，公司正醞釀在中國香港上市，甚至在納斯達克重新上市。瑞幸否認希望在香港上市，但表示還是“主要關注美國資本市場”，其美國存托憑證（ADR）仍然在場外交易。
瑞幸居然考慮重返華爾街，讓人意想不到。
在美國國會，瑞幸的造假行為引發了關于對中國在美上市公司監管松懈的激烈辯論，批評人士譴責中國和香港公司的審計和披露標準比來自其他市場的公司寬松。令人震驚的瑞幸造假案曝光后，2020年《外國公司擔責法案》（Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act）在美國的參眾兩院迅速一致通過，該法案規定如果美國上市公司會計監督委員會（U.S. Public Accounting Oversight Board）無法審核所有文檔，對相關公司在美國以外的業務進行審計，那么未來三年，200多家中國公司就可能被迫從美國交易所退市。
在瑞幸爭取華爾街原諒之際，中國的一些金融高層決策者也在廣泛推動全球投資者恢復對中國企業的信心。近幾周，國務院副總理劉鶴領導的一群頂尖經濟規劃師努力安撫國內外行業高管，表示兩年來政府針對瑞幸、打車平臺滴滴、電商巨頭阿里巴巴，以及移動游戲和信息領袖騰訊控股等公司的閃電行動已經結束。
5月17日，在北京與數十位高管和行業專家高調舉行的會議上，劉鶴重申中國政府“必須支持平臺經濟，保障民營經濟健康發展”。他補充道，中國要“處理好政府和市場的關系，支持數字企業在國內外資本市場上市”。
但政策的利好對瑞幸有多大提振作用，專家們意見不一。華爾街傳統觀點仍然認為，名譽掃地的瑞幸不可能在納斯達克重新上市。不過一些反對者認為瑞幸能夠成功翻身，理由是公司的新管理團隊得力，推出一系列創新產品，以及“消費者民族主義”在中國興起，哪怕只是一杯咖啡。
崩塌
2018年，星巴克在北京前門南郊開設了1000平方米的臻選店。旗艦店三層，位于中國最繁華的旅游景點之一故宮正南的歷史街區，地理位置優越。商店一層有“互動咖啡吧”，銅質天花板，墻上裝飾著專門委托制作的咖啡豆藝術品。二樓是星巴克的高端茶品牌茶瓦納（Teavana），而三樓則供應咖啡味酒精飲料。
瑞幸咖啡前門店就在星巴克的對面，店面里只有單調的柜臺，四周放著幾張簡單的桌椅，一群顧客和送貨司機擠著取訂單，跟美國競爭對手的大店面簡直毫無相同之處。
上海中歐國際商學院營銷學助理教授陳林表示，裝修簡陋的瑞幸前門店在數千家門店中很典型，沒有高檔物業和高級裝潢，專門在不起眼的地點經營，主要將門店當作取貨中心。
瑞幸重技術和低成本的商業模式正是錢治亞的愿景，她曾經在中國最大的汽車租賃公司神州租車擔任高管，認為租車行業的成功策略可以復制到咖啡行業，打破星巴克的主導地位。2017年，瑞幸在南部沿海城市廈門推出，價格遠低于競爭對手：星巴克美式咖啡售價約為30元，瑞幸則是15元左右，甚至更低。瑞幸的資金主要來自錢治亞在神州租車的老板，身價不菲的億萬富翁陸正耀，他最出名的是帶領2007年成立的神州租車，還有2015年在深圳成立的網約車公司神州優車迅速增長。陸正耀曾持有瑞幸30%的股份，他的妹妹持有12%股份，他擔任董事長后公司快速擴張。第一年瑞幸便開設了2000多家門店，2019年又增加了2500家門店。
遠在華爾街的投資者也聞到了咖啡飄香。瑞幸上市之前的幾輪融資中，陸正耀和錢治亞從貝萊德（Blackrock）、新加坡政府投資公司（GIC）和路易達孚（Louis Dreyfus）等行業巨頭募集到5億多美元。2019年5月，瑞幸在納斯達克上市時，共募集了6.51億美元，成立兩年的公司估值超過50億美元。瑞幸股價達到頂峰時，市值一度超過130億美元。
然而一些分析人士開始懷疑，瑞幸的一夜成功有些咖啡因過量。
2020年1月，總部位于美國舊金山的做空方渾水研究（Muddy Waters Research）發布了一份89頁的報告，稱報告作者為從事私下調查業務的外部研究實體。渾水拒絕透露研究公司的名字，但聲稱報告結果來自1500多名調查人員在600多家瑞幸零售店跟蹤銷售額并錄制的數千小時視頻。該報告稱，瑞幸在納斯達克上市后接連夸大銷售額。后來《華爾街日報》（Wall Street Journal）報道稱，調查方是中國對沖基金雪湖資本（Snow Lake Funds）。雪湖拒絕就是否參與調查發表評論。
剛開始，瑞幸“明確否認”報告結果。但隨后債務和股權投資者以欺詐罪將公司告上法庭，瑞幸才同意內部審計。當年4月，瑞幸公開承認首席運營官劉劍及下屬2019年虛增了3.37億美元銷售額，約占當年業務的四分之一。5月，公司罷免了錢治亞和劉劍。到6月中旬，瑞幸股票暴跌90%，市值縮水110億美元。納斯達克當月宣布將瑞幸摘牌。7月，瑞幸董事會罷免了陸正耀董事長一職，由瑞幸早期員工郭謹一接替，郭謹一也接替了錢治亞，擔任首席執行官。
中國市場監管機構單獨調查了瑞幸，2020年9月得出結論稱公司確實偽造財務記錄誤導了消費者和投資者。中國監管機構對瑞幸等45家涉案公司處以6100萬元的罰款。四個月后，美國證券交易委員會（U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission）嚴厲批評了瑞幸的不當行為，并決定再罰1.8億美元。2021年2月，瑞幸根據《破產法》第15章，即允許外國債務人在美國法院系統爭取債權人保護的法律文件申請破產保護。
東山再起？
身處動蕩中，郭謹一、新管理團隊和一些關鍵的財務支持者都在努力維持瑞幸生存并謀劃復蘇。2021年4月，瑞幸向私募股權公司大鉦資本（Centurium Capital）募集了2.4億美元。大鉦資本總部位于北京，負責人為華平投資（Warburg Pincus）的前高管黎輝。黎輝在華平期間，曾經負責向神州租車和神州優車投資，還曾經短暫擔任神州優車的副總裁。但在瑞幸欺詐事件曝光后，黎輝與陸正耀斷絕了關系。今年早些時候，黎輝告訴《華爾街日報》，他認為瑞幸財務造假行為是“巨大的背叛”。
大鉦資本是瑞幸最早期的投資者之一，一直積極幫助公司重組清算會計問題。今年1月，大鉦資本宣布組織財團收購兩位聯合創始人之前持有的股份，成為瑞幸控股的股東。
瑞幸正在以驚人速度走出破產程序。2021年10月，申請破產保護僅8個月后，瑞幸就投資者提出的1.75億美元集體訴訟索賠達成和解。
同樣令人驚訝的是，在丑聞籠罩下以及新冠疫情期間，瑞幸的基本業務表現得十分出色。該公司表示，2019年12月至2020年12月，門店虧損僅12%。瑞幸上市之前和期間從投資者募集了16億美元，現在仍然有7.8億美元現金儲備，推動了公司的發展。
分析人士指出，瑞幸財務騙局對中國消費者沒有多大影響。“中國消費者向來非常務實，瑞幸沒有食品安全問題，他們就不認為是騙局。”陳林說。消費者認為瑞幸的問題“與會計有關”，“不會像投資者一樣感覺被出賣”。
陳林表示，在今年的冬奧會期間，瑞幸決定簽下中國滑雪運動員谷愛凌作為發言人，也是吸引愛國消費者的“聰明之舉”。
很多中國消費者并不知道這起丑聞。上海博圣軒咨詢公司的副總監胡宇萬表示，瑞幸欺詐是“大新聞”，但在上海和北京以外的小城市“不算什么大事”。
丑聞發生后，瑞幸還以其他方式自我調整。胡宇萬指出，瑞幸放棄了跟星巴克競爭，轉而選擇關注較低層次的消費者。“瑞幸（針對）大眾市場且價格非常實惠，該策略很有幫助。”她說。
分析師稱，瑞幸結合了大幅折扣與創新產品。“他們發現中國人并沒有那么喜歡傳統的美式咖啡。”陳林說。他指出，現在瑞幸的“熱門產品”是椰云拿鐵和紅絲絨拿鐵，比起星巴克拿鐵更像中式奶茶。
救贖
雖然瑞幸努力安撫投資者和監管機構，但與外部會計師事務所關系緊張造成了一些影響。瑞幸退市之前，由四大會計師事務所中安永華明會計師事務所（Ernst & Young Hua Ming）負責審計。安永拒絕對瑞幸的欺詐銷售行為負責。2020年9月，瑞幸找紐約的麥楷博平會計師事務所（Marcum Bernstein & Pinchuk）代替了安永。但沒到幾個月麥楷博平便選擇退出，抱怨無法收集“足夠的第三方數據”完成審計。2021年4月，香港的中正達會計師事務所（Centurion ZD CPA）接替麥楷博平作為瑞幸的獨立審計師。
前任審計師“顯然無法完成工作，要么是不愿做。”中正達會計師事務所接手瑞幸審計業務時，Quo Vadis Capital的分析師約翰·佐利迪斯在一份報告中表示。“瑞幸是資本市場最罕見的案例之一……到現在也仍然如此。”
至于瑞幸宣稱的業績，位于上海的咨詢機構AgencyChina的高級研究分析師邁克爾·諾里斯仍然持謹慎態度。他指出，去年四季度，瑞幸公布的同店銷售增長率為44%，而星巴克為-14%。諾里斯說，差距如此之大“令人驚訝”。“我也不相信瑞幸新管理層……已經杜絕了欺詐行為。”瑞幸拒絕了《財富》雜志的置評請求。
5月19日，瑞幸咖啡的股價為8.20美元，較丑聞后的低點1.40美元有所回升，但仍然遠低于2020年1月50.02美元的峰值。
博克表示，現在判斷瑞幸翻身成功與否還為時過早。但他認為，瑞幸可能有機會迎來救贖。
“就像從監獄獲釋的罪犯一樣，”博克說，“也許應該給瑞幸第二次機會。”（財富中文網）
譯者：夏林
In the summer of 2020, Chinese coffeehouse chain Luckin Coffee languished on what appeared to be its deathbed. In April, the firm had confessed to falsely inflating its sales by over $300 million. Chinese police had raided the company's headquarters. Debt and equity investors were suing the company for fraud. Luckin's board ejected the company's top executives. The price of the company's shares, which traded over Nasdaq plummeted by more than 90%. In July, Nasdaq officials banished Luckin from the U.S. exchange. “It was quite a massive fraud,” says Henrik Bork, founder of Beijing-based research firm Asia Waypoint. “They cooked their books. Nobody expected they could survive.”
But now, less than two years later, Luckin Coffee is attempting one of the most audacious turnarounds in corporate history. The coffee chain recently overtook Starbucks as the largest coffee chain in China by store count. Luckin now claims 6,024 stores in China compared to Starbucks' 5,654. The company has never operated at a profit. But last year, Luckin narrowed losses to $86 million, down from $406 million in 2020, while revenues soared 80% compared to the previous year, according to Luckin's unaudited quarterly earnings statement. Luckin has recently enlisted Chinese snowboarder and Olympic star Eileen Gu as the face of a new ad campaign and, according to several media reports, is hatching plans to list in Hong Kong or even re-list on Nasdaq. Luckin denies that it is pursuing a Hong Kong listing. But the company, whose American Depository Receipts (ADRs) still trade over the counter, says it remains "committed to U.S. capital markets."
That Luckin can even contemplate a return to Wall Street is extraordinary.
The Chinese coffee chain's fabrications poured fuel on a fiery debate in the U.S. Congress about lax regulation of U.S.-listed Chinese firms. Critics who decried the failings of a system that subjected Chinese and Hong Kong-based firms to looser auditing and disclosure standards than firms from other markets cited the Luckin debacle as "Exhibit A." The company's spectacular implosion helped speed passage, by unanimous vote in both houses, of the 2020 Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act, which could potentially force more than two hundred Chinese companies off of U.S. exchanges over the next three years if they fail to allow the U.S. Public Accounting Oversight Board to review all work documents for audits of the company's non-U.S. operations.
Luckin's bid for forgiveness on Wall Street comes amid a broader push by some of China's most senior financial policymakers to restore the confidence of global investors in Chinese firms. In recent weeks, a gaggle of top economic planners led by vice-premier Liu He has sought to reassure industry executives at home and abroad that Beijing is backing off from a two-year regulatory blitzkrieg designed to weaken the power of consumer-facing internet companies like Luckin, ride-hailing platform Didi Global, e-commerce giant Alibaba Group Holding, and mobile gaming and messaging leader Tencent Holdings.
In a high-profile meeting Tuesday with dozens of executives and industry experts in Beijing, Liu affirmed that China's government "must support the platform economy and sustain the healthy development of the private economy." He added that China should better "balance the relationship between the government and the market, and support digital companies to list on domestic and foreign exchanges."
Experts differ as to whether Liu's rhetoric signals a genuine policy shift—and if it does, how much that shift might benefit Luckin. On Wall Street, the conventional wisdom remains that the disgraced coffee company's attempt to win reinstatement to Nasdaq is a long shot. Even so, a handful of contrarians—hailing the company's new management team, a flurry of innovative new product offerings, and the rise of "consumer nationalism" in China even for something as basic as a cup of coffee—insist Luckin's turnaround is real.
The crash
In 2018, Starbucks opened a lavish 1,000-square-meter Reserve Roastery in Beijing's southern neighborhood of Qianmen. The three-story flagship store occupies a prime location—in a historic district directly south of the Forbidden City—that is one of China's busiest tourist destinations. The store's first floor features an "interactive coffee bar," copper ceilings, and walls adorned with specially-commissioned coffee bean artwork. The second floor is dedicated to Starbucks' tea brand Teavana, while the third serves coffee-infused alcoholic drinks.
Luckin Coffee's Qianmen outlet is just down the street from Starbucks'. But the Chinese chain's store—a dowdy counter surrounded by a few simple tables and chairs where a scrum of customers and delivery drivers jostle to pick up orders—couldn't be more different than its American rival's grand emporium.
Luckin's no-frills shop in Qianmen is typical of its thousands of other outlets, says Chen Lin, assistant professor of marketing at the China Europe International Business School in Shanghai. The company eschews prime properties and upscale interiors and operates instead from nondescript locations, using stores mainly as online hubs for delivery orders.
Luckin's tech-forward and cost-efficient business model reflects the vision of Jenny Qian, a former executive at Car Inc., China's largest car rental company, who thought she could disrupt Starbucks' coffee dominance using the same strategy that had worked for her in the rent-a-car industry. Luckin, launched in 2017 in the southern coastal city of Xiamen, offered drastically lower prices than its competitor: where an americano at Starbucks costs roughly $5, Luckin's version is $3 or less. Luckin was largely bankrolled by Qian's former Car Inc. boss, hard-charging billionaire Charles Lu, who was famous for pushing for growth above all both at Car Inc., which he founded in 2007, and Ucar, a Shenzhen-based ride hailing venture he launched in 2015. At Luckin, Lu took a 30% stake, secured another 12% for his sister, assumed the company’s chairmanship, and pushed expansion at a blistering pace. The venture opened over 2,000 outlets in its first year and added another 2,500 in 2019.
On Wall Street, investors woke up and smelled the coffee. Lu and Qian raised over $500 million in pre-IPO funding rounds from heavy hitters like Blackrock, GIC, and Louis Dreyfus. In May 2019, when Luckin debuted on Nasdaq, the company raised $651 million, valuing the two-year-old venture at over $5 billion. At the peak of its share price, Luckin's market value topped $13 billion.
And yet, a few analysts began to suspect Luckin's overnight success was over-caffeinated.
In January 2020, Muddy Waters Research, a San Francisco-based short seller that had bet heavily on Luckin's demise, published an 89-page report the short seller said had been produced by an outside research entity operating undercover. Muddy Waters declined to identify the research firm but claimed the report to be the product of over 1,500 investigators tracking sales and recording thousands of hours of video at over 600 Luckin retail outlets. The document alleged Luckin had been systematically inflating sales figures since its Nasdaq debut. The Wall Street Journal later reported that Chinese hedge fund Snow Lake Capital was behind the investigation; Snow Lake has declined to comment on its involvement.
Luckin “categorically denied” the report—at first. But as debt and equity investors dragged the company to court on fraud charges, Luckin agreed to conduct an internal audit. In April, Luckin publicly acknowledged that its chief operating officer Liu Jian and his subordinates had faked $337 million of 2019 sales—about a quarter of the company's business during that year. In May, the company ousted Qian and Liu. By mid-June, Luckin's stock had plunged 90%, erasing $11 billion in market value. Nasdaq announced that it would delist the company that same month. In July, Luckin's board pushed out Lu as chairman and replaced him with Jinyi Guo, an early Luckin employee who also took over for Qian as CEO.
China’s market regulator conducted a separate probe of Luckin which concluded in September 2020 that the company had indeed falsified financial records and misled consumers and investors. The Chinese agency let Luckin off with a wrist slap: a fine of just $9 million. But four months later, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission issued a scathing assessment of misconduct at the Chinese coffee chain and fined the company another $180 million. In February 2021, Luckin filed for Chapter 15 bankruptcy, a legal filing that allows foreign debtors to seek protection from creditors in the U.S. court system.
The comeback?
Amid the turmoil, Guo, the new management team, and a handful of key financial backers have scrambled to keep Luckin afloat and plot the chain's resurrection. In April 2021, Luckin raised $240 million from private equity firm Centurium Capital, a Beijing-based private equity firm led by former Warburg Pincus executive David Li. At Warburg, Li oversaw the global private equity firm's investments Car Inc. and Ucar, and served briefly as Ucar's vice chairman. But in the wake of revelations of fraud at Luckin, Li has cut ties with Lu, telling the Wall Street Journal earlier this year he considered the company's fabrications "an enormous betrayal."
Centurium was one of Luckin's earliest investors and has been actively involved in trying to help the company restructure and straighten out its accounting practices. In January, Centurium announced that it had become Luckin's controlling shareholder by organizing a consortium to acquire shares held previously by two of the company's co-founders.
Luckin is emerging from bankruptcy court proceedings with remarkable speed. In October 2021, only eight months after filing for bankruptcy protection, the Chinese chain reached a $175 million settlement of class-action claims against it by investors.
Equally surprising is how well Luckin's underlying business operations weathered both the scandal and the outbreak of a global pandemic. The company says it lost only 12% of its stores between December 2019 to December 2020. It helped that Luckin still had $780 million in cash reserves left over from the $1.6 billion it raised from investors before and during its IPO.
Analysts say Luckin's financial shenanigans don't matter much to Chinese consumers. "Chinese consumers have been very pragmatic in the sense that because Luckin does not have a food safety problem they do not consider it a scam," says Lin. Consumers view Luckin's problems as "related to accounting" and "do not feel betrayed" in the same way investors might.
Lin argues Luckin's decision to sign Chinese snowboarder Eileen Gu as company spokesperson during the Winter Olympics was also a "smart play" to attract patriotic consumers.
Many Chinese consumers are unaware of the scandal. The coffee chain's fraud was "big news," but it was "not as big of a deal" in smaller cities outside Shanghai and Beijing, says Yuwan Hu, associate director of Daxue Consulting in Shanghai.
Luckin has re-invented itself in other ways since the scandal. The company has given up on trying to compete with Starbucks and has instead chosen to double down on a lower tier of consumers, according to Hu. "They are benefiting from [pursuing] mass markets and using very affordable pricing," she says.
Analysts say Luckin combined deep discounts with innovative products. "They realized that Chinese people are not that into traditional, American coffee that much," says Lin, who points out that Luckin's "killer products" are now a coconut milk latte and a red velvet latte, drinks more similar to Chinese milk tea than Starbucks lattes.
Redemption
Luckin's effort to reassure investors and regulators has been marred by tempestuous relationships with outside accounting firms. Prior to Luckin's delisting, the company's auditor was Ernst & Young Hua Ming, the China-based practice of the Big Four accounting firm. EY has denied responsibility for Luckin's fraudulant sales practices. In September 2020, Luckin replaced EY with New York-based auditor Marcum Bernstein & Pinchuk. But Marcum quit within months, complaining that it could not gather "sufficient third-party data" to complete an audit. In April 2021, Centurion ZD CPA, a Hong Kong-based auditor, took over auditing duties from Marcum.
The previous auditor was "apparently unable or unwilling to complete the job," John Zolidis, an analyst at Quo Vadis Capital, said in a note when Centurion ZD CPA took over as auditor. “Luckin was already one of the most unusual situations we’d ever seen... this continued today.”
Michael Norris, senior research analyst at Shanghai-based consultancy AgencyChina, remains wary of Luckin's claims about its financial performance, noting that in the fourth quarter of last year, Luckin reported 44% growth in same-store sales compared to -14% from Starbucks. That disparity is "eyebrow-raising," Norris says. “I'm not yet convinced that Luckin's new management…has parted with previous fraudulent practices.” Luckin declined Fortune's request for comment.
Shares in Luckin Coffee were priced at $8.20 on May 19, better than their post-scandal low of $1.40, but still far below their peak of $50.02 in January 2020.
Bork says it's too early to tell if Luckin's turnaround will work. But he thinks the company may have a shot at redemption.
"Just like a criminal who gets released from prison," Bork says, Luckin "may just deserve a second chance."
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