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衰退真的要來了,這得怪美聯(lián)儲

Shawn Tully
2022-04-25

一位著名經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家認(rèn)為美聯(lián)儲完全忽視了一項(xiàng)重要指標(biāo)。

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圖片來源:RICHARD SHARROCKS VIA GETTY IMAGES

著名專家小組現(xiàn)在預(yù)測,美國肯定會陷入經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退困境。在4月14日的一次采訪中,美國財(cái)政部的前部長拉里·薩默斯說:“當(dāng)通貨膨脹率高于4%,失業(yè)率低于5%時,兩年內(nèi)必然會出現(xiàn)經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退的情況?!彼肛?zé)美聯(lián)儲(Federal Reserve)暗示可能會出現(xiàn)“軟著陸”情況,并建議其負(fù)責(zé)人通過發(fā)表更加切合實(shí)際的看法來與公眾保持一致,即表明未來的發(fā)展道路是曲折的。薩默斯認(rèn)為經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退的幾率“很可能達(dá)到三分之二或更多”。幾周前,在2009年到2018年期間擔(dān)任紐約聯(lián)邦儲備銀行(New York Fed)主席的比爾·杜德利在彭博社(Bloomberg)的一篇專欄文章中給出了更為悲觀的評估,他警告稱:“美聯(lián)儲已經(jīng)使經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退不可避免。”在杜德利看來,美聯(lián)儲因?yàn)殚L期保持如此寬松的貨幣政策而引發(fā)失誤, “降溫”將需要經(jīng)歷極其艱難的緊縮周期,這勢必會使經(jīng)濟(jì)從繁榮走向衰退。

即便是美聯(lián)儲智囊團(tuán)中通常最鴿派的人士也在變得鷹派。美聯(lián)儲理事萊爾·布雷納德、明尼阿波利斯聯(lián)儲(Minneapolis Fed)主席尼爾·卡什卡利以及其他傳統(tǒng)進(jìn)步人士都呼吁大幅、快速地提高聯(lián)邦基金利率,并迅速縮減美聯(lián)儲的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表,這些強(qiáng)硬措施經(jīng)常引發(fā)經(jīng)濟(jì)急劇下滑。

一年前,一位著名的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家用正統(tǒng)的貨幣數(shù)量理論預(yù)測了美聯(lián)儲和幾乎所有同行都忽略的問題:通貨膨脹即將爆發(fā)。他甚至一語中的,預(yù)測到2021年年底,物價將飆升6%,甚至9%。他就是史蒂夫·漢克,約翰斯·霍普金斯大學(xué)(Johns Hopkins University)的應(yīng)用經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教授和鐵桿的貨幣主義者。2021年7月,漢克與約翰斯·霍普金斯大學(xué)的同事和景順集團(tuán)(Invesco)的前首席經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家約翰·格林伍德共同在《華爾街日報(bào)》(Wall Street Journal)發(fā)表專欄文章,該文章有預(yù)見性地指出通貨膨脹即將爆發(fā)?,F(xiàn)在漢克同意薩默斯和杜德利的觀點(diǎn),即我們陷入經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退困境的可能性很高。但他得出這個結(jié)論的理由卻截然不同。

漢克斷言,美聯(lián)儲可以通過遵循在過去通貨膨脹率飆升時期偶爾奏效的法則來避免使經(jīng)濟(jì)陷入困境。他告訴《財(cái)富》雜志:“真正的問題不是我們不可能逃往安全地帶,而是出在美聯(lián)儲的政策。”

這位資深的業(yè)余飛行員補(bǔ)充說:“美聯(lián)儲就像一名飛行員,卻無視顯示飛機(jī)高度的高度計(jì)。美聯(lián)儲需要停止盲目行事,才能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)杰羅姆·鮑威爾主席承諾的軟著陸。”漢克認(rèn)為美聯(lián)儲仍然可以避免這種可怕的迫降——但它必須精確地?fù)糁姓_的目標(biāo),而它目前并沒有做到這一點(diǎn)。

是什么導(dǎo)致了通貨膨脹率的飆升

在漢克看來,始終且完全決定通貨膨脹率的“高度計(jì)”是貨幣供應(yīng)量的水平和軌跡。這是美聯(lián)儲避免讓我們陷入困境的關(guān)鍵標(biāo)準(zhǔn),而這一標(biāo)準(zhǔn)也是美聯(lián)儲必須遵循的標(biāo)準(zhǔn),只有這樣才能夠讓我們擺脫困境。漢克認(rèn)為,正是美聯(lián)儲印鈔為赤字激增提供資金,才導(dǎo)致了今天的物價壓力。他解釋說:“高額的財(cái)政赤字本身并不會導(dǎo)致通貨膨脹。如果公民購買債券,他們就會將購買力轉(zhuǎn)移給政府,但通貨膨脹率不會上升。相反,是美聯(lián)儲一直在用印出來的錢購買債券。這就像一架直升機(jī)在美國各地傾倒新美元。”旨在應(yīng)對新冠肺炎疫情危機(jī)的額外數(shù)萬億支出催生了赤字。美聯(lián)儲隨后通過加印美元將超過90%的額外財(cái)政赤字“貨幣化”,并在此過程中增加了貨幣供應(yīng)量。事實(shí)上,自2020年2月以來,美聯(lián)儲在其資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表上增加了3.8萬億美元新發(fā)行的美國國債,幾乎將其持有量增加了兩倍,這是令人難以置信的。

在推行量化寬松政策的過程中,美聯(lián)儲在短短兩年多時間里累計(jì)增加了近41%的貨幣供應(yīng)量或廣義貨幣(M2)。漢克指出:“這是前所未有的增長。”他喜歡把加印美元(綠色潮水)如何推高通貨膨脹率比作浴缸中的積水。他說:“如果水龍頭像過去兩年一樣大開,水進(jìn)入的速度就要比排出的速度快得多。這種情況自2020年2月以來一直在發(fā)生?!辈粩嗌仙乃?,或者過剩的貨幣供應(yīng)是通過兩個閥門排出的。第一個是由于經(jīng)濟(jì)體生產(chǎn)出更多的商品和提供更多的服務(wù),國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值出現(xiàn)“實(shí)際”增長。第二個是由于人們持有的現(xiàn)金、支票和貨幣市場賬戶隨著收入的增加而增加,從而出現(xiàn)了“貨幣需求”。

他表示,這兩個出口閥只會排出部分堆積物——并留下過剩的物質(zhì),而過剩的物質(zhì)將作為額外的通貨膨脹溢出浴缸。他說:“在貨幣供應(yīng)量的巨大積累轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)橥ㄘ浥蛎浿?,會出現(xiàn)12個月到24個月的滯后期。這就是我在2021年年中看到的情況,這讓我推測年底前物價會大幅上漲。但美聯(lián)儲完全忽略了這一信號?!币虼?,漢克指出,無論美聯(lián)儲現(xiàn)在采取什么行動,他預(yù)計(jì)美國今年的通貨膨脹率將一直保持在6%或更高,這一情況會在2023年全年持續(xù)存在,甚至可能持續(xù)到2024年的頭幾個月,這是因?yàn)槎嘤嗟腻X不斷從貨幣浴缸的溢流閥中流出。

在漢克看來,解決方案是將貨幣供應(yīng)量放緩到每年6%左右的黃金增長率。以這樣的速度,進(jìn)入浴缸的水量應(yīng)該剛好填滿浴缸,以便美聯(lián)儲達(dá)到其2%的通貨膨脹目標(biāo)。他說,粗略地算一下,2%的貨幣供應(yīng)量增長推動了實(shí)體經(jīng)濟(jì)的擴(kuò)張,2%用于滿足貨幣需求的增長,而2%則留在浴缸中,最終流經(jīng)通貨膨脹溢流閥。但尚不清楚這一情況是否會發(fā)生,因?yàn)槊缆?lián)儲根本沒有關(guān)注貨幣供應(yīng)量。這里有強(qiáng)有力的證據(jù):即便是現(xiàn)在,在美聯(lián)儲于2021年11月放棄了“過渡性”標(biāo)簽并宣布通貨膨脹是一個主要問題之后很長時間,廣義貨幣仍然以11%的速度逐年增長,幾乎是理想增長率6%的兩倍。漢克認(rèn)為,美聯(lián)儲應(yīng)該通過調(diào)整工具來引導(dǎo)貨幣供應(yīng)量走上正確的軌道來對抗通貨膨脹。相反,美聯(lián)儲承諾在不考慮廣義貨幣的情況下推動其杠桿發(fā)揮作用,對漢克而言,這相當(dāng)于在沒有儀表的情況下飛行,不知道你是在云層上飛行還是在地面上滑行。

通貨膨脹的兩個來源

正如漢克所指出的,導(dǎo)致所有這些定價壓力的貨幣供應(yīng)量激增有兩個來源。第一個來源是美聯(lián)儲本身。美聯(lián)儲將赤字貨幣化,為支出井噴提供資金,這在我們今天所經(jīng)歷的宿醉中占了最大部分。這是美聯(lián)儲現(xiàn)在通過縮減資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表希望達(dá)成的目標(biāo)。美聯(lián)儲于今年3月結(jié)束了其量化寬松或量化寬松政策(用新發(fā)行的貨幣購買美國國債)。市場預(yù)計(jì)美聯(lián)儲將在美國國債到期時開始拋售,并從5月開始減少其持有的抵押貸款支持證券,這標(biāo)志著美聯(lián)儲轉(zhuǎn)向量化緊縮或量化緊縮政策。漢克說:“毫無疑問,縮減資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表是一種可以預(yù)測的工具,用來減少美聯(lián)儲對貨幣供應(yīng)量造成的影響?!眴栴}在于美聯(lián)儲是否掌握了正確的節(jié)奏,如果它們不關(guān)注貨幣供應(yīng)量讀數(shù),它們就可能會犯嚴(yán)重錯誤。

第二個來源是商業(yè)銀行。它們借出的美元越多,廣義貨幣的增長速度就越快,而銀行在繁榮時期一直在發(fā)放大量的新房貸款、再融資貸款和信用卡貸款。簡言之,銀行向借款人提供的美元越多,貨幣供應(yīng)量就擴(kuò)張得越快。

美聯(lián)儲大幅提高聯(lián)邦基金利率的策略是針對第二個來源——遏制銀行提供更多信貸。但漢克擔(dān)心,過度依賴提升利率才是問題所在。他指出:“聯(lián)邦基金利率的上升與銀行提供的貨幣供應(yīng)量增長率的變化之間沒有明確的聯(lián)系。大多數(shù)人認(rèn)為,提高聯(lián)邦基金利率就是表明貨幣政策收緊。但事實(shí)并非如此。在查看貨幣供應(yīng)量數(shù)據(jù)之前,你不知道美聯(lián)儲是否收緊了貨幣政策。”(也就是說,在讀高度計(jì)讀數(shù)前,你無法確定實(shí)際情況到底是怎樣的。)他表示,當(dāng)前對信貸的強(qiáng)勁需求使情況變得模糊。他觀察到,公司的利潤率很高,并且希望擴(kuò)張。消費(fèi)者資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表狀況良好。漢克補(bǔ)充說,即使在幾次加息之后,許多類別的利率仍然可能低于通貨膨脹水平,這讓新抵押貸款之類的貸款依舊很劃算。在這種情況下,即便在美聯(lián)儲加息的情況下,貨幣供應(yīng)量也可能繼續(xù)增長。

經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退要來了嗎?

漢克對一件事情深信不疑:為避免經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退,美聯(lián)儲必須關(guān)注貨幣供應(yīng)量,這需要對美聯(lián)儲控制的兩個杠桿(量化寬松和利率)進(jìn)行精細(xì)的操控。他說,保持貨幣供應(yīng)量增長至關(guān)重要,這是因?yàn)槊绹际窃谪泿殴?yīng)量不斷增加的情況下實(shí)現(xiàn)軟著陸的。漢克說:“即使在美聯(lián)儲加息的情況下,例如1965年、1984年和1994-1995年,也沒有發(fā)生經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退現(xiàn)象,這是因?yàn)樨泿殴?yīng)量的增長足以支撐購買力?!毕啾戎?,所有的經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退現(xiàn)象都以廣義貨幣的急劇下降為特征——漢克列舉了1973年、1988-1989年和1999-2000年的例子。他認(rèn)為美聯(lián)儲可能出錯的方式有兩種:其一,他們看到可怕的月度通貨膨脹數(shù)字感到驚慌,以至于過度加息或過快地縮減資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表,從而沖擊了貨幣供應(yīng)量,造成經(jīng)濟(jì)崩潰。其次,如果美國總統(tǒng)喬·拜登政府認(rèn)為,在即將到來的選舉中,經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退將比惡性通貨膨脹更具破壞性,他們可能會繼續(xù)向鮑威爾發(fā)出指令,鮑威爾可以保持貨幣供應(yīng)量增加。在這種情況下,傳說中的浴缸要花費(fèi)兩年多的時間才能夠排出過去錯誤帶來的過剩物質(zhì)。

漢克表示,正確的做法是調(diào)整各種杠桿,以實(shí)現(xiàn)理想的6%的貨幣供應(yīng)量增長率,保證美聯(lián)儲2%的通貨膨脹目標(biāo)。比如,如果盡管聯(lián)邦基金利率大幅上調(diào),但銀行貸款仍然在快速增長,就可能有必要加快資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表的流失,從而抑制廣義貨幣增長?;蛘撸绻酉⒋蟠鬁p少了信貸,廣義貨幣下降的速度超過預(yù)期,美聯(lián)儲就可以減緩或暫??s減資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表,以確保政策組合達(dá)到6%的目標(biāo)。

然而,在美國國會的證詞中,鮑威爾明確表示,貨幣供應(yīng)量狀況對經(jīng)濟(jì)進(jìn)程幾乎沒有影響或根本沒有影響,這一立場讓漢克懷疑他是否可以正確處理微妙的平衡。漢克將美聯(lián)儲比作昔日倒霉的飛行員道格拉斯·科里根(綽號為“迷路的科里根”)。1938年,科里根進(jìn)行了一次著名的橫跨大陸的飛行,他計(jì)劃從長灘飛到紐約。然后,他向東而不是向西出發(fā),因此,他沒有按照計(jì)劃返回加利福尼亞,而是最終降落在愛爾蘭,這讓他很是吃驚??评锔肛?zé)是過厚的云層使他飛錯了方向,飛了2500英里(約4023.36千米)。這次不幸的經(jīng)歷為他贏得了一個不朽的綽號,漢克用這個綽號來形容美聯(lián)儲:“迷路的美聯(lián)儲”。美聯(lián)儲這位飛行員忽視了使我們經(jīng)濟(jì)平穩(wěn)、安全著陸所需的一項(xiàng)關(guān)鍵的指標(biāo)。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))

譯者:中慧言-王芳

著名專家小組現(xiàn)在預(yù)測,美國肯定會陷入經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退困境。在4月14日的一次采訪中,美國財(cái)政部的前部長拉里·薩默斯說:“當(dāng)通貨膨脹率高于4%,失業(yè)率低于5%時,兩年內(nèi)必然會出現(xiàn)經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退的情況?!彼肛?zé)美聯(lián)儲(Federal Reserve)暗示可能會出現(xiàn)“軟著陸”情況,并建議其負(fù)責(zé)人通過發(fā)表更加切合實(shí)際的看法來與公眾保持一致,即表明未來的發(fā)展道路是曲折的。薩默斯認(rèn)為經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退的幾率“很可能達(dá)到三分之二或更多”。幾周前,在2009年到2018年期間擔(dān)任紐約聯(lián)邦儲備銀行(New York Fed)主席的比爾·杜德利在彭博社(Bloomberg)的一篇專欄文章中給出了更為悲觀的評估,他警告稱:“美聯(lián)儲已經(jīng)使經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退不可避免?!痹诙诺吕磥?,美聯(lián)儲因?yàn)殚L期保持如此寬松的貨幣政策而引發(fā)失誤, “降溫”將需要經(jīng)歷極其艱難的緊縮周期,這勢必會使經(jīng)濟(jì)從繁榮走向衰退。

即便是美聯(lián)儲智囊團(tuán)中通常最鴿派的人士也在變得鷹派。美聯(lián)儲理事萊爾·布雷納德、明尼阿波利斯聯(lián)儲(Minneapolis Fed)主席尼爾·卡什卡利以及其他傳統(tǒng)進(jìn)步人士都呼吁大幅、快速地提高聯(lián)邦基金利率,并迅速縮減美聯(lián)儲的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表,這些強(qiáng)硬措施經(jīng)常引發(fā)經(jīng)濟(jì)急劇下滑。

一年前,一位著名的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家用正統(tǒng)的貨幣數(shù)量理論預(yù)測了美聯(lián)儲和幾乎所有同行都忽略的問題:通貨膨脹即將爆發(fā)。他甚至一語中的,預(yù)測到2021年年底,物價將飆升6%,甚至9%。他就是史蒂夫·漢克,約翰斯·霍普金斯大學(xué)(Johns Hopkins University)的應(yīng)用經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教授和鐵桿的貨幣主義者。2021年7月,漢克與約翰斯·霍普金斯大學(xué)的同事和景順集團(tuán)(Invesco)的前首席經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家約翰·格林伍德共同在《華爾街日報(bào)》(Wall Street Journal)發(fā)表專欄文章,該文章有預(yù)見性地指出通貨膨脹即將爆發(fā)?,F(xiàn)在漢克同意薩默斯和杜德利的觀點(diǎn),即我們陷入經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退困境的可能性很高。但他得出這個結(jié)論的理由卻截然不同。

漢克斷言,美聯(lián)儲可以通過遵循在過去通貨膨脹率飆升時期偶爾奏效的法則來避免使經(jīng)濟(jì)陷入困境。他告訴《財(cái)富》雜志:“真正的問題不是我們不可能逃往安全地帶,而是出在美聯(lián)儲的政策?!?/p>

這位資深的業(yè)余飛行員補(bǔ)充說:“美聯(lián)儲就像一名飛行員,卻無視顯示飛機(jī)高度的高度計(jì)。美聯(lián)儲需要停止盲目行事,才能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)杰羅姆·鮑威爾主席承諾的軟著陸。”漢克認(rèn)為美聯(lián)儲仍然可以避免這種可怕的迫降——但它必須精確地?fù)糁姓_的目標(biāo),而它目前并沒有做到這一點(diǎn)。

是什么導(dǎo)致了通貨膨脹率的飆升

在漢克看來,始終且完全決定通貨膨脹率的“高度計(jì)”是貨幣供應(yīng)量的水平和軌跡。這是美聯(lián)儲避免讓我們陷入困境的關(guān)鍵標(biāo)準(zhǔn),而這一標(biāo)準(zhǔn)也是美聯(lián)儲必須遵循的標(biāo)準(zhǔn),只有這樣才能夠讓我們擺脫困境。漢克認(rèn)為,正是美聯(lián)儲印鈔為赤字激增提供資金,才導(dǎo)致了今天的物價壓力。他解釋說:“高額的財(cái)政赤字本身并不會導(dǎo)致通貨膨脹。如果公民購買債券,他們就會將購買力轉(zhuǎn)移給政府,但通貨膨脹率不會上升。相反,是美聯(lián)儲一直在用印出來的錢購買債券。這就像一架直升機(jī)在美國各地傾倒新美元?!敝荚趹?yīng)對新冠肺炎疫情危機(jī)的額外數(shù)萬億支出催生了赤字。美聯(lián)儲隨后通過加印美元將超過90%的額外財(cái)政赤字“貨幣化”,并在此過程中增加了貨幣供應(yīng)量。事實(shí)上,自2020年2月以來,美聯(lián)儲在其資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表上增加了3.8萬億美元新發(fā)行的美國國債,幾乎將其持有量增加了兩倍,這是令人難以置信的。

在推行量化寬松政策的過程中,美聯(lián)儲在短短兩年多時間里累計(jì)增加了近41%的貨幣供應(yīng)量或廣義貨幣(M2)。漢克指出:“這是前所未有的增長?!彼矚g把加印美元(綠色潮水)如何推高通貨膨脹率比作浴缸中的積水。他說:“如果水龍頭像過去兩年一樣大開,水進(jìn)入的速度就要比排出的速度快得多。這種情況自2020年2月以來一直在發(fā)生?!辈粩嗌仙乃?,或者過剩的貨幣供應(yīng)是通過兩個閥門排出的。第一個是由于經(jīng)濟(jì)體生產(chǎn)出更多的商品和提供更多的服務(wù),國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值出現(xiàn)“實(shí)際”增長。第二個是由于人們持有的現(xiàn)金、支票和貨幣市場賬戶隨著收入的增加而增加,從而出現(xiàn)了“貨幣需求”。

他表示,這兩個出口閥只會排出部分堆積物——并留下過剩的物質(zhì),而過剩的物質(zhì)將作為額外的通貨膨脹溢出浴缸。他說:“在貨幣供應(yīng)量的巨大積累轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)橥ㄘ浥蛎浿?,會出現(xiàn)12個月到24個月的滯后期。這就是我在2021年年中看到的情況,這讓我推測年底前物價會大幅上漲。但美聯(lián)儲完全忽略了這一信號?!币虼?,漢克指出,無論美聯(lián)儲現(xiàn)在采取什么行動,他預(yù)計(jì)美國今年的通貨膨脹率將一直保持在6%或更高,這一情況會在2023年全年持續(xù)存在,甚至可能持續(xù)到2024年的頭幾個月,這是因?yàn)槎嘤嗟腻X不斷從貨幣浴缸的溢流閥中流出。

在漢克看來,解決方案是將貨幣供應(yīng)量放緩到每年6%左右的黃金增長率。以這樣的速度,進(jìn)入浴缸的水量應(yīng)該剛好填滿浴缸,以便美聯(lián)儲達(dá)到其2%的通貨膨脹目標(biāo)。他說,粗略地算一下,2%的貨幣供應(yīng)量增長推動了實(shí)體經(jīng)濟(jì)的擴(kuò)張,2%用于滿足貨幣需求的增長,而2%則留在浴缸中,最終流經(jīng)通貨膨脹溢流閥。但尚不清楚這一情況是否會發(fā)生,因?yàn)槊缆?lián)儲根本沒有關(guān)注貨幣供應(yīng)量。這里有強(qiáng)有力的證據(jù):即便是現(xiàn)在,在美聯(lián)儲于2021年11月放棄了“過渡性”標(biāo)簽并宣布通貨膨脹是一個主要問題之后很長時間,廣義貨幣仍然以11%的速度逐年增長,幾乎是理想增長率6%的兩倍。漢克認(rèn)為,美聯(lián)儲應(yīng)該通過調(diào)整工具來引導(dǎo)貨幣供應(yīng)量走上正確的軌道來對抗通貨膨脹。相反,美聯(lián)儲承諾在不考慮廣義貨幣的情況下推動其杠桿發(fā)揮作用,對漢克而言,這相當(dāng)于在沒有儀表的情況下飛行,不知道你是在云層上飛行還是在地面上滑行。

通貨膨脹的兩個來源

正如漢克所指出的,導(dǎo)致所有這些定價壓力的貨幣供應(yīng)量激增有兩個來源。第一個來源是美聯(lián)儲本身。美聯(lián)儲將赤字貨幣化,為支出井噴提供資金,這在我們今天所經(jīng)歷的宿醉中占了最大部分。這是美聯(lián)儲現(xiàn)在通過縮減資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表希望達(dá)成的目標(biāo)。美聯(lián)儲于今年3月結(jié)束了其量化寬松或量化寬松政策(用新發(fā)行的貨幣購買美國國債)。市場預(yù)計(jì)美聯(lián)儲將在美國國債到期時開始拋售,并從5月開始減少其持有的抵押貸款支持證券,這標(biāo)志著美聯(lián)儲轉(zhuǎn)向量化緊縮或量化緊縮政策。漢克說:“毫無疑問,縮減資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表是一種可以預(yù)測的工具,用來減少美聯(lián)儲對貨幣供應(yīng)量造成的影響?!眴栴}在于美聯(lián)儲是否掌握了正確的節(jié)奏,如果它們不關(guān)注貨幣供應(yīng)量讀數(shù),它們就可能會犯嚴(yán)重錯誤。

第二個來源是商業(yè)銀行。它們借出的美元越多,廣義貨幣的增長速度就越快,而銀行在繁榮時期一直在發(fā)放大量的新房貸款、再融資貸款和信用卡貸款。簡言之,銀行向借款人提供的美元越多,貨幣供應(yīng)量就擴(kuò)張得越快。

美聯(lián)儲大幅提高聯(lián)邦基金利率的策略是針對第二個來源——遏制銀行提供更多信貸。但漢克擔(dān)心,過度依賴提升利率才是問題所在。他指出:“聯(lián)邦基金利率的上升與銀行提供的貨幣供應(yīng)量增長率的變化之間沒有明確的聯(lián)系。大多數(shù)人認(rèn)為,提高聯(lián)邦基金利率就是表明貨幣政策收緊。但事實(shí)并非如此。在查看貨幣供應(yīng)量數(shù)據(jù)之前,你不知道美聯(lián)儲是否收緊了貨幣政策。”(也就是說,在讀高度計(jì)讀數(shù)前,你無法確定實(shí)際情況到底是怎樣的。)他表示,當(dāng)前對信貸的強(qiáng)勁需求使情況變得模糊。他觀察到,公司的利潤率很高,并且希望擴(kuò)張。消費(fèi)者資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表狀況良好。漢克補(bǔ)充說,即使在幾次加息之后,許多類別的利率仍然可能低于通貨膨脹水平,這讓新抵押貸款之類的貸款依舊很劃算。在這種情況下,即便在美聯(lián)儲加息的情況下,貨幣供應(yīng)量也可能繼續(xù)增長。

經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退要來了嗎?

漢克對一件事情深信不疑:為避免經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退,美聯(lián)儲必須關(guān)注貨幣供應(yīng)量,這需要對美聯(lián)儲控制的兩個杠桿(量化寬松和利率)進(jìn)行精細(xì)的操控。他說,保持貨幣供應(yīng)量增長至關(guān)重要,這是因?yàn)槊绹际窃谪泿殴?yīng)量不斷增加的情況下實(shí)現(xiàn)軟著陸的。漢克說:“即使在美聯(lián)儲加息的情況下,例如1965年、1984年和1994-1995年,也沒有發(fā)生經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退現(xiàn)象,這是因?yàn)樨泿殴?yīng)量的增長足以支撐購買力?!毕啾戎?,所有的經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退現(xiàn)象都以廣義貨幣的急劇下降為特征——漢克列舉了1973年、1988-1989年和1999-2000年的例子。他認(rèn)為美聯(lián)儲可能出錯的方式有兩種:其一,他們看到可怕的月度通貨膨脹數(shù)字感到驚慌,以至于過度加息或過快地縮減資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表,從而沖擊了貨幣供應(yīng)量,造成經(jīng)濟(jì)崩潰。其次,如果美國總統(tǒng)喬·拜登政府認(rèn)為,在即將到來的選舉中,經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退將比惡性通貨膨脹更具破壞性,他們可能會繼續(xù)向鮑威爾發(fā)出指令,鮑威爾可以保持貨幣供應(yīng)量增加。在這種情況下,傳說中的浴缸要花費(fèi)兩年多的時間才能夠排出過去錯誤帶來的過剩物質(zhì)。

漢克表示,正確的做法是調(diào)整各種杠桿,以實(shí)現(xiàn)理想的6%的貨幣供應(yīng)量增長率,保證美聯(lián)儲2%的通貨膨脹目標(biāo)。比如,如果盡管聯(lián)邦基金利率大幅上調(diào),但銀行貸款仍然在快速增長,就可能有必要加快資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表的流失,從而抑制廣義貨幣增長。或者,如果加息大大減少了信貸,廣義貨幣下降的速度超過預(yù)期,美聯(lián)儲就可以減緩或暫停縮減資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表,以確保政策組合達(dá)到6%的目標(biāo)。

然而,在美國國會的證詞中,鮑威爾明確表示,貨幣供應(yīng)量狀況對經(jīng)濟(jì)進(jìn)程幾乎沒有影響或根本沒有影響,這一立場讓漢克懷疑他是否可以正確處理微妙的平衡。漢克將美聯(lián)儲比作昔日倒霉的飛行員道格拉斯·科里根(綽號為“迷路的科里根”)。1938年,科里根進(jìn)行了一次著名的橫跨大陸的飛行,他計(jì)劃從長灘飛到紐約。然后,他向東而不是向西出發(fā),因此,他沒有按照計(jì)劃返回加利福尼亞,而是最終降落在愛爾蘭,這讓他很是吃驚。科里根指責(zé)是過厚的云層使他飛錯了方向,飛了2500英里(約4023.36千米)。這次不幸的經(jīng)歷為他贏得了一個不朽的綽號,漢克用這個綽號來形容美聯(lián)儲:“迷路的美聯(lián)儲”。美聯(lián)儲這位飛行員忽視了使我們經(jīng)濟(jì)平穩(wěn)、安全著陸所需的一項(xiàng)關(guān)鍵的指標(biāo)。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))

譯者:中慧言-王芳

A prestigious chorus of experts now forecast that a U.S. recession is practically a sure thing. In an April 14 interview, former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers declared, "There has never been a moment when inflation was above 4% and unemployment below 5% when we didn't have a recession within two years." Summers chided the Fed for suggesting that a "soft landing" is likely, advising its leaders to level with the public by issuing a far more realistic, and rocky, view for the road ahead. Summers put the odds of a recession at "quite possibly at two-thirds or more." A couple of weeks earlier, Bill Dudley, who headed the New York Fed from 2009 to 2018, gave an even gloomier assessment in a Bloomberg oped, warning that "the Fed has made a recession inevitable." For Dudley, the central bank misfired by keeping monetary policy so loose, for so long, that "cooling things off" will require a tightening cycle so severe that it's bound to send the economy from a boom to a tailspin.

Even the most usually dovish of the Fed braintrust are turning hawkish. Governor Lael Brainard and Minneapolis Fed chief Neel Kashkari, among other traditional progressives, are calling for big, fast increases in the Fed Funds rate and a rapid shrinkage in the central bank's balance sheet, tough measures that frequently trigger steep downturns.

A year ago, a prominent economist used the orthodox quantity theory of money to predict what the Fed and almost all of his peers missed: That an inflationary explosion was close at hand. He even hit the mark by predicting that prices would be roaring at 6% and as much as 9% by the close of 2021. He's Steve Hanke, a hardcore monetarist and professor of applied economics at Johns Hopkins University. Hanke made the prescient call on inflation in a July 2021 oped in the Wall Street Journal co-authored with his Johns Hopkins colleague and the former Invesco chief economist John Greenwood. Now Hanke agrees with Summers and Dudley that the we're facing a high probability of a recession. But he reaches that conclusion for very different reasons.

Hanke asserts that the Fed could avoid tanking the economy by simply following the playbook that has on occasion worked in past periods of leap in inflation. "The real problem isn't that a flight to safety is impossible, it's the Fed's policies," Hanke told Fortune.

Added the veteran amateur pilot: "The Fed's like a pilot that's ignoring the altimeter that shows the plane's altitude. It needs to stop flying blind to achieve the soft landing that Chairman Jerome Powell is promising." Hanke thinks the Fed can still avert that dreaded crash landing—but it must exercise precision to hit the right targets, something it is currently not doing.

What caused the jump in inflation

For Hanke, the "altimeter" that always and solely determines the rate of inflation is the level and trajectory of the money supply. That's the crucial yardstick the Fed's shunned to get us into this mess, and the one it must follow to get us out. For Hanke, it was the Fed's money printing marshaled to fund the blowout in deficits that spawned today's price pressures. "High fiscal deficits don't in themselves cause inflation," he explains. "If the citizens buy the bonds, they transfer their spending power to the government, but inflation wouldn't go up. Instead, it's the Fed that's been buying the bonds with printed money. It was like a helicopter dumping new dollars across America." The extra trillions in outlays aimed at combating the COVID crisis spawned the deficits. The Fed then "monetized" over 90% those extra fiscal shortfalls by creating dollars, and in the process, fattened the money supply. Indeed, the Fed piled an incredible $3.8 trillion of newly-issued Treasuries on its balance sheet since February of 2020, almost tripling its holdings.

In pursuing that policy of Quantitative Easing, the Fed swelled the money supply, or M2, by close to a cumulative 41% in just over two years. "That's an unprecedented increase," Hanke notes. He likes to compare how that green tide lifts inflation, to the buildup of water in a bathtub. "If the faucet is wide open as in the past two years, the water enters much faster than it can drain out," he says. "That's been happening since February of 2020." The rising water level, or the excess money supply, drains via two valves. The first is "real" growth in GDP as the economy produces more goods and services. The second is "demand for money," as peoples' holdings in cash, checking and money market accounts rise along with their incomes.

The two exit valves, he says, will drain only part of that accumulation––and leave a glut that will overflow the tub as extra inflation. "There's a lag of 12 to 24 months before a huge buildup in the money supply turns into inflation," he says. "That's what I saw in mid-2021 that led me to call big price increases by the end of the year. But the Fed ignored that signal completely." Hence, Hanke notes that whatever the Fed's course of action now, he predicts the U.S. will be stuck with inflation of 6% or more this year, through all of 2023, and perhaps into the early months of 2024, as the excess keeps draining out of the the monetary's bathtub's overflow valve.

For Hanke, the solution is slowing the money supply to a golden growth rate of around 6% a year. At that pace, the amount of water entering should fill the tub just enough so that the Fed hits its inflation target of 2%. Back of the envelope, says Hanke, 2% of that money supply growth fuels real economic expansion, 2% goes to accommodate the increase in the demand for money, and 2% is left in the tub to eventually flow through the inflation overflow valve. But it's not clear that will happen, because the Fed isn't watching the money supply at all. Here's strong evidence: Even now, long after the Fed killed the "transitory" label and declared inflation a major problem last November, M2 is growing year over year at an 11% clip, almost double the ideal rate of 6%. For Hanke, the Fed should fight inflation by tuning its instruments to steer the money supply on the correct course. Instead, the Fed pledges to push its levers without regard to M2, which for Hanke is the equivalent of flying without a gauge, not knowing whether you're motoring over the clouds or skimming the ground.

The two sources of inflation

As Hanke points out, the jump in the money supply that's causing all this pricing pressure has two sources. The first is the Fed itself. Its hand in monetizing the deficits that funded the spending blowout accounts for the biggest portion of the hangover we're experiencing today. It's the fount the Fed now targets by shrinking its balance sheet. The central bank ended its quantitative easing or QE campaign of amassing Treasuries with newly-minted money in March. The markets are expecting the Fed to start letting Treasuries run off as they mature and also reduce their holdings of mortgage backed securities starting in May, marking a shift to QT or Quantitative Tightening. "There's no question that shrinking the balance sheet is a predictable instrument for lowering the Fed's contribution to the money supply," says Hanke. The problem is whether the central bank gets the pace correct, and they could get it extremely wrong if they're not watching the money supply reading.

The second source is the commercial banks. The more dollars they lend, the faster M2 increases, and banks have been extending big volumes of new home, refi, and credit card loans in these flush times. Put simply, the more dollars banks channel to borrowers, the faster the money supply expands.

The Fed's strategy of sharply raising the Fed Funds rate is aimed at the second source––curbing credit furnished by banks. But Hanke fears that over-reliance on lifting rates is where the trouble lies. "There's no clear linkage between an increase in the Fed Funds rate and changes in the growth rate of the money supply provided by banks," he notes. "Most people think that raising the Fed Fund rate automatically indicates a tightening of monetary policy. But that's not necessarily the case. You don't know if the Fed's tightened until you look at the money supply numbers." (Read: the altimeter.) He notes the current strong demand for credit is clouding the picture. Companies have high margins and want to expand, he observes. Consumer balance sheets are in good shape. Even after a few hikes, adds Hanke, many categories of interest rates could remain below the level of inflation, making the likes of new mortgages still a bargain. In that instance, the money supply could keep growing even in the face of Fed rate increases.

Is a recession coming?

Hanke is convinced of one thing: to avoid a recession the Fed must follow the money supply, something that will require an exquisitely fine maneuvering of both levers the Fed has control over (QE and interest rates). It's vital to keep the money supply growing, because all the times the U.S. has achieved a soft landing, he says, have occurred when the money supply kept waxing. "Even in the cases where the Fed raised rates as in 1965, 1984, and 1994-5, the economy didn't suffer a swoon because money supply growth supported sufficient buying power," he says. By contrast, all recessions are characterized by sharp declines in M2––Hanke cites the examples of 1973, 1988-1989, and 1999-2000. There are two ways he thinks the Fed could go wrong: One, they become so panicked by the scary monthly inflation numbers that they overdo it by raising rates too high or shrinking the balance sheet too rapidly so that they hammer the money supply, crashing the economy. Second, if the Joe Biden Administration figures that a recession will be even more damaging in the coming elections than rampant inflation, they could keep whispering to Powell, who could keep the money supply goosed. In that case it'll take much longer than two years for the fabled tub to drain the excess from past mistakes.

The right course, he says, is adjusting the various levers to achieve the ideal 6% growth rate in the money supply that assures the Fed's 2% target. For example, if despite big increases in the Fed Funds rate, bank lending keeps going gangbusters, it might be necessary to hasten the runoff in the balance sheet that throttles back M2. Or if rate increases greatly diminish credit and shrink M2 more rapidly than expected, the Fed could slow or pause the decline in its balance sheet to ensure the policy mix that hits the 6% goal.

However, in Congressional testimony, Powell has explicitly stated that the status of money supply has little or no effect on the course of the economy, a position that makes Hanke skeptical that he'll get the delicate balance right. Hanke compares the central bank to a hapless flyer of yore, Douglas "Wrong Way" Corrigan. In 1938, Corrigan made a celebrated transcontinental flight from Long Beach to New York. Then, instead of cruising back to California as planned, he took off east instead of west, landing apparently to his own amazement, in Ireland. Corrigan blamed heavy cloud cover for winging 2500 miles the wrong way. The misadventure earned him an immortal nickname revived by Hanke to characterize what he calls the "Wrong Way Fed," the pilot that's ignoring the one, crucial gauge needed to bring our economy to a smooth, safe landing.

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