價(jià)值股優(yōu)先于成長(zhǎng)股。要想在股票長(zhǎng)線投資中有所收獲,這個(gè)理論大概比其他任何理念都更管用。選擇便宜、受冷落的價(jià)值股是股市中大多數(shù)有影響力的學(xué)生所奉行的策略:例如格雷厄姆和多德,以及沃倫巴菲特的多名資金管理人,還有丹尼爾?羅埃布。這一點(diǎn)在長(zhǎng)線投資方面異常奏效:一個(gè)在過去6年中僅購(gòu)買價(jià)值股的家庭如今比僅購(gòu)買成長(zhǎng)股的家庭富有4倍。
然而在最近幾年中,這些長(zhǎng)線優(yōu)勝股卻不斷地?cái)〗o這個(gè)傳統(tǒng)上的輸家,而且是慘敗。價(jià)值股長(zhǎng)期在超低價(jià)位徘徊,以至于華爾街很多人士都認(rèn)為我們已經(jīng)進(jìn)入了一個(gè)新模式。多年來,超級(jí)明星科技股已經(jīng)遠(yuǎn)超諸如銀行和制造業(yè)領(lǐng)域那些平價(jià)股知名企業(yè)。此外,新冠疫情引發(fā)的大封鎖也延長(zhǎng)了成長(zhǎng)股相對(duì)于價(jià)值股的優(yōu)勢(shì),并創(chuàng)下了歷史新高。隨著消費(fèi)者購(gòu)買居家辦公用數(shù)字產(chǎn)品,并像潮水般涌入線上購(gòu)物平臺(tái),像蘋果和亞馬遜這樣的公司一片欣欣向榮,而航空、零售和酒店等行業(yè)價(jià)值股的擁躉們則遭受了數(shù)十年以來最嚴(yán)重的打擊。
短線投資者認(rèn)為科技公司將繼續(xù)在這一領(lǐng)域處于引領(lǐng)地位。持有這一觀點(diǎn)的人越來越多:即便科技企業(yè)發(fā)展成了科技巨頭,他們依然可以保持超快的增速,因?yàn)樵陂_發(fā)突破性領(lǐng)域和產(chǎn)品方面,他們可選的內(nèi)容太多。
成長(zhǎng)股如今成為了投資熱土,這一點(diǎn)不足為奇。在過去13年中,遭到冷落的價(jià)值股在這個(gè)光鮮亮麗的門類面前一直都是不堪一擊,也創(chuàng)下了歷史上股市特價(jià)股遇冷時(shí)長(zhǎng)的新高。然而,盡管長(zhǎng)期以來都處于連敗狀態(tài),但有關(guān)價(jià)值股消亡的廣泛討論已經(jīng)進(jìn)入了歧途,而且在當(dāng)前的市場(chǎng)環(huán)境下更是有點(diǎn)剛愎自用的意味。
加州大學(xué)洛杉磯分校的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)博士維塔利?卡勒斯尼克說:“隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)在未來幾年的恢復(fù),當(dāng)前這個(gè)環(huán)境正是價(jià)值股表現(xiàn)遠(yuǎn)超成長(zhǎng)股的絕佳時(shí)機(jī)。”維塔利還擔(dān)任Research Affiliates的歐洲市場(chǎng)研究主任,該公司致力于為1480億美元的共同基金和交易所交易基金設(shè)計(jì)投資策略。
價(jià)值股看起來如此有希望以及其與成長(zhǎng)股對(duì)決輸?shù)囊粩⊥康氐脑蚝芎?jiǎn)單。在歷史上,價(jià)值股相對(duì)于成長(zhǎng)股以及大盤的價(jià)差越大,那么未來超越的幅度就越大。兩者之間的鴻溝越大,價(jià)值股的反彈能力就越大。
在新冠疫情經(jīng)濟(jì)中,兩者之間的差距之大可謂是前所未有。但差距如今只是發(fā)揮作用的三大推手之一。第二:價(jià)值股傳統(tǒng)上在走出深度衰退之后會(huì)出現(xiàn)飆升,而且美國(guó)正在經(jīng)歷自大蕭條以來最嚴(yán)重的經(jīng)濟(jì)下行時(shí)期。
第三個(gè)因素:當(dāng)受影響的經(jīng)濟(jì)刺破股市泡沫時(shí),價(jià)值股將成為最大的贏家。離此次泡沫破滅的時(shí)間可能不遠(yuǎn)了。受所謂的 FANMAG(即Facebook、蘋果、Netflix、微軟、亞馬遜和谷歌母公司Alphabet)的引領(lǐng),成長(zhǎng)股如今已經(jīng)達(dá)到了自2000年科技狂熱盛會(huì)以來的最高價(jià)格。
來自于過去經(jīng)濟(jì)下行時(shí)期的教訓(xùn)
在一篇新發(fā)表的名為《經(jīng)濟(jì)蕭條與恢復(fù)期間的價(jià)值股》的上好文章中,作者卡勒斯尼克與合著者阿瑞?波利克羅諾波羅斯探討了為什么價(jià)值股的大幅下探以及成長(zhǎng)股的持續(xù)大幅走高預(yù)示著財(cái)富的驚艷反轉(zhuǎn)。他們審視了價(jià)值股在此前6個(gè)下行期間相對(duì)于大盤的表現(xiàn),以及隨后的反彈。我與卡勒斯尼克進(jìn)行了對(duì)話,以了解如果以史為鑒,新冠疫情之后股市將以什么樣方式的回歸。
作者認(rèn)為,這兩股力量中的其中一個(gè)(或者同時(shí)兩個(gè),很罕見)都是其所研究的6次經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退的背后推手,分別是經(jīng)濟(jì)基本面受重大影響,或者股市泡沫的破滅。在其中四次衰退中,起因是經(jīng)濟(jì)基本面受到重創(chuàng),1968年至1970年越戰(zhàn)期間的財(cái)政緊縮;1980-1982年之間的伊朗石油危機(jī);1990年中期至末期美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)一手導(dǎo)演的利率上調(diào);以及2007-2009年初的全球金融危機(jī)。2000年的科技股崩盤是唯一一個(gè)由股市崩盤唱主角的事件。只有一次衰退源自于經(jīng)濟(jì)動(dòng)蕩與股市崩潰的合力,也就是1972-1974年間,歐佩克石油危機(jī)導(dǎo)致了“50只熱門大盤股”的劇烈回調(diào),這些公司包括IBM、Polaroid和露華濃,也就是當(dāng)時(shí)的FANMAG。
對(duì)于每一個(gè)時(shí)期,作者都會(huì)建立一個(gè)“價(jià)值股”倉(cāng),其中涵蓋30%的標(biāo)普500市盈率最低的股票,意味著與其凈價(jià)值相比,它們的市值已經(jīng)處于最低點(diǎn),也就是其資產(chǎn)超過了其債務(wù)。對(duì)于那些進(jìn)入這一最末尾梯隊(duì)的公司來說,投資者對(duì)其未來銷售增長(zhǎng)和盈利能力十分悲觀。這些市凈率較低的股票都是市場(chǎng)的失敗者。它們與流星股截然相反,后者被給予了與其凈值或營(yíng)收非常不匹配的高市值,意味著投資者寄希望于這些公司在未來能夠斬獲遠(yuǎn)超當(dāng)前銷售和利潤(rùn)的史詩(shī)級(jí)業(yè)績(jī)。
盡管僅有一次衰退源于狂暴股市的崩盤,但所有6次經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退都出現(xiàn)了熊市。總的來說,在拋售狂潮期間,價(jià)值股的跌幅要小于標(biāo)普500的整體跌幅。平均來說,市凈率最低的股票下跌了23.8%,而整個(gè)標(biāo)普500的跌幅達(dá)到了32.2%,差距超過了8個(gè)百分點(diǎn)。
價(jià)值股表現(xiàn)真正突出的時(shí)段在于恢復(fù)期。在市場(chǎng)觸底之后平均兩年的時(shí)間中,價(jià)值股躍升了85.6%,大幅超越了標(biāo)普500整體61.4%的增幅。從市場(chǎng)下行的開始到經(jīng)濟(jì)完全恢復(fù)的整個(gè)階段,價(jià)值股的表現(xiàn)亦超出了平均水平。價(jià)值股全周期回報(bào)率為38.5%,是標(biāo)普500整體水平的5倍多。
鑒于當(dāng)前的環(huán)境,我們尤為有必要弄明白,當(dāng)標(biāo)普500在循環(huán)伊始出現(xiàn)股價(jià)過高現(xiàn)象后造成了什么后果。在此前的兩個(gè)情形中,價(jià)值股超越股指的幅度最大。價(jià)值股在歐佩克危機(jī)期間的超越幅度達(dá)到了47%,而“50只大熱股”則走下了高位;在科技泡沫破滅的2000年(純粹的經(jīng)濟(jì)受股市崩盤拖累),價(jià)值股從熊市開始到經(jīng)濟(jì)在2004年秋季完全恢復(fù)這一期間增長(zhǎng)了62.2%。在同一時(shí)期,標(biāo)普下跌了20.3%,意味著購(gòu)買那些超低價(jià)股的投資者斬獲的收益高出大盤82.5%。
“我們進(jìn)入了一個(gè)泡沫時(shí)期”
卡勒斯尼克警告說,如今的情形與二十年前科技股災(zāi)難之前的興奮期十分相似。同時(shí),他也十分反對(duì)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)泡沫時(shí)期那種“這一次不一樣”的論調(diào)。他指出,過去幾年中股市的增長(zhǎng)大多源于少數(shù)幾家包括FANMAG在內(nèi)的熱門科技公司,以及那些快速增長(zhǎng)的企業(yè),例如特斯拉和PayPal。這六家巨頭(FANMAG)的市值從2007年初的5260億美元(占標(biāo)普500總市值4%)飆升至如今的7.1萬億美元(占標(biāo)普500總市值的24%)。如果沒有這些公司巨大的貢獻(xiàn),自2007年初之后的大盤回報(bào)率將下滑30%。
卡勒斯尼克說:“我們進(jìn)入了一個(gè)泡沫時(shí)期。四分之一的市值都集中在少數(shù)公司,它們的總體市盈率和市凈率異常之高。支撐這個(gè)股價(jià)的背后希望是,這些公司在未來能夠以其初創(chuàng)之時(shí)的速度無限發(fā)展壯大。”在他看來,這種市值高度集中在超高價(jià)股上的情況屬于“危險(xiǎn)現(xiàn)象”。
因此,這些高價(jià)FANMAG股以及包括特斯拉在內(nèi)的其他火箭股,在大盤暴跌時(shí)異常脆弱。在這個(gè)理論的支撐下,可能出現(xiàn)的情況是,價(jià)值股的表現(xiàn)超越成長(zhǎng)股的幅度甚至比此前大多數(shù)經(jīng)濟(jì)恢復(fù)期的幅度更大。此外,價(jià)值股應(yīng)該還會(huì)受益于成長(zhǎng)股高額股票折扣的收緊。
在過去57年當(dāng)中,成長(zhǎng)股的平均市凈率是價(jià)值股的4.7倍。今年1月底之前狂暴的牛市期間,這個(gè)倍數(shù)飆升至9倍。然后3月出現(xiàn)的大幅拋售讓標(biāo)普暴跌了約35%。值得注意的是,價(jià)值股受到的影響甚至比成長(zhǎng)股還要大,部分原因在于科技股發(fā)力了,而且理由十分充分:封鎖期間,線上銷售以及科技設(shè)備和服務(wù)的銷售,從視頻游戲到虛擬會(huì)議等一切的一切,呈現(xiàn)出一片欣欣向榮的景象。結(jié)果,截至3月底,兩者之間的市凈率比值達(dá)到了10.3。然后市場(chǎng)出現(xiàn)了反彈,成長(zhǎng)股再次擊敗價(jià)值股。像能源、航空和金融這類行業(yè)恢復(fù)了些許元?dú)猓h(yuǎn)低于其今年年初的水平,而所有6家公司(FANMAG)的股價(jià)在標(biāo)普升至創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄水平的期間達(dá)到了歷史新高。
因此對(duì)比成長(zhǎng)股,價(jià)值股已經(jīng)處于白菜價(jià)價(jià)位。但它真是劃算的交易嗎,還是在泡沫不斷膨脹、占主導(dǎo)地位的科技公司大軍面前看起來是個(gè)劃算的交易。卡勒斯尼克說:“最終,成長(zhǎng)股已經(jīng)來到其歷史上的最貴價(jià)位區(qū)間,而價(jià)值股則處于歷史上的最便宜價(jià)位區(qū)間。”如今,價(jià)值股的市凈率約為0.58,是過去60年平均水平的70%。在最近的2014年和2017年,其市凈率是當(dāng)前的兩倍。
這一舉措尤為有意義。當(dāng)價(jià)值股看起來已經(jīng)是毫無后勁時(shí),它不僅僅是過熱大市值股市中最值得推薦的股票,也是十分劃算的股票,僅此而已。擔(dān)憂能夠帶來不俗的折扣和較大的收益,而且擔(dān)憂一直伴隨著價(jià)值股。卡勒斯尼克說:“包括能源、金融和航空公司在內(nèi)的公司終將恢復(fù)。當(dāng)然,每一個(gè)行業(yè)都會(huì)有公司破產(chǎn)。但整體來說,它們才是經(jīng)濟(jì)的重要領(lǐng)域,而且其銷售和利潤(rùn)會(huì)回歸到以前水平。”
另一方面,如今的超級(jí)新星們將吸引饑餓的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者,而且已經(jīng)引發(fā)了多起政治審查。與此同時(shí),當(dāng)投資者意識(shí)到它們無法滿足華爾街超前的預(yù)測(cè)以及投資者膨脹的預(yù)期時(shí),這些超級(jí)新星們便會(huì)敲響退堂鼓。此外,全球投資者對(duì)價(jià)值股的預(yù)期甚至要低于或遠(yuǎn)低于正常水平。因此,這些被低估的價(jià)值股很有可能會(huì)超過投資者微不足道的預(yù)期。有鑒于價(jià)值股展現(xiàn)了自己越過這一超低門檻的能力,因此它們將像此前幾次經(jīng)濟(jì)恢復(fù)期間那樣,提供可觀的收益。最保險(xiǎn)的賭注在于,歷史將在未來重演,因此價(jià)值股也會(huì)再次成為冠軍,而且以大幅優(yōu)勢(shì)奪冠。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:Feb
價(jià)值股優(yōu)先于成長(zhǎng)股。要想在股票長(zhǎng)線投資中有所收獲,這個(gè)理論大概比其他任何理念都更管用。選擇便宜、受冷落的價(jià)值股是股市中大多數(shù)有影響力的學(xué)生所奉行的策略:例如格雷厄姆和多德,以及沃倫巴菲特的多名資金管理人,還有丹尼爾?羅埃布。這一點(diǎn)在長(zhǎng)線投資方面異常奏效:一個(gè)在過去6年中僅購(gòu)買價(jià)值股的家庭如今比僅購(gòu)買成長(zhǎng)股的家庭富有4倍。
然而在最近幾年中,這些長(zhǎng)線優(yōu)勝股卻不斷地?cái)〗o這個(gè)傳統(tǒng)上的輸家,而且是慘敗。價(jià)值股長(zhǎng)期在超低價(jià)位徘徊,以至于華爾街很多人士都認(rèn)為我們已經(jīng)進(jìn)入了一個(gè)新模式。多年來,超級(jí)明星科技股已經(jīng)遠(yuǎn)超諸如銀行和制造業(yè)領(lǐng)域那些平價(jià)股知名企業(yè)。此外,新冠疫情引發(fā)的大封鎖也延長(zhǎng)了成長(zhǎng)股相對(duì)于價(jià)值股的優(yōu)勢(shì),并創(chuàng)下了歷史新高。隨著消費(fèi)者購(gòu)買居家辦公用數(shù)字產(chǎn)品,并像潮水般涌入線上購(gòu)物平臺(tái),像蘋果和亞馬遜這樣的公司一片欣欣向榮,而航空、零售和酒店等行業(yè)價(jià)值股的擁躉們則遭受了數(shù)十年以來最嚴(yán)重的打擊。
短線投資者認(rèn)為科技公司將繼續(xù)在這一領(lǐng)域處于引領(lǐng)地位。持有這一觀點(diǎn)的人越來越多:即便科技企業(yè)發(fā)展成了科技巨頭,他們依然可以保持超快的增速,因?yàn)樵陂_發(fā)突破性領(lǐng)域和產(chǎn)品方面,他們可選的內(nèi)容太多。
成長(zhǎng)股如今成為了投資熱土,這一點(diǎn)不足為奇。在過去13年中,遭到冷落的價(jià)值股在這個(gè)光鮮亮麗的門類面前一直都是不堪一擊,也創(chuàng)下了歷史上股市特價(jià)股遇冷時(shí)長(zhǎng)的新高。然而,盡管長(zhǎng)期以來都處于連敗狀態(tài),但有關(guān)價(jià)值股消亡的廣泛討論已經(jīng)進(jìn)入了歧途,而且在當(dāng)前的市場(chǎng)環(huán)境下更是有點(diǎn)剛愎自用的意味。
加州大學(xué)洛杉磯分校的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)博士維塔利?卡勒斯尼克說:“隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)在未來幾年的恢復(fù),當(dāng)前這個(gè)環(huán)境正是價(jià)值股表現(xiàn)遠(yuǎn)超成長(zhǎng)股的絕佳時(shí)機(jī)。”維塔利還擔(dān)任Research Affiliates的歐洲市場(chǎng)研究主任,該公司致力于為1480億美元的共同基金和交易所交易基金設(shè)計(jì)投資策略。
價(jià)值股看起來如此有希望以及其與成長(zhǎng)股對(duì)決輸?shù)囊粩⊥康氐脑蚝芎?jiǎn)單。在歷史上,價(jià)值股相對(duì)于成長(zhǎng)股以及大盤的價(jià)差越大,那么未來超越的幅度就越大。兩者之間的鴻溝越大,價(jià)值股的反彈能力就越大。
在新冠疫情經(jīng)濟(jì)中,兩者之間的差距之大可謂是前所未有。但差距如今只是發(fā)揮作用的三大推手之一。第二:價(jià)值股傳統(tǒng)上在走出深度衰退之后會(huì)出現(xiàn)飆升,而且美國(guó)正在經(jīng)歷自大蕭條以來最嚴(yán)重的經(jīng)濟(jì)下行時(shí)期。
第三個(gè)因素:當(dāng)受影響的經(jīng)濟(jì)刺破股市泡沫時(shí),價(jià)值股將成為最大的贏家。離此次泡沫破滅的時(shí)間可能不遠(yuǎn)了。受所謂的 FANMAG(即Facebook、蘋果、Netflix、微軟、亞馬遜和谷歌母公司Alphabet)的引領(lǐng),成長(zhǎng)股如今已經(jīng)達(dá)到了自2000年科技狂熱盛會(huì)以來的最高價(jià)格。
來自于過去經(jīng)濟(jì)下行時(shí)期的教訓(xùn)
在一篇新發(fā)表的名為《經(jīng)濟(jì)蕭條與恢復(fù)期間的價(jià)值股》的上好文章中,作者卡勒斯尼克與合著者阿瑞?波利克羅諾波羅斯探討了為什么價(jià)值股的大幅下探以及成長(zhǎng)股的持續(xù)大幅走高預(yù)示著財(cái)富的驚艷反轉(zhuǎn)。他們審視了價(jià)值股在此前6個(gè)下行期間相對(duì)于大盤的表現(xiàn),以及隨后的反彈。我與卡勒斯尼克進(jìn)行了對(duì)話,以了解如果以史為鑒,新冠疫情之后股市將以什么樣方式的回歸。
作者認(rèn)為,這兩股力量中的其中一個(gè)(或者同時(shí)兩個(gè),很罕見)都是其所研究的6次經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退的背后推手,分別是經(jīng)濟(jì)基本面受重大影響,或者股市泡沫的破滅。在其中四次衰退中,起因是經(jīng)濟(jì)基本面受到重創(chuàng),1968年至1970年越戰(zhàn)期間的財(cái)政緊縮;1980-1982年之間的伊朗石油危機(jī);1990年中期至末期美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)一手導(dǎo)演的利率上調(diào);以及2007-2009年初的全球金融危機(jī)。2000年的科技股崩盤是唯一一個(gè)由股市崩盤唱主角的事件。只有一次衰退源自于經(jīng)濟(jì)動(dòng)蕩與股市崩潰的合力,也就是1972-1974年間,歐佩克石油危機(jī)導(dǎo)致了“50只熱門大盤股”的劇烈回調(diào),這些公司包括IBM、Polaroid和露華濃,也就是當(dāng)時(shí)的FANMAG。
對(duì)于每一個(gè)時(shí)期,作者都會(huì)建立一個(gè)“價(jià)值股”倉(cāng),其中涵蓋30%的標(biāo)普500市盈率最低的股票,意味著與其凈價(jià)值相比,它們的市值已經(jīng)處于最低點(diǎn),也就是其資產(chǎn)超過了其債務(wù)。對(duì)于那些進(jìn)入這一最末尾梯隊(duì)的公司來說,投資者對(duì)其未來銷售增長(zhǎng)和盈利能力十分悲觀。這些市凈率較低的股票都是市場(chǎng)的失敗者。它們與流星股截然相反,后者被給予了與其凈值或營(yíng)收非常不匹配的高市值,意味著投資者寄希望于這些公司在未來能夠斬獲遠(yuǎn)超當(dāng)前銷售和利潤(rùn)的史詩(shī)級(jí)業(yè)績(jī)。
盡管僅有一次衰退源于狂暴股市的崩盤,但所有6次經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退都出現(xiàn)了熊市。總的來說,在拋售狂潮期間,價(jià)值股的跌幅要小于標(biāo)普500的整體跌幅。平均來說,市凈率最低的股票下跌了23.8%,而整個(gè)標(biāo)普500的跌幅達(dá)到了32.2%,差距超過了8個(gè)百分點(diǎn)。
價(jià)值股表現(xiàn)真正突出的時(shí)段在于恢復(fù)期。在市場(chǎng)觸底之后平均兩年的時(shí)間中,價(jià)值股躍升了85.6%,大幅超越了標(biāo)普500整體61.4%的增幅。從市場(chǎng)下行的開始到經(jīng)濟(jì)完全恢復(fù)的整個(gè)階段,價(jià)值股的表現(xiàn)亦超出了平均水平。價(jià)值股全周期回報(bào)率為38.5%,是標(biāo)普500整體水平的5倍多。
鑒于當(dāng)前的環(huán)境,我們尤為有必要弄明白,當(dāng)標(biāo)普500在循環(huán)伊始出現(xiàn)股價(jià)過高現(xiàn)象后造成了什么后果。在此前的兩個(gè)情形中,價(jià)值股超越股指的幅度最大。價(jià)值股在歐佩克危機(jī)期間的超越幅度達(dá)到了47%,而“50只大熱股”則走下了高位;在科技泡沫破滅的2000年(純粹的經(jīng)濟(jì)受股市崩盤拖累),價(jià)值股從熊市開始到經(jīng)濟(jì)在2004年秋季完全恢復(fù)這一期間增長(zhǎng)了62.2%。在同一時(shí)期,標(biāo)普下跌了20.3%,意味著購(gòu)買那些超低價(jià)股的投資者斬獲的收益高出大盤82.5%。
“我們進(jìn)入了一個(gè)泡沫時(shí)期”
卡勒斯尼克警告說,如今的情形與二十年前科技股災(zāi)難之前的興奮期十分相似。同時(shí),他也十分反對(duì)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)泡沫時(shí)期那種“這一次不一樣”的論調(diào)。他指出,過去幾年中股市的增長(zhǎng)大多源于少數(shù)幾家包括FANMAG在內(nèi)的熱門科技公司,以及那些快速增長(zhǎng)的企業(yè),例如特斯拉和PayPal。這六家巨頭(FANMAG)的市值從2007年初的5260億美元(占標(biāo)普500總市值4%)飆升至如今的7.1萬億美元(占標(biāo)普500總市值的24%)。如果沒有這些公司巨大的貢獻(xiàn),自2007年初之后的大盤回報(bào)率將下滑30%。
卡勒斯尼克說:“我們進(jìn)入了一個(gè)泡沫時(shí)期。四分之一的市值都集中在少數(shù)公司,它們的總體市盈率和市凈率異常之高。支撐這個(gè)股價(jià)的背后希望是,這些公司在未來能夠以其初創(chuàng)之時(shí)的速度無限發(fā)展壯大。”在他看來,這種市值高度集中在超高價(jià)股上的情況屬于“危險(xiǎn)現(xiàn)象”。
因此,這些高價(jià)FANMAG股以及包括特斯拉在內(nèi)的其他火箭股,在大盤暴跌時(shí)異常脆弱。在這個(gè)理論的支撐下,可能出現(xiàn)的情況是,價(jià)值股的表現(xiàn)超越成長(zhǎng)股的幅度甚至比此前大多數(shù)經(jīng)濟(jì)恢復(fù)期的幅度更大。此外,價(jià)值股應(yīng)該還會(huì)受益于成長(zhǎng)股高額股票折扣的收緊。
在過去57年當(dāng)中,成長(zhǎng)股的平均市凈率是價(jià)值股的4.7倍。今年1月底之前狂暴的牛市期間,這個(gè)倍數(shù)飆升至9倍。然后3月出現(xiàn)的大幅拋售讓標(biāo)普暴跌了約35%。值得注意的是,價(jià)值股受到的影響甚至比成長(zhǎng)股還要大,部分原因在于科技股發(fā)力了,而且理由十分充分:封鎖期間,線上銷售以及科技設(shè)備和服務(wù)的銷售,從視頻游戲到虛擬會(huì)議等一切的一切,呈現(xiàn)出一片欣欣向榮的景象。結(jié)果,截至3月底,兩者之間的市凈率比值達(dá)到了10.3。然后市場(chǎng)出現(xiàn)了反彈,成長(zhǎng)股再次擊敗價(jià)值股。像能源、航空和金融這類行業(yè)恢復(fù)了些許元?dú)猓h(yuǎn)低于其今年年初的水平,而所有6家公司(FANMAG)的股價(jià)在標(biāo)普升至創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄水平的期間達(dá)到了歷史新高。
因此對(duì)比成長(zhǎng)股,價(jià)值股已經(jīng)處于白菜價(jià)價(jià)位。但它真是劃算的交易嗎,還是在泡沫不斷膨脹、占主導(dǎo)地位的科技公司大軍面前看起來是個(gè)劃算的交易。卡勒斯尼克說:“最終,成長(zhǎng)股已經(jīng)來到其歷史上的最貴價(jià)位區(qū)間,而價(jià)值股則處于歷史上的最便宜價(jià)位區(qū)間。”如今,價(jià)值股的市凈率約為0.58,是過去60年平均水平的70%。在最近的2014年和2017年,其市凈率是當(dāng)前的兩倍。
這一舉措尤為有意義。當(dāng)價(jià)值股看起來已經(jīng)是毫無后勁時(shí),它不僅僅是過熱大市值股市中最值得推薦的股票,也是十分劃算的股票,僅此而已。擔(dān)憂能夠帶來不俗的折扣和較大的收益,而且擔(dān)憂一直伴隨著價(jià)值股。卡勒斯尼克說:“包括能源、金融和航空公司在內(nèi)的公司終將恢復(fù)。當(dāng)然,每一個(gè)行業(yè)都會(huì)有公司破產(chǎn)。但整體來說,它們才是經(jīng)濟(jì)的重要領(lǐng)域,而且其銷售和利潤(rùn)會(huì)回歸到以前水平。”
另一方面,如今的超級(jí)新星們將吸引饑餓的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者,而且已經(jīng)引發(fā)了多起政治審查。與此同時(shí),當(dāng)投資者意識(shí)到它們無法滿足華爾街超前的預(yù)測(cè)以及投資者膨脹的預(yù)期時(shí),這些超級(jí)新星們便會(huì)敲響退堂鼓。此外,全球投資者對(duì)價(jià)值股的預(yù)期甚至要低于或遠(yuǎn)低于正常水平。因此,這些被低估的價(jià)值股很有可能會(huì)超過投資者微不足道的預(yù)期。有鑒于價(jià)值股展現(xiàn)了自己越過這一超低門檻的能力,因此它們將像此前幾次經(jīng)濟(jì)恢復(fù)期間那樣,提供可觀的收益。最保險(xiǎn)的賭注在于,歷史將在未來重演,因此價(jià)值股也會(huì)再次成為冠軍,而且以大幅優(yōu)勢(shì)奪冠。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:Feb
Value beats growth. That's arguably the theme that, more than any other, has proved the long-term winner in equity investing. Picking the cheap and unloved over high-fliers is the strategy advocated by the most influential students of markets: Think Graham and Dodd, and a pantheon of money managers from Warren Buffett to Daniel Loeb. And it's worked brilliantly over the long haul: A family that for the past six decades bought nothing but value stocks is now four times richer than the clan that bet exclusively on growth.
But in recent years, the traditional loser has been famously thrashing the longstanding champ. Value has been experiencing a drought so deep and extended that many on Wall Street believe we've entered a new paradigm. Tech superstars have been far outperforming inexpensive names in such sectors as banking and manufacturing for years. And the Great Lockdown prompted by COVID-19 has lengthened growth's lead over value to an all-time record. The likes of Apple and Amazon are thriving as consumers buy digital gadgets for working at home and flock to online shopping, while value stalwarts in such sectors as airlines, retail, and hotels have taken their worst beating in decades.
Fans of the sprinters believe they'll keep lapping the field. The view gaining momentum: Even as the tech players mushroom into giants, they can keep growing incredibly fast, because they harbor such rich options for branching into groundbreaking fields and products.
It's hardly surprising that growth has gained cachet as the better place to be. Over the past 13 years, the glamour category has been handily beating unlovely value, the longest period in history for which what's supposed to be the market's bargain basement has lagged. But despite the long losing streak, the widespread talk of value's demise is misguided and especially wrongheaded at this moment in the markets.
"The conditions have never been more right for value to far outperform growth as the economy recovers over the next few years," says Vitali Kalesnik, a Ph.D. economist from the University of California, Los Angeles, who serves as director of research for Europe at Research Affiliates, a firm that designs investment strategies for $148 billion in mutual funds and ETFs.
The reason value looks so promising just as its record versus growth is hitting all-time lows is basic. Historically, the cheaper value becomes in relation to growth and hence the overall market, the more it outperforms going forward. The bigger the gulf between the two, the stronger the springboard for value.
In the COVID-19 economy, that gap has never been wider. But it's just one of three drivers that are now joining forces. The second: Value traditionally wins big coming out of deep recessions, and the U.S. is living through the worst downturn since the Great Depression.
Here's the third factor: Value wins biggest when a reeling economy explodes a stock market bubble. That giant pop could be looming. Led by what we'll call the FANMAGs (Facebook, Apple, Netflix, Microsoft, Amazon, and Google parent Alphabet), growth stocks are now at their most exuberantly priced since the tech craze's summit in 2000.
Lessons from downturns past
How value's steep descent and growth's ongoing explosion portend a stunning reversal of fortunes is the subject of an excellent new article, "Value in Recessions and Recoveries," by Kalesnik and coauthor Ari Polychronopoulos. They examined the performance of value compared to the overall market during six previous downturns and the rebounds that followed. I talked with Kalesnik to learn what history is likely to tell us about the road back from the COVID-19 cataclysm.
The authors note that one of two forces, or in rare cases both, drove all six recessions they studied: a shock to fundamentals, or the collapse of a bubble in stocks. In four episodes, the cause was a basic economic tremor: the fiscal tightening during the Vietnam War from 1968 to 1970; the Iran oil crisis of 1980 to 1982; the Fed-engineered interest rate increases in mid-to-late 1990; and the global financial crisis from late 2007 to early 2009. The tech crash of 2000 was the only instance when a crash in stocks was the principal dynamic. Only in one case did an economic tremor coincide with market meltdown, when the OPEC oil crisis of 1972 to 1974 caused a sharp pullback in the "Nifty Fifty" stocks, including IBM, Polaroid, and Revlon, the FANMAGs of their day.
For each period, the authors establish a "value" bucket consisting of the 30% of S&P 500 stocks with the lowest price-to-book-value ratios, meaning that their market caps are the most depressed compared to their net worth, the excess of their assets over their liabilities. For companies to fall in this lowest tier means that investors are pessimistic about their future sales growth and profitability. The low-price-to-book crowd are the market's dogs. They're the opposite of the shooting stars that are awarded huge valuations compared to their net worth or earnings, meaning investors are counting on epic performance in the years ahead that far exceeds today's sales and profits.
Although only one recession saw the bona fide busting of a frenzy, all six included bear markets. In general, value stocks fell less than the overall S&P 500 during the big selloffs. On average, the lowest price-to-book contingent fell 23.8%, while the entire 500 dropped over eight percentage points more, by 32.2%.
Where value really shines is in recoveries. Over the average two-year period following the market bottom, value jumped 85.6%, trouncing the S&P's rise of 61.4%. Value also beats the averages over the entire span of from the start of the down market to a full economic recovery. Value notched a full-cycle return of 38.5%, beating the 500 as a whole by more than five to one.
Given today's conditions, it's especially important to study what happened when the S&P 500 started the cycle radically overpriced. On those two previous occasions, value beat the index by the biggest margin. It outperformed by 47% during the OPEC crisis that included the Nifty Fifty's fall from the heights, and in the tech bubble of 2000—the pure-play case of collapsing stocks pounding the economy—value gained 62.2% from the start of the bear market in 2000 to the time the economy staged a full comeback in the fall of 2004. Over that period, the S&P dropped by 20.3%, meaning that the players that started out with the cheapest stocks bested the field by a stupendous 82.5%.
“We’re getting into a bubble period”
Kalesnik warns that today's scenario is reminiscent of the heady days before the tech disaster that struck two decades ago. He also cautions against buying into the kinds of "this time it's different" theories that crashed with the dotcoms. He points out that what has propelled most of the market's gigantic rise over the past few years is a narrow group of tech darlings encompassing the FANMAGs as well as other fast-growing names such as Tesla and PayPal. Those big six FANMAGs have seen their valuations rocket from $526 billion and 4% of the S&P 500 total valuation at the start of 2007, to $7.1 trillion and 24% today. In the absence of their huge contribution, the market's overall return since then would be 30% lower.
"We're getting into a bubble period," says Kalesnik. "You have one-fourth of the total market cap in a few companies that overall have extremely high multiples of price to earnings and book value. They're priced on the hopes they can grow at the same rate as giants as they did as tiny companies infinitely in the future." He brands that much concentration in extremely expensive stocks as "dangerous."
Hence, those richly priced FANMAGs, along with other rockets such as Tesla, are highly vulnerable to a steep fall. That prospect raises the odds that value will outperform growth by an even bigger margin than in most recoveries. Value should also benefit from the tightening of that yawning, steepest-ever discount to growth.
Over the past 57 years, the price-to-book for growth stocks has averaged 4.7 times that for value. By the end of January, in a raging bull market, that difference had jumped to nine to one. Then came the big selloff that sank the S&P by around 35% in March. Remarkably, value got hit even harder than growth, in part because tech stocks held up. And for good reason: Online sales and tech equipment and services, for everything from video games to virtual meetings, are prospering in the Great Lockdown. As a result, by the end of March, the growth-to-value price-book ratio hit 10.3. Then the market rebounded, and once again, growth beat value. Such industries as energy, airlines, and financials have recovered a bit but remain far below their levels of early this year, while all six of the FANMAGs hit all-time highs during the S&P's resurgence to record levels.
So value is dirt cheap compared to growth. But is it really a deal, or just what looks like a buy when stacked against a cohort dominated by bubbling tech? "Essentially, growth is at one of its most expensive levels in history while value is at one of its cheapest levels in history," says Kalesnik. Right now, value's price-to-book ratio stands at around .58. That's about 70% of its average over the past 60 years. As recently as 2014 and 2017, it was twice this expensive.
This measure is especially meaningful. Just when value looks like it has nothing going, it's not just the best buy in an overheated big-cap market—it's a good buy, period. Fear is what breeds terrific bargains and big gains, and fear is pounding value stocks. "Companies in areas like energy, financials, and airlines will recover," says Kalesnik. "Of course, in each sector, you could have bankruptcies. But overall, they're key sectors of the economy, and their sales and profits will bounce back."
On the other hand, today's superstars will attract hungry competitors, are already drawing lots of political scrutiny, and will retreat when investors realize they can never meet Wall Street's bluebird forecasts and investors' inflated expectations. Meanwhile, the world is expecting even less, far less, from value than usual. Chances are, the downtrodden will more than meet those paltry expectations. As value shows it can clear that super-low bar, value stocks will deliver strong gains, just as in past recoveries. The best bet is that we're going back to the future, and value will repeat as champ. And win big.