過去幾年,美國(guó)公司成了他們自己股票的最大買主,購(gòu)買額遙遙領(lǐng)先。據(jù)高盛11月的一份研究,從2016到2019年,美國(guó)的大市值企業(yè)重購(gòu)股票金額達(dá)令人咂舌的2.5萬億美元。去年標(biāo)普500企業(yè)的分紅和回購(gòu)達(dá)4800億美元,超過這些公司的現(xiàn)金流總額——順便提一句,目前回購(gòu)金額遠(yuǎn)超分紅,因?yàn)槊绹?guó)公司青睞所謂的“現(xiàn)金回歸股東”金融工具。
在兩種情況下,回購(gòu)確實(shí)是好主意。首先,大型成熟的公司擁有充沛的收入,但可能無法找到可盈利的項(xiàng)目進(jìn)行再投資,從汽車制造商到消費(fèi)品提供商都存在這種情況。其次,管理層將股票當(dāng)作交易。比如,公司股票達(dá)19倍市盈率,而管理層認(rèn)為真實(shí)價(jià)值應(yīng)該在22倍市盈率,那么如果他們是對(duì)的,通過折價(jià)回購(gòu)股票的方式讓每個(gè)股東擁有更多的股份,將在未來給他們創(chuàng)造收益。這種做法遵循了沃倫·巴菲特的信條:當(dāng)股價(jià)低于其內(nèi)在價(jià)值時(shí),重購(gòu)是明智的。
但要記住,當(dāng)投資者每年賣出其股票的比例,等于回購(gòu)所降低的公司股票數(shù)的比例,投資者只是把回購(gòu)轉(zhuǎn)成了現(xiàn)金。我不提復(fù)雜的數(shù)學(xué)公式,舉個(gè)例子解釋。比如你擁有XYZ公司的股票,而管理層去年回購(gòu)了5%的股票,那么你可以賣出你股票的5%獲得現(xiàn)金,而你仍舊擁有去年你在XYZ的股票比例額。
但這個(gè)神奇的公式,只有在估值合理、公司確實(shí)回購(gòu)了,且不在股票低位時(shí)重置才有效。
我們剛剛經(jīng)歷這樣一次史詩般的重新定價(jià)。2月19日在史上最高點(diǎn),標(biāo)普的市盈率高達(dá)24。而當(dāng)股市3月16日周一收盤時(shí),已經(jīng)跌到17,這是基于創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄收益的數(shù)字,也將很快消褪,但看起來仍有泡沫。
記住,回購(gòu)的目的是提高每股收益和讓投資者獲得資本回報(bào)。作為一個(gè)投資者,如果你每年賣出你擁有股票的一部分,并將收益存起來,你的日子要比一直持有所有股票好得多。如果你一直不賣,最終你會(huì)擁有比如XYZ公司的越來越大比例的股份,如果XYZ公司目前市值比三周前少了30%,這股價(jià)跌掉的部分,遠(yuǎn)超你股份增加的利益。由于拋售程度很深,范圍很廣,自2017年8月開始的1.25萬億美元回購(gòu)收益的很大一部分,在標(biāo)普達(dá)到今天的水平時(shí),已經(jīng)蒸發(fā)掉了。
所以,突然間回購(gòu)看似壞交易,至少短期內(nèi)如此。長(zhǎng)期看,形勢(shì)還不明朗。比如一些大銀行,包括摩根大通、美國(guó)銀行和富國(guó)銀行,他們?cè)谑杏侍幱诘偷街械膫€(gè)位數(shù)時(shí)進(jìn)行了回購(gòu),盡管目前的市盈率慘不忍睹,但看未來幾年,他們的回購(gòu)還是不錯(cuò)的交易。(目前,最大的8家銀行宣布暫停股票回購(gòu),以釋放資金借貸給企業(yè)和消費(fèi)者)。
另一方面,四家大型航空公司,美聯(lián)航、西南航空、達(dá)美航空和美國(guó)航空,從2015至2019年的五個(gè)財(cái)政年度里,大筆花費(fèi)了310億美元回購(gòu)自家的股票,相當(dāng)于他們凈收入的三分之二。每家公司在這個(gè)5年期初始時(shí)的股價(jià)都高于今天的股價(jià),基本要高得多,美國(guó)航空和美聯(lián)航的股價(jià)跌了70%。由于這些年的股票回購(gòu),他們所擁有的股票數(shù)都超過2015初始時(shí)。如果有人堅(jiān)決地持有這些股票,而不是每年賣掉一些,那么他們將很難從這場(chǎng)回購(gòu)盛宴中分到一杯羹。
結(jié)論:市場(chǎng)已經(jīng)調(diào)整了價(jià)格,因?yàn)榇蠹叶伎吹?,目前的世界比三周前風(fēng)險(xiǎn)更大。這使得管理層這些年標(biāo)榜的好交易,在今日看來是很糟糕的。多數(shù)情況下,首席執(zhí)行官和董事會(huì)應(yīng)該更知情,并應(yīng)該將這數(shù)十億美元回歸到分紅中。大拋售揭示了股票回購(gòu)的陰暗面。當(dāng)股票被重新定價(jià),回購(gòu)的收益瞬間消失,在多數(shù)情況下,看不到賺回來的希望。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:宣峰
過去幾年,美國(guó)公司成了他們自己股票的最大買主,購(gòu)買額遙遙領(lǐng)先。據(jù)高盛11月的一份研究,從2016到2019年,美國(guó)的大市值企業(yè)重購(gòu)股票金額達(dá)令人咂舌的2.5萬億美元。去年標(biāo)普500企業(yè)的分紅和回購(gòu)達(dá)4800億美元,超過這些公司的現(xiàn)金流總額——順便提一句,目前回購(gòu)金額遠(yuǎn)超分紅,因?yàn)槊绹?guó)公司青睞所謂的“現(xiàn)金回歸股東”金融工具。
在兩種情況下,回購(gòu)確實(shí)是好主意。首先,大型成熟的公司擁有充沛的收入,但可能無法找到可盈利的項(xiàng)目進(jìn)行再投資,從汽車制造商到消費(fèi)品提供商都存在這種情況。其次,管理層將股票當(dāng)作交易。比如,公司股票達(dá)19倍市盈率,而管理層認(rèn)為真實(shí)價(jià)值應(yīng)該在22倍市盈率,那么如果他們是對(duì)的,通過折價(jià)回購(gòu)股票的方式讓每個(gè)股東擁有更多的股份,將在未來給他們創(chuàng)造收益。這種做法遵循了沃倫·巴菲特的信條:當(dāng)股價(jià)低于其內(nèi)在價(jià)值時(shí),重購(gòu)是明智的。
但要記住,當(dāng)投資者每年賣出其股票的比例,等于回購(gòu)所降低的公司股票數(shù)的比例,投資者只是把回購(gòu)轉(zhuǎn)成了現(xiàn)金。我不提復(fù)雜的數(shù)學(xué)公式,舉個(gè)例子解釋。比如你擁有XYZ公司的股票,而管理層去年回購(gòu)了5%的股票,那么你可以賣出你股票的5%獲得現(xiàn)金,而你仍舊擁有去年你在XYZ的股票比例額。
但這個(gè)神奇的公式,只有在估值合理、公司確實(shí)回購(gòu)了,且不在股票低位時(shí)重置才有效。
我們剛剛經(jīng)歷這樣一次史詩般的重新定價(jià)。2月19日在史上最高點(diǎn),標(biāo)普的市盈率高達(dá)24。而當(dāng)股市3月16日周一收盤時(shí),已經(jīng)跌到17,這是基于創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄收益的數(shù)字,也將很快消褪,但看起來仍有泡沫。
記住,回購(gòu)的目的是提高每股收益和讓投資者獲得資本回報(bào)。作為一個(gè)投資者,如果你每年賣出你擁有股票的一部分,并將收益存起來,你的日子要比一直持有所有股票好得多。如果你一直不賣,最終你會(huì)擁有比如XYZ公司的越來越大比例的股份,如果XYZ公司目前市值比三周前少了30%,這股價(jià)跌掉的部分,遠(yuǎn)超你股份增加的利益。由于拋售程度很深,范圍很廣,自2017年8月開始的1.25萬億美元回購(gòu)收益的很大一部分,在標(biāo)普達(dá)到今天的水平時(shí),已經(jīng)蒸發(fā)掉了。
所以,突然間回購(gòu)看似壞交易,至少短期內(nèi)如此。長(zhǎng)期看,形勢(shì)還不明朗。比如一些大銀行,包括摩根大通、美國(guó)銀行和富國(guó)銀行,他們?cè)谑杏侍幱诘偷街械膫€(gè)位數(shù)時(shí)進(jìn)行了回購(gòu),盡管目前的市盈率慘不忍睹,但看未來幾年,他們的回購(gòu)還是不錯(cuò)的交易。(目前,最大的8家銀行宣布暫停股票回購(gòu),以釋放資金借貸給企業(yè)和消費(fèi)者)。
另一方面,四家大型航空公司,美聯(lián)航、西南航空、達(dá)美航空和美國(guó)航空,從2015至2019年的五個(gè)財(cái)政年度里,大筆花費(fèi)了310億美元回購(gòu)自家的股票,相當(dāng)于他們凈收入的三分之二。每家公司在這個(gè)5年期初始時(shí)的股價(jià)都高于今天的股價(jià),基本要高得多,美國(guó)航空和美聯(lián)航的股價(jià)跌了70%。由于這些年的股票回購(gòu),他們所擁有的股票數(shù)都超過2015初始時(shí)。如果有人堅(jiān)決地持有這些股票,而不是每年賣掉一些,那么他們將很難從這場(chǎng)回購(gòu)盛宴中分到一杯羹。
結(jié)論:市場(chǎng)已經(jīng)調(diào)整了價(jià)格,因?yàn)榇蠹叶伎吹?,目前的世界比三周前風(fēng)險(xiǎn)更大。這使得管理層這些年標(biāo)榜的好交易,在今日看來是很糟糕的。多數(shù)情況下,首席執(zhí)行官和董事會(huì)應(yīng)該更知情,并應(yīng)該將這數(shù)十億美元回歸到分紅中。大拋售揭示了股票回購(gòu)的陰暗面。當(dāng)股票被重新定價(jià),回購(gòu)的收益瞬間消失,在多數(shù)情況下,看不到賺回來的希望。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:宣峰
For the past several years, America's corporations have been by far the biggest buyers of their own stock. From 2016 through 2019, our big cap enterprises repurchased a staggering $2.5 trillion in shares, according to a November study by Goldman Sachs. Last year's outlays of $480 billion in dividends and buybacks by the S&P 500 amounted to over 100% of their free cash flow––and by the way, buybacks now far exceed dividends as corporate America's favored vehicle for what's known as "returning cash to shareholders."
Buybacks are indeed a good idea under two conditions. First, the company can't find profitable ways to reinvest part of its ample earnings, generally the case with big, mature businesses from automakers to consumer goods purveyors. Second, management perceives their shares as a bargain. For example, if their stock is selling at an 19 price-to-earnings multiple, and the brass believes that its real value is more like 22 time earnings, then if they're correct, handing each shareholder a bigger ownership stake through buying back shares at a discount will enhance their returns in the future. That practice follows Warren Buffett's maxim that repurchases are smart when a stock is selling below its "intrinsic value."
But keep in mind, investors themselves only translate buybacks into cash if each year they sell the percentage of their shares that equals the percentage by which the buybacks lowered the company's share count. I'll save you from all the math, but if you own stock in XYZ Corp, and management repurchased 5% of its shares last year, you could sell 5% of your shares, pocket the cash, and still own the same percentage of XYZ you held the year before.
But this marvelous formula only works if valuations were reasonable when companies did the gorging, and don't reset at much lower levels.
We've just experienced just such an epic repricing. At its all-time high on February 19, the S&P traded at a lofty P/E of 24. As of the market close on Monday, March 16, that benchmark has dropped to 17.0, a number that based on record earnings that will soon retreat, still looks frothy.
Remember, the purpose of buybacks is to raise earnings per share and hand investors capital gains. As an investor, if you'd sold a portion of your holdings every year and banked the gains, you'd be a lot better off than if you'd held all of your stock. If you didn't sell anything, you've ended up owning a bigger and bigger percentage of, say, XYZ, and XYZ is now worth 30% less than than it was three weeks ago. The fall in the share price far outweighed the increase in your stake. Because the selloff is so steep and broad, a giant portion of the erstwhile benefits of the $1.25 trillion in buybacks since August of 2017, when the S&P stood at today's levels, have evaporated.
So repurchases suddenly look like a raw deal, at least in the short term. In the long-run, it's not yet clear. For example, the big banks, including J.P. Morgan, Bank of America and Wells Fargo, were purchasing at PEs in the low to middle single digits, and incredible as it may seem today, those buys may look well founded a couple of years from now. (For now, eight of the largest banks announced they are suspending buybacks to free up capital to lend to businesses and consumers.)
On the other hand, the big four airlines, United Continental, Southwest, Deltaand American, lavished $31 billion on their own shares from the start of fiscal 2015 through 2019, equal to two-thirds of their net earnings. In every case, their shares were higher when at the start of that five year period than they are today, generally by a lot; shares are down around 70% at both American and United. Their shares were mostly above the 2015 starting point during the entire time they were buying in all that stock. It's unlikely that staunch loyalists who didn't cash in shares each year will ever see any benefits from that buyback extravaganza.
Conclusion: Markets have reset prices based on the view that the world is a much riskier place than it appeared just three weeks ago. That makes what management touted as great deals for years look terrible today. In many cases, CEOs and boards should have known better, and returned those billions in dividends instead. The selloff has revealed the dark side of buybacks. When stocks get repriced, the gains from repurchases vanish in a hurry, with in many cases, little prospect of returning.