沃倫?巴菲特被視為這個時代最好的投資者、甚至“股神”，但他的管理記錄其實(shí)也同樣無與倫比。1965年5月，也就是整整50年前，他接掌了伯克希爾哈撒韋公司。時至今日，他依然是該公司的掌門人。這是一項(xiàng)極不尋常的成就。阿爾弗雷德?P?斯隆可能是美國商業(yè)史上最富傳奇色彩的首席執(zhí)行官，他執(zhí)掌通用汽車公司23年。約翰?D?洛克菲勒掌管美孚石油公司27年。就近期而言，比爾?蓋茨曾經(jīng)擔(dān)任微軟公司首席執(zhí)行官25年時間。

但這就是問題所在。盡管世界各地的投資者都在熱切模仿巴菲特的投資方式，但毫不夸張地說，他的管理模式對公司文化毫無影響。查理?芒格是巴菲特的老戰(zhàn)友，也是伯克希爾公司的副總裁。在他看來，“伯克希爾體系”是該公司成功的關(guān)鍵所在。然而，芒格在2015年的致股東公開信中寫道，“在我所了解的大公司里，還沒有哪家具備這個體系的一半要素?！?/p>

巴菲特管理方式的一大特點(diǎn)是特別關(guān)注資本配置。對巴菲特來說，在伯克希爾體系中增加一家公司與在投資組合中增加一個股票并無二致。然而，一旦完成收購，巴菲特就幾乎再也不會賣掉，并給予該公司經(jīng)理層以極大的自主權(quán)。

另一大特點(diǎn)是避免官僚體制。伯克希爾并沒有對旗下60多家公司實(shí)施某種標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化流程，這家擁有34萬名雇員的龐大聯(lián)合體，也沒有全公司范圍的預(yù)算。

第三個特點(diǎn)是，不搞那些司空見慣、在巴菲特看來只會滋生短期主義思維的企業(yè)儀式。所以，該公司從不發(fā)布業(yè)績指引，不經(jīng)常搞股票分拆，也沒有股票期權(quán)。

當(dāng)然要承認(rèn)，并不是巴菲特風(fēng)格的每一方面都適合所有行業(yè)，其中一些要素有可能導(dǎo)致多種問題（下文會繼續(xù)探討這一點(diǎn)）。但就在他擔(dān)任掌門人的這半個多世紀(jì)里，伯克希爾的股價上漲了12000倍，道瓊斯工業(yè)指數(shù)同期僅上漲了18倍。目前伯克希爾的市值高達(dá)3500億美元，位居美國上市公司第三位。由此可以想見，他必有某些方面值得一些經(jīng)理人學(xué)習(xí)。

當(dāng)然，我必須澄清的是，我本人投資了伯克希爾公司。我是一家擁有該公司股票的共同基金的董事會成員，也是巴菲特傳記的作者。所以，別指望我會對伯克希爾的前景有什么不偏不倚的展望。

奇怪的是，當(dāng)年收購伯克希爾時，巴菲特并沒有使用其招牌式的策略——友好地收購那些領(lǐng)導(dǎo)有方的優(yōu)秀公司。在最近致股東的信中，他講述了這段舊事。那時，伯克希爾只是一家在低成本對手圍攻下深陷困境的紡織品企業(yè)，巴菲特一時沖動，收購了這家公司。在他的合伙制投資公司購買了該公司股份后，巴菲特對其管理戰(zhàn)略越來越失望，最終購買了控股權(quán)，并將首席執(zhí)行官掃地出門。當(dāng)時是1965年，巴菲特時年34歲（如今他已經(jīng)85歲了）。

通過觀察該公司前任首席執(zhí)行官的錯誤，巴菲特獲得了第一個教訓(xùn)：絕不要將有用的錢投到糟糕的業(yè)務(wù)上，哪怕這是你的本業(yè)。伯克希爾在紡織業(yè)掙扎了20多年。經(jīng)過一番努力，該公司微薄的利潤逐漸變得豐厚起來。到1985年他關(guān)閉工廠時，伯克希爾已在保險、報(bào)業(yè)、糖果業(yè)和制造業(yè)擁有相當(dāng)?shù)墓煞?，還有一個龐大的普通股投資組合。

到那時，巴菲特的合伙制投資公司已經(jīng)進(jìn)行了清償：其投資者獲得伯克希爾公司的股票，而巴菲特則成為該公司最大的股東。合伙制遺產(chǎn)非常重要，因?yàn)椴讼柟灸壳耙廊粚?shí)行這種運(yùn)營制度。該公司的董事只領(lǐng)取象征性的薪酬，也沒有責(zé)任保險。他們大量購買股票。這種在美國公司史上幾乎聞所未聞的制度安排意味著，董事們必須對自己的使命深信不疑。

巴菲特和股東的關(guān)系也體現(xiàn)了合伙制的精髓。巴菲特從不做短期內(nèi)拉升股價的事情（比如發(fā)布業(yè)績指引），因?yàn)樗胍㈤L期的股東關(guān)系。他也很少會用股份去支付收購款，因?yàn)樗幌胂♂尮煞荨?/p>

巴菲特也不搞什么股權(quán)激勵，因?yàn)檫@么做會使高管的利益和普通投資者的利益脫鉤。實(shí)際上，在高管薪酬上，伯克希爾也和傳統(tǒng)做法大相徑庭。巴菲特和芒格每人的薪酬僅為10萬美元，也沒什么獎金，而如今很多首席執(zhí)行官僅每天的收入就能達(dá)到10萬美元。

如果內(nèi)心的貪婪是導(dǎo)致那些同行不愿采用巴菲特薪酬模式的原因，那么還有些東西——可稱其為管理層的不安全感——使得他們不想效仿他對短期績效的超然態(tài)度。很多首席執(zhí)行官都對華爾街怕得要死，不敢讓投資人失望，而且常常滿足于獲得一些華而不實(shí)的表面價值。拆分股票以提高流動性，就是這種心態(tài)的表現(xiàn)，剝離公司資產(chǎn)以“釋放”價值亦是如此。

喬治華盛頓大學(xué)教授，《超越巴菲特的伯克希爾》（Berkshire Beyond Buffett）一書的作者勞倫斯?坎寧安表示，巴菲特的絕大多數(shù)管理技巧都是從現(xiàn)已退休的Capital Cities/ABC公司首席執(zhí)行官湯姆?墨菲身上學(xué)來的（巴菲特是該公司的主要投資者，墨菲現(xiàn)在是伯克希爾董事會成員）。

不過坎寧安指出，那些想效仿巴菲特的上市公司都面臨顯而易見的障礙。以通用汽車公司為例，最近，短期股東都要求公司派發(fā)現(xiàn)金股利（哪怕明知通用汽車幾年前才擺脫破產(chǎn)危機(jī)）。由于急于避免發(fā)生代理人沖突，經(jīng)理層讓步了。而巴菲特?fù)碛械目毓蓹?quán)，能讓他像私營企業(yè)的老板一樣，免受這種壓力。

但伯克希爾畢竟是一家上市公司，其管理風(fēng)格有違一些管理規(guī)范。正如巴菲特所寫的那樣：“我們信任自己的經(jīng)理，放手讓他們經(jīng)營?！边@一誠信體系在2011年遭遇了滑鐵盧。當(dāng)時有媒體爆料稱，伯克希爾能源行業(yè)總監(jiān)戴維?索科爾先是向一家公司投資了1千萬美元，然后推薦伯克希爾去收購該公司。

盡管這一事件是伯克希爾歷史上的污點(diǎn)，但坎寧漢認(rèn)為，這只是一種富有價值的折衷體制難免出現(xiàn)的缺陷。他說，如果伯克希爾加強(qiáng)其官僚體制，“那就會減緩決策進(jìn)度，從而錯失各種機(jī)會，同時也沒人能保證這樣就不會出問題?！?/p>

伯克希爾之所以獲得如此巨大的成功，僅僅是因?yàn)樗恼崎T人是巴菲特嗎？這是一個讓無數(shù)股東頗感痛苦的問題。如果伯克希爾嚴(yán)格遵循企業(yè)治理制度，董事會不那么洋溢親情，或者讓公司變成一個沒有那么多巴菲特的親朋故友的機(jī)構(gòu)，并且讓巴菲特65歲就告老還鄉(xiāng)，伯克希爾的股東現(xiàn)在很可能就不會那么富有。芒格字斟句酌地問道：“天下有幾人能干出巴菲特這番偉業(yè)呢？”

不過，讓其他公司因?yàn)榘头铺氐奶厥獬删投南乙邹H，似乎不太恰當(dāng)。事實(shí)上，他和芒格主要的不滿，即美國公司太官僚、太執(zhí)迷于短期利益，確實(shí)無比正確。芒格在自己致股東的信中寫道：“伯克希爾這套管理體系應(yīng)該在更多的公司推行，應(yīng)該像治療癌癥那樣對付官僚體制最糟糕的陰暗面，這兩者簡直太像了。”很難想象，還有哪家公司的副總裁會公然不顧禮節(jié)，這么教育同齡人，還使用如此不顧及他人感受的比喻。其他高管應(yīng)該試試這么做。

如何像巴菲特那樣管理公司

沃倫?巴菲特50年掌控伯克希爾哈撒韋公司的三大管理秘訣：

1、讓經(jīng)理們獨(dú)立自主——伯克希爾所擁有的60多家企業(yè)的經(jīng)理層擁有很大自主權(quán)，這也讓他們愿意長期為公司服務(wù)。

2、必須消滅官僚習(xí)氣——公司決策者在預(yù)算、法務(wù)和公關(guān)等層面遭遇繁文縟節(jié)，意味著你會錯失很多機(jī)遇。

3、不要操縱股價——業(yè)績指引、拆分股票和剝離資產(chǎn)都是短期行為，長期來看它們對股東的利益貢獻(xiàn)很小或毫無作用。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

羅杰?洛溫斯坦是《美國銀行業(yè)：創(chuàng)建美聯(lián)儲的奮斗歷程》一書的作者。

譯者：清遠(yuǎn)

審校：任文科

Warren Buffett is regarded as the best investor of our time; arguably, his management record is just as singular. He took over as head of Berkshire Hathaway in May 1965 — 50 years ago. And he is still at it. Think about that. Alfred P. Sloan, perhaps the most storied CEO in American business, ran General Motorsfor 23 years. John D. Rockefeller ran Standard Oil for 27. In recent times, Bill Gates was CEO of Microsoft for 25.

But here’s the thing. Investors around the world avidly mimic Buffett’s investment approach, yet it’s fair to say his managerial model has had zero impact on the corporate culture. Charlie Munger, Buffett’s longtime partner and Berkshire’s vice chairman, says the “Berkshire system” is essential to its success. Nonetheless, Munger wrote in this year’s annual shareholders letter, “No other large corporation I know of has half of such elements in place.”

One hallmark of Buffett’s management is unusual attention to capital allocation (for Buffett, adding a company to Berkshire is akin to adding a stock to an investment portfolio). But once he makes an acquisition, he almost never sells, and gives managers extreme autonomy.

Another is shunning of bureaucracy. Berkshire has no processes to standardize the more than 60 operating units it owns, no companywide budgeting for a conglomerate with 340,000 employees.

A third hallmark is renunciation of familiar rituals that in Buffett’s view promote short-term thinking. Thus, no earnings guidance, no regular stock splits, no stock options.

Admittedly, not every aspect of Buffett’s style would fit every business, and you can argue that elements of his approach can lead to problems. (More on that later.) But over the half-century of his management, Berkshire’s stock is up 12,000 times, while the Dow Jones industrial average is up 18 times. Berkshire’s market cap is $350 billion, the third highest in America. You’d think some manager would find something worth imitating.

(A disclosure: I’m invested in Berkshire, I sit on the board of a mutual fund that owns the stock, and I’m the author of a Buffett biography. So don’t look here for a disinterested forecast of Berkshire’s future.)

Oddly enough, Buffett’s signature tactic—friendly acquisitions of strong, well-led companies—was violated when he bought Berkshire itself. As Buffett tells it in his most recent shareholders letter, his takeover of Berkshire, a textile manufacturer besieged by low-cost rivals, came about almost impulsively. After his investment partnership bought a stake, Buffett grew disenchanted with the company’s management strategy. He eventually bought a controlling interest and ousted the CEO. That was in 1965, when Buffett was all of 34 (he is 85 today).

Buffett’s first lesson came from observing the former CEO’s errors—don’t put good money into a bad business, even if it’s the business you are in. Berkshire struggled in textiles for 20 more years; all along, Buffett deployed its meager profits into greener pastures. By the time he closed the mill in 1985, Berkshire owned major interests in insurance, newspapers, candy, and manufacturing, along with a large portfolio of common stocks.

By then, Buffett’s investment partnership had liquidated: Its investors received stakes in Berkshire, and Buffett became the largest individual owner. The partnership legacy is important because the company is still run like a partnership. Berkshire’s directors get only token compensation; they don’t get liability insurance either. And they have purchased large amounts of stock. This arrangement—almost unheard of in corporate America—means the directors must truly believe in their mission.

The partnership ethos is also visible in Buffett’s relations with stockholders. Buffett does not do things to buoy the stock in the short term (such as issue earnings guidance), because he seeks to encourage long-term ownership. He rarely uses shares to pay for acquisitions, because he does not want to dilute the stock.

Buffett also shuns stock options because they could unhitch the interests of executives from those of ordinary investors. Indeed, in executive pay, Berkshire staggeringly departs from convention. Buffett and Munger collect salaries of $100,000 each; neither receives a bonus. (Many CEOs haul in $100,000 every day or so.)

If greed dissuades rivals from adopting Buffett’s pay model, something else—call it managerial -insecurity—inhibits them from replicating his indifference to short-term results. Many CEOs live in mortal fear of disappointing Wall Street, and often settle for the appearance of value as distinct from the substance. Stock splits to increase liquidity are a sign of this mentality, as are spin-offs of corporate assets to “unlock” value.

Lawrence Cunningham, a professor at George Washington University and the author of Berkshire Beyond Buffett, says Buffett learned much of his management style from Tom Murphy, the retired Capital Cities/ABC CEO. (Buffett was a big Cap Cities investor, and Murphy now sits on Berkshire’s board.)

But Cunningham notes that public companies that try to imitate Buffett face obvious hurdles. Witness GM, where short-term shareholders recently demanded that the company distribute billions in cash (even though GM is only a few years removed from bankruptcy). Anxious to avoid a proxy battle, managers caved; Buffett’s controlling position, like that of a private operator, insulates him from such pressures.

Still, Berkshire is public, and its style violates some governance norms. As Buffett wrote, “We trust our managers to run their operations.” That honor system slipped in 2011, when David Sokol, head of Berkshire’s energy business, was revealed to have invested $10 million in a company and then recommended that Berkshire acquire it.

While that affair tarnished Berkshire, Cunningham depicts it as the downside of a worthwhile tradeoff. If Berkshire beefed up its governance bureaucracy, he says, “it would slow decisions, you would miss opportunities, and there is no guarantee you would not have problems.”

Is it possible that Berkshire works—and this is the question that causes agony for -shareholders—only because Buffett runs it? Arguably, had a rules-bound, less cozy board (one stuffed with fewer of Buffett’s associates, friends, and family) sent Buffett to pasture at, say, age 65, its shareholders would now be poorer. “How many people do you think could do what Warren does?” Munger asks rhetorically.

Yet letting other companies off the hook because Buffett is special seems too pat. His and Munger’s basic complaint—that corporate America is too bureaucratic and too obsessed with the short term—is absolutely correct. Munger, in his letter, argues that “versions of the Berkshire system should be tried more often elsewhere, and the worst attributes of bureaucracy should much more often be treated like the cancers they so much resemble.” It is hard to think of another company where the vice chairman would violate protocol by lecturing his peers and employing such an insensitive metaphor. Other executives should try it.

How to run your company the way Buffett does

Three management takeaways from Warren Buffett’s 50 years at Berkshire Hathaway

1. Leave your managers alone — Managers at the 60-plus business units owned by Berkshire have a lot of autonomy, and that encourages them to stick around.

2. Bureaucracy must die — Extra layers of corporate decision-makers in budgeting, legal affairs, and public relations mean you’ll miss opportunities.

3. Don’t massage the stock price — Earnings guidance, stock splits, and spin-offs are short-term moves that do little or nothing for your shareholders in the long run.

Roger Lowenstein is the author of America’s Bank: The Epic Struggle to Create the Federal Reserve.