????限制任期年限，但不限制任期屆數。

????這意味著建立相應機制，吸引具有部分技能組合的長期股東成為新董事，同時確立董事解聘機制，以便催生新思維、促進多元化、增加女性董事數量。

????對于解聘董事，維權投資者往往主張實行嚴格的任期限制。作為替代方案，許多公司通常是對董事設定退休年齡。我對這兩種方案都不太贊同。為何要建立一個機制，迫使那些出色的董事讓位？

????話又說回來，大多數董事會至少都有那么一位甚或好幾位董事，創造的價值小于引入新董事可能帶來的價值，導致了“機會成本”。一旦某人進入公司董事會，要想將其解聘決非易事，正所謂請神容易送神難。即便天時地利，炒朋友的魷魚都很難，在沒有經濟激勵的情況下，更是難上加難。

????感情上，更容易的做法是“干等著”。而且，當首席執行官面對的董事會，成員全都是由前任首席執行官挑選并推薦，其技能組合不能滿足企業新戰略的需求時，事態將更加復雜。

????我認為，董事會應確立相應程序，明確規定新董事輪換機制，并確保該規定得到理解和執行。換言之，限制任期年限，但對任期屆數不做統一限制。僅對新任董事適用上述改變，能有效規避來自于現任董事的阻力，從而使新規更易推行。

????我傾向于這樣一個體系：每位新任董事都同意，每六至八年遞交一次辭呈。如果有些董事在幫助首席執行官和企業創造價值方面，能發揮無可替代的作用，會被請求連任。至于那些沒有突出作用的董事，將在企業對他們此前的服務表示感謝后，就此離開董事會。

????是否接受某位董事的辭呈，可由一位指定的董事，或其余董事絕對保密且具有約束力的多數票來決定。后一種做法可能更易實行。

????像維權投資者那樣思考。

????董事們必須堅決要求企業管理層像維權投資者一樣分析戰略選擇：審視在首席執行官推薦的戰略之外，有何替代方案。這種做法十分罕見。通常的做法是，首席執行官在權衡各種戰略后，僅向董事會介紹自己認為最好的戰略。

????維權投資者主張的，必然是企業未采用的戰略。因此，董事會必須提前分析所有替代方案。這意味著弄清與首席執行官推薦的戰略相比，放棄業績不佳的公司、分拆企業、評估測量和處理過剩現金的各種替代方案意味著什么。如果董事會沒有討論上述選擇，將在闡明和捍衛自身戰略方面準備不足。

????重要的是，分析顯示某企業的拆分或私人交易價值大于其股票市值，并不表示企業必須出售。歷史上，由于宏觀經濟環境或其他條件，導致當前股市和私人交易價值偏離企業內在價值的例子并不鮮見。董事會的職責，是提升企業內在價值，行使審慎職責，充分理解企業做出的戰略決策，以及做出決策的理由。

????通過主動利用手中權力，積極配合創造長期股東價值，董事會可以幫助企業避免維權投資者的短期議程將帶來的混亂。（財富中文網）

????Sue Decker是伯克希爾哈撒韋、好市多以及英特爾公司的董事。她此前曾擔任雅虎公司總裁兼首席財務官。本文節選自Sue的一篇博客文章，原文發表于她的博客deckposts.net。本文僅代表Sue的個人觀點，并不代表她所任職的公司以及相關公司其他董事的觀點。

????譯者：Hunter

????審稿：李翔

????Limit terms, but don’t install terms limits.

????This means setting up a mechanism for both attracting new directors with some of the skill sets of long-term shareholders, as well as a mechanism for rotation off the board to create room for new thinking, more diversity, and women.

????For removing directors, the solution that activists primarily advocate is a hard term-limit. As an alternative, many companies instead opt for a retirement age. I am not a fan of either. Why create a system that force out good board members?

????Then again, most boards have at least one or maybe a few directors who are not adding as much value as a new member might bring and therefore represent an “opportunity cost.” Once directors are on a board, it can be extremely difficult to naturally rotate them off. Firing a friend is tough under the best conditions, and even more so because there is no economic incentive.

????It’s emotionally easier just to “wait it out.” This is even more complicated when a CEO inherits a board that was picked and groomed by her predecessor and doesn’t have the collective skills for her new strategy.

????My view is that boards would be well served to adopt a process that specifically outlines the rotation process and that is understood and implemented for new directors. In other words, limited terms, but not unified term-limits. By making this change for all new directors, it side-steps the issue of those already on the board, making it easier to implement on a go forward basis.

????I lean toward a system in which each new member of the board agrees to hand in their resignation every six to eight years, with the idea being that some directors will be asked to serve multiple terms it they are uniquely qualified to help the CEO and company build value, but many will be thanked for their service and move on after that time frame.

????The decision regarding whose resignations to keep, or whose to accept, could be made either by an appointed director, or by an absolutely confidential and binding majority vote of the other board members. This latter approach might be easier socially.

????Think like an activist.

????Directors must insist on asking management to analyze strategic choices as an activist would: by looking at alternatives to the strategies the CEO is recommending. This is not typical. The more common pattern is for the CEO to consider options and present only the recommended one to the board.

????The road not taken is the one the activist will surface so the board must have analyzed these alternatives. This means understanding what it would mean to get out of underperforming operations, split up the company and evaluate varying alternatives for measuring and handling excess cash versus the ones being recommended. If these choices are not discussed, the board will be poorly prepared to articulate and defend its alternative course.

????Importantly, an analysis of the break-up or private transaction value of a company that shows a higher value than where the stock is trading does not oblige a company to make a sale. There have been many times in history where macro-economic or other conditions have made the current stock market and private transaction values poor indicators of intrinsic value. The board’s duty is to enhance the latter, exercising its duty of care, by fully understanding what strategic choices the company is making and why.

????By proactively using their power to align with long-term shareholder value creation, boards can help companies avoid the disruption that a shorter-term activist agenda will bring.

????Sue Decker serves on the boards of Berkshire Hathaway, Costco and Intel. She previously served as president and chief financial officer at Yahoo. This article is an excerpt from a more detailed version published on Sue’s blog, deckposts.net. The opinions expressed are her own and not necessarily those of the companies on whose boards she serves or her colleagues on those boards.