????如今，在許多公司的董事會議室里，最熱門的話題是股東維權行動，更確切的說，是被維權股東盯上的可能性以及應對之策。董事會不應對此諱疾忌醫(yī)，甚至拖到不得不奮力反抗，而是應當在問題出現前就主動出擊。與獨立當事人相比，我們作為董事會成員，處于更有利的地位，能更好地履行我們的受托責任，代表股東利益，而且我們掌握著許多工具和權力，來幫助我們做到這一點。若處理得當，這可能會帶來一些控制得當的有益變化。

????如今，維權投資者的市場影響力之大，可謂前所未見。簡言之，他們如今受到的關注更多，吸引的資金也更多，目前估計已經突破1150億美元，是20世紀90年代的10倍。維權投資者“傳經布道”也變得更加容易。他們經常通過社交媒體和商業(yè)新聞頻道發(fā)表看法，借此向公司管理層施壓，并與其他股東聯合起來。

????那董事會應該怎么做？董事會被授權保護股東，但許多股東認為，現行體制存在內在利益沖突，而董事們更熱衷于從公司領薪水、維持自身現狀，而非履行對股東的信托責任，股東們因此對維權投資者持贊同態(tài)度。

????相反，董事會的價值創(chuàng)造投資期比任何維權投資者的都要長得多，許多董事會和管理團隊感到，維權投資者過于注重短期收益，根本不了解企業(yè)經營領域的復雜性。經營企業(yè)需要平衡客戶、供應商、員工和監(jiān)管機構的利益。在兼顧上述因素的同時，引進管理得當的改變，所需要的時間，往往比投資者想的要長。

????不過，在更好地履行對股東的核心責任方面，上市公司董事會確實大有可為。而且，與應對維權投資者不同的是，董事會可以事前采取行動，并立足長遠。

????以下是筆者在此方面的三個想法，旨在拋磚引玉，并不要求一一照做。

????讓股東暢所欲言

????大多數董事會對企業(yè)的了解，來自于閱讀由賣方分析師撰寫的報告，以及由企業(yè)首席執(zhí)行官和首席財務官提供的信息。其中，賣方分析師并非企業(yè)股東，而企業(yè)首席執(zhí)行官和首席財務官則直接與機構股東對話。試想，作為一名管理者，怎能從不與自己老板碰面以獲取其反饋，而是聽信自己員工的一面之詞？然而，在許多董事會，現狀都是如此。

????股東是董事會的“老板”，董事會是幫助股東增進企業(yè)內在價值的代理人。然而，董事會通常只能間接獲悉股東看法，而且往往很難聽到單個股東的看法。

????就這樣，與股東直接接觸的大好機會被白白浪費。而維權投資者正是抓住了這一機會，與大批股東進行接觸，交換對業(yè)績不佳的公司的看法，并共同尋求補救之法。

????董事會也應該這樣做。要做到這一點，可以通過多種方式。舉例來說，可口可樂公司（Coca-Cola Co.）董事、薪酬委員會主席瑪麗亞?埃萊娜?拉格馬西諾，曾就高管薪酬問題與一位大股東直接會面，并考慮可口可樂主要機構股東對該問題的具體反饋。可口可樂根據獲得的反饋信息，對股權薪酬進行了調整。拉格馬西諾通過公司網站，直接與股東就該調整進行了溝通。

????這甚至可能會成為常規(guī)做法。例如，可以指定一名董事，邀請大股東們參加定期聚會，暢談自身想法和顧慮。股東們的反饋，可以由該董事向董事會簡要概述，也可以由一名股東代表直接在董事會上進行陳述。

????在這方面，伯克希爾哈撒韋公司（Berkshire Hathaway Inc.）走得更遠。該公司每年邀請3萬多名股東齊聚奧馬哈，股東們有6個多小時可以隨意提問。關于這一點，伯克希爾哈撒韋董事長兼首席執(zhí)行官沃倫?巴菲特最近給出了一條明智的建議。“我經營公司，是為了那些準備長期持有的股東，而不是那些準備短線操作的股東。”

????如果指定一名董事或第三方來代表董事會，時常與股東接觸，董事會和股東都將從中受益。關鍵董事將有機會對股東進行教育，并在問題出現前樹立信譽、建立關系。此外，股東可以同董事會分享自己的獨到見解。股東往往與企業(yè)的競爭對手、客戶以及供應商有接觸，因而能提供“由外及內”的獨特視角，這可能對企業(yè)極具價值。

????The hottest topic in many corporate boardrooms today is shareholder activism — or more specifically, the vulnerability of becoming the target of a shareholder activist and what to do about it. Instead of dreading this or, worse, have to defend against it, boards of directors should be proactive about getting out ahead of it. As insiders, we are in a better position to act on our fiduciary responsibility to represent the interests of shareholders than is an independent party, and we have more tools and power at our disposal to do so. Done right, this might result in some healthy, but managed changes.

????The influence the activists are having in the market has never been greater. Simply put, what they are doing is attracting more interest and more capital, now estimated at north of $115 billion, 10 times the levels of the 1990’s. Distributing their messages has also become easier. They often communicate via social media and business news channels to emotionally pressure management and collaborate with other shareholders.

????So what is a board of directors to do? Boards are empowered to protect shareholders, but many shareholders have become sympathetic to activists because they believe the system has inherent conflicts of interest; that directors are more interested in collecting paychecks and preserving their status quo than in exercising their fiduciary duty to shareholders.

????Conversely, the board’s time horizon for creating value is by definition much longer than that of any one activist, and many boards and management teams feel activists are too short-term and just don’t get the complexities of the landscape in which they operate. Operating realities include balancing the interests of customers, suppliers, employees, and regulators. Implementing well-managed changes, while navigating these factors, often takes longer than investors may realize.

????But there are many things public company boards can do to better align with their core responsibility to the stockholders—and they can do it in a way that is proactive and more long-term in nature than if it is in response to an activist.

????Here are three ideas, which are meant to be directional rather than prescriptive.

????Let shareholders air it out.

????Most boards only receive input from reading reports by sell-side analysts, who are not their shareholders, and from the CEO and CFO, who directly talk to institutional shareholders. Imagine, as an executive, never meeting with your boss to get feedback, but instead receiving it filtered from someone on your staff. That’s essentially what happens for many boards.

????The shareholders are ultimately the “boss” of the board in the sense that the board serves as their proxy for enhancing intrinsic value. Yet boards typically hear about shareholder concerns indirectly and often not attributed to any specific shareholder.

????A huge opportunity is missed without direct contact. This is exactly the opportunity the activists are availing themselves of by contacting blocks of shareholders to exchange views on underperforming companies and collaborating on remedies.

????Boards should do the same. There are a variety of ways to accomplish this. For example, Coca-Cola Co. Director Maria Elena Lagomasino, Chair of the Compensation Committee, met directly with one large shareholder and also considered specific feedback derived from major institutional shareholders of Coke on the issue of executive compensation. This input led to the revised approach to equity compensation, communicated by her directly with shareholders through the company’s website.

????This could even become part of a regular process. For example, a designated board member could invite large shareholders to periodic get togethers to air their thoughts and concerns. This feedback could either be summarized for the board by that board member or delivered directly by a representative from the group at a board gathering.

????Berkshire Hathaway Inc. is even more ambitious. It hosts more than 30,000 shareholders in Omaha annually and allows them more than six hours to ask unfiltered questions. Recently, Chairman and CEO Warren Buffett offered some sage advice on the subject. “I believe in running the company for shareholders that are going to stay, rather than the ones that are going to leave.”

????If a designated director or a designated third party representing the board were to reach out to shareholders from time to time, both sides would learn and benefit. It would allow key directors to educate shareholders, as well as build credibility and a relationship before problems arise. In addition, shareholders can add insight to the board, because they often speak with competitors, customers, and suppliers of the company and can bring an “outside in” perspective that can be hugely valuable.