????埃及穆巴拉克政權垮臺時，我在《財富》（Fortune）雜志上發表了專欄文章，提出商界人士不應持觀望立場。相反，他們應該積極參與解決撕裂埃及社會結構的信任缺失問題。我認為，如果不培養信任，各種機構都將無法正常運轉。

????當時，我那些來自埃及、并在埃及和其他地方生活的商界學生對他們所走上的道路進行了思考。他們大多為開羅解放廣場（Tahrir Square）的熱烈氣氛感到欣喜若狂，因為它看起來似乎是民主的開端。對于他們而言，另一種情況似乎不太可能出現：即埃及在沒有強權的情況下陷入混亂。不管是好是壞，過去穆巴拉克政權一手遮天，使得埃及各對立派別之間的斗爭并未陷入失控境地。

????近兩年后，解放廣場已被重新占領。我再度遇上了我的學生。他們都顯得急躁和失望。穆斯林兄弟會（Muslim Brotherhood）的穆爾西已當選總統，但他試圖獲取超過普通民眾可接受范圍內的權力。最近遭到穆爾西撤換的將領們正發出威脅的聲音。法官們也感到很委屈，他們被指責為舊政權的走狗。此外，該國的貿易和投資活動也陷入停滯狀態。

????不耐煩是可以理解的，因為他們的日常生活和生計都受到了威脅。作為一個企業家，我可以理解這種挫敗感。在長達兩年的時間里一直讓金融家閑置資本、工人待業或工廠停工，確實難以接受。

????然而，作為一個學者，我唯一感到意外的是：最近發生的事件讓所有人都感到驚訝。就重新安排權力坐席達成新協定——誰掌握什么樣的權力以及如何問責——是一個混亂的過程。據我估計，這個過程需要耗時數年，甚至幾十年。我無法想象新的安排在一年半內達成。

????我的一位口才頗佳的學生感嘆到：“看到開羅的今天，我覺得就像是看到了喀布爾。”言下之意是，這個昔日阿拉伯世界知識分子聚集的中心應該做得更好。也許是這樣吧，但把開羅比作喀布爾是過于悲觀了。其他的比喻更適合些。

????例如，在最近的新聞頭條中，另一個以伊斯蘭教徒為主的國家——巴基斯坦也面臨內部紛爭。它的情況與埃及有些相似之處。軍方和司法部門都自認為是國家的保護者。若平民政府無能，或者腐敗程度超過軍方容忍范圍，巴基斯坦軍隊隨時會介入干預。巴基斯坦司法部門保持了積極的姿態，因為背后有一部分巴基斯坦人的激勵。這些人希望有人站出來，對權力機構說實話。但在其他人看來，司法部門在爭取權力方面走過頭了。正如穆爾西必須把重點放在埃及與以色列的關系上，巴基斯坦也在勉力與鄰國阿富汗改善關系。巴基斯坦與阿富汗的國境線存在劃分不清的問題。從巴基斯坦的經驗來看，埃及前路漫長。

????When Hosni Mubarak's regime fell in Egypt, I wrote in a?column for?Fortune?that businesspeople should not stand by the sidelines. Rather, they should actively combat the deficit of trust that had rent the Egyptian social fabric. Without nurturing trust, I argued, institutions would not function properly.

????At the time, my students -- businesspeople of Egyptian origin living within Egypt and elsewhere -- mused about the course they were on.?Most were ecstatic over the heady atmosphere in Tahrir Square, which looked to them like the onset of democracy.?The alternative seemed less likely to them: a collapse into chaos in the absence of the authoritarian hand that had, for better or worse, kept Egypt's contending factions in check.

????Almost two years later, Tahrir Square has been re-occupied. I caught up with my students again.?They are all impatient and disillusioned. Morsi, of the Muslim Brotherhood, has been elected president but has tried to assume more power than the denizens of the street are willing to concede.?The generals, emasculated by Morsi lately, are making threatening noises on the sidelines. The judges feel aggrieved, accused of being stooges of the old regime.?And commerce and investment flows are in stasis.

????The impatience is understandable as daily lives, and livelihoods, are at stake.?As an entrepreneur, I can relate to the frustration. Two years is a long time for a financier to keep capital un-deployed, or for workers to be in limbo, or production runs to be compromised.

????Yet, as a scholar, the only surprise is that anyone is surprised at the recent turn of events.?Re-arranging an institutional deck of chairs -- reaching a new bargain about who wields what kinds of authority and how they will be held accountable -- is a messy process that, in my estimation, takes years, if not decades sometimes.?I'm hard-pressed to imagine that a new arrangement could have been settled on in a year-and-a-half.

????One of my more articulate students lamented, "When I see Cairo today, it feels like Kabul," reflecting the view that the erstwhile intellectual center of the Arab world ought to do better. Maybe so, but comparisons to Kabul are overly pessimistic. Others are more apt.

????Pakistan, another majority Islamic country in the news today, also suffers from internal strife. It shares some similarities to Egypt. The military and the judiciary consider themselves protectors of the country.?Pakistan's army is ready to step in if civilian incompetence or corruption exceeds tolerable (to them) bounds.?The judiciary is an activist one, egged on by relieved Pakistanis eager to see someone speak truth to power, but, in others' views, over-reaching in its assumption of power. Just as Morsi must focus on his country's relationship with Israel, Pakistan struggles with Afghanistan along its poorly demarcated border.?To the extent that the Pakistani experience has anything to say about Egypt's evolution, we're in for a long journey.