????《美國律師》雜志（The American Lawyer）的統計數據顯示，在美國前100大律所中，2010年，每位合伙人的平均盈利為136萬美元，比2000年的741,056美元翻了一番。

????戈登認為：“合伙人費用之所以暴漲，是因為他們參與大型金融交易時發現，銀行業者的工資非常高。說白了，就是嫉妒別人的高收入。他們將其稱為積分榜工資。”

????萊波爾特稱：“在經濟衰退期間，由于對法律服務的需求減少，律所工資上漲的勢頭有所緩解。但合伙人卻仍享受著巨額薪酬。”

????經濟衰退期間，美國就業崗位減少了45,000個，一大批大型知名律所紛紛倒閉，比如豪瑞律師事務所（Howrey）、海倫律師事務所（Heller Ehrman）和思瑞律師事務所（Thelen Reid）等。原先能拿到七位數薪酬的合伙人，突然之間面臨薪酬大幅縮水的境況，于是，許多人紛紛轉投其他律所。而據業內專家披露，大型律所為了鞏固自己的地位，瘋狂從其他律所招募明星合伙人，甚至開出了接近1000萬美元的年薪。結果，導致低薪酬員工與合伙人之間的薪酬差距不斷擴大。

????莫頓?A?皮爾斯是杜威路博薪酬最高的律師之一，年薪高達800萬美元。他曾擔任該律所副總裁，是優秀的企業并購與收購專家。2007年，他的公司杜威律師事務所（Dewey Ballantine）與路博律師事務所（LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae）合并為杜威路博律師事務所。后來，他離開了合并后的律所，但對外宣稱律所欠他6100萬美元，其中可能包括延期未支付的薪酬、退休金和在律所的投資等。

????雖然杜威路博向合伙人開出了數額驚人的薪酬，但仍有大批合伙人轉而投奔境況更好的律所，結果留下律所的管理人員、律師助理、年輕的律師和退休人員自生自滅。

????律所咨詢公司Altman Weil的負責人吉姆?科特曼認為：“太多律所的老板只追求短期收入，而不注重長期投資。”他認為，律所在法學院畢業生身上進行了巨額投資，但“公司要想從合伙人身上獲利要等到四年之后。而到那時，這些成長起來的畢業生們有一半已經跳槽。”

????所以，他認為“人才流動是大趨勢”，因為法學院畢業生背負著沉重的債務，他們“需要償還債務，而且希望在個人履歷中增添在大律所中任職的經歷，之后才會選擇小一點的律所。”

????戈登以及其他法律界專家認為，大律所的問題可以追溯到上世紀七十年代末。按照戈登的話說，當年，大律所“迫不及待地達成共謀”，向《美國律師》等新成立的法律刊物提供薪酬數據。而這“宣揚的是赤裸裸的商業成功標準”。這些數字成為計算每位合伙人年均收入的基礎，之后又產生了律所排名，法律行業學者認為，這使得律所進一步商業化。

????科羅拉多大學（University of Colorado）法律專業教授保羅?坎波斯認為：“它最終演變成了吹牛的游戲，而法律行業也淪落到和其他行業一樣的生意，只是它到處充滿了狂妄和自負。”保羅?坎波斯是博客網站《法學院騙局揭秘》（Inside the Law School Scam）的寫手。

????最后，戈登得出結論稱，薪酬差距的不斷擴大、合伙人的加入、以及員工對律所日益下降的忠誠度和日益縮短的工齡使律所成為“松散的聯盟”，而“如今的合伙人更像是自由人。”

????譯者：阿龍/汪皓

????At the 100 largest U.S. law firms, profit per partner averaged $1.36 million in 2010 -- almost double the $741,056 figure in 2000, according to statistics from The American Lawyer.

????Partner fees have skyrocketed as "lawyers who were involved in big financial deals saw bankers taking big fees," says Gordon. "Salary envy is what it is," he says. "They call it scoreboard salaries."

????Soaring law firm salaries took a dip when "the demand for legal services slipped in the Great Recession," says Leipold, "but partner compensation remains strong."

????Some 45,000 jobs disappeared during the economic meltdown, and a group of large, well-known law firms, like Howrey, Heller Ehrman, and Thelen Reid collapsed. Suddenly "rainmaker" partners who made seven figures were facing a sizable drop below that, making them ripe candidates for other firms. And the salary gap between lower paid personnel and partners widened as large firms sought to shore themselves up by zealously recruiting stellar business generators from other firms with salaries for some approaching $10 million annually, according to industry experts.

????One of Dewey's highest-paid lawyers, Morton A. Pierce, the former vice chairman of the firm and a prominent mergers and acquisitions specialist, was paid as much $8 million annually. His firm, Dewey Ballantine, merged in 2007 with LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae. He has left the merged entity, called Dewey & LeBoeuf, but claims he is owed $61 million, a sum that is likely derived from deferred compensation, retirement funds, and investment in the firm.

????As Dewey frays and faces staggering sums promised to partners, a stream of partners have left for well-paid perches at flourishing law firms, leaving the firm's administrative staff, paralegals, younger lawyers, and pensioners to fend for themselves.

????"Too many law firm leaders look for short-term income, rather than long-term investment, "says Jim Cotterman, a principal at law firm consultant Altman Weil. Firms make huge investments in new law graduates, he says, but "it takes until year four for the firm to make a profit on an associate. And, by that time, half of them are gone."

????So "mobility is the trend," he says, because law school graduates have significant debt, and "they need to pay it down and get the big law firm pedigree on their resume before moving on to a smaller firm or elsewhere."

????Gordon and other legal industry experts trace Big Law's unraveling to the late 1970s when such firms "eagerly connived" -- in Gordon's words -- to provide compensation figures to newly launched legal publications like The American Lawyer. That was "flaunting purely commercial criteria of success," Gordon notes. The numbers served as the basis for calculating average profits-per-partner, which led to firm rankings, a development which further commercialized law firms, legal industry scholars say.

????"It became a bragging contest, and the legal profession became a business like any other, but with pretensions," says Paul Campos, a University of Colorado law professor and blogger at Inside the Law School Scam.

????The growing pay gaps, the insertion of lateral partners, and even less loyalty and longevity among employees have all turned firms into "loose confederations," Gordon concludes. And "partners these days are more like free agents."