公司的首席執(zhí)行官們,比如亞馬遜(Amazon)的安迪·賈西是從哪里得到的數(shù)據(jù),支持他們制定重返辦公室政策?很可惜,許多首席執(zhí)行官的數(shù)據(jù)來(lái)自同一個(gè)地方:由具有相同心態(tài)的首席執(zhí)行官們組成的一個(gè)“回音室”,他們根據(jù)自己的感覺(jué)和直覺(jué)作出這些關(guān)鍵決策。這些首席執(zhí)行官們相信口頭消息和自己的直覺(jué)而不是數(shù)據(jù),這可能讓他們的公司陷入災(zāi)難。
在亞馬遜最近舉行的一次內(nèi)部爐邊談話中,賈西為自己做出的自上而下的強(qiáng)制重返辦公室規(guī)定辯護(hù)。亞馬遜要求從團(tuán)隊(duì)自行決定工作方式的靈活政策轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)槊恐苡腥鞆?qiáng)制現(xiàn)場(chǎng)辦公,這是一個(gè)巨大的政策轉(zhuǎn)變。此次爐邊談話由媒體Business Insider最先曝光,后來(lái)得到了亞馬遜的證實(shí)。亞馬遜稱,員工一直都清楚辦公政策會(huì)隨著新冠疫情的變化而變化,但這次調(diào)整沒(méi)有避免反對(duì)的聲音。
在被問(wèn)到支持這一決定的數(shù)據(jù)時(shí),賈西卻沒(méi)有給出合理的回答。他表示,他“在過(guò)去18個(gè)月與60位至80位其他公司的首席執(zhí)行官進(jìn)行過(guò)交流”,并且“幾乎所有首席執(zhí)行官”都更支持現(xiàn)場(chǎng)辦公。賈西承認(rèn),這是“主觀判斷”,沒(méi)有廣泛的數(shù)據(jù)支持,而且他將這個(gè)決策與過(guò)去另外一個(gè)沒(méi)有數(shù)據(jù)支持的重要決策進(jìn)行了對(duì)比,那就是亞馬遜云科技(Amazon Web Services)的成立。
看數(shù)據(jù)還是靠感覺(jué)?
這種比較是否恰當(dāng)?亞馬遜啟動(dòng)云科技業(yè)務(wù)在內(nèi)部和外部都遭到了質(zhì)疑,因?yàn)檫@種商業(yè)模式并未得到驗(yàn)證。換言之,亞馬遜違背常規(guī),并承擔(dān)了巨大風(fēng)險(xiǎn),該業(yè)務(wù)一旦成功可能潛力無(wú)限。相比之下,自上而下的每周三天強(qiáng)制重返辦公室的規(guī)定,并不是一種“未得到驗(yàn)證的商業(yè)模式”。有許多有關(guān)這種模式的證據(jù),它們遠(yuǎn)比那些志同道合的首席執(zhí)行官們組成的回音室更加可靠。然而,賈西拒絕拿出證據(jù),而是相信自己的感覺(jué),以及其他首席執(zhí)行官們的驗(yàn)證。
賈西要堅(jiān)決執(zhí)行這項(xiàng)嚴(yán)格的政策。他對(duì)員工表示,如果你們不到辦公室現(xiàn)場(chǎng)辦公,“這對(duì)你們來(lái)說(shuō)很可能行不通”。亞馬遜正在跟蹤員工的打卡數(shù)據(jù),在8月初,亞馬遜向部分員工發(fā)送的一條信息稱“我們之所以聯(lián)系你,是因?yàn)槟愕霓k公樓已經(jīng)做好準(zhǔn)備,但你并沒(méi)有按照我們的預(yù)期每周至少三天在辦公室與同事現(xiàn)場(chǎng)辦公。”亞馬遜稱,會(huì)與管理者分享匯總的匿名打卡數(shù)據(jù),以整體了解有多少員工來(lái)到現(xiàn)場(chǎng)辦公,但公司不會(huì)向管理者提供個(gè)別員工的打卡數(shù)據(jù)。
當(dāng)然,并非只有賈西這一位首席執(zhí)行官,不依靠數(shù)據(jù)而是相信自己的直覺(jué),自上而下地作出了嚴(yán)格的重返辦公室規(guī)定。例如星巴克(Starbucks)的首席執(zhí)行官霍華德·舒爾茨在今年1月發(fā)布的指示,要求公司員工每周三天現(xiàn)場(chǎng)辦公。舒爾茨表示,出臺(tái)這個(gè)政策的原因是員工進(jìn)入辦公樓的打卡數(shù)據(jù)顯示,公司鼓勵(lì)員工每周到辦公室一天至兩天,但員工并沒(méi)有遵守公司的指導(dǎo)方針,這令他非常不滿。他因?yàn)閷?duì)員工打卡數(shù)據(jù)感到不滿,就根據(jù)這種感受作出重返辦公室這樣一個(gè)重要的政策決定,這是糟糕至極的做法!
我每周與5位至10位公司領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者討論重返辦公室政策的最佳實(shí)踐,在討論過(guò)程中,我聽(tīng)過(guò)許多類似的故事。大多數(shù)的首席執(zhí)行官告訴我,他們的重返辦公室政策,主要是基于與其他公司領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者討論的他們直覺(jué)認(rèn)為最合適的辦公方式。這是一種教科書(shū)式的確認(rèn)偏見(jiàn)示例,這種認(rèn)知偏見(jiàn)是指我們會(huì)尋找能夠確認(rèn)我們的信念的信息,卻忽視其他信息。
確認(rèn)偏見(jiàn)與重返辦公室政策
賈西或其他領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者為什么不與Atlassian的首席執(zhí)行官或首席人力資源官探討他們著名的遠(yuǎn)程辦公模式的效果?因?yàn)樗麄儚膶?duì)方那里獲得的數(shù)據(jù)與他們的觀念相沖突。
但首席執(zhí)行官們由回音室驅(qū)動(dòng)作出的重返辦公室決策,會(huì)造成令他們意想不到的負(fù)面后果。今年5月,數(shù)百名亞馬遜員工在公司的第一個(gè)重返辦公室日,在午餐時(shí)間舉著寫(xiě)有“不要重返辦公室”的標(biāo)語(yǔ),走出公司的西雅圖總部表達(dá)抗議。亞馬遜最近宣布強(qiáng)制重返辦公室政策后,很快有超過(guò)30,000名員工加入了一個(gè)名為“遠(yuǎn)程辦公倡議”的新Slack頻道,并組織了一次請(qǐng)?jiān)浮嗰R遜員工在請(qǐng)?jiān)钢斜硎荆芯匡@示遠(yuǎn)程辦公可以改善工作效率、招聘、工作/生活平衡、包容性和減少公司支出。
盡管亞馬遜的股價(jià)在新冠疫情期間的遠(yuǎn)程辦公期間翻了一番,但安迪·賈西的主觀判斷不認(rèn)同這種數(shù)據(jù)驅(qū)動(dòng)的做法,他更愿意相信首席執(zhí)行官們組成的回音室。股票的表現(xiàn)和領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者的不滿情緒之間的不一致,顯示出人們對(duì)重返辦公室的理解和現(xiàn)實(shí)之間的差距。
我們知道,在回音室效應(yīng)下作出重返辦公室政策造成的危害,在亞馬遜等研究案例中并不明顯。Envoy通過(guò)采訪1,000多位每周至少現(xiàn)場(chǎng)辦公一天的美國(guó)公司高管和管理者發(fā)現(xiàn),有多達(dá)80%的老板表示,對(duì)最初的重返辦公室決策感到后悔。
領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者稱,如果他們對(duì)員工實(shí)際出現(xiàn)在辦公室和使用辦公便利設(shè)施的頻率有更多的了解,他們可能就會(huì)作出截然不同的決策。有人困惑不已,希望確認(rèn)他們的現(xiàn)場(chǎng)辦公政策是否有效。有人發(fā)現(xiàn),如果不能了解團(tuán)隊(duì)未來(lái)對(duì)現(xiàn)場(chǎng)辦公的態(tài)度,就很難進(jìn)行長(zhǎng)期房地產(chǎn)交易。Envoy的首席執(zhí)行官及創(chuàng)始人拉里·加德亞說(shuō):“許多公司意識(shí)到,他們本來(lái)可以更慎重,而不是根據(jù)高管的意見(jiàn)就作出大膽的、充滿爭(zhēng)議的重要決策,卻不參考員工的數(shù)據(jù)。”
或者能夠參考另外一個(gè)數(shù)據(jù),即Unispace的《永遠(yuǎn)回歸》(Returning for Good)報(bào)告。Unispace發(fā)現(xiàn),在執(zhí)行重返辦公室規(guī)定的公司里,高達(dá)42%的公司發(fā)現(xiàn)辭職人數(shù)超出他們的預(yù)期。此外,其中約29%的公司在招聘新員工時(shí)面臨困難。因此,雖然老板知道讓員工重返辦公室會(huì)引起動(dòng)蕩,但他們并沒(méi)有看到未來(lái)可能出現(xiàn)的嚴(yán)重問(wèn)題。
Unispace還提出了另外一點(diǎn):關(guān)鍵在于選擇。他們的研究顯示,一般情況下,員工表示在辦公室辦公令他們感到開(kāi)心(31%)、有動(dòng)力(30%)和興奮(27%)。但如果重返辦公室不是一種靈活的選擇,這些積極的情緒將會(huì)減少,有這三種積極情緒的員工比例分別下降到27%、26%和22%。因此,如果員工重返辦公室是他們的自主選擇而不是因?yàn)楣镜膹?qiáng)制規(guī)定,他們就會(huì)更愿意重返辦公室。我曾經(jīng)幫助20多家機(jī)構(gòu)制定它們的重返辦公室政策。在從這些機(jī)構(gòu)收集數(shù)據(jù)時(shí),我也發(fā)現(xiàn)了靈活選擇的好處。
是否所有重返辦公室決策都沒(méi)有使用數(shù)據(jù)?
并非所有首席執(zhí)行官在決定重返辦公室的政策時(shí),都只信任他們的直覺(jué)和回音室。事實(shí)上,有些首席執(zhí)行官確實(shí)會(huì)使用數(shù)據(jù)(意外吧)。比如,賽富時(shí)(Salesforce)的首席執(zhí)行官馬克·貝尼奧夫曾經(jīng)表示:“對(duì)于新入職的員工,我們根據(jù)經(jīng)驗(yàn)可以判斷,他們?cè)谵k公室里與同事接觸,參加入職培訓(xùn)和接受其他培訓(xùn),在這種環(huán)境下他們的表現(xiàn)更好。如果他們居家辦公,不經(jīng)過(guò)這些流程,我們就認(rèn)為他們不可能取得同樣的成功。”
貝尼奧夫的觀點(diǎn)有數(shù)據(jù)支持。哈佛大學(xué)(Harvard University)的一篇工作論文研究了一家《財(cái)富》美國(guó)500強(qiáng)公司的軟件工程師。這家公司的總部有兩棟建筑,跨越了多個(gè)街區(qū)。研究的主要課題是物理接近對(duì)反饋、編程產(chǎn)出和員工保留的影響。
研究結(jié)果如何?與團(tuán)隊(duì)成員在同一棟建筑里辦公的工程師,比與團(tuán)隊(duì)成員不在一起辦公的工程師,獲得的在線反饋多22%。然而,隨著新冠疫情導(dǎo)致辦公室關(guān)閉,這種優(yōu)勢(shì)幾乎徹底消失,在反饋方面的優(yōu)勢(shì)減少到只有8%。有趣的是,在同一個(gè)地點(diǎn)辦公似乎讓編程產(chǎn)出減少了24%。高級(jí)工程師的表現(xiàn)更加明顯,編程產(chǎn)出減少30%,這主要是因?yàn)樗麄兓ㄙM(fèi)更多時(shí)間為其他人提供反饋。因此,雖然近距離接觸有助于溝通,但這可能要以降低工作效率為代價(jià),尤其是團(tuán)隊(duì)中經(jīng)驗(yàn)更豐富的成員。然而,研究發(fā)現(xiàn),從長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來(lái)看,物理接近對(duì)初級(jí)員工的成功大有裨益。因此賽富時(shí)的決定非常合理。
廣義而言,賽富時(shí)采用的是一種差異化的混合辦公模式,公司并非簡(jiǎn)單地根據(jù)不同工作年限規(guī)定員工的現(xiàn)場(chǎng)辦公時(shí)間,而是根據(jù)員工的不同職位作出規(guī)定。工程師每個(gè)季度只需要在辦公室辦公10天,而行政人員則需要每周三天現(xiàn)場(chǎng)辦公。銷售和營(yíng)銷團(tuán)隊(duì)除了需要外出完成交易外,還需要每周四天現(xiàn)場(chǎng)辦公。貝尼奧夫甚至不會(huì)把公司的安排視為一種強(qiáng)制規(guī)定。他說(shuō):“我不想強(qiáng)迫任何人。我們不想失去我們的優(yōu)秀人才。”他警告過(guò)于強(qiáng)烈地推動(dòng)重返辦公室,會(huì)造成人才流失。
相反,貝尼奧夫希望將辦公室打造成員工們?cè)敢鈦?lái)的地方。他會(huì)允許員工與他們的上司談判完全遠(yuǎn)程辦公的安排。但貝尼奧夫也明確地指出,有些崗位始終需要面對(duì)面的交流。
雖然賽富時(shí)的重返辦公室策略并不完美,但它卻比大多數(shù)公司的策略更合理。它具備了真正有效的重返辦公室策略的三個(gè)要素之一:根據(jù)公司的需求量身定制重返辦公室策略。畢竟,正如貝尼奧夫所言,不同崗位對(duì)在辦公室現(xiàn)場(chǎng)辦公有不同要求。工程師可能每個(gè)季度只需要有10天到辦公室辦公,例如在項(xiàng)目開(kāi)始和結(jié)束時(shí)。行政人員的工作涉及辦公室管理,他們需要履行的辦公職責(zé)包括幫助同事使用復(fù)印機(jī),或者接待訪客等,因此應(yīng)該確保始終有行政人員能夠滿足這些需求。會(huì)計(jì)師可以月底到辦公室辦公兩天處理賬目,并在每個(gè)季度末現(xiàn)場(chǎng)辦公一周。
像絕大多數(shù)大公司的做法一樣,強(qiáng)制規(guī)定每周現(xiàn)場(chǎng)辦公的天數(shù),是一種懶惰和盲從的表現(xiàn)。公司領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者和人力資源部門(mén)沒(méi)有全面考慮哪些人需要現(xiàn)場(chǎng)辦公,以及現(xiàn)場(chǎng)辦公的目的是什么。如果公司沒(méi)有合理的理由,卻要求員工到辦公室做他們?cè)诩乙部梢酝瓿傻娜蝿?wù),員工就會(huì)有頗多怨言。
數(shù)據(jù)驅(qū)動(dòng)的重返辦公室政策
很可惜,賽富時(shí)缺少了數(shù)據(jù)驅(qū)動(dòng)的重返辦公室政策應(yīng)該具備的另外兩個(gè)關(guān)鍵要素:評(píng)估員工意見(jiàn)和獲得員工支持。有一些類似的工具能夠一石二鳥(niǎo),同時(shí)解決這兩個(gè)問(wèn)題。
首先,你需要調(diào)查員工對(duì)重返辦公室的意見(jiàn),開(kāi)展調(diào)查的理想時(shí)機(jī)是在制定重返辦公室政策之前,但如果政策已經(jīng)開(kāi)始執(zhí)行,就也可以在事后展開(kāi)調(diào)查。在我指導(dǎo)制定重返辦公室政策的所有公司,無(wú)論是在流程開(kāi)始時(shí),還是在政策發(fā)布后希望對(duì)其進(jìn)行完善,我們首先都會(huì)充分調(diào)查員工對(duì)遠(yuǎn)程辦公和重返辦公室的意見(jiàn)。調(diào)查的問(wèn)題涉及員工對(duì)重返辦公室的偏好,支持不同版本重返辦公室政策的意向,如果公司制定不同版本的政策,員工是否就會(huì)向其他人推薦在他們的公司工作,員工居家辦公和在辦公室辦公時(shí)執(zhí)行獨(dú)立任務(wù)和合作任務(wù)的效率,以及與健康、幸福、士氣、壓力等有關(guān)的類似問(wèn)題。關(guān)于這項(xiàng)調(diào)查,可以參閱我的暢銷書(shū)《重返辦公室:領(lǐng)導(dǎo)混合和遠(yuǎn)程團(tuán)隊(duì)》(Returning to the Office and Leading Hybrid and Remote Teams)的附錄。
接下來(lái),你需要組織焦點(diǎn)小組討論會(huì)。從不同部門(mén)選擇員工代表,包括基層員工和不同層級(jí)的管理者。一定要避免將管理者與基層員工安排在同一個(gè)焦點(diǎn)小組,因?yàn)槿绻泄芾碚叱鱿瘯?huì)議,許多員工可能就不愿意完全敞開(kāi)心扉。
焦點(diǎn)小組討論會(huì)能夠提供寶貴的定性數(shù)據(jù),有助于深入了解調(diào)查結(jié)果背后的“原因”。你可以結(jié)合這些調(diào)查結(jié)果,探索一次調(diào)查可能無(wú)法充分體現(xiàn)的細(xì)微問(wèn)題,比如工作-生活平衡、居家辦公室的設(shè)置以及團(tuán)隊(duì)動(dòng)態(tài)等。例如,為什么一些員工更喜歡混合辦公而不是完全遠(yuǎn)程辦公?是因?yàn)檗k公室便利設(shè)施、團(tuán)隊(duì)成員之間的友情,還是其他原因?理想情況下, 應(yīng)該由一個(gè)中立團(tuán)隊(duì)組織這類討論會(huì),以鼓勵(lì)坦誠(chéng)對(duì)話,并在獲得參與者的同意后,將討論內(nèi)容記錄下來(lái),用于后續(xù)分析。
收集到大量數(shù)據(jù)之后,下一步是進(jìn)行匯總。將從焦點(diǎn)小組討論會(huì)中得到的定性見(jiàn)解與調(diào)查中的定性指標(biāo)相結(jié)合。這種雙重方式不僅能夠從更全面的角度出發(fā)制定重返辦公室策略,還可以保證這種策略能夠深入理解員工的需求和偏好。
形成一個(gè)封閉的循環(huán)是關(guān)鍵。與員工分享你根據(jù)這些討論將要采取的可行措施。即使員工并不完全認(rèn)同最終決策,這個(gè)透明的過(guò)程也可以讓員工感覺(jué)公司聽(tīng)取和征求了他們的意見(jiàn)。
結(jié)果會(huì)怎樣?重返辦公室計(jì)劃的支持率大幅提高,執(zhí)行的阻力減少,因?yàn)閱T工感覺(jué)決定公司未來(lái)的過(guò)程真正考慮了他們的意見(jiàn)。因此,與亞馬遜的情況不同,不會(huì)有員工向媒體曝光公司內(nèi)部會(huì)議記錄,讓媒體干涉公司的運(yùn)營(yíng)。也不會(huì)有員工走上街頭,公開(kāi)表示抗議或簽署大規(guī)模請(qǐng)?jiān)笗?shū)。我的所有客戶都沒(méi)有遇到過(guò)這些情況,因?yàn)閱T工感覺(jué)他們的意見(jiàn)得到了傾聽(tīng),自己受到了尊重,而且重返辦公室政策是基于各團(tuán)隊(duì)和崗位的需求量身定制。
亞馬遜暴露出回音室驅(qū)動(dòng)的重返辦公室政策的缺點(diǎn),尤其是員工的抵觸和士氣低下。相比之下,更細(xì)微的數(shù)據(jù)驅(qū)動(dòng)的重返辦公室政策,會(huì)提供一種平衡的、具有同理心的策略。尼克·布盧姆和其他學(xué)者對(duì)首席執(zhí)行官未來(lái)計(jì)劃的研究顯示,未來(lái)遠(yuǎn)程辦公將會(huì)增多而不是減少,因此許多領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者似乎已經(jīng)意識(shí)到他們當(dāng)初的重返辦公室政策是錯(cuò)誤的。事實(shí)上,Envoy發(fā)現(xiàn),超過(guò)80%的老板對(duì)最初的重返辦公室計(jì)劃感到后悔,并表示他們寧愿收集更多的信息,并作出數(shù)據(jù)驅(qū)動(dòng)的決策。如果公司能夠走出首席執(zhí)行官回音室,與員工進(jìn)行有意義的對(duì)話,就可以解決重返辦公室這個(gè)復(fù)雜的問(wèn)題。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
格列布·齊珀斯基博士(Gleb Tsipursky,又稱“辦公室耳語(yǔ)者”)幫助科技和金融行業(yè)的高管在混合工作中推動(dòng)合作、創(chuàng)新和留住人才。他擔(dān)任精品未來(lái)工作咨詢公司Disaster Avoidance Experts的首席執(zhí)行官。他是七本書(shū)的暢銷書(shū)作者,包括《永不與直覺(jué)同行》(Never Go With Your Gut)和《領(lǐng)導(dǎo)混合和遠(yuǎn)程團(tuán)隊(duì)》(Leading Hybrid and Remote Teams)。他的專業(yè)知識(shí)來(lái)自于20多年來(lái)為從美國(guó)家庭人壽保險(xiǎn)公司(Aflac)到施樂(lè)(Xerox)的《財(cái)富》美國(guó)500強(qiáng)公司提供咨詢,以及在北卡羅來(lái)納大學(xué)教堂山分校(UNC–Chapel Hill)和俄亥俄州立大學(xué)(Ohio State University)擔(dān)任行為科學(xué)家超過(guò)15年的學(xué)術(shù)生涯。
Fortune.com上發(fā)表的評(píng)論文章中表達(dá)的觀點(diǎn),僅代表作者本人的觀點(diǎn),不代表《財(cái)富》雜志的觀點(diǎn)和立場(chǎng)。
譯者:劉進(jìn)龍
審校:汪皓
公司的首席執(zhí)行官們,比如亞馬遜(Amazon)的安迪·賈西是從哪里得到的數(shù)據(jù),支持他們制定重返辦公室政策?很可惜,許多首席執(zhí)行官的數(shù)據(jù)來(lái)自同一個(gè)地方:由具有相同心態(tài)的首席執(zhí)行官們組成的一個(gè)“回音室”,他們根據(jù)自己的感覺(jué)和直覺(jué)作出這些關(guān)鍵決策。這些首席執(zhí)行官們相信口頭消息和自己的直覺(jué)而不是數(shù)據(jù),這可能讓他們的公司陷入災(zāi)難。
在亞馬遜最近舉行的一次內(nèi)部爐邊談話中,賈西為自己做出的自上而下的強(qiáng)制重返辦公室規(guī)定辯護(hù)。亞馬遜要求從團(tuán)隊(duì)自行決定工作方式的靈活政策轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)槊恐苡腥鞆?qiáng)制現(xiàn)場(chǎng)辦公,這是一個(gè)巨大的政策轉(zhuǎn)變。此次爐邊談話由媒體Business Insider最先曝光,后來(lái)得到了亞馬遜的證實(shí)。亞馬遜稱,員工一直都清楚辦公政策會(huì)隨著新冠疫情的變化而變化,但這次調(diào)整沒(méi)有避免反對(duì)的聲音。
在被問(wèn)到支持這一決定的數(shù)據(jù)時(shí),賈西卻沒(méi)有給出合理的回答。他表示,他“在過(guò)去18個(gè)月與60位至80位其他公司的首席執(zhí)行官進(jìn)行過(guò)交流”,并且“幾乎所有首席執(zhí)行官”都更支持現(xiàn)場(chǎng)辦公。賈西承認(rèn),這是“主觀判斷”,沒(méi)有廣泛的數(shù)據(jù)支持,而且他將這個(gè)決策與過(guò)去另外一個(gè)沒(méi)有數(shù)據(jù)支持的重要決策進(jìn)行了對(duì)比,那就是亞馬遜云科技(Amazon Web Services)的成立。
看數(shù)據(jù)還是靠感覺(jué)?
這種比較是否恰當(dāng)?亞馬遜啟動(dòng)云科技業(yè)務(wù)在內(nèi)部和外部都遭到了質(zhì)疑,因?yàn)檫@種商業(yè)模式并未得到驗(yàn)證。換言之,亞馬遜違背常規(guī),并承擔(dān)了巨大風(fēng)險(xiǎn),該業(yè)務(wù)一旦成功可能潛力無(wú)限。相比之下,自上而下的每周三天強(qiáng)制重返辦公室的規(guī)定,并不是一種“未得到驗(yàn)證的商業(yè)模式”。有許多有關(guān)這種模式的證據(jù),它們遠(yuǎn)比那些志同道合的首席執(zhí)行官們組成的回音室更加可靠。然而,賈西拒絕拿出證據(jù),而是相信自己的感覺(jué),以及其他首席執(zhí)行官們的驗(yàn)證。
賈西要堅(jiān)決執(zhí)行這項(xiàng)嚴(yán)格的政策。他對(duì)員工表示,如果你們不到辦公室現(xiàn)場(chǎng)辦公,“這對(duì)你們來(lái)說(shuō)很可能行不通”。亞馬遜正在跟蹤員工的打卡數(shù)據(jù),在8月初,亞馬遜向部分員工發(fā)送的一條信息稱“我們之所以聯(lián)系你,是因?yàn)槟愕霓k公樓已經(jīng)做好準(zhǔn)備,但你并沒(méi)有按照我們的預(yù)期每周至少三天在辦公室與同事現(xiàn)場(chǎng)辦公。”亞馬遜稱,會(huì)與管理者分享匯總的匿名打卡數(shù)據(jù),以整體了解有多少員工來(lái)到現(xiàn)場(chǎng)辦公,但公司不會(huì)向管理者提供個(gè)別員工的打卡數(shù)據(jù)。
當(dāng)然,并非只有賈西這一位首席執(zhí)行官,不依靠數(shù)據(jù)而是相信自己的直覺(jué),自上而下地作出了嚴(yán)格的重返辦公室規(guī)定。例如星巴克(Starbucks)的首席執(zhí)行官霍華德·舒爾茨在今年1月發(fā)布的指示,要求公司員工每周三天現(xiàn)場(chǎng)辦公。舒爾茨表示,出臺(tái)這個(gè)政策的原因是員工進(jìn)入辦公樓的打卡數(shù)據(jù)顯示,公司鼓勵(lì)員工每周到辦公室一天至兩天,但員工并沒(méi)有遵守公司的指導(dǎo)方針,這令他非常不滿。他因?yàn)閷?duì)員工打卡數(shù)據(jù)感到不滿,就根據(jù)這種感受作出重返辦公室這樣一個(gè)重要的政策決定,這是糟糕至極的做法!
我每周與5位至10位公司領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者討論重返辦公室政策的最佳實(shí)踐,在討論過(guò)程中,我聽(tīng)過(guò)許多類似的故事。大多數(shù)的首席執(zhí)行官告訴我,他們的重返辦公室政策,主要是基于與其他公司領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者討論的他們直覺(jué)認(rèn)為最合適的辦公方式。這是一種教科書(shū)式的確認(rèn)偏見(jiàn)示例,這種認(rèn)知偏見(jiàn)是指我們會(huì)尋找能夠確認(rèn)我們的信念的信息,卻忽視其他信息。
確認(rèn)偏見(jiàn)與重返辦公室政策
賈西或其他領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者為什么不與Atlassian的首席執(zhí)行官或首席人力資源官探討他們著名的遠(yuǎn)程辦公模式的效果?因?yàn)樗麄儚膶?duì)方那里獲得的數(shù)據(jù)與他們的觀念相沖突。
但首席執(zhí)行官們由回音室驅(qū)動(dòng)作出的重返辦公室決策,會(huì)造成令他們意想不到的負(fù)面后果。今年5月,數(shù)百名亞馬遜員工在公司的第一個(gè)重返辦公室日,在午餐時(shí)間舉著寫(xiě)有“不要重返辦公室”的標(biāo)語(yǔ),走出公司的西雅圖總部表達(dá)抗議。亞馬遜最近宣布強(qiáng)制重返辦公室政策后,很快有超過(guò)30,000名員工加入了一個(gè)名為“遠(yuǎn)程辦公倡議”的新Slack頻道,并組織了一次請(qǐng)?jiān)浮嗰R遜員工在請(qǐng)?jiān)钢斜硎荆芯匡@示遠(yuǎn)程辦公可以改善工作效率、招聘、工作/生活平衡、包容性和減少公司支出。
盡管亞馬遜的股價(jià)在新冠疫情期間的遠(yuǎn)程辦公期間翻了一番,但安迪·賈西的主觀判斷不認(rèn)同這種數(shù)據(jù)驅(qū)動(dòng)的做法,他更愿意相信首席執(zhí)行官們組成的回音室。股票的表現(xiàn)和領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者的不滿情緒之間的不一致,顯示出人們對(duì)重返辦公室的理解和現(xiàn)實(shí)之間的差距。
我們知道,在回音室效應(yīng)下作出重返辦公室政策造成的危害,在亞馬遜等研究案例中并不明顯。Envoy通過(guò)采訪1,000多位每周至少現(xiàn)場(chǎng)辦公一天的美國(guó)公司高管和管理者發(fā)現(xiàn),有多達(dá)80%的老板表示,對(duì)最初的重返辦公室決策感到后悔。
領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者稱,如果他們對(duì)員工實(shí)際出現(xiàn)在辦公室和使用辦公便利設(shè)施的頻率有更多的了解,他們可能就會(huì)作出截然不同的決策。有人困惑不已,希望確認(rèn)他們的現(xiàn)場(chǎng)辦公政策是否有效。有人發(fā)現(xiàn),如果不能了解團(tuán)隊(duì)未來(lái)對(duì)現(xiàn)場(chǎng)辦公的態(tài)度,就很難進(jìn)行長(zhǎng)期房地產(chǎn)交易。Envoy的首席執(zhí)行官及創(chuàng)始人拉里·加德亞說(shuō):“許多公司意識(shí)到,他們本來(lái)可以更慎重,而不是根據(jù)高管的意見(jiàn)就作出大膽的、充滿爭(zhēng)議的重要決策,卻不參考員工的數(shù)據(jù)。”
或者能夠參考另外一個(gè)數(shù)據(jù),即Unispace的《永遠(yuǎn)回歸》(Returning for Good)報(bào)告。Unispace發(fā)現(xiàn),在執(zhí)行重返辦公室規(guī)定的公司里,高達(dá)42%的公司發(fā)現(xiàn)辭職人數(shù)超出他們的預(yù)期。此外,其中約29%的公司在招聘新員工時(shí)面臨困難。因此,雖然老板知道讓員工重返辦公室會(huì)引起動(dòng)蕩,但他們并沒(méi)有看到未來(lái)可能出現(xiàn)的嚴(yán)重問(wèn)題。
Unispace還提出了另外一點(diǎn):關(guān)鍵在于選擇。他們的研究顯示,一般情況下,員工表示在辦公室辦公令他們感到開(kāi)心(31%)、有動(dòng)力(30%)和興奮(27%)。但如果重返辦公室不是一種靈活的選擇,這些積極的情緒將會(huì)減少,有這三種積極情緒的員工比例分別下降到27%、26%和22%。因此,如果員工重返辦公室是他們的自主選擇而不是因?yàn)楣镜膹?qiáng)制規(guī)定,他們就會(huì)更愿意重返辦公室。我曾經(jīng)幫助20多家機(jī)構(gòu)制定它們的重返辦公室政策。在從這些機(jī)構(gòu)收集數(shù)據(jù)時(shí),我也發(fā)現(xiàn)了靈活選擇的好處。
是否所有重返辦公室決策都沒(méi)有使用數(shù)據(jù)?
并非所有首席執(zhí)行官在決定重返辦公室的政策時(shí),都只信任他們的直覺(jué)和回音室。事實(shí)上,有些首席執(zhí)行官確實(shí)會(huì)使用數(shù)據(jù)(意外吧)。比如,賽富時(shí)(Salesforce)的首席執(zhí)行官馬克·貝尼奧夫曾經(jīng)表示:“對(duì)于新入職的員工,我們根據(jù)經(jīng)驗(yàn)可以判斷,他們?cè)谵k公室里與同事接觸,參加入職培訓(xùn)和接受其他培訓(xùn),在這種環(huán)境下他們的表現(xiàn)更好。如果他們居家辦公,不經(jīng)過(guò)這些流程,我們就認(rèn)為他們不可能取得同樣的成功。”
貝尼奧夫的觀點(diǎn)有數(shù)據(jù)支持。哈佛大學(xué)(Harvard University)的一篇工作論文研究了一家《財(cái)富》美國(guó)500強(qiáng)公司的軟件工程師。這家公司的總部有兩棟建筑,跨越了多個(gè)街區(qū)。研究的主要課題是物理接近對(duì)反饋、編程產(chǎn)出和員工保留的影響。
研究結(jié)果如何?與團(tuán)隊(duì)成員在同一棟建筑里辦公的工程師,比與團(tuán)隊(duì)成員不在一起辦公的工程師,獲得的在線反饋多22%。然而,隨著新冠疫情導(dǎo)致辦公室關(guān)閉,這種優(yōu)勢(shì)幾乎徹底消失,在反饋方面的優(yōu)勢(shì)減少到只有8%。有趣的是,在同一個(gè)地點(diǎn)辦公似乎讓編程產(chǎn)出減少了24%。高級(jí)工程師的表現(xiàn)更加明顯,編程產(chǎn)出減少30%,這主要是因?yàn)樗麄兓ㄙM(fèi)更多時(shí)間為其他人提供反饋。因此,雖然近距離接觸有助于溝通,但這可能要以降低工作效率為代價(jià),尤其是團(tuán)隊(duì)中經(jīng)驗(yàn)更豐富的成員。然而,研究發(fā)現(xiàn),從長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來(lái)看,物理接近對(duì)初級(jí)員工的成功大有裨益。因此賽富時(shí)的決定非常合理。
廣義而言,賽富時(shí)采用的是一種差異化的混合辦公模式,公司并非簡(jiǎn)單地根據(jù)不同工作年限規(guī)定員工的現(xiàn)場(chǎng)辦公時(shí)間,而是根據(jù)員工的不同職位作出規(guī)定。工程師每個(gè)季度只需要在辦公室辦公10天,而行政人員則需要每周三天現(xiàn)場(chǎng)辦公。銷售和營(yíng)銷團(tuán)隊(duì)除了需要外出完成交易外,還需要每周四天現(xiàn)場(chǎng)辦公。貝尼奧夫甚至不會(huì)把公司的安排視為一種強(qiáng)制規(guī)定。他說(shuō):“我不想強(qiáng)迫任何人。我們不想失去我們的優(yōu)秀人才。”他警告過(guò)于強(qiáng)烈地推動(dòng)重返辦公室,會(huì)造成人才流失。
相反,貝尼奧夫希望將辦公室打造成員工們?cè)敢鈦?lái)的地方。他會(huì)允許員工與他們的上司談判完全遠(yuǎn)程辦公的安排。但貝尼奧夫也明確地指出,有些崗位始終需要面對(duì)面的交流。
雖然賽富時(shí)的重返辦公室策略并不完美,但它卻比大多數(shù)公司的策略更合理。它具備了真正有效的重返辦公室策略的三個(gè)要素之一:根據(jù)公司的需求量身定制重返辦公室策略。畢竟,正如貝尼奧夫所言,不同崗位對(duì)在辦公室現(xiàn)場(chǎng)辦公有不同要求。工程師可能每個(gè)季度只需要有10天到辦公室辦公,例如在項(xiàng)目開(kāi)始和結(jié)束時(shí)。行政人員的工作涉及辦公室管理,他們需要履行的辦公職責(zé)包括幫助同事使用復(fù)印機(jī),或者接待訪客等,因此應(yīng)該確保始終有行政人員能夠滿足這些需求。會(huì)計(jì)師可以月底到辦公室辦公兩天處理賬目,并在每個(gè)季度末現(xiàn)場(chǎng)辦公一周。
像絕大多數(shù)大公司的做法一樣,強(qiáng)制規(guī)定每周現(xiàn)場(chǎng)辦公的天數(shù),是一種懶惰和盲從的表現(xiàn)。公司領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者和人力資源部門(mén)沒(méi)有全面考慮哪些人需要現(xiàn)場(chǎng)辦公,以及現(xiàn)場(chǎng)辦公的目的是什么。如果公司沒(méi)有合理的理由,卻要求員工到辦公室做他們?cè)诩乙部梢酝瓿傻娜蝿?wù),員工就會(huì)有頗多怨言。
數(shù)據(jù)驅(qū)動(dòng)的重返辦公室政策
很可惜,賽富時(shí)缺少了數(shù)據(jù)驅(qū)動(dòng)的重返辦公室政策應(yīng)該具備的另外兩個(gè)關(guān)鍵要素:評(píng)估員工意見(jiàn)和獲得員工支持。有一些類似的工具能夠一石二鳥(niǎo),同時(shí)解決這兩個(gè)問(wèn)題。
首先,你需要調(diào)查員工對(duì)重返辦公室的意見(jiàn),開(kāi)展調(diào)查的理想時(shí)機(jī)是在制定重返辦公室政策之前,但如果政策已經(jīng)開(kāi)始執(zhí)行,就也可以在事后展開(kāi)調(diào)查。在我指導(dǎo)制定重返辦公室政策的所有公司,無(wú)論是在流程開(kāi)始時(shí),還是在政策發(fā)布后希望對(duì)其進(jìn)行完善,我們首先都會(huì)充分調(diào)查員工對(duì)遠(yuǎn)程辦公和重返辦公室的意見(jiàn)。調(diào)查的問(wèn)題涉及員工對(duì)重返辦公室的偏好,支持不同版本重返辦公室政策的意向,如果公司制定不同版本的政策,員工是否就會(huì)向其他人推薦在他們的公司工作,員工居家辦公和在辦公室辦公時(shí)執(zhí)行獨(dú)立任務(wù)和合作任務(wù)的效率,以及與健康、幸福、士氣、壓力等有關(guān)的類似問(wèn)題。關(guān)于這項(xiàng)調(diào)查,可以參閱我的暢銷書(shū)《重返辦公室:領(lǐng)導(dǎo)混合和遠(yuǎn)程團(tuán)隊(duì)》(Returning to the Office and Leading Hybrid and Remote Teams)的附錄。
接下來(lái),你需要組織焦點(diǎn)小組討論會(huì)。從不同部門(mén)選擇員工代表,包括基層員工和不同層級(jí)的管理者。一定要避免將管理者與基層員工安排在同一個(gè)焦點(diǎn)小組,因?yàn)槿绻泄芾碚叱鱿瘯?huì)議,許多員工可能就不愿意完全敞開(kāi)心扉。
焦點(diǎn)小組討論會(huì)能夠提供寶貴的定性數(shù)據(jù),有助于深入了解調(diào)查結(jié)果背后的“原因”。你可以結(jié)合這些調(diào)查結(jié)果,探索一次調(diào)查可能無(wú)法充分體現(xiàn)的細(xì)微問(wèn)題,比如工作-生活平衡、居家辦公室的設(shè)置以及團(tuán)隊(duì)動(dòng)態(tài)等。例如,為什么一些員工更喜歡混合辦公而不是完全遠(yuǎn)程辦公?是因?yàn)檗k公室便利設(shè)施、團(tuán)隊(duì)成員之間的友情,還是其他原因?理想情況下, 應(yīng)該由一個(gè)中立團(tuán)隊(duì)組織這類討論會(huì),以鼓勵(lì)坦誠(chéng)對(duì)話,并在獲得參與者的同意后,將討論內(nèi)容記錄下來(lái),用于后續(xù)分析。
收集到大量數(shù)據(jù)之后,下一步是進(jìn)行匯總。將從焦點(diǎn)小組討論會(huì)中得到的定性見(jiàn)解與調(diào)查中的定性指標(biāo)相結(jié)合。這種雙重方式不僅能夠從更全面的角度出發(fā)制定重返辦公室策略,還可以保證這種策略能夠深入理解員工的需求和偏好。
形成一個(gè)封閉的循環(huán)是關(guān)鍵。與員工分享你根據(jù)這些討論將要采取的可行措施。即使員工并不完全認(rèn)同最終決策,這個(gè)透明的過(guò)程也可以讓員工感覺(jué)公司聽(tīng)取和征求了他們的意見(jiàn)。
結(jié)果會(huì)怎樣?重返辦公室計(jì)劃的支持率大幅提高,執(zhí)行的阻力減少,因?yàn)閱T工感覺(jué)決定公司未來(lái)的過(guò)程真正考慮了他們的意見(jiàn)。因此,與亞馬遜的情況不同,不會(huì)有員工向媒體曝光公司內(nèi)部會(huì)議記錄,讓媒體干涉公司的運(yùn)營(yíng)。也不會(huì)有員工走上街頭,公開(kāi)表示抗議或簽署大規(guī)模請(qǐng)?jiān)笗?shū)。我的所有客戶都沒(méi)有遇到過(guò)這些情況,因?yàn)閱T工感覺(jué)他們的意見(jiàn)得到了傾聽(tīng),自己受到了尊重,而且重返辦公室政策是基于各團(tuán)隊(duì)和崗位的需求量身定制。
亞馬遜暴露出回音室驅(qū)動(dòng)的重返辦公室政策的缺點(diǎn),尤其是員工的抵觸和士氣低下。相比之下,更細(xì)微的數(shù)據(jù)驅(qū)動(dòng)的重返辦公室政策,會(huì)提供一種平衡的、具有同理心的策略。尼克·布盧姆和其他學(xué)者對(duì)首席執(zhí)行官未來(lái)計(jì)劃的研究顯示,未來(lái)遠(yuǎn)程辦公將會(huì)增多而不是減少,因此許多領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者似乎已經(jīng)意識(shí)到他們當(dāng)初的重返辦公室政策是錯(cuò)誤的。事實(shí)上,Envoy發(fā)現(xiàn),超過(guò)80%的老板對(duì)最初的重返辦公室計(jì)劃感到后悔,并表示他們寧愿收集更多的信息,并作出數(shù)據(jù)驅(qū)動(dòng)的決策。如果公司能夠走出首席執(zhí)行官回音室,與員工進(jìn)行有意義的對(duì)話,就可以解決重返辦公室這個(gè)復(fù)雜的問(wèn)題。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
格列布·齊珀斯基博士(Gleb Tsipursky,又稱“辦公室耳語(yǔ)者”)幫助科技和金融行業(yè)的高管在混合工作中推動(dòng)合作、創(chuàng)新和留住人才。他擔(dān)任精品未來(lái)工作咨詢公司Disaster Avoidance Experts的首席執(zhí)行官。他是七本書(shū)的暢銷書(shū)作者,包括《永不與直覺(jué)同行》(Never Go With Your Gut)和《領(lǐng)導(dǎo)混合和遠(yuǎn)程團(tuán)隊(duì)》(Leading Hybrid and Remote Teams)。他的專業(yè)知識(shí)來(lái)自于20多年來(lái)為從美國(guó)家庭人壽保險(xiǎn)公司(Aflac)到施樂(lè)(Xerox)的《財(cái)富》美國(guó)500強(qiáng)公司提供咨詢,以及在北卡羅來(lái)納大學(xué)教堂山分校(UNC–Chapel Hill)和俄亥俄州立大學(xué)(Ohio State University)擔(dān)任行為科學(xué)家超過(guò)15年的學(xué)術(shù)生涯。
Fortune.com上發(fā)表的評(píng)論文章中表達(dá)的觀點(diǎn),僅代表作者本人的觀點(diǎn),不代表《財(cái)富》雜志的觀點(diǎn)和立場(chǎng)。
譯者:劉進(jìn)龍
審校:汪皓
Where are CEOs like Amazon’s Andy Jassy getting the data to inform their return-to-office policies? Unfortunately, too many are getting their data from the same place: an echo chamber of like-minded CEOs who use their feelings and intuitions to make these pivotal decisions. By relying on word of mouth and following their gut, rather than the data, these CEOs could be leading their companies into catastrophe.
During a recent internal fireside chat that was first reported by Insider and then confirmed by Amazon, Jassy defended his top-down return-to-office mandate–a drastic shift from a flexible policy of teams deciding what to do on their own to an obligation to come to the office three days a week. The company said employees knew all along that office policies would evolve with the pandemic–but it didn’t avert a backlash.
When asked for data to support the move, Jassy lacked a good answer. He said that he spoke to “60 to 80 CEOs of other companies over the last 18 months,” and “virtually all of them” preferred in-office work. He admitted it was a “judgment call” that wasn’t widely supported by data and compared it to another major decision that wasn’t supported by data in the past: the launch of the Amazon Web Services cloud unit.
Data over feelings
Is that an apt comparison? There were doubts internally and externally about the launch of AWS because it was an unproven business model. In other words, Amazon was going against the grain and taking a large risk with a huge potential upside if it worked. By contrast, a top-down RTO mandate of three days a week is not at all an “unproven business model.” There’s plenty of evidence around that model, much stronger than the echo chamber of like-minded CEOs. However, Jassy refused to lay out the evidence and relied instead on how he felt–and the validating echo chamber of other CEOs.
Doubling down on the rigid policy, Jassy told staff that “it’s probably not going to work out for you” if you don’t come to the office. Amazon is tracking badge swipe data, and in early August sent a message to some employees, saying “We are reaching out as you are not currently meeting our expectation of joining your colleagues in the office at least three days a week, even though your assigned building is ready.” Amazon says it shares aggregated and anonymized badge-swipe data with managers to provide an overall view of how many members of a team are coming into the office, but doesn’t give managers data about badge swipes by individual employees.
Of course, Jassy is far from the only CEO to launch a rigid, top-down RTO mandate without relying on data and instead focusing on feelings. Consider Starbucks CEO Howard Schultz’s directive for corporate staff to come to the office three days a week this January. According to Schultz, this policy stemmed from his annoyance that corporate employees hadn’t been following a guideline encouraging them to come into the office one or two days a week, as tracked by badge swipes into the building. What a terrible way to make a major RTO policy decision–based on feelings of annoyance about employee badge swipes!
In my discussions with five to 10 corporate leaders each week about best practices for RTO policies, I hear many similar stories. Most CEOs tell me they decided on their RTO approach based primarily on discussing their intuitions about what works best with other corporate leaders. That’s a textbook example of confirmation bias–a cognitive bias where we look for information that confirms our beliefs, and ignore information that doesn’t.
Confirmation bias and RTO
Why didn’t Jassy–or these other leaders–talk to the CEO or CHRO of Atlassian about how well their famous remote model works? Because they would have provided data that contradicts these beliefs.
Yet CEOs keep getting surprised by the negative consequences of their echo-chamber-driven RTO decisions. In May, hundreds of Amazon employees walked out on their first RTO day from the company’s Seattle headquarters during the lunch hour, with signs like “Hell no, RTO!” Following the latest announcement, more than 30,000 employees joined a new Slack channel called “remote advocacy” shortly after the announcement and organized a petition. In the petition, Amazon employees argued, based on research, that remote work improved productivity, recruitment, work/life balance, inclusion efforts, and reduced corporate expenses.
Andy Jassy’s judgment call rejected this data-driven approach, preferring instead to rely on the CEO echo chamber. That’s despite Amazon’s stock performance, which doubled during the pandemic’s remote work era. The dissonance between stock performance and the leadership’s discontent shows the gap between perceptions and reality around RTO.
We know that the perils of echo-chamber-driven approaches to RTO are not simply evident from case studies like with Amazon. A whopping 80% of bosses reported that they regret their initial return-to-office decisions, according to new research from Envoy, which interviewed more than 1,000 U.S. company executives and workplace managers who work in person at least one day per week.
Leaders said they’d do things differently if they knew more about how often employees actually show up at the office and use the amenities. Some are scratching their heads trying to figure out if their in-office policies are even working. Others are finding it tough to lock in long-term property deals without a clue about how their teams will feel about coming into the office down the road. Larry Gadea, Envoy’s CEO and founder, said “many companies are realizing they could have been a lot more measured in their approach, rather than making big, bold, very controversial decisions based on executives’ opinions rather than employee data.”
Or consider another data point, Unispace’s Returning for Good report. Unispace discovered that a surprising 42% of firms with back-to-office rules saw more people quitting than they’d expected. Additionally, about 29% of these companies are having a hard time hiring new talent. So, while bosses knew pushing folks back into the office would shake things up, they didn’t see the big headaches coming.
Unispace adds a twist: it’s all about options. Their study shows that generally, employees say they’re happy (31%), motivated (30%), and excited (27%) to be back at the desk. But those good vibes dip when going back isn’t optional–dropping to 27%, 26%, and 22% respectively. So, people are more into the office comeback when it’s their call, not a mandate. That benefit of optionality is the same thing I find when gathering data from more than two dozen organizations that I helped figure out their approach to RTO.
Do all RTOs fail to use data?
Far from all CEOs rely on intuition and the echo chamber in the return to office. In fact, (surprise, surprise) some actually use data. For example, Marc Benioff, the CEO of Salesforce, said that “for our new employees who are coming in, we know empirically that they do better if they’re in the office, meeting people, being onboarded, being trained. If they are at home and not going through that process, we don’t think they’re as successful.”
Benioff’s comments are supported by the data. A Harvard University working paper studied software engineers at a Fortune 500 company with a main campus spread across two buildings separated by several blocks. The research focused on the impact of physical proximity on feedback, coding output, and retention.
The findings? Engineers who shared a building with all their teammates received 22% more online feedback compared to those who were further apart. However, once the pandemic closed offices, this edge mostly vanished, shrinking to just an 8% advantage in feedback. Interestingly, being in the same location seemed to cut programming output by 24%. This dip was even more pronounced for senior engineers, who saw a 39% drop, largely because they spent more time giving feedback to others. So, while close quarters can boost communication, they may also come with a cost to productivity–especially for the more experienced folks on the team. However, the study found that proximity helped junior folks succeed in the long run. And that’s a fair call for Salesforce to make.
More broadly, Salesforce is adopting a differentiated approach to hybrid work, with different amounts of in-office time not simply for staff with different tenure at the company, but also for different roles. Engineers are looking at just 10 days in the office per quarter, while admin folks need to show up three days a week. Sales and marketing teams need to be in the office four days a week unless they’re out hustling deals. Benioff, won’t even label their setup as a mandate. “I don’t want to force anybody,” he said, warning that pushing the issue too strongly would lead to an outflow of talent. “We don’t want to lose our stars.”
Instead of mandates, Benioff aims to make the office a place people want to be. He’s keeping the door open for employees to negotiate full remote status with their bosses. But he also made it clear that there will always be roles that require some face time.
While that’s not a perfect approach to RTO, it’s much better than most. It hits one of the three required elements of a truly effective RTO: customizing it to your organization’s needs. After all, as Benioff rightly points out, different roles have divergent needs for being in the office. Engineers might only need to come in 10 days a quarter, perhaps at the start and end of a sprint. Admin staff–whose job involves office management–need to cover office duties like helping people with copiers or receiving visitors, so you should make sure there’s always an admin to cover such needs. Accountants can come in a couple of days at the end of the month to close the books and for a week at the end of the quarter.
Just demanding a set number of days per week–as the large majority of major corporate giants have done–is a sign of laziness and conformism. The company’s leaders and HR failed to think through who needs to be in the office and for what purpose. Employees feel a lot of resentment when they come to the office without a good reason to be there, doing the same thing they would do at home.
What a data-driven RTO looks like
Salesforce unfortunately lacked two other key elements of a data-driven RTO: assessing employee opinions and getting their buy-in. Both of these problems are solved with similar tools, killing two birds with one stone.
First, you need to survey your staff on RTO–ideally before the RTO, or after it if you already launched the RTO. At all the companies I worked with to help guide their RTO, whether it’s from the start of the process or to refine it after RTO was already launched, we started with a thorough survey of staff opinions about remote work and the return to office. That survey involves questions around their preferences on RTO, intent to stay with various versions of RTO, whether they would recommend working here to their peers given these versions, their productivity on individual and collaborative tasks at home vs. in the office, and similar questions on well-being, happiness, morale, stress, and so on. The survey is available in the appendix of my best-selling book, Returning to the Office and Leading Hybrid and Remote Teams.
Next, you’ll want to run focus groups. Choose representative staff from a variety of departments, both rank-and-file and managers at all levels of the organization. Make sure to avoid putting managers together with rank-and-file staff in focus groups, as many employees might be reluctant to be fully transparent when those in managerial roles are in the meeting.
Focus groups offer invaluable qualitative data, diving deeper into the “why” behind survey responses. They let you explore nuanced issues like work-life balance, home office setups, and team dynamics that a survey might not fully capture. This is where you can dig into some of the nuanced issues that a survey might not fully capture. For example, why do some employees prefer hybrid work over fully remote? Is it the office amenities, the team camaraderie, or something else? These sessions should ideally be run by a neutral party to encourage candid conversation and, with participant consent, be recorded for later analysis.
Once you’ve gathered this rich data, the next step is synthesis. Combine the qualitative insights from the focus groups with the quantitative metrics from the surveys. This dual approach not only informs the RTO strategy with a well-rounded perspective but also makes it deeply empathetic to employees’ needs and preferences.
Closing the loop is crucial. Share with employees the actionable steps you’ll take based on these discussions. Even if they don’t fully agree with the final decision, this transparent process makes them feel heard, listened to, and consulted.
The result? A significantly higher level of buy-in and reduced resistance to the RTO plan, as employees will feel that their opinions were genuinely considered in shaping the company’s future. Thus, unlike at Amazon, you won’t have employees leaking recordings of internal company meetings to the media and otherwise getting media involved in your company’s business. You also won’t have employees walking out and publicly protesting or signing mass petitions. None of that happened at any of my clients–because the employees felt listened to, respected, and heard, and because RTO policies were customized to the needs of each team and role.
Amazon illustrates the shortcomings of echo-chamber-driven RTO, characterized by employee resistance and low morale. In contrast, a nuanced, data-driven RTO approach provides a balanced and empathetic strategy. Given that research on CEO plans for the future by Nick Bloom and other scholars indicates that there will be more remote work, not less, it seems that many leaders have learned that their initial RTO approach was wrong. Indeed, Envoy finds that over 80% of bosses regret their initial RTO plans, saying they wished they gathered more information and made data-driven decisions. By stepping out of the CEO echo chamber and engaging in meaningful dialogue with their workforce, companies can succeed in navigating the complexities of RTO.
Gleb Tsipursky, Ph.D. (a.k.a. “the office whisperer”), helps tech and finance industry executives drive collaboration, innovation, and retention in hybrid work. He serves as the CEO of the boutique future-of-work consultancy Disaster Avoidance Experts. He is the bestselling author of seven books, including Never Go With Your Gut and Leading Hybrid and Remote Teams. His expertise comes from over 20 years of consulting for Fortune 500 companies from Aflac to Xerox and over 15 years in academia as a behavioral scientist at UNC–Chapel Hill and Ohio State.
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