華盛頓有一句名言:“人事任命即政策”,每屆新政府成立之初都會(huì)以此為行動(dòng)準(zhǔn)則。確實(shí)如此;只有知道政策由誰(shuí)來制定以及由誰(shuí)來執(zhí)行,才能真正理解政策本身。
我們不妨從拜登的人事任命中,一窺拜登的經(jīng)濟(jì)政策和對(duì)華政策——兩個(gè)最受關(guān)注的問題。
【經(jīng)濟(jì)團(tuán)隊(duì)】
拜登總統(tǒng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)團(tuán)隊(duì)雖然尚未組建完成,但已體現(xiàn)了當(dāng)今民主黨的主要力量。美國(guó)企業(yè)研究所駐華盛頓經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家兼哈佛大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)講師斯坦?維格表示:“團(tuán)隊(duì)成員來自多個(gè)派系,既有民主黨中間派人士,也有左派人士。”
除了財(cái)政部長(zhǎng)珍妮特?耶倫之外,拜登經(jīng)濟(jì)團(tuán)隊(duì)還有另外一些頂尖重量級(jí)成員。
國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)委員會(huì)主任布萊恩?迪斯
現(xiàn)年只有42歲的迪斯并不是專業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家,但他曾在奧巴馬政府期間擔(dān)任管理與預(yù)算辦公室副主任和國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)委員會(huì)副主任,負(fù)責(zé)管理總統(tǒng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)決策過程。
布魯金斯學(xué)會(huì)會(huì)員大衛(wèi)?韋塞爾說:“白宮越強(qiáng)勢(shì),會(huì)議、簡(jiǎn)報(bào)編纂者及匯報(bào)者的權(quán)力就越大。我想他就是那個(gè)人。”
經(jīng)濟(jì)顧問委員會(huì)成員賈里德?伯恩斯坦
伯恩斯坦的實(shí)際權(quán)力遠(yuǎn)超其職權(quán)范圍。他的級(jí)別并沒有高于其他經(jīng)濟(jì)顧問委員會(huì)成員,但他與拜登的關(guān)系一直非常密切,他已成為拜登政府內(nèi)最有影響力的人物之一。在奧巴馬執(zhí)政期間,他曾是時(shí)任副總統(tǒng)拜登的首席經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家。伯恩斯坦無(wú)疑是偏左派人士,但并不會(huì)被伯尼?桑德斯邊緣化。
消費(fèi)者金融保護(hù)局局長(zhǎng)羅希特?喬普拉*
加強(qiáng)對(duì)金融服務(wù)業(yè)監(jiān)管力度是拜登政府的一個(gè)重要趨勢(shì)。
美國(guó)財(cái)政部長(zhǎng)珍妮特?耶倫表示,她認(rèn)為《多德-弗蘭克法案》還不夠有力,而透過喬普拉的過往表現(xiàn),我們可以預(yù)見他將是一個(gè)強(qiáng)勢(shì)監(jiān)管者。
在消費(fèi)者金融保護(hù)局成立初期曾與喬普拉共事的律師露西?莫里斯表示:“我預(yù)計(jì),喬普拉至少會(huì)像前任局長(zhǎng)理查德?科德雷一樣強(qiáng)勢(shì),甚至?xí)鼊僖换I。”這一前景可能會(huì)讓華爾街高管們后背發(fā)涼。
自2018年5月以來,喬普拉一直在聯(lián)邦貿(mào)易委員會(huì)任職。*待參議院確認(rèn)
截至本文撰稿時(shí),其他高管職位尚無(wú)合適人選,但無(wú)論誰(shuí)接任,都將在執(zhí)行拜登的經(jīng)濟(jì)政策中發(fā)揮重要作用。其中最重要的兩個(gè)職位是:
反壟斷部門助理總檢察長(zhǎng)
特朗普司法部在反壟斷問題上的表現(xiàn),比多數(shù)人對(duì)共和黨總統(tǒng)任期內(nèi)的預(yù)期更為積極。拜登政府可能會(huì)更加積極。
作為候選人的拜登曾說,科技巨頭的權(quán)力太大,這一觀點(diǎn)得到了兩黨的共同支持。特朗普司法部去年與14個(gè)州,包括紅藍(lán)兩派,對(duì)谷歌提起反壟斷訴訟。
拜登提名的反壟斷部門負(fù)責(zé)人,將預(yù)示硅谷(或許還有其他一些行業(yè))會(huì)面臨什么樣的未來。
貨幣主計(jì)長(zhǎng)
這一職位雖然不顯眼,但對(duì)于國(guó)家銀行監(jiān)管至關(guān)重要,包括摩根大通、美國(guó)銀行、花旗集團(tuán)和富國(guó)銀行等大型銀行。如果像多數(shù)人預(yù)期的那樣,加強(qiáng)金融監(jiān)管將是拜登政府的首要任務(wù),那么出任這一職位的人將非常有影響力。
至于拜登經(jīng)濟(jì)團(tuán)隊(duì)將要執(zhí)行的政策:從其最高層面來看,部分源于當(dāng)前形勢(shì),部分源于其內(nèi)心深處共同堅(jiān)定的信念。
目前最重要的是如何應(yīng)對(duì)新冠疫情。維格說,“如果伊麗莎白?沃倫或伯尼?桑德斯當(dāng)選總統(tǒng),他們的首要任務(wù)仍是應(yīng)對(duì)新冠疫情。”
除新冠疫情之外,該團(tuán)隊(duì)需優(yōu)先解決的其他問題還有基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施、氣候、不平等和增稅。
韋塞爾說,拜登和他的團(tuán)隊(duì)將會(huì)推行一項(xiàng)積極的議程,他們認(rèn)為,如今形成的超低利率(通脹后為負(fù)值) “提供了一個(gè)巨額的公共投資機(jī)會(huì),這種機(jī)會(huì)千載難逢,能推動(dòng)下一代人的生活水平的提高。”
這種觀點(diǎn)與推進(jìn)整體經(jīng)濟(jì)更加廣泛且深入的觀點(diǎn)相契合。
韋塞爾說,“如果讓拜登政府的全部經(jīng)濟(jì)團(tuán)隊(duì)成員聚在一起,向他們提出如下問題,‘你們認(rèn)為大力投資學(xué)前教育,并援助幼兒和低收入家庭,是否既能增加他們進(jìn)入中產(chǎn)階級(jí)的機(jī)會(huì),還能推動(dòng)美國(guó)生產(chǎn)力的增長(zhǎng)?’我想他們會(huì)說‘是的’。”
在實(shí)現(xiàn)控制白宮和國(guó)會(huì)兩院后,新任總統(tǒng)拜登、他的團(tuán)隊(duì)及其政黨現(xiàn)在終于有機(jī)會(huì)來檢驗(yàn)這一信念。
【對(duì)中國(guó)的態(tài)度】
就如何與中國(guó)打交道這一關(guān)鍵問題,拜登曾暗示,他不急于背離特朗普政府的政策。
值得注意的是,在拜登發(fā)起的“十日政令閃電戰(zhàn)”中,根本沒有提及撤銷特朗普對(duì)3500億美元中國(guó)商品加征關(guān)稅的計(jì)劃。對(duì)于推翻特朗普政府諸多對(duì)華制裁措施,包括將中國(guó)三家電信公司從紐約證券交易所停牌除名、封禁中國(guó)APP,以及將中國(guó)科技公司列入黑名單,拜登也沒有表現(xiàn)出興趣。
拜登的助手表示,對(duì)于涉及中國(guó)的許多問題,新總統(tǒng)計(jì)劃采用多邊方式,爭(zhēng)取西方盟友的支持。這將與特朗普的“美國(guó)優(yōu)先”風(fēng)格大相徑庭。
然而與盟友達(dá)成共識(shí)需要時(shí)間。1月,隨著拜登宣布其內(nèi)閣和高級(jí)政策顧問成員名單,可以發(fā)現(xiàn)其新團(tuán)隊(duì)與即將離任的特朗普官員兩者的對(duì)華言論是何其相似。
財(cái)政部長(zhǎng)
財(cái)政部長(zhǎng)提名人選珍妮特?耶倫曾指中國(guó)“設(shè)置貿(mào)易壁壘,向企業(yè)提供非法補(bǔ)貼”和“竊取知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)”,并指責(zé)中國(guó)的低“勞動(dòng)和環(huán)境標(biāo)準(zhǔn)”。雖然她沒有特別指明中國(guó)操縱匯率,但這位前美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)主席承諾“反對(duì)他國(guó)人為操縱匯率以獲得不公平貿(mào)易優(yōu)勢(shì)的任何企圖”。
國(guó)家安全委員會(huì)“印太事務(wù)協(xié)調(diào)員”
拜登的其他任命也凸顯了新總統(tǒng)愿意效仿特朗普的對(duì)話態(tài)度。庫(kù)爾特?坎貝爾被任命為國(guó)家安全委員會(huì)“印太事務(wù)協(xié)調(diào)員”。坎貝爾曾在奧巴馬任內(nèi)擔(dān)任國(guó)務(wù)院負(fù)責(zé)亞洲事務(wù)的最高官員,被認(rèn)為是“重返亞洲”戰(zhàn)略的設(shè)計(jì)者。該戰(zhàn)略呼吁對(duì)中國(guó)采取強(qiáng)硬立場(chǎng),同時(shí)加強(qiáng)美國(guó)在該地區(qū)其他國(guó)家的軍事資源和外交關(guān)系。
2018年,坎貝爾與拜登前助手伊利?拉特納合著的一篇題為《清算中國(guó)》的文章,在文中,他對(duì)特朗普所謂的美國(guó)40年對(duì)華接觸政策失敗的論調(diào)表示了贊同。
美國(guó)貿(mào)易代表
前特朗普政府官員對(duì)拜登選擇華裔女律師戴琦擔(dān)任美國(guó)貿(mào)易代表一職也表示了歡迎。戴琦會(huì)說普通話,父母來自中國(guó)臺(tái)灣。在奧巴馬政府時(shí)期,戴琦曾擔(dān)任對(duì)華貿(mào)易執(zhí)法首席律師,2017年以來,戴琦一直是眾議院籌款委員會(huì)的首席貿(mào)易顧問。兩黨貿(mào)易專家都把她描述為一個(gè)談判者,在對(duì)華貿(mào)易問題上,她與即將離任的“美國(guó)貿(mào)易沙皇”羅伯特?萊特希澤(特朗普最激進(jìn)的貿(mào)易鷹派人物之一)有著相同的看法。
中國(guó)是否會(huì)認(rèn)為拜登的對(duì)華鷹派比與特朗普的對(duì)華鷹派更容易接觸,目前尚不清楚。
不過,黑石集團(tuán)主席蘇世民上個(gè)月在香港的一個(gè)金融論壇上發(fā)言時(shí)表示,新一屆美國(guó)政府將對(duì)中國(guó)采取“更溫和基調(diào)”,他預(yù)計(jì)兩國(guó)之間的緊張局勢(shì)將有所緩和。
“這兩個(gè)國(guó)家的利益和世界的利益確實(shí)有著非常大的重疊,”蘇世民說,“我預(yù)計(jì)緊張關(guān)系會(huì)大大緩解。”
美中貿(mào)易全國(guó)委員會(huì)在上個(gè)月呼吁拜登政府削減特朗普的對(duì)華關(guān)稅,并“制定一個(gè)更加細(xì)致、更加有效的對(duì)華貿(mào)易政策”。該委員會(huì)代表著230多家在華經(jīng)營(yíng)的大型美國(guó)公司,其援引牛津經(jīng)濟(jì)研究院的研究結(jié)果稱,到2025年,如果中美兩國(guó)將平均關(guān)稅從目前的19% 逐步降至12% ,美國(guó)的GDP將會(huì)增加1690億美元,同時(shí)將新增14.5萬(wàn)個(gè)就業(yè)崗位。
但拜登已經(jīng)表示不會(huì)立即降低關(guān)稅。助手們說,總統(tǒng)打算先對(duì)中美關(guān)系做全方位審視,再?zèng)Q定是否對(duì)特朗普政策進(jìn)行保留、修改或廢除。
華盛頓戰(zhàn)略與國(guó)際研究中心高級(jí)顧問斯科特?肯尼迪敦促拜登將特朗普的對(duì)華政策遺產(chǎn)分為四類:美國(guó)無(wú)需與盟友討論就能改變的政策(如重返《巴黎協(xié)定》和世衛(wèi)組織);可以通過與中國(guó)對(duì)話解決的沖突政策(例如重新評(píng)估TikTok禁令);美國(guó)應(yīng)該堅(jiān)持的問題政策(包括將不遵守美國(guó)信息披露規(guī)則的中國(guó)公司摘牌除名);美國(guó)應(yīng)該與盟友協(xié)調(diào)決定的問題政策(例如,如何處理對(duì)國(guó)家安全構(gòu)成潛在威脅的中國(guó)公司)。
肯尼迪寫道:“在對(duì)華政策創(chuàng)新方面,拜登政府存在的機(jī)會(huì)比許多人預(yù)想的要大得多。”
而抓住這一機(jī)會(huì)的窗口期可能遠(yuǎn)不止拜執(zhí)政后的頭100天。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
翻譯:郝秀、梁宇
審校:汪皓、夏林
華盛頓有一句名言:“人事任命即政策”,每屆新政府成立之初都會(huì)以此為行動(dòng)準(zhǔn)則。確實(shí)如此;只有知道政策由誰(shuí)來制定以及由誰(shuí)來執(zhí)行,才能真正理解政策本身。
我們不妨從拜登的人事任命中,一窺拜登的經(jīng)濟(jì)政策和對(duì)華政策——兩個(gè)最受關(guān)注的問題。
【經(jīng)濟(jì)團(tuán)隊(duì)】
拜登總統(tǒng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)團(tuán)隊(duì)雖然尚未組建完成,但已體現(xiàn)了當(dāng)今民主黨的主要力量。美國(guó)企業(yè)研究所駐華盛頓經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家兼哈佛大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)講師斯坦?維格表示:“團(tuán)隊(duì)成員來自多個(gè)派系,既有民主黨中間派人士,也有左派人士。”
除了財(cái)政部長(zhǎng)珍妮特?耶倫之外,拜登經(jīng)濟(jì)團(tuán)隊(duì)還有另外一些頂尖重量級(jí)成員。
國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)委員會(huì)主任布萊恩?迪斯
現(xiàn)年只有42歲的迪斯并不是專業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家,但他曾在奧巴馬政府期間擔(dān)任管理與預(yù)算辦公室副主任和國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)委員會(huì)副主任,負(fù)責(zé)管理總統(tǒng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)決策過程。
布魯金斯學(xué)會(huì)會(huì)員大衛(wèi)?韋塞爾說:“白宮越強(qiáng)勢(shì),會(huì)議、簡(jiǎn)報(bào)編纂者及匯報(bào)者的權(quán)力就越大。我想他就是那個(gè)人。”
經(jīng)濟(jì)顧問委員會(huì)成員賈里德?伯恩斯坦
伯恩斯坦的實(shí)際權(quán)力遠(yuǎn)超其職權(quán)范圍。他的級(jí)別并沒有高于其他經(jīng)濟(jì)顧問委員會(huì)成員,但他與拜登的關(guān)系一直非常密切,他已成為拜登政府內(nèi)最有影響力的人物之一。在奧巴馬執(zhí)政期間,他曾是時(shí)任副總統(tǒng)拜登的首席經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家。伯恩斯坦無(wú)疑是偏左派人士,但并不會(huì)被伯尼?桑德斯邊緣化。
消費(fèi)者金融保護(hù)局局長(zhǎng)羅希特?喬普拉*
加強(qiáng)對(duì)金融服務(wù)業(yè)監(jiān)管力度是拜登政府的一個(gè)重要趨勢(shì)。
美國(guó)財(cái)政部長(zhǎng)珍妮特?耶倫表示,她認(rèn)為《多德-弗蘭克法案》還不夠有力,而透過喬普拉的過往表現(xiàn),我們可以預(yù)見他將是一個(gè)強(qiáng)勢(shì)監(jiān)管者。
在消費(fèi)者金融保護(hù)局成立初期曾與喬普拉共事的律師露西?莫里斯表示:“我預(yù)計(jì),喬普拉至少會(huì)像前任局長(zhǎng)理查德?科德雷一樣強(qiáng)勢(shì),甚至?xí)鼊僖换I。”這一前景可能會(huì)讓華爾街高管們后背發(fā)涼。
自2018年5月以來,喬普拉一直在聯(lián)邦貿(mào)易委員會(huì)任職。*待參議院確認(rèn)
截至本文撰稿時(shí),其他高管職位尚無(wú)合適人選,但無(wú)論誰(shuí)接任,都將在執(zhí)行拜登的經(jīng)濟(jì)政策中發(fā)揮重要作用。其中最重要的兩個(gè)職位是:
反壟斷部門助理總檢察長(zhǎng)
特朗普司法部在反壟斷問題上的表現(xiàn),比多數(shù)人對(duì)共和黨總統(tǒng)任期內(nèi)的預(yù)期更為積極。拜登政府可能會(huì)更加積極。
作為候選人的拜登曾說,科技巨頭的權(quán)力太大,這一觀點(diǎn)得到了兩黨的共同支持。特朗普司法部去年與14個(gè)州,包括紅藍(lán)兩派,對(duì)谷歌提起反壟斷訴訟。
拜登提名的反壟斷部門負(fù)責(zé)人,將預(yù)示硅谷(或許還有其他一些行業(yè))會(huì)面臨什么樣的未來。
貨幣主計(jì)長(zhǎng)
這一職位雖然不顯眼,但對(duì)于國(guó)家銀行監(jiān)管至關(guān)重要,包括摩根大通、美國(guó)銀行、花旗集團(tuán)和富國(guó)銀行等大型銀行。如果像多數(shù)人預(yù)期的那樣,加強(qiáng)金融監(jiān)管將是拜登政府的首要任務(wù),那么出任這一職位的人將非常有影響力。
至于拜登經(jīng)濟(jì)團(tuán)隊(duì)將要執(zhí)行的政策:從其最高層面來看,部分源于當(dāng)前形勢(shì),部分源于其內(nèi)心深處共同堅(jiān)定的信念。
目前最重要的是如何應(yīng)對(duì)新冠疫情。維格說,“如果伊麗莎白?沃倫或伯尼?桑德斯當(dāng)選總統(tǒng),他們的首要任務(wù)仍是應(yīng)對(duì)新冠疫情。”
除新冠疫情之外,該團(tuán)隊(duì)需優(yōu)先解決的其他問題還有基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施、氣候、不平等和增稅。
韋塞爾說,拜登和他的團(tuán)隊(duì)將會(huì)推行一項(xiàng)積極的議程,他們認(rèn)為,如今形成的超低利率(通脹后為負(fù)值) “提供了一個(gè)巨額的公共投資機(jī)會(huì),這種機(jī)會(huì)千載難逢,能推動(dòng)下一代人的生活水平的提高。”
這種觀點(diǎn)與推進(jìn)整體經(jīng)濟(jì)更加廣泛且深入的觀點(diǎn)相契合。
韋塞爾說,“如果讓拜登政府的全部經(jīng)濟(jì)團(tuán)隊(duì)成員聚在一起,向他們提出如下問題,‘你們認(rèn)為大力投資學(xué)前教育,并援助幼兒和低收入家庭,是否既能增加他們進(jìn)入中產(chǎn)階級(jí)的機(jī)會(huì),還能推動(dòng)美國(guó)生產(chǎn)力的增長(zhǎng)?’我想他們會(huì)說‘是的’。”
在實(shí)現(xiàn)控制白宮和國(guó)會(huì)兩院后,新任總統(tǒng)拜登、他的團(tuán)隊(duì)及其政黨現(xiàn)在終于有機(jī)會(huì)來檢驗(yàn)這一信念。
【對(duì)中國(guó)的態(tài)度】
就如何與中國(guó)打交道這一關(guān)鍵問題,拜登曾暗示,他不急于背離特朗普政府的政策。
值得注意的是,在拜登發(fā)起的“十日政令閃電戰(zhàn)”中,根本沒有提及撤銷特朗普對(duì)3500億美元中國(guó)商品加征關(guān)稅的計(jì)劃。對(duì)于推翻特朗普政府諸多對(duì)華制裁措施,包括將中國(guó)三家電信公司從紐約證券交易所停牌除名、封禁中國(guó)APP,以及將中國(guó)科技公司列入黑名單,拜登也沒有表現(xiàn)出興趣。
拜登的助手表示,對(duì)于涉及中國(guó)的許多問題,新總統(tǒng)計(jì)劃采用多邊方式,爭(zhēng)取西方盟友的支持。這將與特朗普的“美國(guó)優(yōu)先”風(fēng)格大相徑庭。
然而與盟友達(dá)成共識(shí)需要時(shí)間。1月,隨著拜登宣布其內(nèi)閣和高級(jí)政策顧問成員名單,可以發(fā)現(xiàn)其新團(tuán)隊(duì)與即將離任的特朗普官員兩者的對(duì)華言論是何其相似。
財(cái)政部長(zhǎng)
財(cái)政部長(zhǎng)提名人選珍妮特?耶倫曾指中國(guó)“設(shè)置貿(mào)易壁壘,向企業(yè)提供非法補(bǔ)貼”和“竊取知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)”,并指責(zé)中國(guó)的低“勞動(dòng)和環(huán)境標(biāo)準(zhǔn)”。雖然她沒有特別指明中國(guó)操縱匯率,但這位前美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)主席承諾“反對(duì)他國(guó)人為操縱匯率以獲得不公平貿(mào)易優(yōu)勢(shì)的任何企圖”。
國(guó)家安全委員會(huì)“印太事務(wù)協(xié)調(diào)員”
拜登的其他任命也凸顯了新總統(tǒng)愿意效仿特朗普的對(duì)話態(tài)度。庫(kù)爾特?坎貝爾被任命為國(guó)家安全委員會(huì)“印太事務(wù)協(xié)調(diào)員”。坎貝爾曾在奧巴馬任內(nèi)擔(dān)任國(guó)務(wù)院負(fù)責(zé)亞洲事務(wù)的最高官員,被認(rèn)為是“重返亞洲”戰(zhàn)略的設(shè)計(jì)者。該戰(zhàn)略呼吁對(duì)中國(guó)采取強(qiáng)硬立場(chǎng),同時(shí)加強(qiáng)美國(guó)在該地區(qū)其他國(guó)家的軍事資源和外交關(guān)系。
2018年,坎貝爾與拜登前助手伊利?拉特納合著的一篇題為《清算中國(guó)》的文章,在文中,他對(duì)特朗普所謂的美國(guó)40年對(duì)華接觸政策失敗的論調(diào)表示了贊同。
美國(guó)貿(mào)易代表
前特朗普政府官員對(duì)拜登選擇華裔女律師戴琦擔(dān)任美國(guó)貿(mào)易代表一職也表示了歡迎。戴琦會(huì)說普通話,父母來自中國(guó)臺(tái)灣。在奧巴馬政府時(shí)期,戴琦曾擔(dān)任對(duì)華貿(mào)易執(zhí)法首席律師,2017年以來,戴琦一直是眾議院籌款委員會(huì)的首席貿(mào)易顧問。兩黨貿(mào)易專家都把她描述為一個(gè)談判者,在對(duì)華貿(mào)易問題上,她與即將離任的“美國(guó)貿(mào)易沙皇”羅伯特?萊特希澤(特朗普最激進(jìn)的貿(mào)易鷹派人物之一)有著相同的看法。
中國(guó)是否會(huì)認(rèn)為拜登的對(duì)華鷹派比與特朗普的對(duì)華鷹派更容易接觸,目前尚不清楚。
不過,黑石集團(tuán)主席蘇世民上個(gè)月在香港的一個(gè)金融論壇上發(fā)言時(shí)表示,新一屆美國(guó)政府將對(duì)中國(guó)采取“更溫和基調(diào)”,他預(yù)計(jì)兩國(guó)之間的緊張局勢(shì)將有所緩和。
“這兩個(gè)國(guó)家的利益和世界的利益確實(shí)有著非常大的重疊,”蘇世民說,“我預(yù)計(jì)緊張關(guān)系會(huì)大大緩解。”
美中貿(mào)易全國(guó)委員會(huì)在上個(gè)月呼吁拜登政府削減特朗普的對(duì)華關(guān)稅,并“制定一個(gè)更加細(xì)致、更加有效的對(duì)華貿(mào)易政策”。該委員會(huì)代表著230多家在華經(jīng)營(yíng)的大型美國(guó)公司,其援引牛津經(jīng)濟(jì)研究院的研究結(jié)果稱,到2025年,如果中美兩國(guó)將平均關(guān)稅從目前的19% 逐步降至12% ,美國(guó)的GDP將會(huì)增加1690億美元,同時(shí)將新增14.5萬(wàn)個(gè)就業(yè)崗位。
但拜登已經(jīng)表示不會(huì)立即降低關(guān)稅。助手們說,總統(tǒng)打算先對(duì)中美關(guān)系做全方位審視,再?zèng)Q定是否對(duì)特朗普政策進(jìn)行保留、修改或廢除。
華盛頓戰(zhàn)略與國(guó)際研究中心高級(jí)顧問斯科特?肯尼迪敦促拜登將特朗普的對(duì)華政策遺產(chǎn)分為四類:美國(guó)無(wú)需與盟友討論就能改變的政策(如重返《巴黎協(xié)定》和世衛(wèi)組織);可以通過與中國(guó)對(duì)話解決的沖突政策(例如重新評(píng)估TikTok禁令);美國(guó)應(yīng)該堅(jiān)持的問題政策(包括將不遵守美國(guó)信息披露規(guī)則的中國(guó)公司摘牌除名);美國(guó)應(yīng)該與盟友協(xié)調(diào)決定的問題政策(例如,如何處理對(duì)國(guó)家安全構(gòu)成潛在威脅的中國(guó)公司)。
肯尼迪寫道:“在對(duì)華政策創(chuàng)新方面,拜登政府存在的機(jī)會(huì)比許多人預(yù)想的要大得多。”
而抓住這一機(jī)會(huì)的窗口期可能遠(yuǎn)不止拜執(zhí)政后的頭100天。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
翻譯:郝秀、梁宇
審校:汪皓、夏林
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“Personnel is policy,” says a Washington maxim invoked at the dawn of each new administration. The point is valid; you don’t really understand policy until you know who’s creating it and executing it. President Biden’s economic team, still being assembled, reflects the forces shaping today’s Democratic Party. “The staffing really runs the gamut from very centrist Democrats to people who come much more from the left,” says Stan Veuger, a Washington-based economist at the American Enterprise Institute and an economics lecturer at Harvard. In addition to Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, here are top power players on Biden’s economic team.
Brian Deese, director of the National Economic Council
Just 42, and not a trained economist, Deese nonetheless held high-level economic posts throughout the Obama administration, including deputy director of the Office of Management and Budget and deputy director of the National Economic Council, which manages the President’s economic decision process. “If you have a strong White House, the person who organizes the meetings, the presentations, and what will be presented to the President has a lot of power,” says the Brookings Institution’s David Wessel. “I think he will be that person.”
Jared Bernstein, member of the Council of Economic Advisers
Bernstein’s power is greater than his title suggests. He won’t outrank other CEA members, but he’s already one of the administration’s most influential figures because of his long and close relationship with Biden. In the Obama administration he was chief economist to then–Vice President Biden. Bernstein is decidedly left of center but not over on the Bernie Sanders fringe.
Rohit Chopra, director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau*
Amped up regulation of the financial services industry looks to be a significant trend in the Biden administration. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen has said she thinks the Dodd-Frank law doesn’t go far enough, and Chopra’s record suggests he’ll be an energetic regulator. Attorney Lucy Morris, who served with Chopra at the CFPB in its early days, writes, “I anticipate that he will be at least as aggressive as former director [Richard] Cordray, if not more,” a prospect that may chill the blood of Wall Street executives. Since May 2018 Chopra has been on the Federal Trade Commission. *pending Senate confirmation
Other top power positions haven’t been filled as of this writing, but whoever takes them will play important roles in executing Biden’s economic policies. Two of the most important:
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust
The Trump Justice Department was more active on antitrust than many would have expected under a Republican President. The Biden administration could be even more active. Candidate Biden said the tech giants wield too much power, a view with bipartisan support. The Trump DOJ last year sued Google on antitrust grounds, joined by 14 states, both red and blue. Biden’s choice of an antitrust chief will signal what’s ahead for Silicon Valley and potentially other industries.
Comptroller of the Currency
A low-profile post, it’s crucially important in the regulation of national banks, including the biggest ones: JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Citigroup, and Wells Fargo. If increased financial regulation becomes a Biden priority, as many expect, the holder of this job will be highly influential.
As for the policy that the Biden economic team will be executing: At its highest level, it’s driven partly by the circumstances of the moment and partly by shared deep beliefs. The most immediate imperative, managing the pandemic crisis, is more about competence than ideology. “If Elizabeth Warren or Bernie Sanders had become President, they would still have to deal first and foremost with just crisis management,” says Veuger. Beyond the pandemic, the issues at the top of the team’s to-do list are infrastructure, climate, inequality, and raising taxes. Biden and the team will pursue an activist agenda based on their view that today’s ultralow interest rates—negative after inflation—present “a once-in-a-generation opportunity to make huge public investments that will pay off in higher living standards for the next generation,” says Wessel.
That view fits well with a broader, deeper view of how to strengthen the overall economy. Wessel says, “If you got all the economic team of the Biden administration in a room and asked them, ‘Do you think that investments in pre-K education and more aid for young children and low-income families can increase not only their prospects of moving into the middle class, but can also increase the productivity growth of the United States?’ I think they would say yes.”
Having hit the trifecta of controlling the White House plus both houses of Congress, Biden, his team, and their party now have a rare opportunity to test that belief.
In one key area—dealing with China—Biden has signaled he's in no rush to depart from the Trump administration policies.
Orders to rescind Trump tariffs on $350 billion worth of Chinese imports are conspicuously absent from Biden's ten-day policy blitz. Nor has Biden suggested any immediate interest in overturning Trump administration actions to delist Chinese telecommunications companies on the New York Stock Exchange, or ban Chinese apps, or blacklist Chinese technology companies.
Biden's aides have said that, for many problems involving China, the incoming president plans to take a multilateral approach by enlisting the support of Western allies to maximize U.S. leverage on Beijing. That would be a clear departure from Trump's "America First" style.
But building that consensus will take time. And in recent days, as Biden has announced his picks for cabinet positions and senior policy advisers, it has been almost impossible to distinguish his new team's China rhetoric from that of the departing Trump officials.
Yellen also accused China of "erecting trade barriers and giving illegal subsidies to corporations" and "stealing intellectual property," and faulted its inadequate "labor and environmental standards." And while she didn't specifically accuse China of currency manipulation, the former Federal Reserve chair promised to "oppose any and all attempts by foreign countries to artificially manipulate currency values to gain advantage in trade."
Other Biden appointments underscore the new president's willingness to emulate Trump's confrontational approach to China. Biden has picked former Obama state department official Kurt Campbell to take on a newly created role within his National Security Council as "Indo-Pacific coordinator." Campbell was the architect of the Obama administration's 2012 "pivot to Asia" strategy, which called for taking a tough line on China while bolstering U.S. military resources and diplomatic relationships in the rest of the region.
In a 2018 essay entitled "The China Reckoning" and co-authored with former Biden aide Ely Ratner, Campbell argued that Trump was right to decry America's four-decades-long policy of engagement with China as a failure.
Former Trump officials also have hailed Biden's choice of Katherine Tai to lead the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. Tai, a native Mandarin speaker whose parents immigrated to the U.S. from Taiwan, served as America's chief enforcement lawyer for China during the Obama Administration and has been chief trade counsel on the House Ways and Means Committee since 2017. She has been described by trade experts on both sides of the partisan aisle as a negotiator whose views on Chinese trade practices match those of outgoing trade czar Robert Lighthizer, one of Trump's most vehement trade hawks.
Whether Beijing will find it easier to engage with Biden's China hawks than Trump's China hawks remains unclear.
Blackstone Group chairman Stephen Schwarzman, speaking before a financial forum in Hong Kong Tuesday, predicted the new U.S. administration would take a “softer tone” towards China, and that he expects tensions between the two countries to ease.
“There is really a very substantial overlap of interest in these countries and the interest of the world,” Schwarzman said. “I expect to see much less tension.”
The U.S.-China Business Council, a group representing more than 230 large American companies operating in China, last week called on the Biden administration to roll back Trump's tariffs and "craft a more nuanced and effective trade policy toward China." The group, citing findings of research by Oxford Economics, said that gradually scaling back tariffs to 12% from the current 19% would produce an additional $169 billion in U.S. GDP and create 145,000 additional American jobs by 2025.
But Biden has ruled out reducing the tariffs right away. Aides have said he intends to review all aspects of the U.S.-China relationship deliberately before deciding which Trump policies to keep, modify or scrap.
Scott Kennedy, senior adviser with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, urges sorting the China policies Biden will inherit from Trump into four categories: those the U.S. can change without discussing with allies (such as rejoining the Paris Accord and World Health Organization); conflicts it can resolve through dialog with China (such as approving visas for journalists or reassessing the TikTok ban); issues on which the U.S. should hold firm (including placing sanctions on Hong Kong and delisting Chinese companies who won't comply with U.S. disclosure rules); and matters U.S. should decide in coordination with U.S. allies (such as how to deal with Chinese companies that pose a potential threat to national security).
"The Biden administration," Kennedy wrote, "has a greater opportunity for policy innovation on China than many appreciate."
Capitalizing on that opportunity may take more than Biden's first 100 days.