一支機器人部隊正在拯救零售商
Jeremy Kahn
2020-05-04
被工作人員稱為“蜂巢”的Ocado分揀中心內，數千臺機器人用最快速度和最少人工完成訂單。圖片來源：COURTESY OF OCADO GROUP
看機器人忙碌工作簡直讓人著迷。倫敦東郊厄里斯一處倉庫里，一千多臺機器人在巨大的鋼鋁網上滾動。每臺機器人看起來很像辦公室的復印機，頂上有短粗天線，還有個閃亮的霓虹綠色LED屏幕。每臺機器人沿著各自的路線疾馳，提速效率堪比法拉利。機器人會瞬間停下，倒退，向左或向右行進，或是暫停片刻讓其他機器人通過，宛若精心編排的電動芭蕾舞。
機器人運行的網格實際上是巨大三維網格，也是裝滿食品的模塊化籠子頂部。每次機器人停下，都用爪子狀的裝置伸進格子內部（員工稱之為“蜂巢”），下降多達三層。爪子抓住白色塑料板條箱的側面，里面裝著水果、蔬菜、谷類等多達55000種物品，然后縮回機器人腹部。隨后機器人將板條箱運到另一個格子區，放在倉庫底層蜂箱下方的“分揀通道”。員工根據顧客訂單從板條箱里拿出商品放進紅色塑料箱，裝上卡車送貨。
此類倉庫又被物流專業人士稱為顧客訂單分揀中心（CFC），是全世界最先進和自動化程度最高的倉庫之一，每周可以處理數萬個訂單。此處倉庫屬于業內領先的英國在線雜貨商Ocado，其定位是像白衣騎士一樣幫助陷入困境的雜貨業在自動化時代展開競爭，也有可能幫助其他行業。
平日里，Ocado的機器人分揀倉庫已業務繁忙，新冠危機爆發以來簡直忙得不可開交。疫情蔓延也證明，即便人類勞動力面臨前所未有的壓力，雜貨電商業務也能保持蓬勃發展。然而與此同時，危機也顛覆了日常生活，在Ocado有望在全球拓展業務之際可能影響業務增長。
Ocado像大多數雜貨店一樣，因社交隔離措施和恐慌性購買推動的出現需求飆升。3月該公司在英國的雜貨銷售額同比增長了20%以上。公司網站的訪問量一度達到正常水平的100倍，高到公司的網絡安全系統判斷網站受到攻擊。“這是我們有史以來流量最高峰。”Ocado集團傳播總監大衛·施賴弗表示。
Ocado遇到的情況并非孤例。3月19日咨詢公司麥肯錫向雜貨店客戶提供的報告稱，全球在線雜貨店都面臨高達700%的需求高峰。疫情大流行很有可能對消費者行為產生持久影響，危機消退之后很長時間里，都會有更多消費者選擇在線購物。各超市要盡可能高效滿足新需求，人們對Ocado自動化倉庫、機器人和軟件的興趣也會隨之提升。
盡管如此，Ocado跟其他同行一樣，滿足需求也不太順利。為了應對鋪天蓋地的訂單，Ocado關閉了其移動應用程序，還在網站上增加了排隊系統。但需求實在太多，3月中旬Ocado一星期里的送貨時間全被預訂，被迫臨時關閉網站。近一周后重新上線時，原有用戶下單都受到限制，然而限制后還是很難及時送貨。而且，Ocado跟許多雜貨店一樣，臨時限制每件商品只能買兩到三件，以阻止囤貨。
Ocado正為其他最壞的情況做準備，主要問題是如果員工開始感染，或是全體團隊要隔離該怎么辦。（可能的解決辦法包括從其他行業抽調休假員工去倉庫，或開卡車送貨。公司已經開始招收賦閑的Uber司機。）
病毒襲擊之前，食品雜貨店已承受巨大壓力。“由于成本上升、效率下滑還有競相降價，雜貨店業務增長和盈利能力都在走低。”麥肯錫最近一份報告中寫道。過去十年，北美和西歐的雜貨店銷售額增長率僅為2%。與此同時，咨詢公司Mercator Advisory Group的數據顯示，美國連鎖雜貨店平均凈利潤率只有1%至2%。不僅趨勢令人沮喪，行業高層也很擔心零售業的兩大對頭亞馬遜和沃爾瑪，兩巨頭均已明確表示要主導食品雜貨業務。根據瑞銀數據，沃爾瑪已是美國最大的食品雜貨銷售商，市場份額為21.3%，比最接近的競爭對手超市連鎖店克羅格份額高出一倍以上。
一些業內人士認為，“傳統”雜貨商與巨頭競爭的唯一途徑就是學習巨頭最先進的技術和物流基礎設施。自動化還有助于削減勞動力成本。麥肯錫的另一份2019年5月發布的報告估計，應用現有技術后，雜貨店指出的工時可能減少55%至65%。
Ocado對雜貨商的宣傳強調了各項好處，還補充了令人信服的事實，即Ocado可協助搭建自動化基礎設施，節省自行開發的精力和成本。
多年來，Ocado轉型技術平臺的說法似乎停留在口頭上。股票分析師普遍懷疑，該股也是長期以來賣空者的最愛。但Ocado的物流能力逐漸獲得了認可。從2017年開始，公司跟四大洲多家食品連鎖店達成一系列許可協議，包括跟克羅格達成巨額合作協議。此后，Ocado的市值翻了兩番超過100億美元，每年收入增長約10%，2019年達到22億美元。對科技公司來說如此慢的增速毫無意義，但對雜貨店來說已相當可觀。
投資者似乎相信Ocado能抓住當前的機會。2月28日以來，盡管全球市場暴跌，Ocado股價還是上漲了28%。然而，未來看起來有點灰暗。由于Ocado采取許可經營，前期要花巨資建設數十個訂單分揀中心。相關債務導致一些分析師懷疑，目前背負逾7.5億美元債務的Ocado承擔的風險是不是太大。而且，即使大流行過去，有個問題也不容忽視，不管是哪家雜貨商，即便引進Ocado的機器人幫助，能否擋住什么都賣的亞馬遜，還有總部位于本頓維爾的沃爾瑪的沖擊。
Ocado于互聯網繁盛時期創立，當時三位20多歲的英國人蒂姆·施泰納、喬納森·法曼和杰森·吉辛在高盛當交易員，投資創業公司虧了錢。2000年4月，三人聯合成立了Ocado。（Ocado是個虛構的詞，之所以選這個詞是因為不屬于任何一種語言，而且創始人喜歡這幾個字母當標志的樣子。）Ocado的首席執行官施泰納是創始人里唯一留在公司的人。他看起來結實修長，短短的灰色頭發，淡藍色的眼睛，快速介紹Ocado的歷史時散發出一種拳擊手的氣質。
跟強手達成戰略伙伴關系有利于公司發展。Ocado發現自身規模很小，很難跟批發商談到合適的價格，于是與高檔英國連鎖超市Waitrose簽訂協議，之后Ocado可參照其合作方式跟供應商交易。作為交換，Ocado同意接下來10年售賣帶有Waitrose白色標志的產品（后來協議延長了10年）。Waitrose的百貨商店母公司約翰·劉易斯曾投資4500萬美元收購其40%的股份。
Ocado創立時，市場上的英國食品連鎖店，如Tesco、Sainsbury’s和沃爾瑪旗下的Asda電商業務均已上線。各家連鎖店利用實體商店完成網上訂單，店員選出商品裝上送貨卡車。該過程被稱為“店內分揀”，是多數零售商將電子商務嫁接到現有業務上的方式。店內分揀不用投資額外的資本或勞動力，但存在缺點。很多店的儲藏室太狹窄，無法承接大規模分揀操作，員工可能得在超市里根據在線訂單選貨，影響到店購物的客戶體驗。由于庫存較小，商品也很有可能出現缺貨現象，這是導致客戶不滿的主要原因。
沒有實體店的Ocado采取了不同的做法。公司在倫敦北部邊緣的哈特菲爾德建立了自動化中央配送中心，接收所有訂單，可將庫存短缺幾率降至最低。這項業務迅速走紅，一直在消費者調查中名列前茅。訂單中商品替換或錯誤率均低于0.5%，遠高于競爭對手。
英國鐵橋，一位Ocado司機正在運送食品。3月英國下令強制居家隔離令后，訂單數量激增。圖片來源：NICK POTTS—PA IMAGES/GETTY IMAGES
問題是：哈特菲爾德應用的技術還有很多需要改進之處。Ocado使用的設備是巨型傳送帶和分揀機，都是為制造業工廠設計，工廠通常大量制造相同的產品。但這種模式不適合種類繁多的雜貨店，而且每位顧客的訂單都不一樣。“之前我開過物料搬運設備的玩笑，感覺是5加5的投入只能得到7的回報。”施泰納說。
與此同時，持續支出改善消耗了大量現金。2007年，Ocado的收入為3.38億美元，每年以超過20%的速度飛速增長。但每年運營損失也超過4500萬美元，還要花費數千萬美元改進分揀中心，以及購買送貨卡車。目前公司債務超過1.3億美元。約翰·劉易斯已將對Ocado的投資減記為零。
大概這段時間里，管理過科技初創企業的軟件顧問保羅·克拉克接到了Ocado招聘人員的電話。“當時我說：‘很抱歉，但我不想做零售業。’” 60歲左右，身材瘦長的克拉克回憶說，雖然沒去牛津大學讀成博士，但一身學者風范。后來克拉克參觀了Ocado的倉庫，對其規模和復雜性印象尤為深刻。哈特菲爾德是自動化方面的巨大難題，正是他喜歡解決的工程問題。“我立刻愛上了。”他說。
克拉克簽了一年合同，任務是改進哈特菲爾德快速運轉的傳送帶貨品流動控制系統。克拉克說，Ocado的操作非常復雜，要重新設計的話，唯一方法就是搭建一系列數字“孿生體”，本質上是對操作的實時軟件模擬。如此一來克拉克和團隊能在實際倉庫中實現配置改進之前進行試驗，避免了代價高昂的測試和錯誤。施泰納說，不久之后，新系統協助提高了設備效率，現在5加5能做到等于12。
2010年夏天，Ocado在倫敦證交所上市，估值為9.37億英鎊（按照當年匯率約合14億美元）。在很多分析師預期里，一直賠錢的雜貨店并不值這么多，上市首日公司股價下跌了10%。之后Ocado一直飽受懷疑情緒困擾，接下來10年里Ocado的股票經常像是市場上最愛賣空的股票之一，大幫基金經理在一邊喝倒彩。
不過接下來的一年里，Ocado實現第一次實現營業利潤。大約在同一時間，食品雜貨咨詢公司、投資銀行，后來連寶潔、聯合利華、雀巢和可口可樂等巨頭也開始低調要求參觀分揀中心。斯坦納的本能反應是拒絕。“當時我們很保密。”他回憶說。但他很快意識到，雖然其他公司參觀分揀中心可能會學到一些技巧，但Ocado十多年里搭建集成軟件、硬件、倉庫工人和送貨流程的系統其實無法復制。2012年的年報中，Ocado首次提出將知識產權貨幣化制定為戰略方針。
造訪Ocdoad的公司當中也包括英國連鎖超市莫里森，其收入遠遠超過Ocado，但沒有電商業務。兩家公司達成協議，將Ocado最新分揀中心一半產能出售給莫里森，Ocado還幫莫里森管理設施和送貨車隊。2014年1月莫里森網店Morrisons.com開業，證明了Ocado的平臺可用于其他公司。
當時克拉克已擢升為首席技術官，他對平臺的構想更加雄心勃勃。Ocado推出莫里森網店的第二天，克拉克在當地一家酒店召集員工開會。他首先祝賀短短六個月內就讓莫里森網站如期投入運營，這是重大的技術成就。但他接下來的話讓很多人倒吸一口冷氣。“整個技術堆棧要重寫。”他告訴員工。剛開始，重寫主要意味著軟件改進。但到2015年中，Ocado已經開始研發大批機器人，在“蜂巢”里忙碌。
機器人由Ocdoo與英國機器人公司Tharsus共同設計，通過內部4G網絡控制，其基站之密集，在全球都無出其右。網絡中每臺機器人每秒能跟控制軟件完成10次通信。厄里斯的蜂巢每天產生4兆兆字節的數據，所有數據都反饋到數字孿生體中以完善系統。
應用機器人后，Ocado最新的分揀中心每工時可揀選200件商品，意味著收到正常訂單后，商品從供應卡車運到蜂巢，揀選、包裝并裝車等待配送，全過程不到15分鐘。同時，由于蜂箱的模塊化設計，可以很容易地復制和調整大小以適應新位置。
公司還為硬件搭配了諸多新軟件，從基于云的移動應用到人工智能均囊括在內。現在Ocado向全世界的雜貨店提供集成軟件包，以及維護和升級的工程支持服務。
亞馬遜和沃爾瑪對機器人技術并不陌生，2012年亞馬遜以7.75億美元收購馬薩諸塞州Kiva公司后，已開始使用Roomba型機器人，在分揀中心運送大堆貨物。去年，亞馬遜還收購了科羅拉多州博爾德市的初創公司Canvas，利用該公司的計算機視覺系統，倉庫機器人可以在擁擠的環境中跟人類共同工作。沃爾瑪則從匹茲堡的Bossa Nova Robotics訂購了數千臺機器人，用來跟蹤門店庫存。沃爾瑪還在新罕布什爾州試點了全自動化倉庫，為用戶在線下單線下自提業務提供支持。
單純做超市業務的公司自動化速度慢得多。但在2017年6月，亞馬遜推出的重大舉措為Ocado推廣現代化銷售提供了V型助力。當時，線上百貨商店亞馬遜斥資137億美元收購了在全球有500家門店的高檔商品商店全食超市（Whole Foods）。雜貨商普遍擔心亞馬遜也會吞掉自己的業務，因為亞馬遜在其他行業有過先例，對Ocado技術的興趣也驟然洶涌。
2017年11月，Ocado宣布與法國零售商Groupe Casino達成協議，為電商業務提供技術。兩個月后又與Sobeys達成合作，Sobeys在加拿大經營1500家不同品牌的店面。“這是我見過唯一能實現大規模盈利的電商模式。”Sobeys電商業務高級副總裁莎拉·喬伊斯談到Ocado時表示。
Ocado測試能處理精致食品和修理的仿真機器人。圖片來源：COURTESY OF OCADO GROUP
隨后還有幾筆交易，包括跟經營1300種雜貨的瑞典公司ICA、澳大利亞的Coles還有日本的亞洲最大連鎖超市Aeon。但規模最大的還是2018年5月Ocado與克羅格達成的戰略合作。根據協議，美國巨頭克羅格收購Ocado的5%股份，并獲得了在美國獨家應用其技術的權利。Ocado則承諾為克羅格建造約20家分揀中心。合伙企業上市當天，Ocado股票飆升了44%。
克羅格的首席執行官羅德尼·麥克馬倫表示，觀察Ocado長達10年，還跟公司高管定期會面。2013年一次合并后，克羅格電商業務主要采用店內分揀方式，但麥克馬倫表示，隨著業務規模增長，越發難以完成。為了讓線上和店內顧客都能滿意，克羅格傾向于Ocado的自動化分揀中心。麥克馬倫承認也在密切關注亞馬遜和沃爾瑪，但他堅稱跟Ocado合作跟競爭對手毫無關系。“主要原因是我們一兩年內根本不可能追上Ocado的水平。”麥克馬倫說。
缺乏資源模仿Ocado的技術，也正是客戶跟Ocado合作的常見原因。“我們公司規模很大，但技術并非專攻。”瑞典公司ICA首席執行官安德斯·斯文森說。相比之下，Ocado雇傭了1800多名軟件工程師和600多名硬件專家。比起亞馬遜或谷歌當然少得多，但在雜貨行業里已經是很龐大的技術團隊。
面對大批許可經營協議，很多投資者不得不放棄懷疑，Ocado被大量做空的日子也一去不返。“之前我拼命做空，但Ocado跟克羅格合作后，我拼命做多。”股票研究公司伯恩斯坦負責歐洲零售商的分析師布魯諾·蒙泰恩說。不過，相關交易并未增加太多利潤，因為自動分揀中心建設完成后Ocado才能收到回報。
Ocado目前經營六家分揀中心，支持在英國食品雜貨店業務，其目標是十年內在全球范圍內至少經營50家。3月26日，Ocado在英國之外為法國Groupe Casino建造的第一家分揀中心正式啟用。另一家位于多倫多郊外為Sobeys建造的分揀中心將于6月開業。至于為克羅格建設的第一家分揀中心，按照計劃2021年上半年將在俄亥俄州門羅縣投入使用。
Ocado的合作伙伴收購土地、搭建外部建筑、組建送貨車隊和雇傭員工。Ocado負責建造蜂箱，提供機器人和軟件，還要提供培訓和現場工程支持。施泰納表示，平均算下來每家分揀中心的“現金流出峰值”大概為4000萬至4500萬美元。建設完成后，Ocado才能根據倉庫的可用容量收取費用。最近一個財年里，Ocado只有6%的收入來自許可經營。
蘇格蘭皇家銀行資本市場的股票分析師謝里·馬萊克表示，2022年之前Ocado都很難從許可經營業務獲得正現金流。與此同時，巨額投資導致損失不斷膨脹，2019年初，一家分揀中心又毀于災難性的大火，導致損失進一步惡化。
迫在眉睫的問題是，冠狀病毒會不會阻礙Ocado擴張。疫情第一次爆發時，Ocado就遇到了困難，因為機器人關鍵零件在中國武漢制造，而武漢正是疫情爆發中心。（此后Ocado找了另一家供貨商。）Ocado主要聘請本地工程團隊，因此旅行禁令影響較小。在大多數地方，雜貨行業和建筑均為必需行業，所以不必停工。今年3月，Ocado的首席財務官鄧肯·塔頓·布朗對記者表示，Ocado將堅持完成海外分揀中心建設。不過他也承認，如果限行措施持續數月，時間表將受到拖累。
與此同時，Ocado也不指望疫情相關收入增長能一直持續。大部分銷售額增長來自購買干貨和不易腐產品的顧客。該公司預測，下半年隨著顧客不斷清庫存，相關商品的需求將低于正常水平。因此，公司并未上調全年銷售和盈利預期。
即便在新冠病毒爆發之前，一些觀察家就懷疑Ocado與雜貨商合作能否有回報。投行Jefferies的食品零售和分銷分析師克里斯托弗·曼德維爾特別批評了跟克羅格的合作。他說，除了少數幾座大城市，美國的人口密度還不夠支持Ocado的分揀中心模式。如果說疫情期間有什么不同，就是證明了“店內揀貨”可能更具彈性。如果發生危機導致需求激增，商店可以雇傭員工完成在線訂單，而分揀中心的設計是多數時候接近滿產能工作，沒有那么靈活。
類似疑慮并未影響Ocado籌集資金。2018年公司發行了1.87億美元的股票。2019年2月，Ocado將50%的英國電商業務出售給英國零售商瑪莎百貨。對投資者來說，此次出售讓Ocado定位更單純，就是純粹的技術平臺，同時籌集了9.82億美元。（瑪莎百貨也成為Ocado新的食品批發合作伙伴；Ocado與Waitrose的長期合同將于2020年底終止。）12月Ocado還出售了6.55億美元的可轉債。
Ocado頻繁融資讓一些分析師不安。但首席執行官施泰納表示，融資是實力的象征，而不是弱點。“融資的唯一原因是打算做更多（業務）。”他表示。今年2月，全球最著名的投資者也對Ocado的戰略間接投了信任票，沃倫·巴菲特旗下的伯克希爾-哈撒韋公司在提交政府的文件中披露，斥資近5.5億美元收購了克羅格2.3%的股權。
雖然Ocado在全球范圍內率先推出機器分揀中心，但首席技術官克拉克正關注下一個技術轉折點。他測試了新款機器人，包括裝有類似人手裝置的機器人，今后可以完全代替人類揀貨。他在研究不損壞水果之類易碎物品的撿取方法。Ocado還測試了叫“第二手”的機器人，此類機器人能用輪子行走，但有仿人類的軀干、頭部和手臂，可以修理蜂箱和傳送帶。克拉克說，最終“目標是設備內完全黑暗”，也就是說分揀中心幾乎沒有人類參與。
機器人并不是克拉克唯一關心的事。在“垂直”農業領域也就是可持續農業的室內試驗方面，Ocado進行了多項投資。公司收購了歐洲最大垂直農業公司Jones Foods的多數股權，投資成立了名叫Infinite Acres的合資企業，以及一家名為80 Acres Urban Agriculture的美國初創企業，還有荷蘭Priva Holdings公司。另一項投資是英國初創企業Karakuri，該公司創建了自動廚房，可準備好餐廳級別飯菜然后送貨。克拉克說，Ocado設想是構建“整合食品機器”。他解釋說，通過垂直耕作、準備食品和同一設施內配送，“可實現從農場到餐桌兩個小時或更短的時間內完成。”
施泰納和克拉克也開始看食品之外的領域，尋找利潤豐厚的業務。Ocado在物流、人工智能、機器人技術和仿真方面的專長可應用于自動停車場、包裹分揀、行李搬運、鐵路貨運、集裝箱港口和模塊化、可配置建筑等。克拉克說，公司已經在相關領域申請了多項專利。克拉克表示，Ocado研發了模擬停車系統，而且開始探索擴大版機器人，以處理比一箱香蕉重得多的貨物。
由于Ocado核心的食品雜貨業務仍在努力證明可持續性，向其他領域拓展聽起來有點壓力。不過，如果想知道Ocado為什么想做停車場或港口運營業務，施泰納有個現成的答案：如果當初亞馬遜只賣書，現在會怎樣？（財富中文網）
本文另一版本登載于《財富》雜志2020年5月刊，標題為《新冠疫情前線上的雜貨機器人》。
譯者：Feb
看機器人忙碌工作簡直讓人著迷。倫敦東郊厄里斯一處倉庫里，一千多臺機器人在巨大的鋼鋁網上滾動。每臺機器人看起來很像辦公室的復印機，頂上有短粗天線，還有個閃亮的霓虹綠色LED屏幕。每臺機器人沿著各自的路線疾馳，提速效率堪比法拉利。機器人會瞬間停下，倒退，向左或向右行進，或是暫停片刻讓其他機器人通過，宛若精心編排的電動芭蕾舞。
機器人運行的網格實際上是巨大三維網格，也是裝滿食品的模塊化籠子頂部。每次機器人停下，都用爪子狀的裝置伸進格子內部（員工稱之為“蜂巢”），下降多達三層。爪子抓住白色塑料板條箱的側面，里面裝著水果、蔬菜、谷類等多達55000種物品，然后縮回機器人腹部。隨后機器人將板條箱運到另一個格子區，放在倉庫底層蜂箱下方的“分揀通道”。員工根據顧客訂單從板條箱里拿出商品放進紅色塑料箱，裝上卡車送貨。
此類倉庫又被物流專業人士稱為顧客訂單分揀中心（CFC），是全世界最先進和自動化程度最高的倉庫之一，每周可以處理數萬個訂單。此處倉庫屬于業內領先的英國在線雜貨商Ocado，其定位是像白衣騎士一樣幫助陷入困境的雜貨業在自動化時代展開競爭，也有可能幫助其他行業。
平日里，Ocado的機器人分揀倉庫已業務繁忙，新冠危機爆發以來簡直忙得不可開交。疫情蔓延也證明，即便人類勞動力面臨前所未有的壓力，雜貨電商業務也能保持蓬勃發展。然而與此同時，危機也顛覆了日常生活，在Ocado有望在全球拓展業務之際可能影響業務增長。
Ocado像大多數雜貨店一樣，因社交隔離措施和恐慌性購買推動的出現需求飆升。3月該公司在英國的雜貨銷售額同比增長了20%以上。公司網站的訪問量一度達到正常水平的100倍，高到公司的網絡安全系統判斷網站受到攻擊。“這是我們有史以來流量最高峰。”Ocado集團傳播總監大衛·施賴弗表示。
Ocado遇到的情況并非孤例。3月19日咨詢公司麥肯錫向雜貨店客戶提供的報告稱，全球在線雜貨店都面臨高達700%的需求高峰。疫情大流行很有可能對消費者行為產生持久影響，危機消退之后很長時間里，都會有更多消費者選擇在線購物。各超市要盡可能高效滿足新需求，人們對Ocado自動化倉庫、機器人和軟件的興趣也會隨之提升。
盡管如此，Ocado跟其他同行一樣，滿足需求也不太順利。為了應對鋪天蓋地的訂單，Ocado關閉了其移動應用程序，還在網站上增加了排隊系統。但需求實在太多，3月中旬Ocado一星期里的送貨時間全被預訂，被迫臨時關閉網站。近一周后重新上線時，原有用戶下單都受到限制，然而限制后還是很難及時送貨。而且，Ocado跟許多雜貨店一樣，臨時限制每件商品只能買兩到三件，以阻止囤貨。
Ocado正為其他最壞的情況做準備，主要問題是如果員工開始感染，或是全體團隊要隔離該怎么辦。（可能的解決辦法包括從其他行業抽調休假員工去倉庫，或開卡車送貨。公司已經開始招收賦閑的Uber司機。）
病毒襲擊之前，食品雜貨店已承受巨大壓力。“由于成本上升、效率下滑還有競相降價，雜貨店業務增長和盈利能力都在走低。”麥肯錫最近一份報告中寫道。過去十年，北美和西歐的雜貨店銷售額增長率僅為2%。與此同時，咨詢公司Mercator Advisory Group的數據顯示，美國連鎖雜貨店平均凈利潤率只有1%至2%。不僅趨勢令人沮喪，行業高層也很擔心零售業的兩大對頭亞馬遜和沃爾瑪，兩巨頭均已明確表示要主導食品雜貨業務。根據瑞銀數據，沃爾瑪已是美國最大的食品雜貨銷售商，市場份額為21.3%，比最接近的競爭對手超市連鎖店克羅格份額高出一倍以上。
一些業內人士認為，“傳統”雜貨商與巨頭競爭的唯一途徑就是學習巨頭最先進的技術和物流基礎設施。自動化還有助于削減勞動力成本。麥肯錫的另一份2019年5月發布的報告估計，應用現有技術后，雜貨店指出的工時可能減少55%至65%。
Ocado對雜貨商的宣傳強調了各項好處，還補充了令人信服的事實，即Ocado可協助搭建自動化基礎設施，節省自行開發的精力和成本。
多年來，Ocado轉型技術平臺的說法似乎停留在口頭上。股票分析師普遍懷疑，該股也是長期以來賣空者的最愛。但Ocado的物流能力逐漸獲得了認可。從2017年開始，公司跟四大洲多家食品連鎖店達成一系列許可協議，包括跟克羅格達成巨額合作協議。此后，Ocado的市值翻了兩番超過100億美元，每年收入增長約10%，2019年達到22億美元。對科技公司來說如此慢的增速毫無意義，但對雜貨店來說已相當可觀。
投資者似乎相信Ocado能抓住當前的機會。2月28日以來，盡管全球市場暴跌，Ocado股價還是上漲了28%。然而，未來看起來有點灰暗。由于Ocado采取許可經營，前期要花巨資建設數十個訂單分揀中心。相關債務導致一些分析師懷疑，目前背負逾7.5億美元債務的Ocado承擔的風險是不是太大。而且，即使大流行過去，有個問題也不容忽視，不管是哪家雜貨商，即便引進Ocado的機器人幫助，能否擋住什么都賣的亞馬遜，還有總部位于本頓維爾的沃爾瑪的沖擊。
Ocado于互聯網繁盛時期創立，當時三位20多歲的英國人蒂姆·施泰納、喬納森·法曼和杰森·吉辛在高盛當交易員，投資創業公司虧了錢。2000年4月，三人聯合成立了Ocado。（Ocado是個虛構的詞，之所以選這個詞是因為不屬于任何一種語言，而且創始人喜歡這幾個字母當標志的樣子。）Ocado的首席執行官施泰納是創始人里唯一留在公司的人。他看起來結實修長，短短的灰色頭發，淡藍色的眼睛，快速介紹Ocado的歷史時散發出一種拳擊手的氣質。
跟強手達成戰略伙伴關系有利于公司發展。Ocado發現自身規模很小，很難跟批發商談到合適的價格，于是與高檔英國連鎖超市Waitrose簽訂協議，之后Ocado可參照其合作方式跟供應商交易。作為交換，Ocado同意接下來10年售賣帶有Waitrose白色標志的產品（后來協議延長了10年）。Waitrose的百貨商店母公司約翰·劉易斯曾投資4500萬美元收購其40%的股份。
Ocado創立時，市場上的英國食品連鎖店，如Tesco、Sainsbury’s和沃爾瑪旗下的Asda電商業務均已上線。各家連鎖店利用實體商店完成網上訂單，店員選出商品裝上送貨卡車。該過程被稱為“店內分揀”，是多數零售商將電子商務嫁接到現有業務上的方式。店內分揀不用投資額外的資本或勞動力，但存在缺點。很多店的儲藏室太狹窄，無法承接大規模分揀操作，員工可能得在超市里根據在線訂單選貨，影響到店購物的客戶體驗。由于庫存較小，商品也很有可能出現缺貨現象，這是導致客戶不滿的主要原因。
沒有實體店的Ocado采取了不同的做法。公司在倫敦北部邊緣的哈特菲爾德建立了自動化中央配送中心，接收所有訂單，可將庫存短缺幾率降至最低。這項業務迅速走紅，一直在消費者調查中名列前茅。訂單中商品替換或錯誤率均低于0.5%，遠高于競爭對手。
問題是：哈特菲爾德應用的技術還有很多需要改進之處。Ocado使用的設備是巨型傳送帶和分揀機，都是為制造業工廠設計，工廠通常大量制造相同的產品。但這種模式不適合種類繁多的雜貨店，而且每位顧客的訂單都不一樣。“之前我開過物料搬運設備的玩笑，感覺是5加5的投入只能得到7的回報。”施泰納說。
與此同時，持續支出改善消耗了大量現金。2007年，Ocado的收入為3.38億美元，每年以超過20%的速度飛速增長。但每年運營損失也超過4500萬美元，還要花費數千萬美元改進分揀中心，以及購買送貨卡車。目前公司債務超過1.3億美元。約翰·劉易斯已將對Ocado的投資減記為零。
大概這段時間里，管理過科技初創企業的軟件顧問保羅·克拉克接到了Ocado招聘人員的電話。“當時我說：‘很抱歉，但我不想做零售業。’” 60歲左右，身材瘦長的克拉克回憶說，雖然沒去牛津大學讀成博士，但一身學者風范。后來克拉克參觀了Ocado的倉庫，對其規模和復雜性印象尤為深刻。哈特菲爾德是自動化方面的巨大難題，正是他喜歡解決的工程問題。“我立刻愛上了。”他說。
克拉克簽了一年合同，任務是改進哈特菲爾德快速運轉的傳送帶貨品流動控制系統。克拉克說，Ocado的操作非常復雜，要重新設計的話，唯一方法就是搭建一系列數字“孿生體”，本質上是對操作的實時軟件模擬。如此一來克拉克和團隊能在實際倉庫中實現配置改進之前進行試驗，避免了代價高昂的測試和錯誤。施泰納說，不久之后，新系統協助提高了設備效率，現在5加5能做到等于12。
2010年夏天，Ocado在倫敦證交所上市，估值為9.37億英鎊（按照當年匯率約合14億美元）。在很多分析師預期里，一直賠錢的雜貨店并不值這么多，上市首日公司股價下跌了10%。之后Ocado一直飽受懷疑情緒困擾，接下來10年里Ocado的股票經常像是市場上最愛賣空的股票之一，大幫基金經理在一邊喝倒彩。
不過接下來的一年里，Ocado實現第一次實現營業利潤。大約在同一時間，食品雜貨咨詢公司、投資銀行，后來連寶潔、聯合利華、雀巢和可口可樂等巨頭也開始低調要求參觀分揀中心。斯坦納的本能反應是拒絕。“當時我們很保密。”他回憶說。但他很快意識到，雖然其他公司參觀分揀中心可能會學到一些技巧，但Ocado十多年里搭建集成軟件、硬件、倉庫工人和送貨流程的系統其實無法復制。2012年的年報中，Ocado首次提出將知識產權貨幣化制定為戰略方針。
造訪Ocdoad的公司當中也包括英國連鎖超市莫里森，其收入遠遠超過Ocado，但沒有電商業務。兩家公司達成協議，將Ocado最新分揀中心一半產能出售給莫里森，Ocado還幫莫里森管理設施和送貨車隊。2014年1月莫里森網店Morrisons.com開業，證明了Ocado的平臺可用于其他公司。
當時克拉克已擢升為首席技術官，他對平臺的構想更加雄心勃勃。Ocado推出莫里森網店的第二天，克拉克在當地一家酒店召集員工開會。他首先祝賀短短六個月內就讓莫里森網站如期投入運營，這是重大的技術成就。但他接下來的話讓很多人倒吸一口冷氣。“整個技術堆棧要重寫。”他告訴員工。剛開始，重寫主要意味著軟件改進。但到2015年中，Ocado已經開始研發大批機器人，在“蜂巢”里忙碌。
機器人由Ocdoo與英國機器人公司Tharsus共同設計，通過內部4G網絡控制，其基站之密集，在全球都無出其右。網絡中每臺機器人每秒能跟控制軟件完成10次通信。厄里斯的蜂巢每天產生4兆兆字節的數據，所有數據都反饋到數字孿生體中以完善系統。
應用機器人后，Ocado最新的分揀中心每工時可揀選200件商品，意味著收到正常訂單后，商品從供應卡車運到蜂巢，揀選、包裝并裝車等待配送，全過程不到15分鐘。同時，由于蜂箱的模塊化設計，可以很容易地復制和調整大小以適應新位置。
公司還為硬件搭配了諸多新軟件，從基于云的移動應用到人工智能均囊括在內。現在Ocado向全世界的雜貨店提供集成軟件包，以及維護和升級的工程支持服務。
亞馬遜和沃爾瑪對機器人技術并不陌生，2012年亞馬遜以7.75億美元收購馬薩諸塞州Kiva公司后，已開始使用Roomba型機器人，在分揀中心運送大堆貨物。去年，亞馬遜還收購了科羅拉多州博爾德市的初創公司Canvas，利用該公司的計算機視覺系統，倉庫機器人可以在擁擠的環境中跟人類共同工作。沃爾瑪則從匹茲堡的Bossa Nova Robotics訂購了數千臺機器人，用來跟蹤門店庫存。沃爾瑪還在新罕布什爾州試點了全自動化倉庫，為用戶在線下單線下自提業務提供支持。
單純做超市業務的公司自動化速度慢得多。但在2017年6月，亞馬遜推出的重大舉措為Ocado推廣現代化銷售提供了V型助力。當時，線上百貨商店亞馬遜斥資137億美元收購了在全球有500家門店的高檔商品商店全食超市（Whole Foods）。雜貨商普遍擔心亞馬遜也會吞掉自己的業務，因為亞馬遜在其他行業有過先例，對Ocado技術的興趣也驟然洶涌。
2017年11月，Ocado宣布與法國零售商Groupe Casino達成協議，為電商業務提供技術。兩個月后又與Sobeys達成合作，Sobeys在加拿大經營1500家不同品牌的店面。“這是我見過唯一能實現大規模盈利的電商模式。”Sobeys電商業務高級副總裁莎拉·喬伊斯談到Ocado時表示。
隨后還有幾筆交易，包括跟經營1300種雜貨的瑞典公司ICA、澳大利亞的Coles還有日本的亞洲最大連鎖超市Aeon。但規模最大的還是2018年5月Ocado與克羅格達成的戰略合作。根據協議，美國巨頭克羅格收購Ocado的5%股份，并獲得了在美國獨家應用其技術的權利。Ocado則承諾為克羅格建造約20家分揀中心。合伙企業上市當天，Ocado股票飆升了44%。
克羅格的首席執行官羅德尼·麥克馬倫表示，觀察Ocado長達10年，還跟公司高管定期會面。2013年一次合并后，克羅格電商業務主要采用店內分揀方式，但麥克馬倫表示，隨著業務規模增長，越發難以完成。為了讓線上和店內顧客都能滿意，克羅格傾向于Ocado的自動化分揀中心。麥克馬倫承認也在密切關注亞馬遜和沃爾瑪，但他堅稱跟Ocado合作跟競爭對手毫無關系。“主要原因是我們一兩年內根本不可能追上Ocado的水平。”麥克馬倫說。
缺乏資源模仿Ocado的技術，也正是客戶跟Ocado合作的常見原因。“我們公司規模很大，但技術并非專攻。”瑞典公司ICA首席執行官安德斯·斯文森說。相比之下，Ocado雇傭了1800多名軟件工程師和600多名硬件專家。比起亞馬遜或谷歌當然少得多，但在雜貨行業里已經是很龐大的技術團隊。
面對大批許可經營協議，很多投資者不得不放棄懷疑，Ocado被大量做空的日子也一去不返。“之前我拼命做空，但Ocado跟克羅格合作后，我拼命做多。”股票研究公司伯恩斯坦負責歐洲零售商的分析師布魯諾·蒙泰恩說。不過，相關交易并未增加太多利潤，因為自動分揀中心建設完成后Ocado才能收到回報。
Ocado目前經營六家分揀中心，支持在英國食品雜貨店業務，其目標是十年內在全球范圍內至少經營50家。3月26日，Ocado在英國之外為法國Groupe Casino建造的第一家分揀中心正式啟用。另一家位于多倫多郊外為Sobeys建造的分揀中心將于6月開業。至于為克羅格建設的第一家分揀中心，按照計劃2021年上半年將在俄亥俄州門羅縣投入使用。
Ocado的合作伙伴收購土地、搭建外部建筑、組建送貨車隊和雇傭員工。Ocado負責建造蜂箱，提供機器人和軟件，還要提供培訓和現場工程支持。施泰納表示，平均算下來每家分揀中心的“現金流出峰值”大概為4000萬至4500萬美元。建設完成后，Ocado才能根據倉庫的可用容量收取費用。最近一個財年里，Ocado只有6%的收入來自許可經營。
蘇格蘭皇家銀行資本市場的股票分析師謝里·馬萊克表示，2022年之前Ocado都很難從許可經營業務獲得正現金流。與此同時，巨額投資導致損失不斷膨脹，2019年初，一家分揀中心又毀于災難性的大火，導致損失進一步惡化。
迫在眉睫的問題是，冠狀病毒會不會阻礙Ocado擴張。疫情第一次爆發時，Ocado就遇到了困難，因為機器人關鍵零件在中國武漢制造，而武漢正是疫情爆發中心。（此后Ocado找了另一家供貨商。）Ocado主要聘請本地工程團隊，因此旅行禁令影響較小。在大多數地方，雜貨行業和建筑均為必需行業，所以不必停工。今年3月，Ocado的首席財務官鄧肯·塔頓·布朗對記者表示，Ocado將堅持完成海外分揀中心建設。不過他也承認，如果限行措施持續數月，時間表將受到拖累。
與此同時，Ocado也不指望疫情相關收入增長能一直持續。大部分銷售額增長來自購買干貨和不易腐產品的顧客。該公司預測，下半年隨著顧客不斷清庫存，相關商品的需求將低于正常水平。因此，公司并未上調全年銷售和盈利預期。
即便在新冠病毒爆發之前，一些觀察家就懷疑Ocado與雜貨商合作能否有回報。投行Jefferies的食品零售和分銷分析師克里斯托弗·曼德維爾特別批評了跟克羅格的合作。他說，除了少數幾座大城市，美國的人口密度還不夠支持Ocado的分揀中心模式。如果說疫情期間有什么不同，就是證明了“店內揀貨”可能更具彈性。如果發生危機導致需求激增，商店可以雇傭員工完成在線訂單，而分揀中心的設計是多數時候接近滿產能工作，沒有那么靈活。
類似疑慮并未影響Ocado籌集資金。2018年公司發行了1.87億美元的股票。2019年2月，Ocado將50%的英國電商業務出售給英國零售商瑪莎百貨。對投資者來說，此次出售讓Ocado定位更單純，就是純粹的技術平臺，同時籌集了9.82億美元。（瑪莎百貨也成為Ocado新的食品批發合作伙伴；Ocado與Waitrose的長期合同將于2020年底終止。）12月Ocado還出售了6.55億美元的可轉債。
Ocado頻繁融資讓一些分析師不安。但首席執行官施泰納表示，融資是實力的象征，而不是弱點。“融資的唯一原因是打算做更多（業務）。”他表示。今年2月，全球最著名的投資者也對Ocado的戰略間接投了信任票，沃倫·巴菲特旗下的伯克希爾-哈撒韋公司在提交政府的文件中披露，斥資近5.5億美元收購了克羅格2.3%的股權。
雖然Ocado在全球范圍內率先推出機器分揀中心，但首席技術官克拉克正關注下一個技術轉折點。他測試了新款機器人，包括裝有類似人手裝置的機器人，今后可以完全代替人類揀貨。他在研究不損壞水果之類易碎物品的撿取方法。Ocado還測試了叫“第二手”的機器人，此類機器人能用輪子行走，但有仿人類的軀干、頭部和手臂，可以修理蜂箱和傳送帶。克拉克說，最終“目標是設備內完全黑暗”，也就是說分揀中心幾乎沒有人類參與。
機器人并不是克拉克唯一關心的事。在“垂直”農業領域也就是可持續農業的室內試驗方面，Ocado進行了多項投資。公司收購了歐洲最大垂直農業公司Jones Foods的多數股權，投資成立了名叫Infinite Acres的合資企業，以及一家名為80 Acres Urban Agriculture的美國初創企業，還有荷蘭Priva Holdings公司。另一項投資是英國初創企業Karakuri，該公司創建了自動廚房，可準備好餐廳級別飯菜然后送貨。克拉克說，Ocado設想是構建“整合食品機器”。他解釋說，通過垂直耕作、準備食品和同一設施內配送，“可實現從農場到餐桌兩個小時或更短的時間內完成。”
施泰納和克拉克也開始看食品之外的領域，尋找利潤豐厚的業務。Ocado在物流、人工智能、機器人技術和仿真方面的專長可應用于自動停車場、包裹分揀、行李搬運、鐵路貨運、集裝箱港口和模塊化、可配置建筑等。克拉克說，公司已經在相關領域申請了多項專利。克拉克表示，Ocado研發了模擬停車系統，而且開始探索擴大版機器人，以處理比一箱香蕉重得多的貨物。
由于Ocado核心的食品雜貨業務仍在努力證明可持續性，向其他領域拓展聽起來有點壓力。不過，如果想知道Ocado為什么想做停車場或港口運營業務，施泰納有個現成的答案：如果當初亞馬遜只賣書，現在會怎樣？（財富中文網）
本文另一版本登載于《財富》雜志2020年5月刊，標題為《新冠疫情前線上的雜貨機器人》。
譯者：Feb
The robots are mesmerizing. Inside a warehouse in Erith, on the outskirts of East London, more than a thousand of them glide across a vast steel and aluminum grid. Each is the size and shape of an office copy machine, topped with stubby antennae and a shining neon-green LED. Following individual routes, they whiz off, accelerating at rates rivaling those of a Ferrari. They stop on a dime, reverse, shoot left or right, or momentarily pause to allow fellow robots to pass—a meticulously choreographed electric ballet.
The robots’ grid is actually the top of a giant three-dimensional lattice—a modular cage packed with groceries. Each time a robot stops, it drops a clawlike attachment into the bowels of the lattice (“the hive,” as human workers call it), descending as many as three stories. The claw grabs the sides of a white plastic crate containing fruit, vegetables, cereal—any of 55,000 different items—and retracts it up into the robot’s belly. The robot then carries the crate to another grid square and lowers it into the “pick tunnel,” which sits beneath the hive on the warehouse’s ground floor. There, workers pick items out of the crates to fill customers’ orders, placing the groceries into red plastic bins, which are then loaded onto trucks for delivery.
This warehouse, or customer fulfillment center (CFC), as logistics pros call it, is one of the most sophisticated and automated on the planet, one that can handle many tens of thousands of orders a week. It belongs to Ocado, a pioneering British online grocer that is positioning itself as a white knight for the beleaguered grocery sector—and possibly other industries too—offering to help supermarket chains compete in an automated age.
Ocado’s robot-powered warehouses thrum with activity on ordinary days; since the coronavirus crisis erupted, they’ve been in roaring overdrive. The pandemic has given the company a chance to prove it can keep an online grocery business humming, even when its human workforce faces unprecedented strain. Yet at the same time, the crisis’s upending of daily life has threatened to knock Ocado off its growth trajectory, just when it seemed tantalizingly close to becoming a global force.
Like most grocers, Ocado has faced skyrocketing demand fueled by social distancing measures and panic buying. Its U.K. grocery sales in March leaped more than 20% year over year. At one point, visits to its website were 100 times the normal rate—a level so high, it triggered the company’s cybersecurity systems to believe the website was under attack. “This is the peakiest peak we’ve ever had in the history of the business,” says David Shriver, Ocado’s group director of communications.
Ocado is hardly alone in this. Consultants McKinsey & Co., in a note to grocery clients on March 19, reported that online grocers worldwide were struggling to meet demand spikes as high as 700%. There’s a good chance the pandemic will have a lasting impact on consumer behavior, converting many more customers to online grocery shopping long after the crisis recedes. Supermarkets will need ways to meet this new demand as efficiently as possible—which ought to boost interest in Ocado’s automated warehouses, robots, and software.
Still, like its peers, Ocado has sometimes stumbled as it races to keep up. To try to slow the overwhelming order volume, Ocado shut down its mobile app and implemented a queuing system on its website. But demand was simply too great, and with all its delivery slots booked for a week out, Ocado was forced to temporarily shut down its website in mid-March. When it came back online, almost a week later, the company restricted orders to existing customers; even so, delivery slots remain difficult to find. And, like many grocers, Ocado temporarily limited customers to two or three of any individual item to deter hoarding.
Ocado is now preparing for other worst-case scenarios; it has held rehearsals for what will happen if its employees begin to fall ill and entire teams need to self-isolate. (One possible solution: drafting furloughed workers from other industries to staff warehouses and drive trucks. The company has already reached out to recruit idled Uber drivers.)
Even before the coronavirus hit, grocers were under tremendous pressure. “Both growth and profitability have been on a downward trajectory due to higher costs, falling productivity, and race-to-the-bottom pricing,” McKinsey wrote in a recent report. Sales growth for North American and Western European grocers has been just 2% over the past decade. Net profit margins for U.S. grocery chains, meanwhile, average just 1% to 2%, according to consulting firm Mercator Advisory Group. On top of these dismal trends, executives in the sector fear the twin Death Stars of retail—Amazon and Walmart—both of which have made clear their intentions to dominate the grocery business. Walmart is already by far the largest seller of groceries in the U.S., with a 21.3% market share, according to UBS, more than twice the share of its nearest competitor, supermarket chain Kroger.
Some industry insiders argue that the only way “legacy” grocers can compete with the titans is by matching their state-of-the-art technology and logistics infrastructure. That automation could also help them trim labor costs: another McKinsey report, from May 2019, estimated that by implementing existing technologies, a grocer could potentially run a store with 55% to 65% fewer labor-hours.
Ocado’s pitch to grocers stresses those benefits and adds a compelling twist: Ocado can build the automation infrastructure for them, sparing them the pains and costs of developing their own.
For many years, Ocado’s talk of becoming a tech platform seemed to be just that: talk. Equity analysts were skeptical, and the stock became a perennial favorite among short-sellers. But Ocado’s logistics prowess has gradually won converts. Beginning in 2017, the company announced a series of licensing deals with grocery chains on four continents—including a huge partnership with Kroger. Since then, Ocado’s market capitalization has quadrupled to north of $10 billion, while revenue has been growing at about 10% annually, reaching $2.2 billion in 2019. That kind of growth is nothing for a tech company—but it’s exceptional for a grocery.
Investors seem confident that Ocado can capitalize on the current moment; its shares have risen 28% since Feb. 28, even as global markets plummeted. The future, however, looks murkier. Ocado’s licensing deals require it to spend heavily upfront to build dozens of CFCs. Those obligations have left some analysts wondering if the company, which currently carries more than $750 million in debt, has taken on too much risk. And, even once the pandemic passes, an existential question looms: whether any grocer, even with Ocado’s robotic helping hand, can withstand the onslaught of the Everything Store and the Behemoth of Bentonville.
Ocado’s roots stretch back to the dotcom boom, when three twentysomething Brits working as traders at Goldman Sachs—Tim Steiner, Jonathan Faiman, and Jason Gissing—got bitten by the startup bug. The trio founded Ocado in April 2000. (The name is an invented word, chosen because it could work across languages and because the founders liked how it looked as a logo.) Steiner, Ocado’s CEO, is the only founder still involved with the company. Compact and trim, with close-cropped gray hair and pale blue eyes, he exudes a pugilistic intensity as he walks through Ocado’s history at a rapid-fire clip.
A strategic partnership helped get the new company going. Realizing it was too small to get the best prices from wholesalers, Ocado signed a deal with the upmarket U.K. supermarket chain Waitrose, allowing Ocado to piggyback on its deals with suppliers. In exchange, Ocado agreed to carry Waitrose’s white label products for ten years (a deal that was later extended for an additional decade). Waitrose’s parent company, the retailer John Lewis, invested $45 million for a 40% stake in the company.
When Ocado made its debut, established British grocery chains such as Tesco, Sainsbury’s, and Walmart-owned Asda already had e-commerce operations. Those chains were using their stores to fulfill online orders, with store clerks gathering the goods and loading them onto delivery trucks. This process, known as “store pick,” is the way most retailers have grafted e-commerce onto their existing operations. Store pick requires little additional capital or labor investment, but it has disadvantages. Many stores’ stockrooms are too cramped to accommodate a sizable picking operation, which means employees may have to fill online orders from the supermarket floor, putting them in competition with in-store customers. With smaller inventories, there’s also a greater chance that items won’t be available—a leading driver of customer dissatisfaction.
Ocado, which had no stores, took a different approach. It built an automated central distribution center in Hatfield, on London’s northern edge, and delivered all its orders from there—a strategy that helped it minimize inventory shortfalls. The business quickly became popular, consistently topping consumer surveys. Its rate of substituted or erroneous items in orders—which it drove down below 0.5%—was much better than those of its rivals.
The problem: The technology at Hatfield left a lot to be desired. The equipment Ocado was using—giant conveyor belts and sorting machines—was designed for the manufacturing sector, where factories churn out mass volumes of identical items. It was ill-suited for the grocery business, where the assortment of items is huge, and each customer’s order is unique. “I used to joke about the law of material-handling equipment, which was, Five plus five equals seven,” Steiner says.
Constant spending on improvements, meanwhile, was eating up cash. By 2007, Ocado’s revenues were $338 million, and galloping ahead at more than 20% annually. But the company was also running annual operating losses of more than $45 million—and spending tens of millions more to improve its CFC and purchase delivery trucks. It had more than $130 million of debt. At one point, John Lewis wrote its investment in the young online grocer down to zero.
Around this time, Paul Clarke, a software consultant with experience running tech startups, received a call from an Ocado recruiter. “I said, ‘Look, I’m really sorry, but I don’t want to work in retail,’” recalls Clarke, a lanky 60-year-old with the professorial demeanor of the Oxford PhD he once considered becoming. But when he toured Ocado’s warehouse, Clarke was impressed by its scale and complexity. Hatfield was a giant automation puzzle—exactly the sort of engineering problem he enjoyed cracking. “I fell in love,” he says.
Clarke signed on for a one-year gig, tasked with improving the system that controlled the flow of goods along Hatfield’s fast--moving conveyor belts. Ocado’s operation was so complex, Clarke says, that the only way to reengineer it was to build a series of digital “twins”—in essence, real-time software simulations of the operation. This allowed Clarke and his team to experiment with improved configurations before implementing them in the real warehouse, avoiding costly trial and error. Before long, Steiner says, the twins helped wring new efficiencies from equipment—making five plus five equal 12.
In the summer of 2010, Ocado went public on the London Stock Exchange, in a listing that valued the company at 937 million pounds ($1.4 billion at the time). That was more than many analysts thought the money-losing grocer was worth, and its shares fell 10% on their first day of trading. That skepticism would continue to haunt Ocado: Over the next decade, its shares would frequently have the dubious distinction of the being among the market’s most shorted, a Greek chorus of hedge fund managers cheering for its failure.
Over the following year, though, Ocado eked out its first small operating profit. Around the same time, grocery consultants, investment banks, and, eventually, huge packaged goods companies—Procter & Gamble, Unilever, Nestlé, and Coca-Cola—began quietly asking to tour the company’s fulfillment centers. Steiner’s instinct was to refuse. “We were quite secretive,” he recalls. But he soon realized that while other companies might glean a few tips by touring the CFCs, they couldn’t replicate the integrated system of software, hardware, warehouse workers, and delivery drivers Ocado had built over a decade. In its 2012 annual report, Ocado for the first time made monetizing its intellectual property a strategic plank.
Among those who visited Ocado was the U.K. grocer Morrisons, which had revenues far exceeding Ocado’s but didn’t have an online offering. The two companies reached a deal that sold half the capacity of Ocado’s newest CFC to Morrisons, with Ocado agreeing to manage the facility and a delivery fleet on Morrisons’ behalf. When Morrisons.com launched in January 2014, it was the first evidence that Ocado could put its platform to work for other grocers.
Clarke, who by then had been promoted to chief technology officer, had an even more ambitious version of that platform in mind. The day after Ocado launched Morrisons, Clarke gathered his staff for an off-site in a local hotel. He congratulated them on having gotten Morrisons up and running on schedule and in just six months—a significant technical achievement. What he said next made many in the room gasp. “We’re going to rewrite the whole technology stack from scratch,” he told them. At first, this largely meant software improvements. But, by mid-2015, Ocado had begun developing the army of robots that would eventually staff its “hives.”
The robots, designed by Ocado in conjunction with U.K. robotics company Tharsus, are controlled by an internal 4G network with more base stations packed into less space than pretty much anywhere else on the planet. The network enables each robot to communicate with the software controlling it 10 times per second. At Erith, the hive generates four terabytes of data every day, all of which is fed back into a digital twin to refine the system.
The robots allow Ocado’s newest fulfillment centers to pick 200 items per hour of labor time—and mean they can move a typical order from inbound supply truck into the hive, and then have it picked, packed, and loaded on a van for delivery in 15 minutes or less. Meanwhile, the modular design of the hive itself means it can easily be replicated and sized to fit new locations.
Complementing the hardware is new software—lots of it, from cloud-based mobile apps to artificial intelligence. This integrated package, along with the engineering support to maintain and upgrade it, is what Ocado now offers to the world’s grocers.
Amazon and Walmart are no strangers to robotics. Amazon has begun using Roomba-like robots from Kiva, a Massachusetts company it acquired in 2012 for $775 million, to move large stacks of pallets around its fulfillment centers. Last year, it also acquired Canvas, a Boulder, Colo., startup whose computer vision systems allow the warehouse robots it builds to work in crowded conditions alongside people. Walmart has deployed thousands of robots from Bossa Nova Robotics, a Pittsburgh company, to keep track of stock in its stores. It has also created a pilot, fully automated warehouse in New Hampshire that serves its order-online-and-customer-pickup grocery business.
Pure-play supermarkets have been far slower to automate. But in June 2017, a major move by Amazon gave Ocado’s modernization sales pitch a Saturn V–size boost. That was when the Everything Store spent $13.7 billion to buy upscale grocer Whole Foods, which had 500 stores worldwide. The deal stoked grocers’ fears that Amazon would decimate them as it had so many retailers in other categories—and the trickle of interest in Ocado’s technology became a torrent.
In November 2017, Ocado announced a deal with French retailer Groupe Casino to supply the technology for its e-commerce in France. Two months later, it partnered with Sobeys, which operates 1,500 stores under a variety of brand names across Canada. “It’s the only profitable e-commerce model at scale that I’ve seen,” Sarah Joyce, Sobeys senior vice president for e-commerce, says of Ocado.
Several other deals followed, including with ICA, a Swedish company that operates 1,300 groceries; with Coles, in Australia; and with Aeon, Asia’s largest supermarket chain, in Japan. But the biggest of them all was the strategic partnership Ocado reached in May 2018 with Kroger. The American giant took a 5% share in Ocado and gained exclusive U.S. rights to its technology; Ocado committed to building about 20 CFCs for Kroger. The British company’s shares soared 44% on the day the partnership became public.
Rodney McMullen, Kroger’s CEO, says he had been watching Ocado for a decade, meeting periodically with its top executives. Kroger implemented a store pick–based -e-commerce operation after a 2013 merger, but McMullen says it became unwieldy as it grew. The struggle to keep both online and in-store customers happy was driving Kroger toward towards the same sort of automated fulfilment centers Ocado had. McMullen admits to keeping a close eye on Amazon and Walmart, but he insists the Ocado partnership is not about what competition might do. “We didn’t see a path where we could accelerate to where Ocado is in a year or two,” McMullen says.
It’s a common refrain among Ocado’s customers: They lack the resources to replicate Ocado’s technology. “We are a big company, but we are not a technology company,” says Anders Svensson, the CEO of ICA Sweden. Ocado, in contrast, employs more than 1,800 software engineers and 600 hardware specialists. That’s far less than Amazon or Google, but it’s a lot for a grocer.
The slew of licensing deals pushed many investors to abandon their skepticism: It’s been a long time since Ocado was a heavily shorted stock. “I used to be a big bear, but I became a big bull after the Kroger deal,” says Bruno Monteyne, an analyst who covers European retailers for the equity research firm Bernstein Research. Still, those deals aren’t adding much to the bottom line—because Ocado receives money only after the automated CFCs are built.
Ocado currently operates six CFCs to support its U.K. grocery operation; it aims to run at least 50 worldwide within the decade. Its first CFC outside Britain, built for France’s Groupe Casino, went live on March 26. Another, for Sobeys, outside Toronto, should open by June. And its first center for Kroger is scheduled to come online in Monroe, Ohio, in the first half of 2021.
Ocado’s partners are responsible for acquiring land, building external structures, providing a delivery fleet, and hiring workers. But Ocado has to build the hives, supply the robots and software, and provide training and on-site engineering support. It costs Ocado $40 million to $45 million in “peak cash outflow” for each average-size CFC, Steiner says. Only after construction does Ocado collect a fee based on the warehouses’ available capacity. In its most recent fiscal year, just 6% of Ocado’s revenue came from licensing.
Sherri Malek, an equity analyst at RBC Capital Markets, says Ocado won’t see positive free cash flow from its licensing until at least 2022. Meanwhile, Ocado’s heavy investment has led to ballooning losses—worsened by a catastrophic fire that gutted one of its CFCs in early 2019.
One looming question is whether the coronavirus could thwart Ocado’s expansion. When the pandemic first struck, Ocado encountered trouble obtaining a key part for its robots, because it was made in Wuhan, China, the epicenter of the outbreak. (The company has since found an alternate supplier.) Ocado mostly hires local engineering teams, so travel bans have had little impact on its plans. And grocery and construction workers have been classified as essential in most places, enabling work to continue. Duncan Tatton-Brown, Ocado’s CFO, told reporters in March that the company is sticking to its guidance on the completion of its international CFCs. Still, he acknowledged that if restrictions on movement stayed in place for many months, the construction timeline would suffer.
At the same time, Ocado doesn’t expect all of its pandemic-driven revenue boost to last. Much of its sales bump came from customers buying dry goods and other nonperishables; the company predicts that demand for many of these items will fall below normal levels in the second half of the year, as customers work through their stockpiles. As a result, the company has not raised its full-year sales and earnings forecasts.
Even before the coronavirus, some observers were doubtful that Ocado’s grocer partnerships would pay off. Christopher Mandeville, a food retail and distribution analyst at research firm Jefferies, has criticized the Kroger deal in particular. Other than in a few major cities, he says, population density in the U.S. isn’t high enough to support Ocado’s CFC model. If anything, the pandemic has shown that “store pick” may be a more resilient business model: Stores can staff up to fulfill online orders if a crisis prompts a surge in demand, whereas automated CFCs, designed to operate close to capacity most of the time, aren’t as flexible.
Such doubts haven’t stopped Ocado from raising capital. It issued a $187 million share offering in 2018. In February 2019, it sold 50% of its British e-commerce operation to U.K. retailer Marks & Spencer. The sale simplified Ocado’s proposition to investors, positioning it as more of a pure-play tech platform, while raising $982 million. (Marks & Spencer will also become Ocado’s new wholesale food partner; Ocado’s long-term supply contract with Waitrose comes to an end in late 2020.) Ocado also sold $655 million of convertible bonds in December.
The frequency of Ocado’s fundraising has made some analysts uneasy. But Steiner, the CEO, says the efforts are a sign of strength, not weakness. “The only reason to do a capital raise is because you think you are going to do more [business],” he says. And in February, the world’s most prominent investor offered an indirect vote of confidence in Ocado’s strategy: Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway disclosed in government filings that it had spent almost $550 million to buy a 2.3% stake in Kroger.
While Ocado breaks ground on CFCs around the world, Clarke, the chief technology officer, is peering around the next technological bend. He has experimented with new robots, including ones with human-like hands that could someday eliminate the need for human pickers altogether. He’s also helped research ones that could grasp delicate items, like fruit, without damaging them. And Ocado has trialed a robot called SecondHands, which travels on wheels but has a humanoid torso, head and arms, to help carry out repairs to the hive and conveyors. Eventually, Clarke says, “the goal is to move to an entirely dark facility”—that is, a CFC with almost no people.
Robots aren’t the only topic on Clarke’s mind. Ocado has made multiple investments in “vertical” farming—indoor experiments in sustainable agriculture. It bought a majority stake in Jones Foods, Europe’s largest vertical farming company, and has put money into a joint venture called Infinite Acres along with a U.S. startup called 80 Acres Urban Agriculture and Dutch company Priva Holdings. Another investment is Karakuri, a British startup creating automated kitchens that can prepare restaurant-style meals for delivery. Clarke says Ocado envisions building an “integrated food machine.” By combining vertical farming, food prep, and delivery in one facility, he explains, “you might be able to go from plant to kitchen table in two hours or less.”
Steiner and Clarke have also begun looking beyond food altogether in search of profitable business lines. Ocado’s expertise in logistics, A.I., robotics, and simulation could be deployed to tackle automated car parks, parcel sorting, baggage handling, rail freight, container ports and modular, configurable buildings. Clarke says the company has filed patents in a number of these areas. Ocado has already created simulations of a car-parking system, Clarke says, and has begun exploring scaled-up versions of its robots for handling freight far heavier than a crate of bananas.
It all may sound like a stretch for a company whose core grocery business is still fighting to prove its staying power. But for those who wonder why Ocado would want to expand into parking or port operations, Steiner has a ready answer: What if Amazon had simply stopped with books??
A version of this story appears in the May 2020 issue of Fortune with the headline “The grocery robots on the pandemic front lines.”
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