反對股票回購的人有了強大的新盟友：美國證券交易委員會（SEC）。近幾周，革新派參議員伯尼·桑德斯（佛蒙特州，獨立議員）、查克·舒默（紐約州，民主黨）和通常都支持企業界的佛羅里達州共和黨參議員馬克·盧比奧開始聯手指責熱火朝天的股票回購扼殺了就業機會并擴大了貧富差距。現在，馬里蘭州民主黨參議員克里斯·范·霍林也表示，美國公司CEO濫用回購，目的是以高價大量拋售股票。

去年12月，范·霍林要求SEC審查公司內部人士是否借回購來提高自身薪酬，而非用這些資金來增強公司實力并創造就業。SEC主席羅伯特·J·杰克森今年3月6日致信范·霍林稱，SEC的廣泛研究顯示公司宣布回購后，數量異常多的高管就會在第二天拋售股票。杰克森指出，回購公告表明管理層認為自家公司股價過低，這會讓第二天的股價平均反彈2.5%左右。他寫道：“這就產生了回購動力來自內部人士自身利益，而非投資者、員工和社區長期需求的風險。”

給范·霍林的信并非杰克森首次敲打回購。去年6月就此發言時，杰克森就曾質疑董事會和CEO選擇回購的原因“是正確使用公司資金”，還是要“犧牲股東的利益來賺上一筆”。對杰克森來說，回購的最大弊病就在于“切斷了薪酬和績效之間的聯系”。

令人意外的是，SEC的研究發現雖然高管顯然策劃了短期行情并通過套現從中受益，但股價很快就會由漲轉跌——宣布回購90天后，這些公司的股票平均跑輸大盤8%。

SEC對內部人士在宣布回購后立即拋售股票的自由加以限制可能是一項好政策，但關鍵問題在于SEC會不會加入民主、共和兩黨議員反對回購的行列，并對回購實加新的限制。有這種可能。杰克森主席目前的態度是，在向自家公司再投資還是向股東返回現金的重大事務上，CEO的判斷基礎可能不是怎樣做最有利于公司，而是提高自己的報酬。

這樣的觀點令人懷疑。CEO等高管的薪酬大多來自股票，主要是限售股和股票期權，后者一般需要4年或更長的時間才能套現。高管也許有借回購行情拋售股票的動機，但如果他們持有并將系統性拋售的非限售股遠遠多于他們隨后通過獎勵而獲得的股份，他們就不會去削弱公司實力并壓低隨后幾年的股價。SEC寫給范·霍林的信并未列舉各位高管在回購時以內部人士身份拋售的股票金額，或者用這個數字和他們仍持有的股票進行比較，包括尚未套現的股票獎勵和非限售股。

如果隨后5-6年里CEO通過提升本公司股票價值所得到的收益確實能超過短暫回購行情帶來的套現收入，那他們就應該把資金用于回報率盡可能高的領域，至少中期內應該如此。國會和SEC打算限制股票回購前應該考慮一下這種非常有可能出現的情況，而且限制回購的政策存在造成意外負面影響的風險。

對CEO和他手下的高管來說，抬高股價的首要杠桿是提升每股收益。主導美國經濟的是成熟的鋼鐵、汽車和包裝產品巨頭，它們創造的利潤遠遠超過它們能在盈利前提下對新工廠、倉庫、晶圓廠和實驗室的再投資，就連真正賺了大錢的企業，比如蘋果公司和微軟現在都屬于這個行列。這些大企業以及其他許多公司都得在再投資和回購之間做出艱難選擇，而它們向股東返還現金時動力十足的原因是，如果一家公司將很大一部分利潤用于再投資并獲得不那么有競爭力的回報，比如空間狹小的老式業務或者昂貴的收購，其每股收益就會比向股東分紅，或者新的流行方式，也就是股票回購所實現的每股收益低得多。就像剛才所說，推動股價上漲的是不斷提高的每股收益，讓CEO通過期權和限售股發財的也是它。

簡而言之，股票回購本身不會提升每股收益或股價，但不向股東返回現金則可能會“要人命”。

思維試驗

讓我們看看兩家公司的情況，一家名為Superb Steward Corp.，另一家是Lacking, Inc.。它們都有標普500指數成分股公司那樣的規模——總股本10億股，市值500億美元，股價均為50美元。去年兩家公司均盈利25億美元，則每股收益都是2.50美元，市盈率均為20倍。兩公司都將40%的利潤用于分紅，區別在于Superb Steward將另外30%利潤通過回購回饋給了股東，保留了30%的利潤。Lacking則將未分紅盈利，也就是全部60%利潤用于再投資。

對它們以及整個股市來說，資本成本，或者說投資者可以從風險水平相當的股票和債券中得到的有競爭力的回報率為5%，這是“實際水平”，也就是剔除了通脹影響的回報率（相當于20倍市盈率的倒數）。加上2%的通脹率，投資者預期的總回報率為7%。大家也許已經想到了，Superb Steward在分配利潤方面做得非常好。它用于再投資的30%收益實現了5%的增長，有競爭力，而且它意識到無法為另外30%利潤找到可盈利的投資目標。這樣，Superb Steward每年的利潤增速為3.5%（30%的利潤獲利5%，增幅為1.5%，再加上2%的通脹率）。它的分紅增速為2%，另外回購1.5%的股票（25億美元利潤的30%為7500萬美元，占其500億美元市值的1.5%）。六年后，也就是到2026年初，Superb Steward的總利潤將增長23%（每年增3.5%），達到30.8億美元，而股本將減少9%左右，降至9.13億股（每年因回購減少1.5%）。在二者共同作用下，Superb Steward的每股收益將升至3.37美元，保持20倍市盈率不變，其股價將上漲35%，從50美元升至67.40美元。

順便說一下，如果Superb Steward為用于回購股票的30%利潤找到了好的投資目標，結果也將完全一樣。這就是回購本身不會提高每股收益和股價的原因。將股本保持在10億股剛好抵銷了利潤再投資所實現的額外收益。

與之相反，Lacking認為自己找到了很棒的目標，可以將分紅后的全部60%利潤投入到基本業務中。但Lacking是一家驕傲自大又趨于老化的大公司，它的企業文化樂于在乏味的基礎行業中建設新工廠，并通過兼并來擴大規模。該公司CEO要打造一個帝國，他對規模的重視程度超過了其他所有東西。因此，Lacking用于再投資的利潤僅實現了1%的實際回報率，雖然仍為正回報，但遠低于5%的市場最低水平。六年過后，Lacking的利潤年增速為2.6%（60%的利潤乘以1%的實際回報率，結果為0.6%，再加上2%的通脹率）。這樣，到2024年該公司利潤將增長16.6%，從25億美元升至29億。每股收益為2.9美元（因為總股本仍為10億股）。按同樣的20倍市盈率計算，其股價為58美元。

Superb Steward的每股收益和股價增速是Lacking的兩倍，一個是35%，另一個是17%。到2025年初，Superb Steward的股價將比Lacking高16%以上。從現在到2025年這段時間里，Superb Steward CEO展現出的水平，也就是保留利潤，只在回報率高時才動用所帶來的期權和限售股要比Lacking那位“燒利潤”大戶多好幾百萬股。

對整個經濟來說，是囤積利潤好，還是把它用出去好呢？在上述六年時間里，Superb Steward將50億美利潤重新投入到經營中，它的業務增長迅速，創造了就業并實現了高回報。它又向股東回饋了50億美元。受此影響，養老金、基金和個人有余力將資金投入快速增長而且急需資金的領域，造就出未來的蘋果公司和亞馬遜，而后者用新資金實現了有競爭力的回報，并創造出大量就業機會。

Lacking把100億美元，也就是全部未分紅利潤投入增速堪堪趕上通脹的業務，而且有可能減少了就業。我給SEC的備忘錄是：不受限制的金融市場或許是將資金導向最佳用途的最理想“機器”。給議員和監管者的備忘錄是：正確的解決方案可能是不要去人為地“換擋”。（財富中文網）

譯者：Charlie

審校：夏林

The forces battling against share buybacks have a powerful new ally: The Securities and Exchange Commission. In the past few weeks,team of progressive Senators Bernie Sanders (I-Vt) and Chuck Schumer (D-NY) have locked arms with normally pro-business Republican Marco Rubio of Florida to denounce the boom in repurchases for killing jobs and spreading income inequality. Now, Senator Chris Van Hollen (D-Md) is claiming that America’s CEOs and other top executives are abusing buybacks to dump shares at inflated prices.

In December, Van Hollen requested that the SEC review whether insiders are deploying repurchases to boost their compensation instead of using those dollars to make the investments that strengthen their companies and create new jobs. In a March 6 letter to Van Hollen, SEC chairman Robert J. Jackson wrote that the agency had performed an extensive study revealing that when companies announce buybacks, an unusually large number of executives sell shares in the days that follow. Jackson noted that a buyback announcement signals that management believes its shares are too cheap, causing stocks to rally, on average, by about 2.5% in the days that follow. Executives, says Jackson, pounce on that bounce to sell shares. “That creates the risk that insiders’ own interests––rather than the long-term needs of investors, employees and communities––are driving buybacks,” wrote Jackson.

The Van Hollen letter isn’t the first time Jackson skewered repurchases. In a June speech on the topic, Jackson questioned whether boards and CEOs are choosing buybacks because they’re “the right thing to do with the company’s capital,” or instead to “pocket some cash at the expense of shareholders.” For Jackson, buybacks are guilty of nothing less than “breaking the pay-performance link.”

Surprisingly, the SEC study found that while top managers apparently orchestrate, and benefit from, a short-term pop to cash out, the gains quickly reverse: Ninety-days after the announcement, the company’s shares underperform the market on average by 8%.

It may be sound policy for the SEC to restrict insiders’ freedom to sell shares right after a buyback announcement. But the crucial issue is whether the SEC will join bi-partisan buyback foes in Congress, and move to impose new restrictions on repurchases. It’s possible. Chairman Jackson is now taking the position that CEOs are likely making crucial decisions on whether to reinvest in the business or return cash to shareholders based not on what’s best for the company, but on boosting their own pay.

That view is questionable. CEOs and other top managers get most of their comp in equity awards, chiefly restricted shares and stock options. Those grants typically vest over four or more years. C-suite executives might have an incentive to cash out using buybacks that deliver a quick bump, but weaken the enterprise and depress the share price in the years to come, if they held––and were systematically selling––a lot more unrestricted stock than they hold in equity awards they’ll collect in the future. The SEC letter to Van Hollen does not cite the dollar amounts of the buyback-related insider sales for individual executives, or compare them to the trove they’re still holding, either in unvested awards or in unrestricted accounts.

If indeed CEOs can get richer by raising the value of their shares in the next five or six years than cashing on an ephemeral spike by pushing buybacks, then they should be deploying capital where it achieves the highest possible returns, at least over the medium-term. And that’s a strong possibility that Congress and the SEC should consider before restricting repurchases, a policy that risks damaging unintended consequences.

For CEOs and their lieutenants, the principal lever for raising the stock price is growing earnings-per-share. Dominating the U.S. economy are mature behemoths in steel, autos and packaged goods that generate far more profits than they can profitably reinvest in new plants, warehouses, fabs, or labs-––even such formerly go-go names as Apple and Microsoft now fit this profile. Here’s why these stalwarts, and many other players that need to make tough choices between reinvestment and repurchases, have a powerful incentive to return cash to shareholders: If a company reinvests a big portion of profits at less than competitive returns, say in pokey old-line businesses or expensive acquisitions, earnings-per-share will badly lag what EPS would have been if the cash had gone to shareholders in dividends, or the new favorite, buybacks. And once again, it’s rising EPS that drives share prices, and wins CEOs a bonanza on their options and restricted stock.

Put simply, buybacks per se don’t raise EPS or share prices, but not returning cash can be a killer.

THOUGHT EXPERIMENT

Let’s look at two companies that we’ll call Superb Steward Corp. and Lacking, Inc. Each is a typical S&P 500-sized outfit, with 1 billion shares outstanding, a market cap of $50 billion, and a share price of $50. Both earned $2.5 billion last year, so EPS is $2.50, and they share a P/E multiple of 20. Each pays out 40% of its earnings in dividends. The difference is that Steward distributes another 30% of profits in buybacks, and retains the remaining 30%. Lacking reinvests all of the earnings not paid in dividends, or 60% of the total.

For each company, and the stock market as a whole, the cost-of-capital, or the competitive return investors could garner from equally risky stocks and bonds, is 5% “real” or adjusted for inflation (equivalent to the inverse of the 20 P/E). Add 2 points for inflation, and investors expect a 7% total return. As you probably guessed, Superb Steward does a great job in allocating profits. It makes a competitive 5% gains on the 30% of earnings it reinvests, and recognizes that it can’t find profitable places to park the other 30%. So each year, its profits rise by 3.5% (30% reinvested earnings at 5%, or 1.5%, plus 2% inflation), it delivers 2% in dividends, and repurchases another 1.5% of its shares (30% of $2.5 billion in earnings are $750 million or 1.5% of its $50 billion market cap). In six years, by early 2026, its total earnings will grow by 23% (3.5% per annum) to $3.08 billion, its share count will fall by around 9% to 913 million shares (shrinking 1.5% a year due to the buybacks). The combination will lift its EPS to $3.37, and its share price by 35%, from $50 to $67.40 at the steady multiple of 20.

By the way, if Steward had found good places to invest the 30% of profits it returned in buybacks, the result would be exactly the same. That’s why buybacks per se don’t raise EPS and stock prices. The extra profits from the reinvested earnings would have exactly compensated for leaving the share count constant at 1 billion.

By contrast, Lacking thinks it’s found great places to plow all of the 60% of profits-after-dividends into its basic business. But Lacking is an aging stalwart that suffers from hubris. Its corporate culture relishes building new factories in plodding bedrock industries, and bulking up on mergers. Lacking’s CEO is an empire builder who prizes size above all else. As a result, Lacking generates only a 1% real return on those reinvested profits, still positive, but far below the 5% market minimum. Over the next six years, Lacking will delver profit growth of 2.6% a year (60% of earnings x real return of 1% = .6%, plus 2% inflation), so that by 2024, its earnings will wax by 16.6% from $2.5 billion to $2.9 billion. Its EPS will be $2.90 (because it still will have the same 1 billion shares outstanding). And its share price will be $58.00 at the same 20 multiple.

Steward grew its EPS and share price at twice the rate of Lacking, 35% versus 17%. By early 2025, Steward’s shares would be over 16% more valuable than Lacking’s. Flipping the calendar to 2025, the skill Steward’s CEO displayed in keeping profits in-house only when they generated good returns delivered many more millions in gains on options and restricted stock than the earnings-burning grandee garnered at Lacking.

Which strategy, hoarding capital or paying it out, was better for the overall economy? Over our six year window, Steward reinvested $5 billion of its earnings in businesses that grew briskly, created jobs, and generated strong returns. It handed another $5 billion back to shareholders. In turn, pension funds, endowments, and individuals had the freedom to funnel those funds into the fast-growing, cash-hungry businesses––the Apples and Amazons of the future––that deliver competitive returns on new capital, and create lots of jobs.

Lacking tied up $10 billion, all of its non-dividend profits, in ventures that barely grow with inflation, and probably shed jobs. Memo to the SEC: An unfettered financial market may be the best machine for channeling capital to the highest and best uses. And for lawmakers and regulators, the right solution may be keeping their hands off the gears.