今年巴菲特本想以90億美元的價格收購德州的 Oncor輸電公司，然而上周億萬富翁保羅·辛格的艾略特管理公司憑空橫插了一杠子，收購了該公司的一部分無擔保債務。此舉為桑普拉能源公司的截胡創造了窗口期，最終使桑普拉能源搶走了煮熟的鴨子。

在此六個月前，巴菲特還有一筆幾十億美元的收購案最終也泡了湯。

今年2月，巴菲特的伯克希爾哈撒公司計劃出資150億美元，幫助卡夫亨氏公司收購聯合利華。不過聯合利華拒絕了這筆交鐵，卡夫亨氏也很快收回了邀約。

在這么短的時間內，兩筆如此高調的收購案都以失敗告終，這對于巴菲特是非常少見的。過去幾十年里，巴菲特就靠著一次次精明的收購打造了伯克希爾哈撒韋的商業帝國。雖然他也發動過很多次無疾而終的收購，但像如此受公眾關注的情況卻不多見。

據知情人士透露，艾略特公司從富達投資集團手中收購了Oncor輸電公司的母公司——能源未來中間控股公司價值6000萬美元的杠桿債務，以一招“四兩撥千斤”，便將巴菲特的邀約變成了廢紙。在收購了這些債務后，艾略特公司和另一個持異議債權人在各個債務類別上都成了能源未來公司的主要債權人，破產法庭幾乎鐵定會否決巴菲特的收購邀約。由于此事的保密性，該知情人士要求不透露其姓名。

據該知情人士稱，目前還不知道伯克希爾哈撒韋的能源部門為何沒有從富達手中收購這筆債務，因為這樣做或許可以提高它的中標機會。在通常情況下，破產法庭只會要求一組無擔保債權人支持收購。

伯克希爾哈撒韋公司的能源部門本周一表示，能源未來公司已經終止了其收購邀約，此后伯克希爾公司便拒絕就此事發表評論。巴菲特本人也沒有回應我們的評論請求。

桑普拉公司首席執行官迪波拉·里德表示，與巴菲特對決并不是公司的目標。

“當時，伯克希爾的交易方案貌似不會獲得債權人的支持，而隨后債權人的交易方案似乎也不會獲得監管機構的支持，我們覺得機會來了，我們認為能通過一次交易，同時滿足債權人和監管機構的要求?！?/p>

CFRA公司的證券分析師凱茜·賽弗特指出，伯克希爾公司今年錯失兩次投資良機，使很多人“開始質疑該公司的‘君子協定’式的收購戰略的效果?！?/p>

賽弗特表示，對于一些比較有難度的交易，“它越來越難獲得以往那樣的聲譽了，除非它很快做出一些變化?！?/p>

投資這筆債務則是艾略特公司走出的一步妙棋，如果桑普拉公司94.5億美元的邀約獲得監管機構批準，那么艾略特公司的投資收益將高達45%到50%。如果是巴菲特贏了，艾略特公司的投資收益將只有18%。

在這場局中，伯克希爾忙活了半天，只是跟艾略特公司一起，給桑普拉公司收購Oncor提供了一張路線圖。

伯克希爾公司同意了47項監管承諾，這些承諾旨在幫助它贏得法庭的批準，并保護Oncor免受不必要的風險，包括對中間公司沒有債務。該公司在周五的一份聲明中表示，這些承諾已經解決了涉及Oncor的所有問題。

據該知情人士稱，桑普拉公司愿意繼續遵守這些承諾，這一表態也贏得了這筆交易的一些利害關系人和德州公共事業委員會內部人員的支持。

該知情人士稱，艾略特公司還提出一個93億美元的基準估值，并表示該公司正在想方設法瞄準這個價位籌集資金。也就是說，如果有人的出價高于這個門檻，該公司將很難表示反對。

一名消息人士指出，艾略特在破產領域有多年摸爬滾打的經驗，這也是它相對巴菲特的優勢之一。

該消息人士稱，伯克希爾公司可能是覺得自己的提議已經相當靠譜了，而且也獲得了足夠的支持，獲得破產法庭的批準應該不成問題。沒想到犯了輕敵的大忌，艾略特公司一買下富達持有的債務，伯克希爾就立時被淘汰出局了。

這兩起失敗的案例都表明，巴菲特對自己的原則已經堅持到了偏執的地步。他的“不妥協”原則使聯合利華的收購案打了水漂。另外巴菲特長期以來一直堅稱他對競價收購沒興趣，這也解釋了他為什么不愿加價收購Oncor。

近兩年的“交易荒”對伯克希爾公司的影響也是多方面的。該公司最近一筆巨額交易，是2005年對美國精密機件公司的收購，收購價超過了350億美元。伯克希爾公司從不分紅，也很少進行股票回購，所以由于連續幾次大收購告吹，各家子公司（包括蓋可保險、BNSF鐵路等等）貢獻的現金越來越多，巴菲特手里也積攢了大筆現金沒地方花。截止到今年6月底，囤積在伯克希爾公司的現金已達近1000億美元。

不過巴菲特還是可以獲得一份安慰獎的。據巴克萊銀行的分析師杰伊·蓋爾布估計，伯克希爾公司可能會獲得2.7億美元的分手費，巴菲特手頭上也又多了一筆花不出去的錢。

巴菲特近來一直在尋找值得投資的地方。比如去年，他斥資數十億美元大肆收購美國四大航空公司以及蘋果的股票。今年6月，伯克希爾公司又進行了兩筆規模較小的證券投資。其中一筆是房地產信托投資，另一筆則投給了一家陷入困境的加拿大按揭貸款商——家庭資本集團。

雖然伯克希爾的這幾筆投資回報率大都不錯，但巴菲特一直都在說，伯克希爾的真正價值是通過購買完整的企業建立的。

今年五月，在伯克希爾公司的年會上，巴菲特本人也向股東表示：“我不可能在三年后回到這里時，告訴你們我們手頭上還有1500億美元現金沒有投資?！保ㄘ敻恢形木W）

譯者：賈政景

Buffett’s $9 billion bid to acquire Oncor Electric Delivery Co. started to unravel last week after Paul Singer’s Elliott Management Corp. outmaneuvered the Oracle of Omaha by acquiring a small parcel of unsecured debt. That opened a window for Sempra Energy to swoop in and strike a deal to acquire the Texas utility.

The loss comes six months after another multibillion-dollar Buffett pursuit hit the skids.

In February, his Berkshire Hathaway Inc. committed $15 billion to help Kraft Heinz Co. in a proposed buyout of Unilever. The Anglo-Dutch consumer goods giant rejected the approach, and the offer was quickly pulled.

The collapse of two high-profile deals in such a short time frame is a rarity for Buffett, who has spent decades building Berkshire into a sprawling conglomerate through shrewd takeovers. While he’s made many offers that went nowhere, it’s less common for any such losses to play out in public.

Elliott’s purchase from Fidelity Investments of $60 million worth of leveraged notes in Oncor’s parent, Energy Future Intermediate Holding Co., was all it needed to do to block Buffett’s bid, according to people familiar with the matter. Buying the notes allowed the activist investor and another dissenting creditor to own the majority of all classes of impaired debt in the company, all but assuring that a bankruptcy judge would reject Buffett’s bid, said the people, who asked not to be identified because the matter is private.

It’s unclear why Berkshire’s energy unit didn’t buy the debt from Fidelity, which would have probably improved its chances, the people said. Typically, bankruptcy courts only require one group of unsecured creditors to support a takeover bid.

Berkshire Hathaway Energy declined to comment on its handling of the deal after saying in a statement Monday that Energy Future had terminated the offer. Buffett didn’t respond to a request for comment.

Squaring off against Buffett wasn’t a factor for Sempra, said Chief Executive Officer Debra Reed.

“When the Berkshire deal looked like it was not going to get creditor support and then the creditor deal looked like it was not going to get regulatory support,” Reed said, “we saw an opportunity to come in with a transaction that we thought would meet the needs of both the creditors and the regulators.”

Berkshire’s loss of two big opportunities this year “calls into question the effectiveness of their gentleman’s agreement acquisition strategy,” said Cathy Seifert, an equity analyst at CFRA Research who has a hold on Berkshire.

“It’s going to get tougher and tougher to earn the reputation” for savvy dealmaking “unless something in this trajectory changes pretty quickly,” Seifert said.

Buying the debt was an elegant solution for Elliott, which will get 45 cents to 50 cents on the dollar for its investment if Sempra’s $9.45 billion bid wins approval. That compares to the 18 cents that Elliott would have gotten from Buffett.

Berkshire, along with Elliott, ended up providing a road map for Sempra to acquire Oncor.

Berkshire agreed to 47 regulatory commitments that were aimed at helping it win court approval and protect Oncor from unnecessary risk, including having no debt at the intermediate companies. It said in a statement Friday that those commitments had resolved all issues involving Oncor.

Sempra is comfortable upholding those commitments, which won over some stakeholders and the staff at the Public Utility Commission of Texas, the people said.

Elliott provided a benchmark when it said it was trying to drum up the finances for its own bid valued at $9.3 billion, meaning it would be hard for the New York hedge fund to oppose a bid higher than that threshold, the people said.

One of the people said it was Elliott’s experience in the rough and tumble bankruptcy space that gave it an edge over Buffett.

Berkshire felt its own proposal was sufficiently formed and had the support needed to win approval from the bankruptcy judge, the people said. Once Elliott bought the Fidelity debt, Berkshire was blocked though, they said.

Both episodes point to how staunchly the billionaire sticks to his principles. His pledge to never go where he isn’t wanted scuttled the Unilever deal. He’s long said he has no interest in auctions, which could have contributed to his willingness to be outbid for Oncor.

Even so, the deal drought has bigger implications for Berkshire, whose last mega deal was its 2015 agreement to the buy Precision Castparts Corp. for more than $35 billion. The company doesn’t pay a dividend and rarely buys back its own stock, so failing to consummate a few major transactions adds to the cash that keeps piling up from dozens of subsidiaries including insurer Geico and BNSF Railway. At the end of June, Berkshire had just shy of $100 billion.

Buffett could get a consolation prize. Barclays Plc analyst Jay Gelb estimated that Berkshire could get an $270 million breakup fee, which would add to the company’s cash pile.

Buffett has been finding a few places to invest. He spent billions amassing shares in the four largest U.S. airlines and Apple Inc. last year. In June, Berkshire made two smaller equity investments. One was a stake in a real estate investment trust and the other propped up Home Capital Group Inc., an embattled Canadian mortgage lender.

While most of those investments have fared well, Buffett has long said that the real value at Berkshire will be created from buying whole businesses.

As Buffett himself told shareholders in May at Berkshire’s annual meeting, “There’s no way I can come back here three years from now and tell you that we hold $150 billion or so in cash.”