歐元自從18年前問世以來已經(jīng)走過了很長的一段路，它也給世界經(jīng)濟帶來了很多好處。正因為此，過去十年間，歐元區(qū)才從12個成員國壯大到了19個成員國。盡管歐元取得了這些成就，然而2017年，歐元在歐洲大陸上恐怕將不會像過去那樣受歡迎了。

歐元區(qū)主權(quán)債務(wù)危機的經(jīng)歷表明，歐元區(qū)還是具有相當(dāng)?shù)膽?yīng)變力和靈活性的。首先，歐元區(qū)各成員國都積極參與了對希臘、愛爾蘭、葡萄牙、西班牙和塞浦路斯的緊急援助計劃，并免除了希臘的部分債務(wù)，而且建立了兩個規(guī)模達(dá)數(shù)十億美元的救援機制——歐洲金融穩(wěn)定機制（EFSF）和歐洲穩(wěn)定機制（ESM），彰顯了各國對保留歐元這一共同貨幣的決心。

另一方面，從這些基金中受益的幾個國家也表示愿意以史無前例的力度穩(wěn)固本國財政，并且進(jìn)行深入、痛苦的結(jié)構(gòu)性改革，以繼續(xù)保持他們的歐元區(qū)成員國地位。而這些國家也的確取得了一些實質(zhì)性進(jìn)展，比如在政府治理、平穩(wěn)經(jīng)濟和鞏固財政等方面出臺了新一些政策。另外從若干宏觀經(jīng)濟指標(biāo)來看，相關(guān)國家也已經(jīng)加強了對貨幣賬戶余額、實際匯率和房地產(chǎn)價格的監(jiān)管力度。此外歐元區(qū)在增強抗風(fēng)險能力方面也邁出了一些重要的步伐，比如強化了歐洲央行對新成立的銀行業(yè)聯(lián)盟的監(jiān)管角色。

雖然歐元區(qū)各國在主權(quán)債務(wù)危機期間做出了很多努力，但歐洲經(jīng)濟貨幣聯(lián)盟（EMU）總體上仍然是一個很脆弱的組織，它面臨的一些基礎(chǔ)性挑戰(zhàn)仍然沒有得到根本解決。在這種背景下，2017年歐洲的經(jīng)濟政治發(fā)展情況很可能將決定歐元的未來。這番判斷主要基于以下三個理由：

銀行業(yè)危機或?qū)訐u歐元區(qū)的穩(wěn)定性

首先說銀行業(yè)。在一些歐元區(qū)成員國中，特別是塞浦路斯、希臘和意大利三國，銀行業(yè)的不良貸款率已經(jīng)達(dá)到令人擔(dān)憂的水平，讓人不禁質(zhì)疑歐洲銀行業(yè)的抗風(fēng)險能力。目前很多人都在猜測一些歐洲銀行（比如德意志銀行和西亞那銀行）是否會重演當(dāng)年雷曼兄弟的悲劇，意大利、荷蘭、法國等個別成員國還出現(xiàn)了政治動蕩，加之英國脫歐對歐元區(qū)的潛在影響，都預(yù)示著歐洲的金融危機有再度升級的可能。

其次是財政方面，很多歐元區(qū)國家的公共部門和私營部門均存在嚴(yán)重的債務(wù)負(fù)擔(dān)，而且存在宏觀經(jīng)濟嚴(yán)重失調(diào)問題的成員國也變得越來越多——如保加利亞、克羅地亞、塞浦路斯、法國、意大利和葡萄牙等國，這也是一個很值得擔(dān)憂的因素，因為這些國家的經(jīng)濟問題有可能會對其他成員國產(chǎn)生傳導(dǎo)效應(yīng)。最后，這些主權(quán)債務(wù)國及其國有銀行體系之間都保持著緊密的聯(lián)系，如果其中一方失去穩(wěn)定，就會使另一方變得更加脆弱。只要這種惡性循環(huán)繼續(xù)存在，就會繼續(xù)有人圍繞歐元區(qū)成員國是否有能力保持歐元區(qū)的穩(wěn)定性做文章，針對歐元大搞投機。

經(jīng)濟增長不均衡的局面仍將繼續(xù)

歐洲的金融危機和銀行業(yè)危機雖然促使歐盟及其成員國開始著手修補歐洲貨幣聯(lián)盟的一些短板，但這次危機所帶來的低增長與投資率和高失業(yè)率等影響還將持續(xù)很久，并將導(dǎo)致歐洲大陸的經(jīng)濟差異進(jìn)一步拉大。如今，歐元區(qū)在地緣上已經(jīng)出現(xiàn)了明顯的劃分，呈現(xiàn)出了南北失衡、東西失衡的特點；在社會層面上也出現(xiàn)了國家內(nèi)部和國家之間的經(jīng)濟發(fā)展水平失衡和貧富差距拉大的問題。

與此同時，雖然歐盟各國在危機期間做出的多數(shù)決策都對歐洲各國人民的日常生活產(chǎn)生了直接影響，但實際上，公民對這些決策流程的參與度并不高，（比如很多決策都由歐洲央行、歐洲穩(wěn)定機制、歐洲投資銀行等機構(gòu)負(fù)責(zé)。）這種社會和政治焦慮導(dǎo)致歐洲各地都出現(xiàn)了反對歐洲一體化的思潮，而這反過來必然會威脅到歐元項目的政治接受度。因此，歐元目前面臨的最嚴(yán)峻的挑戰(zhàn)之一，在于歐元區(qū)國家能否針對部分成員國出現(xiàn)的一些緊迫的社會和政治情緒做出一致的反應(yīng)。

2017年是歐洲的大選年

明年，荷蘭、法國、德國、意大利等國都將舉行重要的選舉。這是否為歐元區(qū)各國解決上述政治社會挑戰(zhàn)提供了有利的契機呢？

由于歐洲人民對移民和安全問題的關(guān)注與日俱增，因此經(jīng)濟和財政改革的問題在政改日程上的地位也就相對下降了。另外，由于眼下歐洲經(jīng)濟出現(xiàn)了一些利好因素（如低利率、相對美元的有利匯率、油價下降等等），金融和經(jīng)濟危機造成的緊迫感也暫時在一定程度上被沖淡了。各國的政策制定者不太可能在大選之前出臺要付出較高的短期成本的長遠(yuǎn)改革措施。

在當(dāng)前的政治環(huán)境下，將歐元作為主要攻擊目標(biāo)之一的“民粹”政黨在荷法德意四國的影響力和代表性很有可能擴大。不過這些小黨沒有一個能夠獨力拿下足夠的席位組閣，因此歐元的命運很可能要看那些主流政黨執(zhí)政后，將采取何種手段應(yīng)對這種民粹情緒。

一方面，民粹勢力的興起很可能會促使新當(dāng)選政府“隨大流”采取財政緊縮策略。另一方面，激進(jìn)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者則可能認(rèn)為，他們必須馬上采取必要的改革措施，因為他們發(fā)現(xiàn)民族主義興起的危險已經(jīng)變得愈發(fā)迫近。

如果第一種情境變成現(xiàn)實，歐洲各國或許將順從日益增長的保護(hù)主義聲浪，那么不僅歐盟對歐元的改革將難以形成共識，甚至整個25年的歐元建設(shè)項目所取得的成就都將受到影響。不過如果第二種情境成真，那么在四到六個歐盟創(chuàng)始成員國的大選結(jié)束后，歐洲貨幣聯(lián)盟的改革或許將真的迎來契機。

歐元的歷史表明，歐元改革首先需要法德兩國圍繞歐元的發(fā)展道路形成共識。因此，現(xiàn)在所有人的關(guān)注點應(yīng)當(dāng)集中在兩國的新當(dāng)選領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人能否憑借成熟的政治智慧調(diào)解歐元區(qū)的矛盾。（財富中文網(wǎng)）

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作者：Robin Huguenot-No?l

譯者：樸成奎

The euro has come a long way since its introduction 18 years ago, and has brought a lot of benefits. This has notably led it to expand from 12 to 19 members in the last decade. Despite these achievements, though, 2017 is unlikely to see the euro celebrated across the continent.

The sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone has shown that the euro area was able to square the circle between resilience and flexibility. On the one hand, euro area members have shown their commitment to preserving the common currency by notably engaging in substantial bailout programs for Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Cyprus, agreeing to a partial write-off of the Greek debt, and creating two multi-billion-euro rescue mechanisms: the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).

On the other hand, the countries benefiting from these funds have indicated that they were ready to go through unprecedented fiscal consolidation efforts, accompanied by deep and painful structural reforms, in order to maintain their membership in the common currency. As a result, some substantial progress has been accomplished, including new instruments of governance, economic and fiscal consolidation, as well as increased surveillance by certain macroeconomic indicators, such as the current account balance, real exchange rate, and housing prices. Furthermore, important steps have been achieved in increasing the resilience of the Eurozone by strengthening the supervisory role of the European Central Bank’s (ECB) in the newly created banking union.

Despite the progress made during the crisis, though, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is still fragile, as some of its underlying challenges remain unresolved. In this context, economic and political developments in 2017 could well determine the future of the euro. Here are three reasons why:

Banks' troubles could destabilize the Eurozone

In the banking sector, non-performing loans are reaching worrying levels in some member states, especially in Cyprus, Greece, and Italy, casting doubts over the resilience of Europe's banking sector. Speculations about the possible failings of European banks (such as Deutsche Bank or Monte Dei Paschi di Siena) and the political turmoil in individual member states, like Italy, the Netherlands, and possibly France, combined with the looming prospect of Brexit, indicate that the crisis could re-escalate.

On the fiscal side, the severe debt overhang—both in the public and the private sector—and the increasing share of countries with excessive macroeconomic imbalances—Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, France, Italy, and Portugal—are also a possible cause of concern, as they could have detrimental effects on other member states. Finally, sovereign debtors and their national banking systems remain closely linked so that the destabilization of either one could still increase the vulnerability of the other. As long as this vicious circle remains, the euro will remain exposed to financial speculation on the ability of its member states to preserve the integrity of the euro area.

Uneven growth persists

While the financial and banking crisis pushed the EU and its members to address some of the shortcomings of the EMU, its lasting impact on low levels of growth and investment and high levels of unemployment indeed lead to increasing disparities across the continent. Today, the EMU is divided geographically—between North-South and East-West asymmetries—and socially—with an increasing discrepancy in development and inequality levels within and between countries.

At the same time, while most of the decisions taken during the crisis have had direct impact on the everyday realities of numerous Europeans, these decisions have failed to be matched with higher involvement of citizens in the decision-making process (by increasing the accountability of institutions such as the ECB, the ESM, or the European Investment Bank, for example). These social and political anxieties have fueled Eurosceptic tendencies across Europe, which could, in turn, threaten the political acceptability of the euro project. In this context, the greatest challenge facing the euro today lies in its member states' ability to agree on a collective response to the sense of social and political urgency in some member states.

It’s a big election year for Europe

Next year will be marked by elections in the Netherlands, France, Germany, and most likely, Italy. Will this provide a more or less favorable environment for the euro governance to address these political and social challenges?

The populations' growing concerns about migration and security issues have pushed economic and fiscal reforms further down the political agenda. Furthermore, as the more favorable conjuncture (low interest rates, favorable exchange rate vis-à-vis the U.S., falling oil prices, etc.) has considerably reduced the sense of emergency created by the financial and economic crisis, it seems highly unlikely that policymakers will introduce long-term reforms with high, short-term political costs before the elections.

In the current political context, 'populist' parties, which have identified the euro as one of their main targets, are expected to see their influence and representation increase in these four member states. Assuming that none of these parties manages to ensure enough seats to form a government on its own, the future of the euro's faith could lie in the way in which mainstream parties will decide to respond to this trend after the election.

On the one hand, the rise of populist forces could push newly elected governments to follow trends toward national retrenchment. On the other hand, progressive leaders may consider that they can no longer afford to wait before engaging the necessary reforms, precisely because they see the danger of rising nationalism becoming more real.

In the first scenario, the temptation to bend to pressures in favor of increased protectionism would not only affect the EU's ability to achieve a consensus on how to reform the euro, but could also potentially undermine the achievements of the 25-year euro construction project. In the second scenario, though, the post-elections period in four of the six EU founding members could help build a momentum for EMU reform.

The history of the euro has shown that reforms of the common currency first required consensus between France and Germany on which way to go forward. All eyes should now be turned on their (newly elected) leaders' ability to reconcile the euro with its political maturity.