正如他們?cè)谑袌?chǎng)上所言，過去的表現(xiàn)并不能保證未來的回報(bào)。唐納德·特朗普出人意料的競(jìng)選勝利使得過去幾年處于在歷史高位的市場(chǎng)陷入混亂之中，道瓊斯指數(shù)、全球股市和債券急劇下跌，投資者紛紛逃向黃金等安全資產(chǎn)。這實(shí)際上并不出人意料。投資者不僅一直擔(dān)心特朗普擔(dān)任總統(tǒng)帶來的經(jīng)濟(jì)影響，而且市場(chǎng)對(duì)任何一位新總統(tǒng)帶來的不確定性都不歡迎（例如，奧巴馬在2008年當(dāng)選時(shí)，美國(guó)股市下跌了5％）。選舉過后幾天，他們通常會(huì)反彈（的確如此，在特朗普勝選的幾個(gè)小時(shí)后，市場(chǎng)已經(jīng)創(chuàng)出新高）。長(zhǎng)期來說，他們傾向于更多地對(duì)基本經(jīng)濟(jì)因素而非政治做出反應(yīng)（順便說一句，就政治的影響而言，歷史上，民主黨往往比共和黨對(duì)市場(chǎng)更有利）。

但這不是典型的時(shí)代，我們的經(jīng)濟(jì)未來深深地與政治糾纏在一起。特朗普擔(dān)任總統(tǒng)將從根本上挑戰(zhàn)全球化的未來和資本主義現(xiàn)狀。事實(shí)上，特朗普出人意料地獲得了較高比例的少數(shù)族裔以及一些受過大學(xué)教育的婦女的投票，這說明經(jīng)濟(jì)焦慮不僅僅與收入水平有關(guān)。這說明一個(gè)事實(shí)，即很大一部分人口——不僅僅是密歇根州或俄亥俄州的工廠工人——認(rèn)為我們有一個(gè)被操縱的經(jīng)濟(jì)制度，而這個(gè)制度過多地惠及美國(guó)和全球精英群體。當(dāng)然，沒有人比克林頓家族更能代表精英群體。

從這種意義上來說，特朗普的勝選與英國(guó)的脫歐公投非常相似。人們并非只是在對(duì)一套明確的政策投票，他們更多的是投票反對(duì)已經(jīng)發(fā)生的事情。正如安聯(lián)集團(tuán)首席戰(zhàn)略家穆罕默德·埃爾-埃里安所言，特朗普的勝選是“憤怒政治的另一個(gè)例證，以及對(duì)當(dāng)權(quán)者的不信任。這顯示出西方經(jīng)濟(jì)體在太多年低速和非包容性增長(zhǎng)之后，正在面臨的壓力。結(jié)果造成更高的破壞風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，無(wú)論是在經(jīng)濟(jì)、金融、制度還是政治方面。”

那么，這在短期、中期和長(zhǎng)期將對(duì)市場(chǎng)和經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)生什么影響呢？在接下來的幾周，你會(huì)看到很多想不到的波動(dòng)。市場(chǎng)從來不曾擅長(zhǎng)預(yù)測(cè)民粹主義，因?yàn)樵谄渲羞M(jìn)行交易的主要是精英。市場(chǎng)將起伏不定，而這取決于特朗普會(huì)傳達(dá)怎樣的信息。如果我們能夠在他的提名演講中看到更多相對(duì)平衡的語(yǔ)氣，那么我們將看到上漲。 如果你聽到圍繞貿(mào)易、移民等問題的民粹主義言論，市場(chǎng)就會(huì)下跌。投資者感受到的不確定性會(huì)放大任何一點(diǎn)點(diǎn)壞消息。如果下一輪就業(yè)數(shù)據(jù)疲軟，或者中國(guó)制造業(yè)數(shù)據(jù)顯得疲弱，或者看起來意大利銀行可能會(huì)爆發(fā)危機(jī)，那么市場(chǎng)將會(huì)出現(xiàn)比以前更為強(qiáng)烈的反應(yīng)。所以，要小心，因?yàn)榻酉聛韺⑹遣黄届o的幾周。

除此之外，投資者還會(huì)尋找特朗普擔(dān)任總統(tǒng)所帶來的真正政策影響的跡象。比如，很可能如果奧巴馬總統(tǒng)試圖在卸任前的任期內(nèi)推動(dòng)TPP貿(mào)易協(xié)議，那么特朗普會(huì)利用這個(gè)機(jī)會(huì)來激化貿(mào)易話題和將中國(guó)列為貨幣操縱者。這可能會(huì)刺激原來已經(jīng)不穩(wěn)定的新興市場(chǎng)的資本外流，如墨西哥（比索像20多年前一樣疲軟）。雖然美國(guó)可能能夠經(jīng)受住這樣的危機(jī)，但其他亞洲國(guó)家可能最終會(huì)在償還債務(wù)問題上遇到麻煩，而這可能會(huì)引發(fā)全球資產(chǎn)價(jià)格崩潰的多米諾效應(yīng)。畢竟，世界上現(xiàn)有的債務(wù)要比2008年之前多，而且其中很多債務(wù)是由新興市場(chǎng)國(guó)家持有，并與美元掛鉤。

毫無(wú)疑問，作為更為強(qiáng)勁的復(fù)蘇的最大希望（思路是，隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)回暖，他們會(huì)再次開始消費(fèi)），美國(guó)企業(yè)和消費(fèi)者將會(huì)未雨綢繆。信心可能會(huì)下降，企業(yè)和消費(fèi)者支出也會(huì)下降。今年美國(guó)增長(zhǎng)率達(dá)到2％的可能性很小，更不用說特朗普在競(jìng)選活動(dòng)中所承諾的4％增長(zhǎng)率。這對(duì)世界來說是個(gè)壞消息，因?yàn)槊绹?guó)仍然是全球經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的引擎。你可能會(huì)看到在過去幾年中我們所看到過的趨勢(shì)會(huì)重演，美國(guó)股票會(huì)成為一種避風(fēng)港，成為全球經(jīng)濟(jì)這塊丑陋的地塊上最漂亮的房子。但這可能僅僅意味著其比其他市場(chǎng)可能遭受的損失更小些，而非重現(xiàn)過去幾年的增長(zhǎng)。增長(zhǎng)緩慢的新時(shí)代已經(jīng)開始。如果特朗普兌現(xiàn)他在過去一年所做的承諾——缺乏資金支持的減稅、關(guān)稅、移民壁壘以及大量背后沒有任何真正建設(shè)性的工作創(chuàng)造作用的經(jīng)濟(jì)民粹主義——那么他擔(dān)任總統(tǒng)期間，使經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)會(huì)進(jìn)一步放緩。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

翻譯：Charlie

審校：詹妮

As they say in the markets, past performance is no guarantee of future returns. Donald Trump’s surprise presidential victory has turned the markets, which have run at record highs for the last few years, upside down, with precipitous drops in the Dow, global stocks, bonds, and a flight to safety assets like gold. That’s actually not surprising. Not only have investors long feared the economic implications of a Trump presidency, but markets never like the uncertainty of a new president (the U.S. stock market fell 5% when Obama was elected in 2008, for example). A few days after an election, they usually rebound (indeed, just a few hours after the Trump victor, markets are already gaining back a bit of what they’ve lost). Longer term, they tend to respond more to fundamental economic factors rather than politics (btw, to the extent that politics matter, Democrats tend to be better for markets historically than Republicans).

But these are not typical times, and our economic future is deeply entangled with politics. A Trump presidency fundamentally challenges the future of globalization and status quo capitalism. Indeed, the fact that Trump grabbed an unexpected share of minority vote, as well as some college educated women, speaks to the fact that economic anxiety is about more than just income levels. It’s about the fact that a large percentage of the population—not just factory workers in Michigan or Ohio—feels that we have a rigged economic system that disproportionately benefits the U.S. and global elite. And of course, no one epitomized that elite more than the Clintons.

In this sense, the Trump victory is quite similar to the U.K.’s “Brexit” vote to leave the European Union. People aren’t voting for a clear set of policies so much as they are voting against what’s come before. As Allianz chief strategist Mohamed El-Erian put it to me, Trump’s victory is, “yet another illustration of the politics of anger, and of the mistrust in the establishment. It speaks to the stress and strains that western economies are experiencing in the aftermath of too many years of low and non-inclusive growth. The result in a higher risk of breakage, be it economic, financial, institutional or political.”

So what does that mean for the markets, and the economy, in the short, medium, and long term? For the next few weeks, you’ll see plenty of–surprise!–volatility. The markets, which have never been great at predicting populism since the people trading in them are mainly elites, will be up and down depending on how Trump communicates. If we see more of the relatively balanced tone of his acceptance speech, we’ll see gains. If you hear populist rhetoric around trade, immigration and so on, the markets will dip. The uncertainly investors feel will magnify any small bit of bad news. If the next round of jobs numbers comes in soft, or Chinese manufacturing figures look weak, or it seems as though Italian banks might blow up, the markets will react more strongly than they have previously. So, buckle in, as it will be a bumpy few weeks.

Beyond that, investors will be looking for signs of what real policy implications of a Trump presidency will be. It’s quite likely for example that if President Obama tries to push through the TPP trade agreement in a lame duck session, Trump would use this an opportunity to inflame trade rhetoric and brand China a currency manipulator. That could galvanize the flight of capital from emerging markets that has already destabilized, for example, Mexico (the peso is as weak as its been in over 20 years). While that country can probably weather such a storm, other Asian nations could end up having trouble servicing debt, which might then set off a domino effect of collapsing global asset prices. There is, after all, more debt out there in the world than there was before 2008, and much of it is held by emerging market nations, and pegged in dollars.

There’s little doubt that American businesses and consumers, which had been the best hope for a stronger recovery (the thinking being that as the economy strengthened, they’d once again start spending), will batten down the hatches. Confidence will likely fall, as will both corporate and consumer spending. There’s little chance US growth will hit 2 % this year–let alone the 4 % Trump promised on the campaign trail. That’s bad news for the world, since the US is still the global economic growth engine. You might see a replay of the trend we’ve seen over the last several years, where US stocks become a kind of safe haven, the prettiest house on the ugly block that is the global economy. But that will likely mean simply less losses than other markets might suffer–rather than the gains of the last few years. A new era of slower growth has already begun. And if Trump delivers what he’s promised over the last year–unfunded tax cuts, tariffs, barriers to immigration and a large dose of economic populism without any real constructive job creating policy behind it–his presidency will make it slower still.