人民幣已成為全球第四大支付貨幣，緊隨美元、歐元和英鎊。

之前，中國(guó)央行曾經(jīng)就是否明確承諾取消資本管制，而進(jìn)行過(guò)探討。這些管制措施使得人民幣不能按市場(chǎng)確定的價(jià)格與其他貨幣自由兌換。

如是種種是否意味著人民幣終于要進(jìn)入全盛時(shí)代呢？很難這樣說(shuō)。

人們將發(fā)現(xiàn)，和媒體報(bào)道相比，上述現(xiàn)象以及人民幣成為國(guó)際貨幣基金組織（IMF）官方儲(chǔ)備貨幣的消息并沒(méi)有那么大的影響。

小巫見大巫

人民幣在全球支付中占的比重仍很小。確切地說(shuō)，2015年9月份這個(gè)數(shù)字為2.45%，8月份的數(shù)值略高一些，為2.79%，居全球第四位。這還不到英鎊所占比重（9%）的三分之一，歐元占比（29%）的十分之一，和美元的份額（43%）相比更是小巫見大巫。

要衡量一種貨幣在國(guó)際上的普及程度，另一個(gè)指標(biāo)是外匯儲(chǔ)備占比，它是國(guó)際貿(mào)易順差積累的結(jié)果。

盡管中國(guó)和美國(guó)在世界貿(mào)易中所占的比重相當(dāng)（約12%），但人民幣在其他國(guó)家/地區(qū)的外匯儲(chǔ)備中只占1%，美元?jiǎng)t占64%。

換句話說(shuō)，人民幣在國(guó)際支付和外匯儲(chǔ)備中的比重并不像中國(guó)在世界貿(mào)易中的份量那么重；同樣的，美元在這方面的占比則超過(guò)了美國(guó)在世界貿(mào)易中的比重，原因是美國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)規(guī)模龐大、流動(dòng)性強(qiáng)而且安全，廣受投資者和政府青睞。

單從市場(chǎng)力量的角度判斷，人民幣的份量應(yīng)該逐漸加重，美元占比則應(yīng)逐步下降。

在貿(mào)易和投資中，收付款雙方使用同一種貨幣可以降低交易成本、貨幣風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和潛在波動(dòng)。因此，隨著和中國(guó)貿(mào)易往來(lái)的增加，想使用人民幣的人就會(huì)增多。

開始遠(yuǎn)離貿(mào)易

今后，中國(guó)在全球GDP中的比重（2014年名義占比為13.3%）很可能上升，原因是中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)增速仍高于其他大型經(jīng)濟(jì)體的平均水平。但人民幣在國(guó)際支付和外匯儲(chǔ)備中的普及率可能上升的較慢，原因是中國(guó)正在遠(yuǎn)離以貿(mào)易為動(dòng)力的經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展模式。

出現(xiàn)這種情況是因?yàn)橹袊?guó)打算減少對(duì)出口拉動(dòng)型增長(zhǎng)的依賴，并提高國(guó)內(nèi)消費(fèi)在GDP中的占比（目前這個(gè)比值非常低）。

盡管到目前為止幾乎還沒(méi)有跡象表明正在出現(xiàn)這種局面，但如果在這方面取得成功，那就意味著貿(mào)易占中國(guó)GDP的比重將減輕，也可能意味著人民幣得到更廣泛應(yīng)用的速度將低于過(guò)去一段時(shí)間的水平。

成為儲(chǔ)備貨幣路途艱難

要真正成為IMF認(rèn)可的官方儲(chǔ)備貨幣，中國(guó)必須滿足多項(xiàng)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，從而使人民幣“可以自由使用”，也就是說(shuō)，任何人在任何時(shí)候都可以買賣人民幣。

這些標(biāo)準(zhǔn)包括由市場(chǎng)決定的利率、匯率靈活性和貨幣可兌換性、更開放的資本項(xiàng)目以及在官方儲(chǔ)備、國(guó)際銀行債務(wù)和全球債務(wù)證券中占據(jù)相當(dāng)大的份額。盡管中國(guó)已經(jīng)為此采取了許多措施，而且最近還在這樣做，但就任何一條標(biāo)準(zhǔn)而言，中國(guó)距離完全達(dá)標(biāo)都還有很大的差距。

這些標(biāo)準(zhǔn)都要求改革并放開國(guó)內(nèi)金融市場(chǎng)，這樣做在政治和技術(shù)上都有難度。這些改革會(huì)削弱政府為了維持穩(wěn)定和促進(jìn)增長(zhǎng)而制定政策的能力。這是因?yàn)閲?guó)際金融領(lǐng)域存在“三元悖論”，也就是說(shuō)，貨幣政策的三大目標(biāo)——控制利率、保持匯率靈活性和資本流動(dòng)性——在任何時(shí)候都只能同時(shí)實(shí)現(xiàn)兩個(gè)。

市場(chǎng)干預(yù)

中國(guó)政府2015年夏天面對(duì)金融市場(chǎng)劇烈波動(dòng)而采取的措施表明，它尚未準(zhǔn)備好實(shí)施或完成諸多必須的改革。

對(duì)市場(chǎng)的干預(yù)表明中國(guó)政府還不愿意讓市場(chǎng)力量來(lái)主導(dǎo)人民幣和金融市場(chǎng)。這些干預(yù)行動(dòng)包括對(duì)估值偏高的股市的暴跌進(jìn)行遏制，以及用20年來(lái)前所未見的力度下調(diào)人民幣中間價(jià)。說(shuō)到股市，政府也曾助推此前的A股泡沫。

信任要自己爭(zhēng)取

如今，IMF已經(jīng)把人民幣指定為儲(chǔ)備貨幣，但這并不意味著人民幣將迅速而且廣泛地發(fā)揮儲(chǔ)備貨幣功能。只有建立了對(duì)貨幣的信心，各國(guó)央行和個(gè)人投資者才會(huì)使用或持有人民幣。

要做到這一點(diǎn)，中國(guó)金融市場(chǎng)就必須在深度、多元性、透明度和安全性方面達(dá)到美國(guó)的水平，美元正是藉此保持著全球最受歡迎儲(chǔ)備貨幣的地位，并未受到美國(guó)在全球貿(mào)易和投資中占比下降的影響。

如果某種貨幣受政治因素主導(dǎo)，而不是由市場(chǎng)力量左右，其他政府就不愿將其納入外匯儲(chǔ)備，這可以理解。

市場(chǎng)參與者的信任，必然是靠日積月累贏得的，僅憑IMF這樣的國(guó)際機(jī)構(gòu)授權(quán)無(wú)法做到這一點(diǎn)。

利與弊

對(duì)于一種貨幣來(lái)說(shuō)，只有當(dāng)它在國(guó)際貨幣體系中得到了更廣泛地應(yīng)用，或者說(shuō)實(shí)現(xiàn)了國(guó)際化，才會(huì)帶來(lái)一系列好處。

其中之一是鑄幣紅利，也就是貨幣發(fā)行國(guó)因貨幣價(jià)值高于鑄幣成本而得到的收益。其他好處還包括貨幣政策更寬松（更能促進(jìn)增長(zhǎng)），從而使經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展速度有所加快，以及可以用本幣進(jìn)行國(guó)際借貸和投資，從而避免貨幣風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。

但也會(huì)出現(xiàn)一些不利影響，比如失去對(duì)貨幣政策有效性的控制，以及讓國(guó)內(nèi)經(jīng)濟(jì)暴露在不穩(wěn)定（而且波動(dòng)越發(fā)劇烈）的全球資本流動(dòng)面前。

正是出于這個(gè)原因，本幣頗受國(guó)際投資者青睞的小型開放經(jīng)濟(jì)體，如新加坡和瑞士，長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)一直拒絕國(guó)際化。相反，中國(guó)似乎認(rèn)為人民幣成為儲(chǔ)備貨幣對(duì)自己有利，而且這樣的“地位”代表著中國(guó)希望贏得的威信。

長(zhǎng)期而言，人民幣在國(guó)際上得到更廣泛的使用將使中國(guó)和世界經(jīng)濟(jì)同時(shí)受益。中國(guó)將受益于國(guó)際化所需的國(guó)內(nèi)金融市場(chǎng)改革，世界其他地區(qū)則會(huì)在貿(mào)易支付、投資和貨幣儲(chǔ)備方面得到一個(gè)更多元化的貨幣籃子，從而改變目前過(guò)度依賴美元的局面。

這應(yīng)該還有助于避免各國(guó)之間出現(xiàn)長(zhǎng)期而且過(guò)大的貿(mào)易和金融不平衡。

但在此之前，中國(guó)需要對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)金融體系實(shí)施重大改革，這項(xiàng)工作不會(huì)進(jìn)展的很快，也不會(huì)容易，更不會(huì)有完全的把握。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

琳達(dá)?利姆是密歇根大學(xué)戰(zhàn)略學(xué)教授。本文最初刊登在網(wǎng)站theconversation.com上。

譯者：Charlie

校對(duì)：詹妮

China’s currency, the yuan, became the world’s fourth-most-used form of payment, behind the U.S. dollar, euro and pound sterling, having (marginally) pushed past the Japanese yen.

China’s central bank discussed whether to make an explicit pledge to dismantle the capital controls that prevent the yuan from becoming fully convertible with other currencies at rates determined by the market.

Does all this mean the yuan’s heyday has finally arrived? Hardly.

As we will see, there is less significance to this phenomenon — and talk of the yuan becoming an “official IMF reserve currency” — than media headlines suggest.

A drop in the bucket

The yuan still accounts for a small fraction of world payments, 2.45%, to be precise in September after edging up to 2.79% — and fourth place — a month earlier. This is less than a third of the pound’s 9% share, a tenth of the euro’s 29% and a drop in the bucket of the dollar’s 43%.

Another measure of a currency’s international prevalence is in foreign exchange reserves, which result from the accumulation of export surpluses.

The yuan accounts for just 1% of other countries’ allocated reserves, compared with 64% for the dollar, even though China accounts for the same share of world trade (about 12%) as the U.S.

In other words, the yuan is underrepresented in payments and reserves relative to its share of world trade, while the dollar is similarly overrepresented, due to the popularity among investors and governments of the U.S.’ broad, liquid and secure capital markets.

Market forces alone should lead one to expect the yuan’s share to rise and the dollar’s to fall over time.

Matching the currency used in payments and receipts in trade and investment reduces transaction costs, currency risk and volatility exposure, so more people will want to use the yuan as their transactions with China increase.

A shift away from trade

China’s share of world GDP (13.3% in nominal terms as of 2014) will likely rise as its economy continues to outpace the average of other large economies. But use of the yuan for payments and reserves may increase at a slower pace as China shifts away from an economy fueled by trade.

This is because China plans to reduce its reliance on export-led growth and increase domestic consumption as a share of GDP (which is currently very low).

Though there are few signs of this happening so far, the plan, if successful, means that trade as a share of GDP will begin to shrink. And that will likely mean slower growth in use of the yuan than in the recent past.

The difficult road to becoming a reserve currency

To become an “official” IMF-endorsed “reserve currency,” China has to meet various criteria that would make the yuan “freely usable”: that is, readily bought and sold by anyone at any time.

These criteria include a market-determined interest rate, exchange rate flexibility and convertibility, a more open capital account, and a significant share of official reserves, international banking liabilities and global debt securities. While many steps have been taken in these directions, including very recently, none of these criteria is close to being fully achieved.

All this requires politically and technically difficult domestic financial market reforms and liberalization. Such reforms reduce the government’s ability to establish policies that reduce volatility and encourage growth. That’s because of what is known as the “trilemma” of international finance, in which only two of the three goals of monetary policy — control of interest rates, exchange rate flexibility and capital mobility – can be achieved at the same time.

Market manipulations

The Chinese government’s own reactions to this past summer’s financial market turmoil suggest that it is not ready to undertake or complete many of the required reforms.

Its interventions show that it is not yet willing to allow market forces to rule in its currency and financial markets. This includes its effort to halt the precipitous decline of an overvalued stock market — which it itself had previously boosted — and to devalue the yuan by the largest amount in two decades.

Trust must be earned

Now，IMF designated the yuan as a reserve currency, this does not mean that its use as such will rise quickly or greatly. World central banks and individual investors will only increase their use and holdings of yuan if they have confidence in the currency.

And that won’t happen until Chinese financial markets develop the depth, diversity, transparency and security that have kept the dollar reigning supreme as the world’s preferred reserve currency, even as the U.S. share of global trade and investment has declined.

Governments are understandably reluctant to hold reserves in a politically managed rather than market-determined currency.

The trust of market actors has to be earned over time and cannot be merely conferred by an international body like the IMF.

Benefits and disadvantages

There are some benefits when a currency becomes more widely used in the global monetary system — its “internationalization”.

One benefit is “seignorage,” which is the revenue the issuer gets from the value of a currency over and above the cost of producing it. Others include a looser (more stimulative) monetary policy, enabling (marginally) faster growth, and the ability to borrow and invest internationally in one’s own currency, thus avoiding currency risk.

But there are also disadvantages, including losing control over the effectiveness of monetary policy and exposing the domestic economy to destabilizing (and increasingly volatile) global capital flows.

This is why small open economies like Singapore and Switzerland, whose currencies are popular with international investors, have long resisted internationalization. In contrast, China seems to regard reserve currency status as desirable for its own sake, as a “status good” conferring an assumed prestige that it craves.

In the longer run, both China and the world economy stand to gain from increased international use of the yuan. China will benefit from the domestic financial market reforms that internationalization will require, and the rest of the world will get a more diverse basket of currencies to choose from to finance trade and investment and hold reserves, reducing the current overdependence on the U.S. dollar.

This should also help us avoid the chronic and excessive trade and financial imbalances among countries.

But before we can get there, China needs to follow through on major reforms of its domestic financial system, which will not be quick, easy or certain.

Linda Lim is a professor of strategy at the University of Michigan. This piece was originally published on The Conversation.