中國花了大半年時間來進行貨幣改革，以便人民幣進入國際貨幣基金組織（IMF）的特別提款權貨幣籃子。最終，中國方面得償所愿——人民幣即將成為IMF儲備貨幣，與美元、歐元、英鎊和日元這些國際性儲備貨幣并駕齊驅。

對中國來說這是一場勝利。兩年來，中國一直在努力，目的就是讓人民幣進入IMF的特別提款權貨幣籃子。特別提款權的唯一實際作用是供IMF和其他多邊貸款人做賬。但就象征意義而言，它則代表了全球金融市場的權利歸屬。

因此，人民幣進入IMF貨幣籃子將極大提升中國在金融領域的威望，這不是因為此舉會促使人們持有人民幣，而是因為它表明目前中國在“制定規則”方面有了多大的話語權。自從布雷頓森林體系在1973年瓦解以來，特別提款權貨幣籃子一直都只接納“可自由使用”的貨幣。人民幣距此仍然還有很大的差距，在獲取人民幣方面遇到過困難的外國生意人或游客都能告訴你這一點。但人民幣的市場化程度已經足夠IMF在保住一些面子的同時對中國做出讓步。

一年來，中國采取了多項改革措施，其中包括放寬央行對匯率的嚴格管理，允許外國央行無限制地投資中國債券市場，以及設立3個月政府債券市場（這是進入IMF貨幣籃子的技術細則提出的要求。）

成為IMF儲備貨幣會在一定程度上提高中國政府的外交和政治威信。受工業滑坡影響，以習近平領導的本屆政府在實現GDP增長目標方面遇到了困難。不過，在分析師看來，人民幣進入IMF貨幣籃子的唯一實質性好處是，它將逐漸鼓勵更多外國投資者持有人民幣。在IMF接納人民幣之前，中國已經實施的改革打開了國內債券市場的大門，這將使外國央行乃至一些私人投資者能夠更容易地進入這個市場。

龍洲經訊中國經濟學家陳龍在北京指出：“人民幣成為‘全球儲備貨幣’確實有可能讓更多央行及其他資產管理機構關注中國金融市場，特別是境內債市。但不應僅僅因為這一點，就認為其他央行將被迫購買大量人民幣資產。”

大多數分析師都認為，鑒于國內經濟增長放緩以及收益率下降造成私人資本外流增多，中國央行可能利用旺盛而穩定的海外需求為人民幣提供一些支持。

今年夏天，中國央行曾一次性下調人民幣兌美元中間價，此舉放寬了匯率政策，使人民幣在一天之內貶值1.8%。但從那時至今，中國央行又斥資數百億來支撐人民幣匯率。這就讓之前那種“貶值是為了再次通過出口來提振經濟”的說法顯得有點兒站不住腳。

包括陳龍在內，很多分析師都指出，夏季的那次貶值很重要，但不是因為“下調的幅度”，而是因為從那以后中國央行不再自行確定人民幣匯率，而是基于前一日收盤價設定一個波動區間。（財富中文網）

譯者：Charlie

校對：詹妮

It would be wrong to think that central banks will be forced to buy substantial amounts of renminbi assets just because the currency is included in the SDR basket.

The country spent the better part of a year reforming its currency to join the International Monetary Fund’s special group of world currencies.

China finally got the news it has been lobbying for: its currency, the renminbi, is set to be included in the International Monetary Fund’s basket of top currencies alongside the world’s reserve currency, the U.S. dollar, as well as the Euro, British pound, and Japanese Yen.

It’s a win for China, which has lobbied for the past two years to be included in the club of countries whose currencies make up the ‘Special Drawing Right’. The SDR’s only practical purpose is that it’s the currency in which the IMF and other multilateral lenders draw up their accounts. But symbolically, it has always represented the balance of power in global financial markets.

As such, China’s inclusion significantly bolsters its prestige in the financial world: not because it forces people to hold the renminbi, but because it shows how far China is now dictating the rules of the game: since the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement in 1973, the SDR has only ever included ‘freely usable’ currencies. The renminbi is still far from a ‘freely usable’ currency—as any trader or visitor to China who has trouble accessing the currency from abroad will tell you —but it has been liberalized enough to allow the IMF to yield to China’s pressure while saving some face.

In the past year, China has enacted reforms that included loosening the central bank’s strict management of the exchange rate, allowing foreign central banks unlimited investment in the domestic bond market, and establishing a market for three-month government bills (a technicality for IMF inclusion).

The inclusion affords China’s government under Xi Jinping, which has struggled to meet GDP growth targets amid an industrial recession, some diplomatic and political prestige. However, the only tangible benefit analysts can point to is that the renminbi’s inclusion in SDR will encourage more foreign investors over time to hold the currency because foreign central banks and even some private investors can now more easily access China’s bond market that was opened as a result of the reforms preceding the SDR inclusion.

Says Chen Long of GavekalDragonomics in Beijing: “Granting the renminbi the status of a “global reserve currency” could indeed encourage more central banks and other asset managers to take a look at China’s financial markets, especially the onshore bond market. But it would be wrong to think that central banks will be forced to buy substantial amounts of renminbi assets just because the currency is included in the SDR basket.”

Most analysts agree that the People’s Bank of China could use some help for its currency in the form of strong, stable, foreign demand, now that lower growth and returns at home are driving more private capital abroad.

Since this summer’s “devaluation,” when the yuan fell by 1.8% in one day in response to the loosening of exchange rate rules, it’s been the Chinese central bank itself that has spent tens of billions shoring up the currency–something that gives lie to previous accusations of a fresh attempt to boost the economy through the export channel.

Analysts including Long have argued the move was important not because of the “size of the depreciation”, but rather because the central bank was no longer fixing the trading price of the yuan on its own, instead using a range based upon the previous day’s close.