????顯然，中國股市泡沫破滅了，而這給中國和世界其他地區帶來了巨大的影響。7月8日收盤時，CSI300（反映上交所和深交所交易的主要股票的綜合指數）較6月12日的頂峰暴跌了31%，而在此前的7個月中，該指數幾乎是呈直線上漲。盡管大規模的政府救市舉措助推已半關閉狀態的股市于7月9-10日上揚了12%，但我們仍無法得知股市是否已經觸底。

????此輪股市泡沫擁有典型的資產泡沫所應具備的所有元素。在連續六年表現不及其他主要股市之后，中國股市開始于2014年下半年復蘇，當時，政府采取了應對經濟緩慢增長的刺激舉措。隨后，在滬港通（允許滬港兩地投資者買賣對方交易所上市的股票的機制）于2014年11月17日推出之后，股市旋即像火箭般一飛沖天。6月12日的前12個月內，大盤漲幅達到了驚人的145%，而其中的87%是在這一跨境互聯機制設立之后實現的。

????與其他國家的資產泡沫破滅的情形一樣，中國股市監管機構并沒有設立多少與泡沫破滅有關的規章制度。確實，正是杠桿融資規模的激增，點燃了這一投機性的股市狂熱，后者占可交易股票市值的比重在6月之前的12個月中增長了兩倍。與此同時，隨著2015年上半年證券監管機構批準的IPO數量的激增，過度供應問題日漸顯現。同時，中國政府的重要官員釋放了鼓勵信號，對股市融資的明顯復蘇態勢表示支持。

????資產泡沫總會在無法繼續支撐的情況下破滅。上月中國股市泡沫的破滅亦是如此。最為重要的問題并不在于泡沫破滅對股市的潛在不利影響（這一點我們無法得知），而是它對實體經濟的最終影響。目前，實體經濟正處于改革和再平衡過程中的重要節點。

????中國的散戶必然會感受到股市暴跌所帶來的沖擊，其數量估計已達約9000萬，約占中國城鎮人口的12%。《中國家庭金融調查》的數據顯示，這些散戶的年齡較小，而且受教育程度不高。2014年，大部分新散戶甚至連高中都沒有念過！中國證券登記結算有限公司的數據顯示，2015年上半年，每周股市賬戶新增數量達到了100-200萬，都是些沒有什么經驗的散戶投資者。此外，他們傾向于以保證金質押形式購買股票，一旦股市泡沫破滅，作為投機者的他們便無法逃脫隨之而來的滅頂之災。

????但僅依靠12%脆弱的城鎮人群（散戶）來妄下結論是不正確的。確實，中國失衡的經濟也存在著不能忽視的一線光明，它應該能把損失控制在一定的范圍內。股市泡沫的破滅會通過經濟學家所謂的“財富效應”影響實體經濟中的股權所有者或消費者，而財富效應實際上也就是股市波動所帶來的資本收益和損失（既有真實的，也有心理上的）。然而，中國的個人消費僅占GDP總量的約36%，比發達國家的占比低不少。如果中國的經濟更為平衡（這也是中國期望實現的目標），那么在股市泡沫破滅后，龐大的消費群體有可能會推高宏觀經濟風險。幸運的是，2015年的中國還沒有出現這一情況。

????我們非常有必要對比一下中國與美國。在2008-09年全球金融危機之前，個人消費占到了美國GDP的近70%，這一比例基本上是中國的兩倍。此外，消費者十分倚重于杠桿工具，從巨大的地產泡沫中隨意借貸以支持消費。當這兩者（地產和信貸）的泡沫同時破滅時，美國消費者陷入了痛苦的負債蕭條模式，一直持續至今。過去7年中，美國實際消費支出的平均年增長率僅為1.4%，較危機之前12年間的3.6%大幅下滑。事實上，該增長率創下了上個世紀30年代以來消費增長的新低。

????這一對比告訴我們，股市泡沫破滅對中國經濟的不利影響有可能要遠低于對其他經濟體的影響，例如日本和美國。然而，與此非常矛盾的一個觀點在于，很多觀點都擔心中國股市泡沫的破滅預示著這一全球第二大經濟體將出現硬著陸。

????不管怎么樣，人們不應輕視中國股市的暴跌。資產泡沫在過去25年中在全球頻頻出現，它可能對實體經濟活動帶來嚴重威脅。在過去的四分之一世紀里，這樣的前車之鑒就有好幾個。首先是日本的地產和股市泡沫，然后便是美國的網絡、地產和信貸泡沫，當然還有歐洲的“趨同泡沫”，其中，南歐和愛爾蘭因歐盟一視同仁的利率政策出現了虛假繁榮。中國應從中吸取以下三個教訓：

????首先，盡管我們無法避免幾個世紀以來引發資產投機泡沫、周而復始的恐慌和貪婪，但監管機構和決策者必須采取措施，防止泡沫對實體經濟構成威脅。幸運的是，正如上面所強調的，中國尚未成氣候的消費群體在這一關鍵時期體現了其優勢所在。然而，終有一天，也就是中國經濟實現再平衡之后，情況將截然不同。中國確有必要為這一天的到來做好準備。

????第二，泡沫和相應的應對政策將對金融穩定構成嚴重的威脅。對于中國來說，股市泡沫的破滅不僅為金融穩定帶來了風險，同時，它還讓人們對鼓勵中國企業進入看似安全的股市、擺脫以銀行為主的融資策略的舉措于產生了嚴重的質疑。好在中國政府仍有很多手段來應對股市暴跌所帶來的影響，這與一些主要發達經濟體形成了鮮明對比，因為一些發達國家仍深陷零利率的流動性陷阱而不能自拔。

????第三，此輪股市泡沫破滅與以往完全一樣。監管機構和決策者絕不能相信股市暴漲就是對經濟管理和發展新舉措的驗證，同時必須抵制這類思想的誘惑。回想起來，中國股市在7個月之內翻一番本身就是一個定時炸彈。當時，監管機構就應盡快設立相關制度，而不是自鳴得意。

????顯然，中國當局在對待這一問題上的態度非常嚴肅。至于如今實施的大范圍舉措是否足以遏制股市下跌仍有待觀察。中國經濟實現平衡的那一天終將到來，不過，但愿是早到而不是晚到。在處理好股市問題之后，中國當局應認真反思期間出現的問題和原因。在同一問題上再次犯同樣的錯誤是難以承受的。（財富中文網）

????本文作者史蒂芬·羅奇是耶魯大學教員，也是摩根士丹利前亞洲業務主席，著有《失衡：中美之間的互依性》一書。

????譯者：馮豐

????校對：詹妮

????The Chinese equity bubble has obviously burst – with enormous consequences for China and the rest of the world. At the close on Wednesday, the CSI 300 – a composite index of major shares trading on the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges – had plunged 31% from its June 12 peak following a near vertical run-up over the previous 7 months. Notwithstanding massive government support actions that have driven a partially closed market up 12% July 9-10, there’s no telling where the market finds a bottom.

????This had all the ingredients of a classic asset bubble. After underperforming other major equity markets for six years, the Chinese stock market started to come to life in the second half of 2014 as the government moved to stimulate a slowing economy. It then took off like a rocket ship immediately after the November 17, 2014 launch of the Hong Kong-Shanghai connect – an arrangement allowing investors in both markets to trade overlapping shares. Fully 87% of the spectacular 145% surge in the 12 months ending June 12 occurred after the cross-border connection was opened.

????As is typically the case in other asset bubbles, Chinese market regulators lacked discipline during the blow-out phase of this bubble. Indeed, this speculative frenzy was fueled by an equally potent surge of margin financing, which nearly trebled as a share of tradable equity market capitalization in the 12 months ending this June. Meanwhile, an overhang of excess supply was building, as security regulators approved a sharply increased volume of initial public offerings in the first half of 2015. And leading Chinese officials expressed encouraging signs of support for this apparent renaissance in equity financing.

????Asset bubbles invariably burst under their own weight. China’s implosion over the past month is no different. The key questions pertain less to the potential downside of the market – impossible to know – and more to the ultimate impact on the real economy, which is at a critical juncture on the road to reform and rebalancing.

????China’s retail investors will certainly feel the brunt of the carnage. There appear to be some 90 million of them – roughly 12% of the nation’s urban population. Data from China’s Household Finance Survey suggest that these investors tend to be young and relatively uneducated. In 2014, a majority of new investors didn’t even have a high school education! And with approximately 1 and 2 million new accounts being opened per week in the first half of 2015, according to the China Securities Depository and Clearing Co., these are very inexperienced investors. Add to that, their penchant for buying stocks on margin, and there can be no escaping the devastation to speculators that invariably follows the bursting of any bubble.

????In the same sense, it would be wrong to generalize on the basis of this vulnerable 12% of the urban population. Indeed, there is an important silver lining to China’s unbalanced economy that should limit the damage. The bursting of equity bubbles impacts shareowners, or consumers, in the real economy through what economists call “wealth effects” – in essence, the capital gains and losses (both real and psychological) that stem from the ups and downs in the stock market. Yet China’s private consumption is only about 36% of its GDP – well below shares of more advanced nations. If China had a more balanced economy – something it clearly aspires to – then a larger consumer sector would have raised the possibility of much greater macro risk in the face of a post-equity bubble implosion. Fortuitously, that is not the case for China in 2015.

????A comparison with the United States is especially pertinent. Prior to the Great Crisis of 2008-09, personal consumption was nearly 70% of U.S. GDP – essentially double the portion in China. Moreover, consumers were heavily levered – borrowing freely from a massive property bubble to support consumption. When the twin bubble burst – both property and credit – American consumers went into a wrenching balance sheet recession, which endures to this day. The annualized growth of real consumer expenditures has averaged just 1.4% over the past seven years – down sharply from the 3.6% trend in the 12 years before the crisis and, in fact, the weakest period of consumption growth since the 1930s.

????What this comparison means is that the downside risk to the Chinese economy in the aftermath of the bursting of its equity bubble is likely to be far less severe than that which has occurred in other post-bubble economies – notably Japan and the United States. This is very much at odds with the fears that have been expressed in many quarters that China’s equity market implosion portends a hard landing for the world’s second largest economy.

????Nevertheless, the sharp decline in Chinese equities should not be taken lightly. Asset bubbles, which have occurred all too frequently around the world over the past 25 years, can pose a severe threat to real economic activity. There are several examples of this in just the past quarter of a century. First it was Japan with its property and equity bubbles, then America with its dotcom, property and credit bubbles, and of course Europe with its “convergence bubble” that saw artificial growth in Southern Europe and Ireland stemming from an interest rate convergence play. China needs to be mindful of three important lessons from these earlier experiences:

????First, while it is impossible to avoid the cycles of fear and greed that have given rise to speculative asset bubbles for centuries, regulators and policymakers must draw the line when bubbles threaten to distort the real economy. Fortunately, as stressed above, China’s embryonic consumer sector works to its advantage in this key respect. However, some day – after rebalancing occurs – that will not be the case. China certainly needs to prepare for that eventuality.

????Second, bubbles and the policy responses they evoke, are a serious threat to financial stability. For China, the bursting of its equity bubble not only poses a risk to financial stability but it also draws into serious question efforts to wean Chinese companies from bank-centric financing strategies by enticing them into the presumed security of the equity market. As such, the bubble, and the instability it underscores, is a major setback on the road to capital market reform – a linchpin of China’s rebalancing strategy. The good news is that Chinese authorities still have plenty of ammunition left to deal with the fallout from a plunging equity market – in sharp contrast to major economies in the developed world, which are stuck in liquidity traps at zero interest rates.

????Third, this time is not different. Regulators and policymakers must avoid the seductive temptation of believing that surging markets are validating a new approach to economic management and development. A seven-month doubling of the Chinese equity market was, in retrospect, an accident waiting to happen. It was a time for discipline – not complacency.

????Chinese authorities are obviously taking this problem very seriously. It remains to be seen if the wide-ranging actions now being initiated will be sufficient to arrest the decline. That day will eventually come – hopefully sooner rather than later. When the dust settles, it will be time for a careful retrospective examination of what happened and why. China can ill afford to make the same mistake twice.

????Stephen S. Roach, a faculty member at Yale University and former Chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia, is the author of Unbalanced: The Codependency of America and China.