????上周，美國(guó)總統(tǒng)奧巴馬在巴伐利亞阿爾卑斯山區(qū)出席了一年一度的七國(guó)集團(tuán)（G7）領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人峰會(huì)，并在會(huì)后按慣例和其他領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人拍了一張別扭的合影。對(duì)于這項(xiàng)程序，就連自由世界的領(lǐng)袖們似乎都無(wú)法叫停（2013年的合影仍然難以超越）。盡管一切都似曾相識(shí)，但從今年的照片里仍能讀出一些新意。

????照片捕捉到的畫(huà)面是G8峰會(huì)再次變成G7峰會(huì)后成員國(guó)首腦的第一次正式會(huì)議，或者說(shuō)，至少是首次足足籌備了一年的會(huì)議（雖然去年也舉行了G7峰會(huì)，但它距離七國(guó)決定將俄羅斯拒于門(mén)外只有短短幾周。會(huì)議修改了日程，并在最后一刻將舉辦地從俄羅斯索契變?yōu)楹商m海牙）。因此，上周的峰會(huì)代表著跨大西洋主義加日本這一人們更熟悉的“全球治理”格局的回歸。冷戰(zhàn)過(guò)后，G7的全球治理已經(jīng)力不從心，需要有所收斂，這一點(diǎn)在這種模式上體現(xiàn)的最為具體。

????真正的朋友重新坐在了一起，那么，G7情況如何呢？

????先來(lái)聽(tīng)聽(tīng)好消息。

????G7領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人借本次會(huì)議聚焦于俄羅斯。對(duì)于目前美歐聯(lián)合制裁俄羅斯，歐洲國(guó)家逐漸失去了熱情，美國(guó)和英國(guó)因此設(shè)法給歐盟伙伴打氣。這樣的場(chǎng)面充分表明，目前美國(guó)和歐盟在聯(lián)合制裁方面的態(tài)勢(shì)有多么新奇。緩慢而笨拙的歐盟外交政策能把人逼瘋，美國(guó)則從來(lái)沒(méi)有如此克制過(guò)，拒絕沖在歐盟前面。

????美國(guó)和歐盟在制裁問(wèn)題上難以保持統(tǒng)一，與之形成鮮明對(duì)比的則是雙方在軍事和安全方面的協(xié)調(diào)既規(guī)范又成熟，這也正是合作與共識(shí)的基本條件。毫無(wú)疑問(wèn)，北約存在缺陷，但美國(guó)和歐盟從無(wú)到有建立起來(lái)的軍事紅線也是如此。無(wú)論12個(gè)月來(lái)北約做出的具體決定正確與否，北約領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人已在較短時(shí)間內(nèi)針對(duì)俄羅斯的挑釁進(jìn)行了商洽和溝通，并采取了一套具體的應(yīng)對(duì)措施。與北約在安全方面的作用相比，歐美在經(jīng)濟(jì)領(lǐng)域缺乏類似機(jī)制，或者說(shuō)缺乏在經(jīng)濟(jì)上協(xié)同作戰(zhàn)的框架或基礎(chǔ)。只要存在這種情況，美國(guó)和歐盟領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人就仍然很難在最關(guān)鍵的領(lǐng)域達(dá)成一致，進(jìn)而解決烏克蘭問(wèn)題，比如通過(guò)聯(lián)合制裁來(lái)遏制俄羅斯，共同制定穩(wěn)定方案以免烏克蘭經(jīng)濟(jì)急劇滑坡，以及針對(duì)石油政治等俄羅斯慣用的經(jīng)濟(jì)壓迫手段采取充分的防御措施。

????事實(shí)證明，這些經(jīng)濟(jì)層面的問(wèn)題對(duì)烏克蘭危機(jī)及其最終結(jié)果都有著核心影響，這絕非偶然。一方面，歐美擁有最成熟的聯(lián)盟體系，足以應(yīng)對(duì)當(dāng)今的軍事威脅，另一方面，雙方在經(jīng)濟(jì)領(lǐng)域缺乏這樣的機(jī)制，因而無(wú)法從這個(gè)角度向共同的外交目標(biāo)邁進(jìn)。這樣的反差正是俄羅斯總統(tǒng)普京把經(jīng)濟(jì)戰(zhàn)術(shù)作為首要對(duì)策的原因（當(dāng)然，普京的軍事手段也顯露無(wú)疑，但他的軍事戰(zhàn)略似乎是通過(guò)隨心所欲地加大或降低攻擊性來(lái)拖垮烏克蘭經(jīng)濟(jì)，同時(shí)讓歐洲達(dá)到損失忍耐極限，再也無(wú)心繼續(xù)對(duì)俄實(shí)施制裁）。也正是出于這個(gè)原因，中國(guó)才會(huì)選擇通過(guò)經(jīng)濟(jì)手段在世界上彰顯國(guó)家意志。當(dāng)世界步入地緣經(jīng)濟(jì)治國(guó)的時(shí)代，越來(lái)越多的地緣政治和權(quán)力斗爭(zhēng)都將通過(guò)經(jīng)濟(jì)手段展開(kāi)。

????上周的峰會(huì)令人鼓舞，它讓G7領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人圍坐在更小、更靈活的會(huì)議桌邊，這至少表明他們開(kāi)始認(rèn)識(shí)到這個(gè)地緣經(jīng)濟(jì)治國(guó)的新時(shí)代，以及在這個(gè)時(shí)代進(jìn)行合作所需的新常態(tài)。這是G7成員國(guó)重新聚首后所面臨的機(jī)遇——為西方亟需的地緣經(jīng)濟(jì)合作建立基礎(chǔ)，進(jìn)而應(yīng)對(duì)正在崛起的中國(guó)、咄咄逼人的俄羅斯以及伊斯蘭國(guó)等精通金融的恐怖組織帶來(lái)的挑戰(zhàn)。

????而為了能夠把握住這些新的機(jī)遇，G7必須做出清醒的決策。它需要建立新的規(guī)范，使各成員國(guó)更好地了解本方的底線。以當(dāng)前對(duì)俄制裁中的結(jié)構(gòu)性設(shè)計(jì)缺陷為例。歐盟27個(gè)成員國(guó)爭(zhēng)論不休肯定是個(gè)問(wèn)題，在這種情況下，為什么還要規(guī)定歐盟制裁會(huì)自動(dòng)到期呢？為什么非要讓歐盟成員國(guó)就是否繼續(xù)制裁做出決定，而不是讓俄羅斯通過(guò)兌現(xiàn)承諾來(lái)爭(zhēng)取解除制裁呢？G7峰會(huì)是個(gè)很有用的場(chǎng)合。在這里，成員國(guó)可以確立基本架構(gòu)，以便各自的制裁措施能夠共同發(fā)揮作用；在這里，各國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人可以消除設(shè)計(jì)和執(zhí)行方面的分歧，為針對(duì)俄羅斯和伊朗的重要制裁掃除障礙。

????最后，G7的回歸還可以讓美國(guó)、歐盟和日本就其真正共同關(guān)心的問(wèn)題制定更高的目標(biāo)，并且建立更有意義的聯(lián)動(dòng)機(jī)制。簡(jiǎn)而言之，就是更多地“一舉兩得”和“一舉三得”。除了烏克蘭危機(jī)，上周G7峰會(huì)的另一個(gè)主要議題是氣候問(wèn)題。在這方面，與會(huì)各國(guó)本有可能就能源補(bǔ)貼達(dá)成一致。最近，筆者和美國(guó)外交關(guān)系協(xié)會(huì)的同事以及業(yè)內(nèi)專家共同發(fā)表了一篇報(bào)告，說(shuō)明了燃油補(bǔ)貼在烏克蘭經(jīng)濟(jì)生存能力中發(fā)揮著怎樣的關(guān)鍵作用（最近幾年，烏克蘭每年的燃料補(bǔ)貼成本大約為100億美元；這是個(gè)天文數(shù)字，尤其是考慮到今后四年國(guó)際貨幣基金組織將為烏克蘭提供總額175億美元的援助）；它如何讓俄羅斯等石油和天然氣主要生產(chǎn)國(guó)受益；以及如果取消燃油補(bǔ)貼，石油日消費(fèi)量就可能減少300-400萬(wàn)桶。相反，G7領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人只滿足于承諾到本世紀(jì)末徹底脫碳。但沒(méi)人能堅(jiān)持到那個(gè)時(shí)候，即使做不到這一點(diǎn)，他們也無(wú)需承擔(dān)責(zé)任，我們也不會(huì)問(wèn)責(zé)。不管怎樣，現(xiàn)在的G7成員國(guó)又都是朋友了，大家就不能同心協(xié)力，把事情做好一點(diǎn)兒?jiǎn)幔浚ㄘ?cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

????本文作者珍妮弗?哈里斯是美國(guó)外交關(guān)系協(xié)會(huì)（CFR）高級(jí)研究員。加入CFR之前，珍妮弗在美國(guó)國(guó)務(wù)院參與政策規(guī)劃工作，負(fù)責(zé)全球市場(chǎng)、地緣經(jīng)濟(jì)以及能源安全問(wèn)題。她目前正在撰寫(xiě)一本書(shū)，內(nèi)容是現(xiàn)代國(guó)家如何讓經(jīng)濟(jì)和金融手段成為治國(guó)工具。

????翻譯：Charlie

????審校：夏林

????President Barack Obama was in the Bavarian Alps this week for the annual Group of Seven Leaders’ Summit, complete with the time-honored awkward Group photo, a rite that even the leaders of the free world seem powerless to end (2013’s entry remains the one to beat). Yet for all of its timeworn familiarity, this year’s photo offered hints of something new.

????It captured the Group’s first real gathering as a body of seven again, down from eight — or, at least the first that all sides had the benefit of a year to plan (while the Group did meet as seven last year, that meeting came just weeks after the Group’s decision to uninvite Russia for conduct unbecoming of a G8 member, upending the planned agenda and forcing a last-minute change of venue from Sochi to the Hague). As such, this week’s Summit suggested the return of a more familiar form of “global governance” – Trans-atlanticism plus Japan. It was the most concrete admission yet that global governance in the post-Cold War era had bitten off more than it could manage, and was in need of downscaling.

????Back among true friends, then, how did the G7 do?

????First the good news.

????Leaders seized the occasion to keep their gaze on Russia, as the United States and the United Kingdom sought to stiffen the resolve of EU countries waning in their enthusiasm for the current U.S. – EU sanctions on Russia. The spectacle underscored just how novel the current U.S.- EU coordination on sanctions is; never before has Washington exercised this much restraint in refusing to get out ahead of a European Union foreign policy apparatus that can be maddeningly slow and unwieldy.

????Such difficulties maintaining a unified line on sanctions drew especially sharp contrast with the routine and sophisticated coordination—the basic habits of cooperation and shared understandings—that the U.S. and Europe enjoy on the military and security side. No doubt NATO has its flaws, but nor are Washington and Brussels inventing military redlines from scratch. Whether or not the specific decisions coming out of NATO over the past 12 months have been the right ones, NATO’s leaders have in relatively short-order managed to settle on, communicate, and execute a concrete set of responses to Russian provocations. The U.S. and Europe have no such economic counterpart similar to what NATO represents on the security side, no such framework or foundation for jointly exercising economic muscle. So long as that is the case, U.S and EU leaders will continue to struggle with many of the most important ingredients to resolving this conflict —from coordinated sanctions capable of pushing back on Russian aggression, to a joint blueprint for stabilizing Ukraine from economic freefall, to adequate defenses against the pipeline politics and other forms of economic coercion so favored by Moscow.

????It is no accident that these economic dimensions are proving central to this crisis and its eventual outcomes. This contrast—the most sophisticated alliance system to answer military threats in the modern world on one hand, and no meaningful counterpart when it comes to advancing the economic aspects of our common foreign policy objectives—is precisely why President Putin has taken to economic tatics as a first resort (of course military tactics are in full evidence, too, but in dialing up or down aggression at will, President Putin’s military strategy seems calculated to fatigue Ukraine economically and exhaust Europe’s pain tolerance for maintaining sanctions). And it is why China, too, has opted for economic means of working its will in the world. Welcome to the era of geoeconomic statecraft, where more and more, geopolitics and state power struggles will be waged through economic means.

????This week’s Summit was a heartening sign that the leaders assembled at the leaner, more nimble G7 table are at least beginning to wake up to this new era of geoeconomic statecraft, and the new habits of cooperation it will require. That is the opportunity of the newly returned G7: to offer a foundation for the kind of geoeconomic cooperation the West will need if it is to meet the challenges of a rising China, a belligerent Russia, and a sophisticated financing outfit like the Islamic State.

????But to evolve in this direction, the G7 will need to make some conscious decisions. It will need new norms that give all sides better baseline presumptions. Take sanctions, for instance, and the structural design flaws inherent to the current EU sanctions approach. Why, when wrangling 27 member nations is certain to prove challenging, are the EU’s sanctions designed so as to automatically expire? Why place the default burden on EU member countries to renew these sanctions, rather than on Moscow to earn their removal through delivering on stated commitments? The G7 would be a useful venue for member countries to agree to a basic architecture for how their respective sanctions regimes should work jointly—a place where leaders could smooth the many design and enforcement wrinkles plaguing important sanctions regimes against both Russia and Iran.

????Finally, a return to the G7 should also allow for more ambition and meaningful linkages across issues of genuine, unanimous concern in the United States, Europe and Japan—in short, more “two-fers” and “three-fers.” In addition to the Russia – Ukraine crisis, another of the Group’s major agenda items this week was climate. Here, the Group could have targeted fuel subsidies. Recent work I have done with colleagues at the Council on Foreign Relations and experts in the field makes clear how centrally fuel subsidies figure into Ukraine’s economic viability (fuel subsidies have cost Ukraine roughly $10 billion per year in recent years—an amazing sum, especially considering that the country’s current IMF bailout totals $17.5 billion over four years); how they reward Russia along with other major oil and gas producers, and how, if dismantled, oil consumption could fall by 3 to 4 million barrels of oil per day. Instead, G7 leaders contented themselves with a pledge to ween themselves from carbon by the end of this century—when neither they will be around to answer for failure, nor we to point it out. At least now back among friends, can’t we agree to do better?

????Jennifer M. Harris is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Prior to joining CFR, Jennifer was a member of the policy planning staff at the U.S. Department of State responsible for global markets, geo-economic issues, and energy security. Jennifer is currently writing a book on the modern use of economic and financial instruments as tools of statecraft.