????俄羅斯剛剛挽救了該國貨幣和銀行業(yè)，或者更準(zhǔn)確地說，使其得以茍延殘喘。

????俄羅斯既沒有向銀行系統(tǒng)投入大量硬通貨，也沒有許諾會注入更多資金（至少在明年之前不會），它所做的，只是放松了（在憤世嫉俗者看來，是放棄了）大部分用于判定是否具有償付能力的審慎標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。通俗點說，就是讓銀行無限期的假裝它們將收到借款公司的還款。

????在我們繼續(xù)深入討論之前，很多非常受人尊敬的觀點表示，放寬審慎標(biāo)準(zhǔn)恰恰是危機(jī)時期所應(yīng)采取的行動，這可以避免風(fēng)險在脆弱的銀行體系內(nèi)驟然凸顯，從而使得情勢不必要的惡化。當(dāng)你有理由相信危機(jī)可能只是暫時的，你所面對的只不過是流動性危機(jī)，而非償付危機(jī)時，就更有理由這么做。這是美國和歐洲自2008年以來反復(fù)討論得出的結(jié)論。

????俄羅斯認(rèn)為，其危機(jī)只是暫時的，是由于石油市場面對供給沖擊反應(yīng)過度所造成的，而油價終究會回歸長期均衡的水平，使得俄羅斯經(jīng)濟(jì)得以恢復(fù)正常（雖然需要稍微緊縮開支）。因此，當(dāng)前因客戶恐慌造成的銀行流動性短缺必須被克服，最終一切將安然無恙。

????本著這種精神，俄羅斯銀行再也不用按市場價格對其債券投資組合進(jìn)行計價。它們可以假裝自己所持有的頭寸一美元仍然價值100美分，盡管事實上，如果現(xiàn)在它們被迫清償，其持有的頭寸一美元僅能作價20美分。銀行還能夠按照三個月前的匯率記錄外幣貸款。這兩項措施降低了銀行為滿足法定標(biāo)準(zhǔn)必須持有的（盧布標(biāo)價）資金額。

????更棒的是，現(xiàn)在你還可以將所有外幣標(biāo)價的信用風(fēng)險轉(zhuǎn)嫁給俄羅斯中央銀行，央行現(xiàn)在將接受外匯債券作為企業(yè)美元貸款的抵押。換言之，如果情況糟糕到極點，怎么從正在破產(chǎn)程序中的某塞浦路斯貿(mào)易分公司拿到錢這種事，就讓俄羅斯央行來擔(dān)心吧。嚴(yán)格來說，信用風(fēng)險不能像賣斷那樣直接轉(zhuǎn)移，但影響卻大致相同：你先得到現(xiàn)金，日后我們再來擔(dān)心貸款質(zhì)量。

????銀行也獲準(zhǔn)提高存款利率，以鼓勵人們將資金留在銀行系統(tǒng)。這打破了之前的邏輯，即禁止超高存款利率，因為其通常是即將破產(chǎn)的銀行壓箱底的最后一招。

????但是，這里的重點是債務(wù)危機(jī)迷們所說的“貸款延期、假裝沒事”（Extend and Pretend）的精髓。即使你不得不重組貸款、推遲還款、改變幣種并降低利率，你依然無需改變你給予此項貸款的風(fēng)險權(quán)重（因此，你仍然無需為這些貸款預(yù)備更多資金）。

????這使得俄羅斯國家支持的企業(yè)（按照巴塞爾協(xié)定III的規(guī)則，這些企業(yè)的本幣債務(wù)風(fēng)險權(quán)重大都為零）能隨心所欲的對國內(nèi)銀行違約，因為（就針對貸款的準(zhǔn)備金而言），貸款機(jī)構(gòu)將能假裝什么事都沒有發(fā)生。

????另一項規(guī)定的效果大致相同，暫停受制裁影響企業(yè)的風(fēng)險權(quán)重。即使你不得不承認(rèn)貸款發(fā)生損失，俄羅斯央行現(xiàn)在將給你兩年，而非一年的時間為貸款進(jìn)行撥備。

????如上所述，這些都在一定程度上有道理，但必須基于一個基本假設(shè)，即危機(jī)是暫時的，而且你的客戶都將留在俄羅斯，真正解決他們的問題。

????然而，歷史表明，很多人寧愿購買前往倫敦的單程機(jī)票，然后用剩下的欠你的錢避免被引渡回俄羅斯。

????監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)采取此類措施時，往往是自欺欺人。這是一場賭博，如果油價反彈，俄羅斯可能會成功，至少是部分成功。而且，目前這樣將導(dǎo)致西方銀行不再向任何俄羅斯銀行提供貸款，不過它們本來也已經(jīng)停止了向后者放貸，所以短期來看幾乎沒有什么損失。

????但是，如果制裁不取消，而且油價明年穩(wěn)定在每桶60美元左右，那么到明年夏季，俄羅斯銀行業(yè)的局勢，將如邁克爾?杰克遜的MTV《Thriller》那般充滿恐怖氣氛。（財富中文網(wǎng)）

????譯者：Jennifer

????審稿：Hunter

????Russia just saved its currency and its banks–or, more precisely, gave them a stay of execution.

????No, it didn’t throw a hatful of hard currency at them. No, it didn’t say it would inject more capital into them (at least not till next year). What it did was to suspend (or, for the cynics, abandon) pretty much all the prudential standards that define whether or not they’re solvent. In layman’s terms, it’s letting them pretend–for an unspecified period of time–that they’ll be repaid by the companies that have their money.

????Before we go any further, a lot of very respectable opinion says that relaxing prudential standards is exactly what you should do at a time of crisis, to stop the risks in a weak banking system from crystallizing all at once, and making things worse than they need to be. The case for doing so is all the stronger when you have good reason to think the crisis is likely to be short-lived, and that all you have is a liquidity crisis, rather than a solvency one. It’s an argument that the U.S. and Europe have been thrashing out ever since 2008.

????Russia thinks its crisis will be temporary, because it’s caused by an oil market that is currently overshooting in reaction to a supply shock and will, in time, return to a price level closer to the long-term average, one which will allow the economy to carry on as normal (albeit with a bit of belt-tightening). Hence the current liquidity squeeze on banks from panicked customers is just something that has to be ridden out. It’ll all be alright in the end.

????In this spirit, banks will no longer have to mark their bond portfolios to market prices. They can pretend their holdings are worth 100 cents on the dollar, rather than the 20 cents they’d get if forced to liquidate today. They’ll be able to book foreign currency loans at exchange rates that are three months out of date. Both measures reduce the amount of (ruble-denominated) capital that they have to hold to meet legal norms.

????It gets better. You can now transfer all of your foreign currency-denominated credit risk to the Central Bank, which will now accept FX claims on companies as collateral for loans in dollars. In other words, let the CBR worry about getting the money out of a Cyprus-based trading affiliate in the bankruptcy proceedings if the worst comes to the worst. Strictly speaking, the credit risk is not directly transferred as it would be under an outright sale, but the effect is much the same: you get the cash today, and we’ll worry about the loan quality another day.

????Banks will also be allowed to offer higher rates on deposits to encourage people to keep their money in the system. That breaks with the previous logic that banned super-elevated deposit rates because they’re normally the last resort of a bank that’s going under.

????But the pièce de résistance here is the very distillation of what debt crisis junkies call “Extend and Pretend.” Even if you have to restructure your loans, delaying repayment, changing their currency and cutting the interest rate, you still won’t have to change the risk-weighting you give to that loan (so you still won’t have to hold more capital against it).

????This gives state-backed companies (whose local-currency debts largely carry a zero risk-weighting under Basel III rules) carte blanche to default to domestic banks, because the lenders will be able to pretend nothing has happened (as regards holding capital against the loans).

????Loss recognition, be damned! President Vladimir Putin has often talked of his country’s pivot to China – here it is in glorious action.

????Another provision has much the same effect, suspending risk-weightings on loans to companies affected by sanctions. Heck, even if you do have to recognize a loss on a loan, the CBR will now give you two years, rather than one, to provision against it.

????As noted, this can all make a degree of sense on one basic assumption: the crisis is temporary, and your clients will actually stay in Russia and work out their problems honestly.

????History suggests, however, that many would rather just buy a one-way plane ticket to London and spend the rest of the money they owe you fighting against extradition.

????As so often when regulators take such measures, the wish is father to the thought. It’s a gamble and it may yet pay off–at least partially–if oil prices rebound. It will make it impossible for western banks to lend to any Russian bank, but then they had already stopped anyway, so little is lost in the short term.

????But if sanctions aren’t lifted, and the price of oil stabilizes next year around $60/barrel, then Moscow’s banking sector will look like something out of Michael Jackson’s Thriller video by next summer.