????不是每個成員國都有同樣的機會進行調整。正如我日前在為《外交》雜志（Foreign Affairs） 撰寫的文章(《少數人治理不當：寡頭如何毀了希臘》‘Misrule of the Few: How the Oligarchs Ruined Greece’)所講的一樣，加入歐盟并未改善弱小成員的經濟體系。實際上可能使它們陷入了更糟的狀況。

????希臘、愛爾蘭、葡萄牙和西班牙加入歐盟后開放了邊境，將自身置于貿易、移民和金融的新浪潮沖擊之下。與其他成員國競爭注定會帶來“創造性破壞”，即那些不能進行國際化競爭、效率低下的企業將關門歇業。為了避免短期困境，這些外圍經濟體將獲得大筆歐盟資金補償。這些資金本應用于國內經濟的重組。但事情發展完全出人意料。

????這些資金增強了資金管理者的實力。大多數歐盟外圍經濟體中缺乏強有力的行政機構，有的只是國內政治階層。在制衡機制較差的小國中，這種影響是徹底的。這些資金就像是“天然的資源詛咒”。由于這些資金不是通過稅收得來的，要求國內對其支出負責似乎是多此一舉。

????歐元區一創立，這種狀況就惡化了。隨著歐洲央行（ECB）將視線轉向他處，西班牙、葡萄牙、愛爾蘭和希臘不僅通過廉價易得的信貸創造出了資產泡沫（其他成員國也出現這種情況），還創建了受政治驅使的不透明銀行體系。因此，廉價信貸阻礙了改革，并且損害了所有外圍經濟體的制度。

????歐元區成員國將這些資金用于無度的投資，使得任人唯親更加有利可圖，為政治腐敗提供新的溫床，強化了本已存在的等級制度。如果歐元區所有成員國都同樣強大，如果它們都曾擁有出色且獨立的銀行監管機構、有力的司法體系和強大的內部問責機制，或許這些事情就不會發生。但是，它們的確發生了。

????西班牙銀行Bankia in Spain、愛爾蘭銀行Allied Irish in Ireland和希臘銀行Proton in Greece的失敗就是明證。特別是在希臘，歐盟準備救援，但希臘政治體系一直受一小撮寡頭左右，他們非法占據電視頻道25年。通過逃避有效的監管，為達到其自身目的而掌控新聞與評論，他們在政治和商業生活中占據主導地位，削弱了政治階層的整體可信度。歐洲央行、國際貨幣基金組織（International Monetary Fund）和歐盟委員會（European Commission）的拯救協議并沒有觸及他們的特權。

????在一些歐元區成員國中，歐元的主要作用就是導致了經濟崩潰、不平等加劇和腐敗泛濫。這并非孤立的國內經濟失敗的結果，而是造成外圍經濟體整體轟然失敗的歐洲集體決策的產物。對于“更緊密聯盟”的不懈追求使得歐盟機構忽視了這一聯盟的質量問題。現在，是時候做出改變了。除非歐洲能夠從歐元區深處消除這些不公平，否則危機不會結束。（財富中文網）

????本文作者帕爾沃斯?埃萊夫塞里亞迪斯是牛津大學（Oxford University）曼斯菲爾德學院（Mansfield College）的法律副教授和研究員。

????Not everyone had the same chance to adjust. As I argue in my recent article for Foreign Affairs (‘Misrule of the Few: How the Oligarchs Ruined Greece’, ) membership in the European Union has not improved the institutions of the weaker members. It has actually made them worse.

????When they joined the EU, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain opened their borders and exposed themselves to new waves of trade, immigration and finance. Competition with other member states was meant to bring about ‘creative destruction,’ whereby inefficient firms – i.e. those who could not compete internationally – would go out of business. In order to avoid short-term hardships, the peripheral economies were set to receive large sums of EU funds by way of compensation. These funds were supposed to be invested in restructuring the domestic economies. But this happened very imperfectly.

????The funds strengthened those who administered them. In the absence of a strong civil service in most of the peripheral EU members, these were simply the local political classes. In small societies with weak checks and balances, the effect was transformative. This money operated as a ‘natural resources curse’. Since the money was not the result of taxation, domestic accountability for its spending was seen to be an unnecessary luxury.

????This situation was made worse once the Eurozone was created. With the ECB looking away, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece built not only asset bubbles with cheap and easy credit (which happened elsewhere) but also opaque and politically driven banking systems. As a result, cheap credit impeded reform and damaged institutions in all the countries of the periphery.

????Membership in the Eurozone directed funds to wasteful investment, made cronyism exceptionally profitable, provided new incentives for political corruption and strengthened already existing hierarchies. If all the members of the Eurozone were equally strong, if they all had, for example, an outstanding and independent banking regulator, a powerful judiciary and strong internal mechanisms of accountability, perhaps these things would not have happened. Yet, they did happen.

????The examples of the failed banks, Bankia in Spain, Allied Irish in Ireland, and Proton in Greece speak for themselves. In Greece, in particular, the EU has stood by while the political system has been undermined by a small group of oligarchs who have illegally occupied television frequencies for 25 years. By escaping any effective regulation and controlling news and commentary for their own purposes, they have dominated political and business life and undermined the credibility of the political class in its entirety. The bailout deal with the ECB, the International Monetary Fund and the European Commission has not touched their privileges.

????In some of the members of the Eurozone the main legacy of the Euro is economic implosion, rising inequality and widespread corruption. This is not the result of isolated domestic failures. It is a result of collective European decision-making that misfired spectacularly throughout the periphery. The relentless pursuit of an ‘ever closer union’ made EU institutions neglect the question of the quality of this union. It is time to change course. Unless Europe addresses the deep unfairness at the heart of the Eurozone, the crisis is not going to end.

????PavlosEleftheriadis is Associate Professor of Law and a Fellow of Mansfield College at Oxford University.