????馬航MH17慘劇令西方國家的壓力倍增，促使他們必須針對俄羅斯的所有產業，實施全面的“行業”制裁。全球經濟可能會受到嚴重損害，但對于即將到來的一切，西方國家有規模更大、實力更強的經濟體以及流動性充足的中央銀行做支持，其抗擊打能力要遠遠超過俄羅斯。

????西方最近的制裁行動很容易被批評為小打小鬧和畏首畏尾。上周，歐盟的制裁名單上又增加了33個名字，有個人也有企業，其中包括俄羅斯政府高級官員。法國依然堅持向俄羅斯出售軍艦，經濟利益看起來成了采取嚴厲措施的障礙。就連美國的最新制裁措施也只是禁止一些俄羅斯能源、金融和國防企業發行新債券或股票。并且美國的制裁名單里不包括俄羅斯聯邦儲蓄銀行（Sberbank），而后者持有大部分俄羅斯人的存款。

????雖然這樣的批評很中肯，但并不意味著那些領導人對俄羅斯過于軟弱。以英國、荷蘭、德國以及歐委會為首的歐盟領導人現在正采取出人意料的措施，以超越美國的力度對俄羅斯的銀行、能源公司和國防企業實施制裁（特別是制裁更多的俄羅斯銀行）。許多人一直都在期待這種全面的“行業”制裁，原因是迄今為止的措施只是禁止一小部分債券和股票融資。但就機構而言，美國的制裁和歐盟制裁計劃的打擊面足夠廣，它們可能對俄羅斯金融體系產生系統性影響。此外，有充分理由相信今后幾個月這些制裁措施將繼續升級，并最終在年底前成為針對俄羅斯金融和能源部門的綜合性行業制裁。

????第一個理由是，俄羅斯總統普京在支持烏克蘭分裂勢力方面幾乎沒有退縮跡象，原因是最近一直有報道稱俄羅斯方面在發射導彈，而且俄羅斯在俄烏邊境的軍事調動也更加頻繁。第二個理由和第一個有關，那就是烏克蘭軍隊的能力有提升跡象，而且在地面軍事行動上節節勝利。這讓人們重新燃起了烏克蘭政局穩定下來的期望，但今后幾周俄羅斯在地面上發起挑釁行為的風險只會越來越大，而這樣的行為將招致更多的制裁。

????第三個理由和市場設法規避現有制裁措施有關——對此還沒有多少人發表評論。盈利動機是個強大動力，它能創造性地躲過貿易或金融管制。一些規避經濟制裁的行為在意料之中，這甚至能成為市場壓力的一種有益釋放。但這樣的行為多了，就必然將削弱制裁措施的效果，也會影響美國政府的可信度。

????因此，奧巴馬政府明確表示愿意加大制裁力度，比如把更多機構納入制裁名單，或禁止其他種類的金融活動，這并不讓人感到意外。最近實施的制裁只針對債券和股票融資，但舉例來說，如果美國財政部（U.S. Treasury）發現金融衍生產品合約的使用量增多，并且發揮了類似于債券的作用，它就可能把制裁范圍擴大到新的金融工具上。財政部不會把所有的金融創新都納入制裁范圍，但為了保持管制效果，它不斷加大制裁力度的可能性相當大。

????市場反應也表明，投資者認為制裁力度將加大。的確，俄羅斯債券和股票市場一直韌性十足，原因是人們希望制裁對經濟的影響有限。雖然全面金融制裁會對市場產生重大影響，但要衡量目前新增制裁措施的效果，更好的方法是看看經濟增長受到的長期影響。這方面的情況并不妙，原因是大量資金持續外流，今年流出規模已經超過1000億美元。進入俄羅斯的外資不斷減少，投資者對現有制裁措施以及西方金融機構削減貸款感到擔心，也從經濟和法律角度擔憂今后出現的制裁措施。此外，俄羅斯央行上周提高了利率，這表明他們擔心制裁帶來的通脹效應，包括盧布貶值提高進口價格。

????當然，烏克蘭危機爆發前俄羅斯的經濟增長速度已經放慢，而且現在看來有可能出現衰退——有些分析師預計俄羅斯GDP下跌幅度將超過5%。俄羅斯前財政部長阿列克謝?庫德林上周警告，目前政策路線會對俄羅斯產生重大影響，已經充分體現了對長期局勢的顧慮。

????難點就在這里。西方加大經濟制裁力度正在發揮作用，而且將對俄羅斯經濟產生深遠影響，但這需要時間。同時，果斷采取可靠措施的政治壓力正在增大。經濟和政治時間軸的錯位需要重新評估，要關注那些對俄羅斯產生更明顯、更直接影響的政策。(財富中文網)

????羅伯特?卡恩是華盛頓美國外交關系協會（Council on Foreign Relations）國際經濟Steven A. Tananbaum高級研究員。此前他在摩爾資本管理公司（Moore Capital Management）擔任高級策略分析師?？ǘ鬟€在世界銀行（World Bank）、國際貨幣基金組織（IMF）、美國財政部和美聯儲（Federal Reserve）供職。

????譯者：Charlie

????The tragic downing of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 accelerates pressure on the West to put full “sectoral” sanctions in place targeting entire industries across Russia. The economic disruption could be profound, but the West—backed by a larger, stronger economies and central banks flush with liquidity liquidity—is far more resilient than Russia for what is to come.

????It is easy to criticize the West’s most recent sanctions as incremental and timid. The European Union last week added 33 individuals and entities to their sanctions list, including senior Russian security service officials and oligarchs. France continues to insist it will provide warships to Russia, and economic interests seem to be blocking tough action. Even the most recent sanctions by the United States only moved to block new debt and equity issuance by a number of energy, financial and military companies. What’s more, U.S. sanctions exclude Sberbank, which holds the majority of Russian deposits.

????While such criticism is fair, it does not suggest that leaders are being too soft on Russia. European leaders—led by the United Kindom, the Netherlands, Germany and the European Commission—now may be ready to surprise us with sanctions against banks, energy and military companies that surpass the U.S. measures (notably by sanctioning more banks). This is short of the broad “sectoral” sanctions many had hoped for, as the move only blocks a narrow band of new debt and equity. But in terms of institutions, the U.S. and proposed European measures are sufficiently broad in the sense that its effects on the Russian financial system could be systemic. Further, there are compelling reasons to expect that sanctions will continue to be extended in coming months, resulting in comprehensive sectoral sanctions on finance and energy by the end of the year.

????For one, we have little evidence that Russian President Vladimir Putin is backing down in his support for separatists, as there have been recent reports of missiles fired from Russia; the country has also intensified troop movements near the border. The second reason, related to the first, is that the Ukrainian military is showing improved capabilities and is gaining ground. This provides renewed hope for political stability in Ukraine, but the risk of provocation on the ground that will draw additional sanctions will only intensify in coming weeks.

????The third reason —which hasn’t received much comment—relates to market efforts to evade the sanctions in place. The profit incentive is a powerful motive to innovate and evade the controls whether on trade or finance. Some evasion is anticipated, and can even be a useful “escape value” for pressure in markets. But substantial evasion undermines both the effectiveness of the measures and the U.S. government’s credibility.

????It is therefore not surprising that the Obama Administration has made it clear they are willing to extend the sanctions either by expanding the list of sanctioned institutions or the types of transactions that are prohibited. The sanctions applied recently may apply have only targeted new debt and equity issuance, but if, for example, the U.S. Treasury saw an increase in use of derivative contracts to mimic the effects of new debt, the agency would extend sanctions to cover the new financial instruments. Treasury will not catch all the financial innovations that take place, but it is quite likely that the effort to sustain the effectiveness of the controls will still lead to their expansion over time.

????Market reaction suggests investors expect more sanctions under way: True, Russian bond and stock markets have been resilient on hopes that sanctions would have a limited impact on the economy. While comprehensive financial sanctions would cause severe market effects, the impact of the current incremental approach is better measured by the longer-term effects on growth. In this regard, the trajectory is grim, as large-scale capital flight has continued and is on track to exceed $100 billion this year. Foreign investments into Russia are dropping on concerns about existing sanctions, a cutoff in lending by western financial institutions, and both economic and legal concerns about future sanctions. What’s more, Russia’s central bank last week raised interest rates, reflecting concern about the inflationary consequences of sanctions, including a weaker rouble that boosts import prices.

????To be sure, growth in Russia was already slowing prior to the crisis, and a projected recession—some analysts project declines in excess of 5% of GDP—now is likely. This concern about the longer term was well captured by former finance minister Alexei Kudrin who last week warned on severe consequences for Russia from the current policy path.

????Herein lies the conundrum. The West’s incremental approach to economic sanctions is working and will have a profound effect on the Russian economy, but it will take time. In the same instance, the political pressures to act credibly and decisively have grown. The disconnect between economic and political timelines calls for a reassessment, with an eye to policies that produce more visible, immediate costs for Russia.

????Robert Kahn is the Steven A. Tananbaum senior fellow for international economics at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, D.C. Previously, he was a senior strategist with Moore Capital Management. He also has held positions at the World Bank, IMF, U.S. Treasury, and Federal Reserve.