????歐洲央行（European Central Bank）的經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇火力瞄錯了方向。

????上周，歐洲央行發(fā)布了一系列經(jīng)濟(jì)刺激政策，旨在誘使銀行將更多的現(xiàn)金運作起來。但意圖“迫使”銀行放貸的政策就算能奏效，也很罕見，特別是在這些銀行缺乏償付能力的情況下。歐洲需要認(rèn)真對待所謂的“僵尸銀行”問題，同時承受因為疏通貸款機(jī)器而帶來的沖擊。在這個問題上抹更多的潤滑油不會讓這些齒輪松快起來，反而更有可能因潤滑油泛濫引發(fā)火災(zāi)。

????歐洲央行行長馬里奧?德拉吉兩年前就曾信誓旦旦地表示，他將“采取一些手段”來拯救歐元。這項聲明擲地有聲，有效終結(jié)了危及歐元區(qū)主權(quán)債市場的兩年信心危機(jī)。一夜之間，主權(quán)債收益率下跌，投資者和銀行都涌向這一市場。

????德拉吉的的確確做到了他承諾的事情。他的做法基本上是只要當(dāng)?shù)劂y行（主要是西班牙和意大利銀行）能將相關(guān)資金用于購買主權(quán)債，歐洲央行就能為這些銀行免費提供現(xiàn)金。實際上，德拉吉將這些銀行作為渠道以穩(wěn)定歐元區(qū)債券市場。

????兩年過去了，歐元仍屹立不倒。不幸的是，歐元區(qū)經(jīng)濟(jì)仍一團(tuán)糟。鑒于歐元得到拯救并保持穩(wěn)定，現(xiàn)在德拉吉把他的目光投向如何提升歐元區(qū)乏力的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長。

????必須申明的一點是，通縮并不是疾病本身，它只是一個癥狀。目標(biāo)是刺激經(jīng)濟(jì)，而不是對抗通縮。

????德拉吉正準(zhǔn)備再次利用這些銀行作為渠道實現(xiàn)他的目標(biāo)。但不是迫使銀行購買、持有劣質(zhì)主權(quán)債，他將迫使它們向私營企業(yè)放貸。

????他會通過兩種方式來達(dá)到這個目的。第一種方式已獲得媒體非常非常多的關(guān)注，是對銀行向歐洲央行繳存的超額準(zhǔn)備金收取費用，這也就是“負(fù)”存款利率的含義。德拉吉希望通過這么做，銀行能將它們通常繳存在歐洲央行的全部超額現(xiàn)金取出來，貸給企業(yè)。但這么做的前提是假定企業(yè)難以獲得貸款（幾乎沒有證據(jù)證明這一點），而且這些銀行為避免產(chǎn)生費用，不會將超額準(zhǔn)備金從歐洲央行取出后轉(zhuǎn)而放進(jìn)自己的金庫。

????這項政策并不像一些人認(rèn)為的那樣沒有先例。實際上，丹麥幾年前在嘗試刺激經(jīng)濟(jì)增長的時候就曾經(jīng)這么干過。這個國家最近在4月份推翻了這項政策，因為它不起作用。成本仍然高得離譜，在哥本哈根買一瓶水要3美元或4美元。丹麥出口仍然沒有機(jī)會。

????而對于歐洲央行上周四宣布的第二種更麻煩的方式，鮮有人討論。歐洲央行將嘗試把它借給這些銀行的免費資金以及類似資金與這些銀行放貸給公眾的金額掛鉤。這些銀行放貸數(shù)額越多，它們從歐洲央行獲得的現(xiàn)金就越多。

????但通過對這些錢設(shè)定條件，歐洲央行實際上可以拒絕這些銀行急需的資本。這些所謂的“僵尸”銀行在金融危機(jī)和主權(quán)債務(wù)危機(jī)中損失了大量的錢，如今隨著它們從歐洲央行獲得貸款支持，它們又活了過來。

????這個新政策的風(fēng)險在于，它可能打破平衡，按放貸能力將系統(tǒng)中的弱勢銀行暴露在風(fēng)險之中。無論什么原因，不進(jìn)行放貸的那些銀行被視為“僵尸”。投資者最終將驚恐地逃離這些銀行，加劇這些半死不活的銀行存在的資本短缺問題。

????因此，德拉吉在制訂這項政策時認(rèn)定，歐元區(qū)銀行手頭有充足的資本，能滿足歐元區(qū)銀行10%的最低資本金要求；能繼續(xù)購買主權(quán)債以支撐歐元；能彌補(bǔ)仍然困擾著歐洲的各種投資泡沫破裂所產(chǎn)生的損失；有足夠的資本進(jìn)行放貸以“刺激”經(jīng)濟(jì)增長；能賺取足夠的利潤使之值得嘗試。

????The European Central Bank has pointed its economic bazooka in the wrong direction.

????The ECB announced a series of economic stimulus measures on Thursday designed to induce banks to put more of their cash to work. But policies intended to “force” banks to lend rarely, if ever, work, especially if those banks are barely solvent. Europe needs to get real about its so-called “zombie bank” problem and take the hits needed to unclog its lending machine. Throwing more grease on the problem won’t loosen up the gears — it’s probably more likely to start a grease fire.

????Mario Draghi, the head of the ECB, famously promised two years ago that he’d do “whatever it takes” to save the euro. That statement was so powerful it effectively ended a two-year crisis of confidence that had infected the eurozone sovereign debt market. Overnight, sovereign bond yields fell as investors and banks poured back into the market.

????Draghi did exactly what he set out to do. He did this by basically making it free for local banks to borrow cash from the central bank–provided that the banks, mostly those in Spain and Italy, use those funds to buy up sovereign debt. In effect, Draghi used the banks as a pass-through vehicle to stabilize the eurozone debt market.

????Two years on, the euro is still standing. Unfortunately, the eurozone economy remains down in the dumps. With the euro saved and stable, Draghi has now set his sights on boosting the zone’s anemic economic growth rate.

????For the record, deflation isn’t the disease here–it’s just a symptom. The goal is to stimulate the economy, not to fight deflation.

????Draghi is attempting to do this by once again using the banks as a pass-through to achieve his goals. But instead of forcing the banks to buy and hold dodgy sovereign bonds, he will now force them to lend to the private sector.

????He is doing this in two ways. The first, which has received way too much attention in the media, is to charge the banks a fee to park their excess reserves with the central bank. That’s what’s meant by a “negative” deposit rate. By doing this, Draghi hopes that the banks would take all their excess cash that they normally park at the central bank and lend it out to businesses. But this assumes that businesses are having a hard time getting loans (for which there is little evidence) and that the banks won’t just take their reserves out of the ECB and put them in their vaults to avoid a fee.

????This policy isn’t as unprecedented as some believe. Indeed, Denmark did it a couple years ago in an attempt to stimulate growth. It recently reversed that policy in April because it didn’t work. It still costs something ridiculous like $3 or $4 to buy a bottle of water in Copenhagen. Danish exports still don’t have a chance.

????Few are talking about the second, more troubling measure announced by the ECB on Thursday. The central bank will attempt to link proportionally all the free money the ECB has been lending to the banks, plus some more with a new acronym, to how much the banks lend out to the public. The more money banks lend, the more cash they get from the ECB.

????But by placing conditions on that money, the ECB could effectively deny much-needed capital to banks in need. These so-called “zombie” banks are the ones that lost tons of money during the financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis and are alive today because of the lending life support they have received from the ECB.

????This new policy risks upsetting that balance and would expose the weak banks in the system based on lending capacity. Those banks that, for whatever reason, aren’t lending could be identified as zombies. Investors could then end up running away from these banks in horror, exacerbating the capital shortfall at these half-dead banks.

????So in instituting this policy, Draghi is betting that eurozone banks are now strong enough to keep an adequate amount of capital on hand to meet the required 10% eurozone bank capital minimum; continue buying sovereign bonds to prop up the euro; cover the losses associated with the various busted investing bubbles still haunting the continent; lend out just enough capital to “stimulate” growth; and make enough profit to make it all worthwhile.