????現在我們的預期是，到2024年CAPE將回到18倍的近期平均水平。按照上文中4.4%的增長率計算，每股收益將比現在高57%；然而，由于CAPE的下降，在這期間股票的資本收益只有8%。每年得到的分紅帶來的收益率約為16%，這樣，總收益率就是24%，而每年的收益率只有2.15%。這個數字應該相當接近通脹率，而且僅此而已。

????經過推算，我們發現了一個重大意外情況。那就是在所有的股票分析中，最重要的指標實際上很正常。這個指標就是股票風險溢價，即投資者所要求的回報率中超過美國政府債券收益率的那部分超額回報，它補償的是持有股票所帶來的額外風險。目前，股票風險溢價高達3.5%，也就是4%的盈利收益率減去10年期美國國債剔除通脹因素后的收益率，后者約為0.5%。Research Affiliates為1600多億美元的投資基金提供策略管理，這家公司的投資管理部門負責人克里斯?布萊特曼說：“我們面對的情況是，盈利收益率格外低，但受反常的貨幣政策影響，實際利率也格外低。用格外低的收益率減去低利率，就得到了看上去好得不能再好的股票風險溢價”。

????這都要怪美聯儲（Fed）。在“新的常態”下，也就是沒有均值回歸的情形下，總回報率就是3.5%的風險溢價加上0.5%的債券實際收益率，再加上通脹率。要讓這個總回報率為6%的情形成為現實，債券實際收益率就得一直很低。一直很低就意味著基本不變，這樣，收益率很低的債券就一直沒什么競爭力，就算和昂貴的股票相比也是這樣。因此，投資者只好勉強接受股票的低回報率，原因是另一種投資是如此的缺乏吸引力。

????布萊特曼指出，實際上，要讓債券實際收益率處于那么低的水平，美國經濟就得長期處于停滯狀態，就像長期萎靡不振的日本經濟那樣。在這種情況下，我們預測的中等個位數回報率都很有可能顯得過于樂觀。

????在第二種情形中，所有指標都回歸常態。但是，風險溢價已經處于正常水平。和平均值相去甚遠，而且作勢要回到常態的是實際利率。20年來，剔除通脹因素后的平均利率約為2%。如果利率回到這個水平，成為現實的就將是我們在上文中談到的那個卑鄙的均值回歸情形。要指出的一個要點是，這樣的變化可能不會很快出現。但是，如果美國經濟顯露出任何活力，這種變化最終還是會到來。屆時收益率就很難超過通脹率，而且隨后的10年將是一個漫長而難熬的過程。

????造成實際利率處于異常低水平的是美聯儲。他們無法堅持很長時間。只要資金需求取代貨幣供給成為左右利率的主要力量——而且實際情況也一定會是這樣——實際利率就會迅速反彈，進而重新呈現始于2013年中期的趨勢。這就是為什么均值回歸情形是最有可能，甚至是必然出現的結果。在上述兩種情形中，一種很公平，另一種很糟糕，而這個糟糕的情形很可能成為現實。華爾街的專業人士沒辦法不感謝美聯儲，但他們應該重新考慮這個問題。（財富中文網）

????譯者：Charlie

????Now we'll project that the CAPE reverts to recent average of 18 in by 2024. EPS will be 57% higher than today at our 4.4% growth rate, but because the multiple will drop, the stock will post a capital gain of only 8% over that entire period. Dividends, collected each year, will deliver another 16% or so, for a total return of 24%. That's an annual gain of just 2.15%, a number that should pretty much match inflation, and nothing more.

????Our exercise reveals a big surprise. The most important measure in all of equity analysis is actually normal. It's the equity risk premium, the extra return investors demand over and above the rate on U.S. government bonds -- it amounts to the compensation for the additional risk of holding stocks. Today, the ERP is a robust 3.5%. That's the 4% earnings yield, minus the inflation-adjusted rate on 10-year treasuries of around 0.5%. "We're in a situation where the level of earnings yield is extraordinarily low, but because of extraordinary monetary policy, the real rates are extraordinarily low," says Chris Brightman, head of investment management at Research Affiliates, which oversees strategies for more than $160 billion in investment funds. "Subtract the low real rate from the extra-low yield, and you have a perfectly good looking ERP."

????Blame it on the Fed. In the "new normal," no mean reversion scenario, the total return is the risk premium of 3.5% plus the real yield of 0.5% plus inflation. For that 6% scenario to triumph, the real yield needs to stay puny. Staying puny means more of the same, so that low-yielding bonds will continue providing weak competition even for expensive stocks. Hence, investors will make do with low returns on stocks because the alternatives are so unattractive.

????In fact, for real rates to remain that low, the U.S. would need to go into a prolonged period of economic stagnation such as the malaise that's long inflicted Japan, says Brightman. In that case, it's highly possible that the mid-single digit returns we forecast could be far too optimistic.

????In the second scenario, everything returns to normal. But the risk premium already is normal. What's far from the mean, and threatens to revert, is the real interest rate. Over the past two decades, inflation-adjusted rates have averaged around 2%. If they return to that level, then our mean, mean reversion scenario is the one that wins. It's important to point out that the change may not come quickly. But if the U.S. economy shows any kind of vitality, it will arrive eventually. Then returns will barely beat inflation. And 10 years in the wilderness is a long, parched journey.

????The abnormally low real rates are the work of the Fed. They cannot last. Once demand for capital supplants money supply creation as the principal force driving rates, as it must, real rates are bound to rise sharply, restoring the trend that began in mid-2013. That's why the mean-reversion scenario is the most likely, if not inevitable, outcome. One scenario is fair, the other is poor, and the poor one will probably reign. The Wall Street pundits can't stop thanking the Fed. They should reconsider.