????沃倫?巴菲特旗下的伯克希爾-哈撒韋公司2013年向股市凈增投資47億美元。

????多年來，巴菲特每年都會將伯克希爾-哈撒韋（Berkshire Hathaway）與標普500指數的總回報率進行對比。50年前，巴菲特還在經營一家對沖基金時就開始了這種做法，但2013年的對比數據可不太好看。

????巴菲特日前公布了伯克希爾的2013年的業績，并在年度致股東信中表示，每股賬面價值（這是巴菲特用于此項對比的基準指標）增長了18.2%，達到了134,973美元。表現非常穩健。但同期，標普500指數經歷了1997年以來最好的一年，總回報率高達32.4%。

????雖然巴菲特在致股東信中沒有特別提到，但2013年這樣的表現使得伯克希爾的5年期每股賬面價值（2008年底至2013年底）漲幅落后于標普500指數——這是伯克希爾有史以來的第一次。這5年中，標普指數大漲128%。伯克希爾每股賬面價值的漲幅只有91%。

????巴菲特過去一直非常看重5年期數據，他相信賬面價值是衡量伯克希爾內在價值增長情況的一個大致指標（方向正確，但不能充分反映）。巴菲特問到，如果伯克希爾的內在價值增長不能跑贏標普指數，為什么公司股東不干脆退出，轉而購買像標普指數這樣的被動投資工具？（請注意，一位CEO向股東問出這樣細致的問題，是頗為少見的事情。）

????顯然，5年的時間跨度并沒有什么神奇之處，巴菲特在最新的致股東信中事實上還增加了一年用于計算。他指出，在整個股市周期中（2007年底至2013年底）——伯克希爾的表現都優于標準普爾指數。這是因為伯克希爾（去年在《財富》美國500強公司中排名第五）更大程度上是一家運營企業，不是股市投資工具，而標普指數當然全部是股票。因此，2008年對于標普指數是災難性的一年，回報率為負37%。伯克希爾的每股賬面價值也下跌了，但跌幅僅僅只有9.6%。在這整個6年期間，伯克希爾的每股賬面價值增長了73%，而標準普爾指數總回報率增長了44%。

????巴菲特用賬面價值作為衡量標準的原因是因為其中包含了全部資本收益，包括未實現收益，而更常用的收益指標并不包含未實現收益。即便如此，很多媒體在報道伯克希爾2013年業績時肯定會報告這家公司3月1日發布的收益數據，而這些數據相當漂亮。至于這家公司的A股，每股收益增長32%，達到了11,850美元。計算的基礎是以2月28日173,700美元的收盤價。

????伯克希爾的稅前利潤從2012年的222億美元增長到了2013年的288億美元，反映了39億美元的已實現投資收益（來自股票和固定收益證券）以及整個公司總體良好的運營業績。良好的業績表現在保險、主要子公司Burlington Northern Santa Fe和MidAmerican Energy及其他工業子公司、零售與住房領域。過去幾年，股東們盯得很緊的衍生品投資在2013年貢獻了26億美元的稅前利潤，上一年約為20億美元。

????Buffett's Berkshire invested $4.7 billion of net new money in stocks during 2013.

????In a practice he began when running a hedge fund 50 years ago, Warren Buffett has always positioned his company, Berkshire Hathaway (BRKA), as being in annual competition with the S&P 500 index's total return—and right now that's not working too well for him.

????Announcing Berkshire's 2013 results this morning, Buffett said in his annual letter to shareholders that book value per-share—Buffett's standard yardstick in this competition—rose by 18.2% to $134,973. That's a very solid performance. But the S&P 500 index, having its best year since 1997, had a huge total return of 32.4%.

????Furthermore, though Buffett doesn't specifically talk about this in his annual letter to shareholders, these results capped a five-year period, year-end 2008 to year-end 2013, in which the S&P 500 beat Berkshire's gain in book value per-share—the first such period in Berkshire's history. For the five years, the S&P index jumped 128%. Berkshire's book value per-share rose by only 91%.

????Buffett has in the past attached importance to the five-year record because he believes that book value is a rough indicator—directionally correct, but greatly understated—of how Berkshire's intrinsic value is rising. If Berkshire's intrinsic value doesn't beat the S&P over the years, Buffett asks, why shouldn't the company's shareholders simply defect and buy a passive investment like the S&P index? (Please note how rarely you have heard a CEO ask his shareholders for this kind of close analysis.)

????Obviously there's nothing magic about a precise five years, and in his new letter Buffett in fact appends a year to the calculation. He points out that over the entire stock market cycle—between year-ends 2007 and 2013—Berkshire outperformed the S&P. That would be because Berkshire, No. 5 in last year's Fortune 500, is these days more of an operating company than a stock market investment vehicle while the S&P is, of course, pure stocks. The year 2008 was therefore a disaster for the S&P: its return was minus 37%. Berkshire's book value per share fell as well, but by only 9.6%. For the entire six-year period, Berkshire's book value per share rose 73% to the S&P's total return gain of 44%.

????Buffett uses book value as a yardstick because it includes all capital gains—including those unrealized, which the more popular indicator of earnings does not. Even so, many press accounts of Berkshire's 2013 record will surely report the earnings figures that the company released today, and these will be excellent. For the company's A shares, earnings per share were up 32% to $11,850. That's against yesterday's stock-price close of $173,700.

????Berkshire's increase in pretax profits from $22.2 billion in 2012 to $28.8 billion in 2013 reflected $3.9 billion in realized investment gains (emanating from both equities and fixed-income securities) and generally favorable operating results throughout this hugely complex company. They showed up in insurance; at major subsidiaries Burlington Northern Santa Fe and MidAmerican Energy, and other industrial units; and in retail and housing. Derivatives, under intense shareholder surveillance for the last few years, contributed $2.6 billion to pre-tax profits in 2013—up from about $2 billion the year before.