????但值得注意的是，冰島在解決自身的經濟問題方面幾乎沒有取得任何實質性的進展。冰島政府及其銀行業只是采用了拖延疼痛的措施，治標不治本。政府在2008年實施的資本管制如今仍然生效，意味著本國公民以及冰島龐大的退休保險基金只能主要投資于冰島。與此同時，冰島消費者仍然很難買到進口產品，只能購買不太理想的本地貨，從而給國內經濟帶來一種人為刺激。同時，高利率使借貸成本高昂。不過，考慮到現在冰島的“僵尸”銀行并沒有真正在放貸（它們正為資產負債表上價值數十億克朗的不良貸款忙得焦頭爛額），借貸成本高昂的問題反而顯得無足輕重。

????總之，冰島的實際GDP仍然比金融危機前峰值低10%。而盡管2011年冰島GDP確實增長了2.9%左右，但增速到去年已經放緩至1.6%左右，今年預計會進一步下滑。這是資本管制丑陋的一面。簡而言之，通過限制人們可以購買和投資的對象，即只有冰島國內的產品和投資機會，人們最終會停止消費。

????事實上，冰島的國內消費和投資均較危機前的水平下降了20%，而且跌勢還在延續。冰島人紛紛選擇償還債務，這雖然是好事，但它的代價是經濟增長放緩。盡管債務有所減輕，但居民和企業的債務水平仍然很高，分別為GDP的109%和170%。

????因為經濟增長放緩而備感沮喪的冰島人在5月份投票選出了一個新的聯合政府，它正是經濟繁榮時期當權的政府。新政府在競選期間承諾將解除資本管制，同時迫使銀行削減居民的抵押貸款本金。可以理解的是，這個承諾動搖了評級機構對冰島的觀點。標準普爾（S&P）6月份將冰島的信用評級前景下調為負面，理由是擔心新政府會落實這項計劃。IMF也表達了類似的保守觀點。

????冰島選擇的余地有限。如果它保持資本管制，經濟將繼續萎縮；若解除資本管制，國內資產價值便會下跌，因為冰島人會將資金轉移至境外。新政府稱，外國直接投資將抵消資本外流的影響，但他們要么是極度樂觀，要么完全是被誤導了。解除資本管制將導致房價和其他冰島資產價格大幅下跌，從而導致新一輪的銀行業恐慌。在這種混亂之后，冰島政府依然認為外國投資者還會紛來沓至嗎？

????由于冰島經濟體量小，有些人可能想當然地認為這個國家并不是歐洲機器的一個重要齒輪。但冰島正面臨著許多同樣困擾著更大經濟體的問題。例如，在歐洲主權債務危機的余波之中，幾個歐洲國家都實施了資本管制措施。這些國家選擇何時及如何解除這種管制將對歐元幣值產生深遠的影響，從而影響到整個歐洲大陸經濟的完整性。

????此外，冰島的銀行和西班牙銀行業也如出一轍，因為它們都曾為已經破裂的房地產泡沫添柴加火。資本管制解除后，冰島的銀行如何處理不良貸款問題可能會對投資者如何看待西班牙及其銀行業問題產生重大影響。冰島銀行業預計將迫使資者和大額儲戶承擔約75%至100%的虧損。這些投資者和大額儲戶中有許多是同時買賣主權債務和主權債務保險的對沖基金。這些對沖基金采取的報復方式可能會同樣用在意大利或法國，而這兩個國家的主權債務占GDP比例正不斷上升。

????冰島不容忽視。畢竟，它是第一個在全球金融危機期間崩盤的國家，也是第一個實現GDP反彈的國家之一。它的小體量和簡單的經濟結構意味著它無法將自身的問題掩蓋在一堆混淆視聽的貨幣行動中。這意味著，相對于陷入類似困境的大國，冰島會早早地面臨殘酷的現實。因此，投資者將密切關注冰島新政府的舉動。如果它開始搖搖欲墜，歐洲的其他地方可能將是下一張倒下的多米諾骨牌。（財富中文網）

????譯者：默默??

????But hang on: Iceland has made little, if any, real progress in tackling its economic issues. The government and its banks have simply employed measures designed to delay the pain, not cure the disease. Capital controls imposed by the government in 2008 are still in effect, forcing its citizens, and, more importantly, the nation's massive pension fund, to invest mainly in Iceland. At the same time, Icelandic consumers still find it hard to buy foreign goods, forcing them to buy less-desirable local equivalents, giving an artificial boost to the domestic economy. Meanwhile, high interest rates have made borrowing expensive. A moot point, considering Iceland's now-zombie banks aren't really lending; they are too busy dealing with fallout from the billions of krona worth of bad loans on their books.

????All in all, real output in Iceland remains 10% below the pre-crisis peak. And while GDP did grow at around 2.9% in 2011, it slowed to around 1.6% last year and is expected to fall even further this year. This is the ugly side of capital controls. In short, by restricting what people can buy and invest in, i.e. only Icelandic goods and opportunities, individuals eventually stop spending.

????Indeed, domestic consumption and investment in Iceland are both down 20% from their pre-crisis levels and continue to fall. Icelanders are instead choosing to pay down their debts, which, while positive, comes at the expense of economic growth. And despite the debt paydown, household and corporate debt remain high, coming in at 109% and 170% of GDP, respectively.

????Icelanders, frustrated with the slowdown in economic growth, voted in a new government coalition in May, the same that was in power during the boom years. The new government promised during the campaign to lift the capital controls and to force banks to cut people's mortgage principals. This has understandably shaken the rating agencies. S&P lowered its outlook on Iceland to negative in June on concern that the new government will go through with its plans. The IMF has expressed similar reservations.

????Iceland has few good options. If it keeps the capital controls in place its economy will continue to shrink; lift them and asset values will fall as Icelanders ship their cash out of the country. The new government says that foreign direct investment will make up for the capital outflows, but they are either extremely optimistic or completely misguided. The lifting of capital controls will cause housing prices and other Icelandic assets to fall dramatically leading to yet another bank panic. In the wake of this chaos the Icelandic government believes foreign investors will come strolling in?

????Iceland is small; it's easy to see why some might not think the country an important cog in the European machine. But Iceland is facing many of the same issues afflicting much larger economies. For example, capital controls have been instituted in several European nations amid the fallout from the sovereign debt crisis. How and when those nations choose to lift such controls will have a profound impact on the value of the euro and thus the economic integrity of the entire continent.

????Furthermore, Iceland's banks are not unlike those in Spain as they both financed housing booms gone bust. How Iceland's banks deal with the problem of its bad loans after capital controls are lifted could have a major impact on the way investors choose to look at Spain and its bank issues. Iceland's banks are expected to force losses of around to 75% to 100% on their investors and large depositors, many of which are hedge funds that also buy and sell sovereign debt and the insurance linked to it. How these hedge funds will retaliate could be replicated in Italy or in France where sovereign debt continues to mount relative to the size of their economies.

????Iceland shouldn't be ignored. After all, it was the first country to implode during the financial crisis and was one of the first ones to see its GDP rebound. Its small size and simple economy means that it is less able to bury its problems under a pile of confusing monetary actions. This forces Iceland to face the music much sooner than larger nations in similar predicaments. As such, investors will be watching what Iceland's new government does intently. If it begins to falter, the rest of Europe could be next.