????塞浦路斯援助行動的拙劣表現不僅表明整個歐洲在設計復雜的國家援助方案時所面臨的困難，它也讓人們意識到，歐洲的目標很多，但手段較為有限，二者并不對等。它還說明，為什么短期戰術性折中無法取代恰當的戰略決策，當然后者的難度要大得多。

????經過漫長協商，塞浦路斯政府和歐洲官員上周六一早公布了雙方達成的協議，結果卻馬上招致批評（請參見我的專欄文章A Muddled and Risky Approach to Cyprus）。幾個小時之內，外界的質疑就讓政府官員開始相互指責起來。

????隨著問罪范圍的擴大，幾乎所有參與設計這項協議的人都爭相和它撇清關系。塞浦路斯人很憤怒。塞浦路斯政府被迫將國內銀行歇業時間延長兩天。塞浦路斯和歐洲方面都再次召開閉門會議，商討如何修改這項協議。

????輕描淡寫地把所有這些情形都說成是特別個案很容易。畢竟，用官方青睞的形容詞來說，塞浦路斯的情況相當“獨特”和“極端”。

????遭遇希臘一系列違約事件重創前，塞浦路斯銀行業一直在不負責任地過度增長。這些銀行構成了一個離岸金融中心，而且吸引了來歷可疑的資金，一些歐洲官員因此認為應當對塞浦路斯銀行業加強監管。此外，塞浦路斯政府剛剛完成換屆。

????然而，對塞浦路斯特殊性的關注不應妨礙我們探討這樣一個問題，那就是如何通過塞浦路斯局勢看到在歐洲經濟和金融危機進入第三個年頭之際，一些普遍存在的問題仍在對歐洲構成侵害。

????按照目前的框架，歐洲官員，不論是債權方還是債務方，仍然在使用過于簡陋的工具來追求過于繁雜的目標。他們并沒有改弦更張，做出痛苦但必要的戰略抉擇，而是自然而然地拋出了一系列蹩腳的折中措施。通常，對某個、或某些談判方來說，每次折中似乎都有道理。塞浦路斯過去這幾天的情況已經非常生動地說明了這一點。甚至連國際貨幣基金組織（IMF）都希望這些折中方案能成功實施。但總的來說，這些方案構成了一個支離破碎、而且難以為繼的整體。

????通常情況下會出現這樣的局面：

????? 官方債權人——以歐洲政府、歐洲央行（ECB）和IMF為首，希望盡可能少地提供資金，并以此換取盡可能強大的政策杠桿。他們提出的限制條件表明，他們不相信債務國有能力在現有框架下持續推進改革。

????? 官方債權人也不愿意背負過重的資金負擔。他們會適當地讓私營部門做出貢獻。雖然他們希望后者自愿提供資金，但他們也明白，可能需要施加一定的壓力（之前這種做法被稱為“自救”（bail-in）或“PSI”，即私營部門參與（private sector involvement））。

????? 另一方面，債務國希望盡可能多地獲得外部資金支持，幫助自己實施改革，同時盡量減少本國公民和既得利益方的負擔。它還會努力消除PSI可能帶來的負面影響，以保護國內信心以及自身對外國投資的長期吸引力。

????The botched bailout of Cyprus sheds light on more than just the difficulties Europeans face in collectively designing a complicated country rescue package. It also serves as a reminder of the mismatch between Europe's multiple objectives and its more limited tools. And it illustrates why short-term tactical compromises are no substitute for proper, albeit much more difficult, strategic decision making.

????After long and protracted negotiations, the Cypriot government and European officials announced early on Saturday an agreement only to see it attract immediate criticism. (see my column A Muddled and Risky Approach to Cyprus.) Within hours, outside questioning fueled contradictory finger pointing within the official community.

????As the blame game expanded, virtually everyone involved in the design of the agreement scrambled to disown it. Cypriot citizens expressed outrage. Their government was forced to announce an extraordinary two-day closure of the domestic banking system. And both Cypriot and European officials are now back behind closed doors debating potential modifications.

????It is easy to dismiss all this as idiosyncratic. After all, Cyprus is, to use descriptors favored by the official community, quite "unique" and "exceptional."

????Its banks had grown excessively and irresponsibly before getting whacked by serial defaults in Greece. They constitute an offshore center that some European officials feel should be regulated more tightly as it attracts funds from dubious sources. And the country has just gone through a change of government.

????Yet the focus on Cyprus's peculiarities should not preclude us from discussing how this case sheds light on general ailments that continue to weaken Europe in the third year of its regional economic and financial crisis.

????Under the current framework, European officials -- be they creditors or debtors -- still pursue too many objectives with too few instruments. Rather than alter the context by making painful but necessary strategic decisions, they naturally end up stumbling through a series of messy compromises. Often, and as illustrated most vividly in the last few days by the case of Cyprus, each compromise is deemed to make sense to some negotiating party or parties. It is even blessed by the IMF. In aggregate, however, they risk constituting an incoherent and unsustainable whole.

????Here is the usual pattern:

????? Official creditors -- led by European governments, the ECB, and the IMF -- seek to contribute the smallest possible financing in return for maximum policy leverage. And their quest for conditionality reflects the distrust they have in debtor countries' ability to sustain reform efforts within the established framework.

????? Official creditors are also hesitant to carry too much of the financing burden. They appropriately seek contributions from the private sector. While hoping for voluntary contributions, they know that a certain amount of coercion is likely to be needed (formally known as a bail-in or "PSI," for private sector involvement).

????? On its part, the debtor country wishes to maximize external financial support in order to facilitate the implementation of reforms and minimize the burden borne by citizens and vested interests. It also struggles with the adverse impact that PSI could have on domestic confidence and the longer-term attractiveness for foreign investment.