????戴爾公司（Dell Inc.）的主要資產——約110億美元現金——大都沒有存放在美國國內。這就意味著，如果戴爾將這些錢轉回美國，或是以此為抵押進行借款，將面臨數十億美元的稅單。因此，大多數人認為，戴爾這些現金沒什么用，既不能為可能的收購提供融資，也無助于戴爾支付收購后的賬單。

????然而，戴爾或許有辦法把手頭的現金做抵押，以極低的成本借款，而無需為此繳稅。而且，通過這樣做，它實際上將使用這些現金為自身的收購提供融資。

????這個辦法由咨詢公司羅伯特?威倫斯（Robert Willens）的稅務專家羅伯特?威倫斯提出（其中也有我亂出主意的功勞）。做法是不以這些現金本身為抵押，而是以持有這些現金的海外子公司的股份為抵押借款。

????威倫斯表示，美國公司在本國以海外子公司的股票作抵押進行借款無需繳稅，只要作為抵押品的股票在子公司的投票權不高于三分之二。

????那么，戴爾如何能以其全部現金為抵押進行借貸？詳解如下：

????成立子公司時，戴爾可采用高投票權與低投票權相結合的方式。一類股票，大概是高投票權的股票，擁有該子公司三分之二的投票權，但持有子公司所有現金。然后戴爾可以用這部分股票為抵押進行借款，從而實際上以自身離岸資金進行抵押借款，而不會收到美國政府開出的稅單。

????如果戴爾公司拖欠貸款，貸款方可以獲得抵押的股票，從而獲得戴爾的離岸資金。一旦貸款方獲得抵押的股票，美國政府將開出稅單，但承擔稅費的將是戴爾，而不是貸款方。

????因此，貸款方將獲得現金，而稅費將歸戴爾公司承擔。然而，在這種情況下，戴爾應該已經陷入財務困難，甚至可能已經申請了破產保護。因此，該稅費將與其貸款方無關——他們應該已經獲得償還——而美國政府將成為戴爾的眾多債權人之一。

????不過，請注意，威倫斯——我也有略盡綿力——提出的這一粗略方法可以說是紙上談兵。他并沒有說它一定能奏效。我們倆其實想說的是，上述策略或是類似的辦法或許能解釋，為什么很多貸款人顯然巴不得以低價向看來風險頗高的戴爾收購案提供融資。

????這樣的策略有許多潛在的法律陷阱，但管它呢。或許有人想出了辦法，能讓戴爾公司將其未向美國政府繳稅的離岸資金轉入美國，而無需向美國國稅局支付高達35%的稅費。若果真如此，那可比公司創始人邁克爾?戴爾最近的把戲有看頭多了。讓我們拭目以待吧。（財富中文網）

????譯者：項航

????Dell Inc. has its major asset—about $11 billion of cash—located primarily outside the United States. That means that it would face a multi-billion-dollar tax bill if it repatriated the money or borrowed against it. Therefore, most people have assumed that Dell's cash is essentially useless when it comes to funding a possible buyout, or helping Dell (DELL) pay its post-buyout bills.

????However, there may be a way for Dell to borrow ultra-cheaply against its foreign cash without a tax bill. And, by doing so, it effectively would be using the cash to fund its buyout.

????The idea, suggested by tax expert Robert Willens of Robert Willens, LLC (with a bit of kibitzing from me) involves borrowing not against the cash itself, but borrowing against the stock of the foreign subsidiary that holds the cash.

????Willens says that a U.S. company can borrow in the U.S. against its overseas assets without tax consequences by pledging the stock of its foreign subsidiaries, provided that no more than two-thirds of the subsidiaries' voting power is posted as collateral.

????So how would that let Dell borrow against all its cash? Watch:

????Dell could use a high-vote, low-vote structure to set up the subsidiary. One class of stock, presumably the high-voting class, would have two-thirds of the subsidiary's voting power, but would hold all the subsidiary's cash. Dell then could borrow against that stock, effectively pledging its offshore cash without triggering a U.S. tax bill.

????If Dell defaults on its loan, the lenders could seize the pledged stock, and thus get their hands on the cash. Having the stock seized by lenders would trigger U.S. tax consequences—but the consequences would be for Dell, not for the foreclosing lenders.

????So the lenders would get the cash and Dell would incur a U.S. tax liability. However, in that case Dell would already be in financial difficulty, perhaps even in Chapter 11. Therefore, that liability wouldn't matter to its lenders -- who already would have been repaid -- and would make the U.S. government one of Dell's many creditors.

????Please note that Willens, with a little help from me, has roughed this out on the back of an envelope, so to speak. He's not saying that this would work. What he and I are saying is that this strategy or something similar might be the hidden factor explaining why so many lenders are apparently eager to provide cheap financing to a high-risk-seeming Dell buyout.

????There are many potential legal pitfalls for such a strategy, but what the Dell? Maybe someone has figured out how the Dells of the world can effectively bring their offshore, untaxed U.S. cash into the country without forking over 35% to the IRS. If that's the case, that's going to be a lot bigger story than Michael Dell's latest shenanigans. Stay tuned.