????其次，而且更重要的是，中國有政策工具，而且已經開始使用——最近的降息（無疑標志著經濟增長已取代通脹成為中國人民銀行的首要擔憂）最為明顯。高盛（Goldman Sachs）投資管理部首席投資策略師哈繼銘最近的研究報告指出，中國一些省級和地方政府已開始悄悄地試圖穩定樓市。有些省份的銀行已開始向首次購房者提供低于現行基準利率的購房貸款（過去，購房貸款利率往往較人民銀行的基準利率上浮5%-10%）。而中央政府關注的是另一面，有跡象顯示樓市，特別是在北京、上海以外的二三線城市開始有反彈跡象。

????中國的消費者仍然需要住房，也想買房——而且，關鍵是他們買得起。雖然宏觀經濟放緩，實際工資增長依然強勁，因此消費態勢保持良好。這也是為何國際危機加深后，中國政府并不著急的原因之一。要知道2008-2009年，中國政府在全球金融危機第一階段后的的確確急了。看到數以萬計突然失業的農民工擠滿了中國東部的火車站，準備坐火車回到貧窮的內陸省份，難免令人著急。中國政府瘋狂地向經濟注資，只為穩定經濟，他們做到了，但后果是通脹上升，以及迄今為止仍然數量不明的壞賬。這次，除了放松樓市調控，中國政府迄今采取的措施都只是小打小鬧，提供節能家電銷售補貼，削減一些特定商業稅賦，監管機構加快審批投資計劃等等，從這類微調可看不出北京著急了。

????更重要的一點是如有需要，北京可以采取更多舉措。悲觀分析認為，中國過去10年，特別是過去四年，所有政府推動的資本投資都已結束；這造成經濟過熱和過度投資重工業，令如今重工業深陷產能過剩。這造成了中國經濟結構的失衡，消費/GDP比率僅為39%，即便對于發展中國家也處于歷史低點。簡而言之，中國的增長模式難以持續，如果不迅速轉變為像美國那樣的消費驅動型國家，前面就是無底的深淵。看著辦吧。

????Second, and more important, China has policy options that it has begun to use -- the recent interest rate cut (signaling emphatically that growth has replaced inflation as the central bank's primary concern) being only the most obvious. Quietly, as a recent research note from Jiming Ha, chief investment strategist at Goldman Sachs' investment management division in China noted, provincial and local governments have begun to try to stabilize the housing sector. Banks in a variety of provinces are now offering mortgages to first time buyers that are available at a discount to the current benchmark rate (in the past they'd have to pay a 5%-10% premium over the PBOC's benchmark rate.) The central government is looking the other way, and there are signs that housing markets, particularly in second and third-tier cities outside Beijing and Shanghai, are now rebounding a bit.

????China's consumers still want and need housing -- and, critically, they can afford it. Real wage growth remains strong, despite the macro deceleration, and that in turn means consumption has held up pretty well. This is part of the reason the central government has not panicked in the wake of the growing global crisis. Believe me, in 2008 and 2009, the central government DID panic in the wake of the first phase of the global financial crisis. The site of tens of thousands of suddenly unemployed migrant workers clogging the trains stations in eastern China, headed home to much poorer interior provinces, tends to have that effect. Beijing dumped money furiously into the economy in order to stabilize it, succeeded in doing so, and then paid the consequences down the road in terms of higher inflation and a still unknown amount of bad loans. This time, the steps it is taking, in addition to loosening controls on housing sector, are so far all little tweaks -- subsidies for the sale of energy efficient appliances, some targeted business tax cuts, quicker approval of investment plans by regulators -- the small kind of stuff that doesn't bespeak panic.

????The more important point is that Beijing can do more if needed. Part of the bearish case on China is that all of the government driven capital investment that we saw in the last decade -- and in particular in the last four years -- is now over; it resulted in excessive growth overall and too much investment in heavy industries that are now plagued by over capacity. It's resulted in a disfigured economy, with consumption comprising only 39% of GDP, a historically low figure even for developing countries. Simply put, China's growth model is supposed to be dead, and if it doesn't shortly turn into a manic consumption driven clone of the United States, well, the abyss is right over there. Proceed accordingly.