????身居上海，大多數(shù)時候，每到夜晚，我都會聽到消費者新聞與財經(jīng)頻道（CNBC）里那些遠(yuǎn)在美國的、面目模糊的專家們絮叨著中國經(jīng)濟的天就要塌了，于是我很快便會睡眼惺忪。我已經(jīng)開始習(xí)慣這些有線電視網(wǎng)的愚昧無知，要不然肯定早就發(fā)瘋了。在對全球經(jīng)濟超級擔(dān)憂的當(dāng)下（提醒一句，這種擔(dān)憂合情合理，畢竟歐美經(jīng)濟危機仍在不斷升級），我們不妨深吸一口氣，將目前中國的經(jīng)濟放緩置于一定背景下來看待。

????過去一年中國經(jīng)濟的放緩是有必要的。前十年大多數(shù)時候，中國的實際GDP增速都保持在10%以上，引發(fā)了普遍的通貨膨脹和經(jīng)濟結(jié)構(gòu)的嚴(yán)重扭曲（過度依賴固定資產(chǎn)投資作為經(jīng)濟增長動力）。為此，政府收緊了政策，特別嚴(yán)加調(diào)控住宅市場。住宅建設(shè)過熱，但絕大多數(shù)中國人還是買不起房，從而導(dǎo)致社會矛盾升級。（建設(shè)過熱和房價過高顯然是一對經(jīng)濟悖論，我們稍后將做解釋。）

????宏觀調(diào)控政策已經(jīng)奏效，效果或許甚至有點超出政府的預(yù)想，因為很明顯，今年前兩個季度中國經(jīng)濟增速正在快速放緩。3月份，中國國務(wù)院總理溫家寶正式將2012年的官方GDP增長目標(biāo)調(diào)低到了7.5%，但就算達(dá)到這個目標(biāo)都還需要點運氣。中國近來的工業(yè)產(chǎn)值、用電量等數(shù)據(jù)都非常差。全球大宗商品價格下跌，從煤炭、鐵礦石到原油的庫存都在不斷攀升，顯然都與中國經(jīng)濟的放緩緊密相關(guān)。受中國需求推動的大宗商品市場長達(dá)十年的牛市正在接近尾聲。

????造成中國經(jīng)濟放緩的部分原因是歐洲危機——經(jīng)濟學(xué)家委婉地稱其“經(jīng)濟衰退”，但老實說，希臘、西班牙等國的情況已經(jīng)比大蕭條好不了多少。歐洲是中國最大的貿(mào)易伙伴國，歐洲危機加深，中國自然不能全身而退。同時，美國是中國第二大貿(mào)易伙伴國，美國經(jīng)濟疲弱自然也無益于中國。

????中國政府主導(dǎo)的這輪經(jīng)濟放緩?fù)耆斜匾『泌s上了外部需求疲弱，所以結(jié)果自然不太美妙。特別是那些相信中國經(jīng)濟將永遠(yuǎn)保持10%的年增長、持續(xù)進(jìn)行相應(yīng)產(chǎn)能擴張的公司。預(yù)計中國業(yè)務(wù)比重高的跨國公司業(yè)績不及預(yù)期的情況將越來越多。

????不過，話雖如此，也不能夸大當(dāng)前中國經(jīng)濟的放緩。中國經(jīng)濟沒有出現(xiàn)自由落體式的下滑。它面臨的宏觀問題也遠(yuǎn)不及歐美眼前的問題。要知道，首先，將中國歸為“出口型”經(jīng)濟已不再準(zhǔn)確，因此外部需求的沖擊可能有限。中國的經(jīng)常項目順差在國民經(jīng)濟中的比率已略低于3%，遠(yuǎn)低于八年前的10%。發(fā)達(dá)世界上演的經(jīng)濟危機已經(jīng)波及中國，但還沒有嚴(yán)重到扼殺中國經(jīng)濟的增長勢頭。

????Some of the last words I hear before nodding off to sleep most nights here in Shanghai are uttered by a pasty-faced guy in the United States, nattering on CNBC about how the sky is falling (economically speaking) in China. I've become somewhat inured to the inanities of cable television -- you'd go insane if it were otherwise -- but in these days of hyper-concern about the global economy (quite legitimate concern mind you, given the unfolding debacles in Europe and the United States), it's useful for everyone to take a deep breath and put China's current slowdown in some context.

????China's economy for the past year has been slowing out of necessity. Its consistent 10%-plus real GDP growth rates for most of the past decade had contributed to a broad inflation, as well as severe distortions in the economy's composition (a significant over reliance on fixed asset investment as the driver of growth). The government tightened policy as a result, and put shackles in particular on the residential housing market, which was at once overbuilt and still unaffordable for the vast majority of Chinese, thus contributing to social tensions here. (Overbuiltand overpriced is, to be sure, an economic oxymoron, but we'll leave the explanation for that for later.)

????The tightening measures worked, arguably a bit more than the government intended, as it became clear in the first two quarters of this year that China was decelerating rapidly. Prime Minister Wen Jiabao in March officially lowered the government's growth target for 2012 to 7.5%, and that should be considered a target that Beijing will be lucky to hit this year. The data these days -- industrial production, electricity consumption -- are weak, and the global slump in commodity prices, with inventories piling up in everything from coal to iron ore to crude oil, is obviously closely tied to macro weakness in China. It's the unwinding of the decade-long, China-driven bull market in commodities that is now over.

????Part of the China slow-down is driven by the disaster in Europe -- what polite economists call a "recession," but which is, let's face it, nothing less than a depression in countries like Greece and Spain. Europe is China's biggest trading partner, and China is plainly not immune to its deepening pain. The U.S. is China's second-largest trading partner, and its weakening economy is obviously not helping China's growth, either.

????So a government-led deceleration, which was necessary, now has weakness in external demand added to it, and the result is not pretty. That's particularly true for companies the world over that convinced themselves that China would grow at 10% per year forever, and scaled up capacity accordingly. Expect earnings disappointments from multinationals everywhere with big China businesses to increase.

????But, having said all that, it's critical not to exaggerate the current weakness. China is not in free fall. The macro issues it confronts pale in comparison with those now front and center in Europe and the U.S. Remember, first, that China can no longer accurately be characterized as an "export led" economy, so the damage the outside world can do is limited. Beijing's current account surplus as a share of its economy is now slightly less than 3%. That's down from 10% eight years ago. The unfolding economic debacle in the developed world is wounding China, but not killing it.