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????初聞西班牙達成1,000億歐元的銀行業(yè)救助方案，投資者歡欣鼓舞，但是慢慢消化方案的細節(jié)后，這種熱情可能不會持續(xù)多久。由馬德里和布魯塞爾協(xié)力撮合并于上周末出臺的這一方案不過是個騙人的把戲，房地產(chǎn)貸款損失只是從銀行的賬上轉(zhuǎn)到了西班牙政府同樣糟糕的資產(chǎn)負債表上。這一方案無恥地將銀行損失公眾化，不僅可能引發(fā)西班牙街頭暴亂，而且還可能進一步提高、而不是降低西班牙政府的融資難度，使它更難以足夠低的利率發(fā)行債券來為自己提供融資。

????最終，西班牙政府可能自己也會需要救助，重演希臘、愛爾蘭和鄰國葡萄牙已經(jīng)發(fā)生過的局面。但鑒于西班牙GDP是上述三國GDP總和的兩倍，救助西班牙可能成為一個催化劑，歐元區(qū)要么更加抱團，要么干脆分崩離析。

????西班牙上任不久的新首相馬里亞諾?拉霍伊直到5月29日還在說，西班牙不需要任何形式的救助。他堅信自他去年11月掌權(quán)以來，他領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的保守黨西班牙人民黨（People's Party）進行的改革足以恢復(fù)人們對西班牙經(jīng)濟的信心。

????西班牙人民黨推進了一些積極的改革，比如建立正式的債務(wù)限額，設(shè)立預(yù)算赤字上限等，但它同時仍在繼續(xù)執(zhí)行前任社會黨制定的一些錯誤政策，特別是強迫銀行業(yè)弱弱合并。這個政策背后的邏輯是通過擴大規(guī)模，將這些各自持有幾十億歐元房地產(chǎn)壞賬的銀行拼湊在一起，希望能更好地應(yīng)對不斷累積的損失。

????這顯然不是應(yīng)對該國銀行業(yè)困境的最佳方式。結(jié)果，市場懲罰了西班牙主權(quán)債券，因為該國銀行體系顯然已處于崩潰邊緣，而該國政府也沒有辦法靠自己來解決這個問題。

????拉霍伊不得不放低身段，上周末宣布西班牙“準(zhǔn)備”接受1,000億歐元的銀行業(yè)救助方案。救助的技術(shù)細節(jié)仍需厘清，但我們已經(jīng)大致知道它將如何進行。歐盟（EU）將通過兩家特殊救助基金——歐洲金融穩(wěn)定安排（European Financial Stability Facility，EFSF）和歐洲穩(wěn)定機制（European Stability Mechanism, ESM）中的一家或兩家將資金轉(zhuǎn)入西班牙自己的救助基金、近來資金枯竭的銀行有序重組基金（FROB）。然后，F(xiàn)ROB很可能向陷入困境的銀行直接注入資金，填補由西班牙房價大跌造成的資產(chǎn)負債表缺口。

????Investors initially cheered the news that Spain reached a deal for a 100 billion euro bank bailout, but that enthusiasm may not last once the details are digested. The deal, concocted in Madrid and Brussels over the weekend, amounts to a kind of shell game, whereby bank property losses are simply transferred from the banks over to the Spanish government's weak balance sheet. Not only is this bailout likely to create public outrage in the streets of Spain, as it shamelessly socializes bank losses, but it will probably make it harder, not easier, for Spain to sell its debt at a low enough rate to fund itself.

????Eventually, the Spanish government will need its own bailout, similar to what has already occurred in Greece, Ireland and neighboring Portugal. But with a GDP that's twice as high as those three countries combined, a Spanish sovereign bailout could be the catalyst that either forces the eurozone closer together or smashes it apart.

????Spain's relatively new Prime Minister, Mariano Rajoy, maintained as late as May 29 that his nation did not need a bailout of any kind. He was confident that the reforms his conservative People's Party (PP) had put in place since coming to power in November of last year were strong enough to bring confidence back to the nation's shaky economy.

????But while the PP pushed through some positive reforms, like establishing a formal debt limit and setting a budget deficit ceiling, it also continued some of the more questionable policies set in place by its socialist predecessors, most notably, the policy of forcing weak banks to merge. The belief behind this policy was that by being bigger, those weak banks, which were all carrying billions of euros worth of bad property loans on their books, would somehow cope better with their mounting losses after being smashed together.

????That obviously was not the best way to deal with the nation's bank woes. The market punished Spanish sovereign bonds as it became clear that the country's banking system was teetering near collapse and the government did not have the means to take care of the issue on its own.

????Swallowing his pride, Rajoy announced this weekend that his nation was "open" to receiving a bailout of its banking sector to the tune of 100 billion euros. The mechanics of the bailout still need to be ironed out, but we know roughly how it will work. The EU, through either one or both of its special bailout funds, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and/or the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), will transfer money to Spain's own bailout fund, the FROB, which recently ran dry. From there the FROB will most likely inject capital directly into weak banks in order to fill the holes in their balance sheets caused by the massive decline in property values in the country.