????德國的低利率和強勁經(jīng)濟增長帶來了低失業(yè)率，創(chuàng)下兩德合并以來新低5.6%。以往平平常常10%失業(yè)率這樣的日子已一去不復返了——現(xiàn)如今，如果你在德國找不到工作，那是你不夠努力。相比之下，法國失業(yè)率10%，是德國的近兩倍，而西班牙高達25%，是德國的近5倍。

????為什么德國經(jīng)濟增長，鄰國卻苦苦掙扎，這里有很多結(jié)構性原因。但關鍵是雖然周邊一團水深火熱，德國在經(jīng)濟方面確實做得不錯。因此，你會怪德國總理默克爾不嘗試改變現(xiàn)狀嗎？

????由法國、西班牙和意大利牽頭的一個歐元區(qū)成員國聯(lián)盟正在向德國施壓，希望它同意創(chuàng)建歐元區(qū)共同債券工具（即歐元債券），以穩(wěn)定成員國借貸利率。隨著法國由贊成赤字支出的社會黨掌權，如今這一壓力已經(jīng)加大。希望是通過共同債務工具，經(jīng)濟疲弱的成員國能以較低利率進行借貸，為促增長項目提供資金，穩(wěn)定歐元匯率。

????德國不是不同意這些觀點——只是沒看到執(zhí)行這一計劃有何好處。讓我們來看看歐元債券能做些什么。首先，它們可以穩(wěn)定并強化歐元匯率，但幫助外匯市場的同時會傷害德國出口行業(yè)。其次，歐元債券將使那些信用評級較差的國家更容易以較低利率進行借貸，等于是把核心成員國的優(yōu)良信用延伸到了那些信用不良的外圍國家。德國是歐元區(qū)兩個具有AAA-評級的國家之一，另一個是芬蘭。如果發(fā)行歐元債券，德國的信用評級無疑會遭下調(diào)，導致德國國內(nèi)借貸成本上升。最后，歐元債券將使得法國能以較低的利率借到更多錢，為法國的預算赤字和大型項目（刺激法國疲弱而效率低下的經(jīng)濟）提供資金。那么，德國能得到什么好處呢？

????另一項正在布魯塞爾討論的、相對簡單的提議是把所有的歐元區(qū)債務集合成一支共同基金，由所有成員國在25年內(nèi)償還。這個提議似乎比歐元債券更糟，因為這只解決了過去的債務問題，無助于幾乎歐元區(qū)所有成員國都存在的財政低效和預算赤字問題。這是朝著終結(jié)危機 邁出的不錯一步，但并不能解決問題。幾年后，歐元區(qū)還會回到老問題，總的債務負擔只會更加沉重，信用狀況更糟。到那時，可能連德國都救不了歐元了。

????The low interest rates and the strong economy have translated to a record low unemployment rate for Germany, post-unification, of 5.6%. Gone are the days where 10% unemployment was the norm – if you don't have a job in Germany these days, you just aren't looking hard enough. Compare that with France, which has an unemployment rate that is almost double that of Germany at 10% or Spain, which is nearly five times higher at 25%.

????There are many structural reasons why Germany is experiencing economic growth while its neighbors are floundering. But the point here is that Germany, despite the fire burning around it, is doing pretty darn well economically. So would you blame chancellor Merkel for not trying to rock the boat here?

????A coalition of eurozone members - led by France, Spain and Italy - is pushing Germany to agree to the creation of a common debt instrument for the eurozone, known as a eurobond, in an effort to stabilize borrowing rates for member nations. The pressure has increased now that France is led by a socialist government in favor of deficit spending. The hope is that a common debt instrument will allow weaker members to borrow at low rates to fund projects meant to stimulate economic growth and stabilize the euro's value.

????Germany doesn't disagree with that assertion – it just doesn't see any upside in going along with the plan. Let's take a look at what eurobonds could do here. First, they would most likely stabilize and strengthen the euro against other currencies. While that would be good for the international currency markets, it would hurt Germany's export industry. Second, eurobonds would make it easier for countries with poor credit ratings to borrow at cheaper rates. This is done by extending the good credit of the core members to those on the periphery with bad credit. As one of two AAA-rated countries in the eurozone, the other being Finland, Germany will undoubtedly see a downgrade in its credit rating if eurobonds were issued, translating to higher borrowing costs at home. And lastly, eurobonds would allow France to borrow more money at lower rates, which will go to fund its budget deficit as well as grand projects to stimulate its weak and inefficient economy. Again, this benefits Germany how?

????Another, less severe, proposal that has been making the rounds in Brussels would be the pooling of all eurozone debt into a common fund, which would be paid down by all members over 25 years. This idea seems to be an even worse alternative to eurobonds as it solves the past debt problem but does nothing to fix the fiscal inefficiencies and budget deficits that plague nearly all eurozone members. This would be a good first step to ending the crisis, but it isn't the cure. In a few years the eurozone will be back just where they started, only with a larger overall debt burden and weaker credit. At that point not even Germany could save the euro.