????但這一災難性場景并非不可避免。“其他已退出事實上共同貨幣區的國家沒有陷入惡性通貨通脹。”持有希臘國債的投資公司Greylock Capital的總裁漢斯?休謨斯說。阿里布認為，希臘的退出將創造出與冰島、阿根廷同樣的增長活力，冰島、阿根廷都事實上放棄了高估的貨幣。

????我認為，出現阿里布預測的、相對樂觀的情形可能性更大：在恢復德拉克馬的最初幾天，很多逃離希臘的歐元儲蓄將回流。希臘產品將極其熱銷，售價比一周前歐元換成德拉克馬時的價格至少低三分之一。這種突然的資金流入將支撐德拉克馬。

????很快，希臘將恢復加入歐元區之前的情形：一個物價不貴的國家。旅游者將取消他們在土耳其的度假（幾周前，土耳其的價格在地中海地區還是很低的），改至希臘島嶼游覽。希臘的番茄、橄欖油和魚產品的出口將增加，加工品進口將下降，因為這些加工品的價格相對于國內制造產品出現了上漲。

????希臘主權債務也會違約，這是走向復蘇的另外必要一步。歐洲央行（European Central Bank）將承受巨大損失，但私營部門的債券持有人早已承受了大部分痛苦。“我們有20種不同期限的希臘國債已經折價80%。”休謨斯說，“我認為沒有任何理由再折價。”

????退出歐元區，這一令希臘和歐洲領導人都害怕的舉措，將讓希臘恢復溫和增長。但這也會恢復希臘在2001年1月1日加入歐元區前的一些負面因素。“未來的問題是我們會看到一個新希臘，還是一個舊希臘，”阿里布說。前者將要求希臘政府摒棄壟斷、縮減龐大的公務員隊伍、取消禁止郵輪線路從希臘始發和終到的反競爭法規。如果希臘生產率落后于鄰國，它將進行更多的進口和更少的出口，降低工人工資和生活水平。為恢復其在國際市場的競爭力，它需要定期將德拉克馬貶值。

????這就是舊希臘，不幸的是舊希臘出現的可能性更大。但至少，希臘擺脫了高估至少50%的歐元的重壓。歐洲即將讓市場而非政客來決定其度假服務和農業物產究竟值多少錢。這很快就會發生。

????譯者：早稻米

????But the disaster scenario isn't inevitable. "Other countries have left what's effectively a common currency zone without suffering hyperinflation," says Hans Humes, president of investment firm Greylock Capital, which holds Greek government bonds. Aliber thinks that Greece's exit will create the same growth dynamic that's recharged Iceland and Argentina, both of whom effectively shed overvalued currencies.

????My view is that the relatively optimistic Aliber forecast is the more likely outcome. Here's how it plays out: In the first few days after the drachma's return, much of the savings that left the country in Euros will come back. Greek goods will be screaming buy, selling for at least one-third less that a week before for people exchanging their Euros for drachma. That sudden inflow will support the drachma.

????Overnight, Greece will once again become what it was in pre-Euro days: an inexpensive country. Tourists will cancel their vacations in Turkey –– which a few weeks ago were the Mediterranean bargain –– and tour the Greek islands instead. Exports of Greek tomatoes, olive oil and fish from its fish farms will expand, and imports of manufactured goods will fall as they rise in price versus domestically made products.

????Greece will also default on its sovereign debt, another necessary step towards recovery. The European Central Bank will suffer big losses, but private bondholders have already taken most of the pain. "We've taken an effective 80% haircut on twenty different maturities of Greek government bonds," says Humes. "I do not see a reason for an additional haircut."

????The move that both Greek and European leaders so dread will restore modest growth. But it will also restore the same negatives that saddled Greece before it entered the Eurozone on January 1st, 2001. "The question for the future is whether we see a new or an old Greece," says Aliber. The former would require that the Greek government junk monopolies, trim the gigantic public workforce, and shed anti-competitive rules that prevent cruise lines from starting and ending trips in Greece. If Greek productivity lags that of its neighbors, it will import more and export less, hobbling wages and the living standards of its workers. To restore its competitiveness on global markets, it will have to keep devaluing the drachma at regular intervals.

????That was the old Greece, and unfortunately, it's the old Greece that's more likely to emerge. But at least will escape the grip of a currency that's at least 50% overvalued. Europe is about to let the market, not politics, decide what price it make its vacation packages and agricultural bounty a great deal again. And it will happen soon.