????8月24日，也就是上周三早上，在他那紅磚白柱的奧馬哈宅邸里，沃倫?巴菲特躺在浴缸中揣度自己最成功的幾次投資：基礎雄厚的公司深陷風暴，輿論沸沸揚揚，投資者紛紛拋售，而他正確地預見到這些公司最終將能渡過危機。一旦它們恢復元氣，巴菲特即將數十億美元收入囊中。躺在浴缸里，巴菲特再次回憶起兩筆這樣的交易。

????第一次是所謂的色拉油大丑聞（Great Salad-Oil Scandal）。上世紀60年代初，一位大宗商品大亨獲取了大量貸款，擔保品是大量色拉油，置于美國運通（American Express）位于新澤西州巴約納的倉庫中。事實證明，那些油箱中儲存的并非他所說的色拉油，基本上都是水，只有最上面浮著些色拉油以作掩飾。受此拖累，美國運通股價暴跌了50%。巴菲特抓住了這個機會，在五年內將對這家公司的投資增加了五倍。

????第二次危機帶來的機會出現在1976年，當時政府雇員保險公司（GEICO）的股價從此前的61美元高位崩盤，一路跌至2美元，原因是這家一度頗為保守的保險公司盲目追求高增長，將保單價格定得太低，而且資金儲備不足，以至于迷失了方向。巴菲特再次發現良機，他認為只要政府雇員保險公司的新管理層恢復低成本、低風險戰略，它就能重現輝煌。其他股東紛紛逃離時，伯克希爾哈撒韋（Berkshire Hathaway）大舉增持，到1996年已經擁有51%股權。同年，伯克希爾又出資23億美元收購了剩余股權，相當于每股71美元——35倍于危機期間增持的成本，但即使這一價格現在看來也極為劃算。

????35年后，巴菲特認為他在一家備受投資者指責的大公司身上再次發現了類似的機會，這就是美國銀行（Bank of America）。

????巴菲特當時甚至沒有美國銀行首席執行官布萊恩?莫伊尼漢的電話號碼，因此叫行政助理去打聽。當他在曼哈頓市中心以注重環保著稱的美國銀行大廈與莫伊尼漢會面時，巴菲特提出的交易在股息方面的要求相對較低，強調的是獲得認股權證，如果美國銀行成功復蘇，這些權證將帶來巨大利潤。憑借為富利波士頓金融公司（FleetBoston Financial）效力的經歷，莫伊尼漢本人就是一位經驗豐富的交易撮合者，他希望完全保密，拒絕讓投行介入，也沒有征詢副手們的意見，最初只和美國銀行董事長、前杜邦（DuPont）首席執行官賀利得探討過該交易。

????董事會周四早上對該交易進行了電話投票。這筆交易的規模達50億美元，決策過程卻只花了24個小時，這種節奏恐怕只有巴菲特才能做到。伯克希爾哈撒韋將獲得每年6%的股息，還有權以7.14美元的價格買入7億股美銀股票，而后者的股價現在已經超過了這個水平。

????Early on Wednesday morning, August 24th, Warren Buffett was soaking in the bathtub at his red-brick, white-columned house in Omaha, musing about how he'd made some of his best buys when investors bailed on solid companies suffering a highly-publicized storm. He correctly predicted they'd work through the trouble, and made billions when they recovered. From the tub, Buffett recalled two such occasions.

????The first was the Great Salad-Oil Scandal. In the early 1960s, a commodities mogul was taking out big loans secured by what he claimed were giant inventories of salad oil stored in warehouses owned by American Express (AXP) in Bayonne, New Jersey. As it turned out, the tanks contained mostly water, with salad oil floating on the top for disguise. Shares of AmEx dropped 50%. Buffett pounced, and multiplied his investment five-fold in five years.

????The second crisis-driven opportunity came in 1976, when the stock of GEICO collapsed to $2 a share from a previous high of $61. The once conservative insurer had lost its way by underpricing its policies in pursuit of reckless growth, and scrimping on reserves. Once again, Buffett reckoned that GEICO would thrive if its new management restored its low-cost, low-risk strategy. Berkshire Hathaway (BRKA) boosted its holdings as others fled, and by 1996 had accumulated 51% of its stock. That year, Berkshire purchased the remaining shares at $71 for $2.3 billion -- 35 times what he paid in the crisis, and a price that now looks like a terrific bargain.

????Thirty-five years later, Buffett thought he saw the same pattern in the big company investors reviled more than any other: Bank of America (BAC).

????Buffett didn't even have CEO Brian Moynihan's phone number, and asked his administrative assistant to find it. When he reached Moynihan at the environmentally-friendly Bank of America Tower in midtown Manhattan, Buffett proposed a deal that was relatively light on dividends, and heavy on warrants that would produce enormous gains if BofA recovers. Moynihan, an experienced dealmaker from his days making acquisitions for Fleet, wanted near-total secrecy. He declined to bring in investment bankers, didn't consult with lieutenants, and initially discussed the deal only with his chairman, former DuPont CEO Chad Holliday.

????The board voted by phone early Thursday morning. The $5 billion deal had taken just 24 hours, a pace that could only happen in Buffett-land. Berkshire Hathaway will receive a 6% dividend, and the right to buy 700 million shares at a price of $7.14. BofA's shares are already trading over that level.