????“美國政府必須接受一個痛苦的事實，昔日靠借債就能輕松擺脫爛攤子的好日子已經(jīng)一去不復(fù)返了……”——中國新華社（Xinhua News Agency）.

????最近，我們的中國朋友心跳加速已經(jīng)有好些日子了。北京的主流媒體同仁們一直加班加點，充滿義憤地撰寫各種評論，抨擊美國政府在財政上揮霍無度，經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展遲緩。畢竟，中國是新興超級經(jīng)濟(jì)體。它出于好心借給美國錢的日子就要到頭了。或者至少中國政府打算讓大家確信這一點。

????作為美國政府最大的債主，中國發(fā)出的聲音肯定聽起來令人膽寒，不是嗎？中國人深恐自己龐大的三萬億美元外匯儲備——其中70%購買了美國國債——即將貶值，正打算拿回自己辛辛苦苦掙下的錢回老家。可惡的美國佬。

????不過，有件小事不得不提。這種情況沒有可能——絕不可能——變?yōu)楝F(xiàn)實。

????圍繞著中國購買美國國債這一主題的種種亂象令人震驚：大量的不實信息，無數(shù)緊張過度的頭條新聞，還有對經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)知識的徹底無知。無論何時，當(dāng)某些歇斯底里的廣播訪談節(jié)目主持人或西裝革履的政客開始慷慨激昂地大談特談中國是如何“支配我們”時，都必須牢記一些關(guān)鍵要點。首先，正如北京大學(xué)光華管理學(xué)院（Peking University's Guanghua School of Management）的金融學(xué)教授邁克爾?佩蒂斯最近在他的“中國金融市場通訊”（China Financial Markets）中所闡述的：“請記住，中國人民銀行（the People's Bank of China）之所以購買巨額的美國政府債券并不是因為它手里的錢多得沒地方花了。它購買美國國債純屬其行使交易政策的職能。”在全球眾多呆瓜圍繞這個議題所發(fā)出的一片喧嘩中，邁克爾的見解可能是最為清醒的。

????其次，正如佩蒂斯再次提醒我們的：“除非是資本凈輸出國，否則不可能出現(xiàn)經(jīng)常項目盈余。”別忘了，中國仍然有巨額的經(jīng)常項目盈余。現(xiàn)狀是，盡管中國的經(jīng)常項目盈余占其經(jīng)濟(jì)總量的比例已不像數(shù)年前那么高了，那時經(jīng)常項目盈余一度達(dá)到GDP的10%，但總量還是十分巨大。今年第一財季，經(jīng)常項目盈余是282億美元，且出口仍然是中國整體經(jīng)濟(jì)增長的關(guān)鍵驅(qū)動因素。（第一財季，商品與服務(wù)出口占中國GDP增長額約40%。）

????當(dāng)然，中國可以將出口商們通過將商品掙來的美元都遣返回美國。但將所有這些錢送返美國意味著要將美元兌換成中國自己的貨幣——人民幣，這就意味著人民幣將對美元大幅升值。這種情形當(dāng)然是教科書式的貿(mào)易和貨幣市場運作的方式。如果一國一直都處于貿(mào)易順差的狀態(tài)，最終其貨幣將會升值到某個臨界點，到了這一點，其商品競爭力就會降低，貿(mào)易賬戶也會進(jìn)行相應(yīng)調(diào)整。然而，正因為出口是中國經(jīng)濟(jì)增長極其重要的組成部分，中國政府有意識地放緩了調(diào)整步伐。在過去五年間，人民幣兌美元的匯率已從8.2：1變成現(xiàn)在的約6.5：1。換言之，人民幣已經(jīng)升值了，但是，如果政府沒有有意介入放緩這一進(jìn)程的話，這一升值進(jìn)程可能會更快。中國人民銀行按照市場價購買了盡可能多的美元，并且用人民幣來支付。（正如佩蒂斯所說，它是通過在國內(nèi)市場借貸人民幣來購買的，或是通過迫使中國各家銀行在央行儲蓄準(zhǔn)備金來實現(xiàn)的。）

????的確，過去十幾年間，中國政府已經(jīng)努力放緩其外匯儲備快速增長的步伐。但是，正如中國人民銀行的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家和顧問余永定上周所說：“這些舉措都未見成效，因為它們并沒有解決外匯儲備快速增長的真正原因：即以控制人民幣升值步伐為目標(biāo)的政府干預(yù)。”

????中國政府基于美元的外匯儲備正在貶值，因為一直以來，人民幣兌美元緩慢但是確定無疑地在升值。這就是為什么余永定的觀點值得肯定。他在《金融時報》（FT）上撰文稱：“中國人民銀行必須停止購買美元，并盡快允許人民幣匯率由市場決定。”

????這一觀點正確至極。然而，要實現(xiàn)這種轉(zhuǎn)變，其可能性就像由我來代替姚明成為休斯頓火箭隊核心主力一樣。要中國政府在匯率政策上突然改弦易轍毫無可能。因為目前已然身處勞動力工資上漲和貨幣升值重壓之下的中國出口企業(yè)將命懸一線。請記住，在中國，穩(wěn)定高于一切。中國將盡一切可能避免突然、劇烈的經(jīng)濟(jì)政策沖擊。

????當(dāng)然，中國也有其他選擇。它可以不再購買美國國債，轉(zhuǎn)而購買其他國家的政府債券。你知道世界第二大和第三大最具流動性的國內(nèi)債券市場是哪兩國嗎？日本和意大利。我們可以請中國外匯管理局（(the State Administration of Foreign Exchange ，SAFE，掌管中國外匯儲備的官方機(jī)構(gòu)）的官員們做個舉手表決。有多少人想要大幅度提高介入日本和意大利市場的程度？特別是考慮到現(xiàn)在歐洲央行（ECB）已開始把購買意大利國債作為最后一招。

????為保證收益，中國政府可能會增加日元的外匯儲備，也會增加黃金儲備。并且，毫無疑問的是，它將在美國和其他地方對“硬資產(chǎn)”（hard assets）加大投資。實際上，這么做對所有人都有好處（奧巴馬政府應(yīng)該對所有愿意出資10萬美元或更多錢在美購買房產(chǎn)的中國公民發(fā)放簽證）。但是請記得，僅僅是本年度的第一財季，中國政府就又增加了1,380億美元的外匯儲備。這么多錢需要找到用武之地。它們可以回到國內(nèi)市場，或是需要進(jìn)行再投資。無論如何，世界上唯一一個具有足夠的規(guī)模和深度吸納這些資金的市場正是美國政府債券市場。

????正如佩蒂斯所說：“過去幾年間每半年我們就能聽到同樣的聲音：”中國要把錢投到其他地方了。現(xiàn)在，特別是在標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾（S&P）發(fā)布了下調(diào)美國信用等級評級這一飽受爭議的決定后，中國政府用前所未有的尖銳措辭重申了這一威脅。此舉在中國國內(nèi)外都贏得了一些政治認(rèn)同。但是事實依然如同佩蒂斯所說：“這一切不會變成現(xiàn)實。”

????譯者：清遠(yuǎn)

????"The U.S. government has to come to terms with the painful fact that the good old days when it could just borrow its way out of messes of its own making are finally gone..." -- China's state-owned Xinhua News Agency.

????It's been quite a few days of chest thumping for our friends in the Chinese government. The ruling Party's propagandists in Beijing have been working overtime, huffily putting out statements bashing the United States for its fiscal profligacy and economic sloth. China, you see, is the new economic super power. Its days of lending to the United States out of the goodness of its beneficent heart are just about over. Or so Beijing would have you believe.

????Coming from Washington's largest creditor, the noises out of Beijing now sure sound threatening don't they? The Chinese, afraid that their massive three trillion dollars portfolio of foreign reserves -- 70% of which is in Treasury debt -- is going to be devalued, are just going to take their hard-earned money and go home. Screw you, Uncle Sam.

????There's this one little thing, though. There is no chance -- none -- that this will happen.

????The amount of misinformation, the number of overwrought headlines and the fundamental economic illiteracy that surrounds the subject of China's purchase of U.S. Treasury debt continues to be astounding. There are a couple of key points to remember whenever some hysterical radio talk show host or uniformed politician starts ranting about how China "owns us." First, as Michael Pettis, a professor of finance at Peking University's Guanghua School of Management and perhaps the most lucid voice on this subject amidst a global cacophony of dunces, wrote recently in his China Financial Markets newsletter: "Remember that the People's Bank of China does not purchase huge amounts of U.S. government bonds because it has a lot of money lying around and doesn't know what to do with it. Its purchase of U.S. government bonds is simply a function of its trade policy."

????Second, as Pettis again reminds us, "you cannot run a current account surplus unless you are also a net exporter of capital." And China, lest anyone forget, is still running huge current account surpluses. Not, it is true, as massive a surplus as a share of its overall economy as it had a couple of years ago, when the current account surplus reached 10% of GDP, but huge nonetheless. It was $28.2 billion in the first quarter of this year, and exports continue to be a key driver of China's overall economic growth. (Exports of goods and services constituted about 40% of China's GDP growth in the first quarter.)

????China could, of course, repatriate all the dollars its exporters earn by selling stuff to the U.S. But bringing that money home means converting the dollars into its own currency, the Renminbi (RMB), which means the value would rise—sharply against the dollar. This, of course, is how text-book trade and currency markets are supposed to function. If you run persistent trade surpluses, eventually your currency appreciates to the point that your goods become less competitive and the trade accounts adjust accordingly. Precisely because exports are such a significant part of China's growth story, however, Beijing has purposefully slowed the adjustment process. The RMB over the last half-decade has gone from 8.2 to the dollar to about 6.5 now. It has appreciated somewhat, in other words, but as fast as it might have if the government hadn't purposefully intervened to slow the process. The PBOC buys as many dollars as the market offers at the price it sets, and it pays for those dollars in RMB. (As Pettis writes, it does so by borrowing RMB in the domestic market, or by forcing Chinese banks to place reserves on deposit at the central bank.)

????Beijing, it's true, has tried to slow down its rapid accumulation of foreign exchange reserves over the last couple of years. But as Yu Yongding, an economist and advisor to the PBOC said in a piece last week, "these policies failed because they did not address the real cause of the rapid increase in foreign exchange: namely, state intervention aimed at controlling the pace of Renminbi appreciation."

????The value of Beijing's dollar based foreign exchange reserves are eroding for China, as the RMB, slowly but surely, has crept against the dollar. Which is why Yu, to his credit, wrote in the FT that "the People's Bank of China must stop buying US dollars and allow the Renminbi exchange rate to be decided by market forces as soon as possible."

????That's exactly correct. The thing of it is, there's about as much chance of that happening as there is of me replacing Yao Ming as the Houston Rocket's center. There is no way Beijing is going to go cold turkey on exchange rates. Its exporters, already under pressure thanks to rising wages and some currency appreciation, would scream bloody murder. And remember, China is all about stability. Sudden, dramatic economic policy shocks are to be avoided if at all possible.

????China does have a few options, of course. It could, instead of U.S. Treasuries, buy other foreign government bonds. You know what the second and third largest, most liquid domestic bond markets are in the world? Japan and Italy. Let's have a show of hands of you folks at SAFE (the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, which manages Beijing's foreign exchange reserves). How many of you want to significantly increase your exposure to Japan and Italy, particularly today with the ECB stepping in as a buyer of last resort for Italian debt?

????On the margins, Beijing may well increase its reserves held in Yen, as well as in gold. And it will no doubt continue to increase its investment in hard assets, in the U.S. and elsewhere. Indeed, that would be good for everyone else. (The Obama administration should be issuing free visas to any Chinese citizen willing to pay $100,000 or more to buy a house in the United States.) But remember that China, in the first quarter of this year alone, acquired an additional $138 billion in new foreign exchange reserves. That money needs to go somewhere. It can either come home, or it needs to be reinvested. And the only market in the world that has the size and depth to handle that kind of money is, for better or worse, the U.S. government debt market.

????As Pettis says, "every six months for the past several years we've heard the same thing:" China's going to take its money elsewhere. Now, Beijing is making that threat in ever more strident terms, particularly following the controversial S&P downgrade. It earns cheap political points, both at home and abroad, for doing so. But the truth is, as Pettis says, "it isn't going to happen."