????以做空中國著稱的對沖基金經理吉姆?查諾斯去年晚些時候在接受《財富》雜志（Fortune）采訪時稱，中國正在“做一些絕無先例的事情”。他指的是已持續多年的大規模建設熱潮。2008年中國政府推出的經濟刺激方案向經濟體系注入了4萬億元人民幣(5,860億美元)，更是起到了推波助瀾的作用。他預計房地產投機泡沫終將破滅，導致房屋閑置，更大范圍內的經濟遭殃。

????對于那些支持查諾斯的人們而言，中國發布的一些數據顯示，他的判斷可能是對的。

????據《紐約時報》( New York Times)報道，中國國家審計署日前宣布，寬松的貸款標準以及地方政府借款大幅增加(當然是用于建設項目)可能已導致債務堆積如山，無力償還。樓市下跌或某種形式的經濟放緩或將使這些難以數計的不良貸款大白于天下。

????在這份政府報告發布的同時，中國國家審計署審計長劉家義周一在講話中稱，“一些地方政府融資平臺的管理不規范，盈利能力和償債能力都相當薄弱。”審計署官員和人民銀行的官員們表示，地方政府債務占中國GDP的27-30%，合計1.7-2.2萬億美元。這樣的數字高于預期。《紐約時報》指出，借款不僅投向了房地產建設，也投向了橋梁、隧道、地鐵和公路等低回報基建項目。

????地方政府為借款而設立的投資公司估計有6,500-10,000個，它們打造的建設熱潮使依賴出口的中國經濟免受到全球經濟放緩的極度痛苦。

????雖然有人說中產階級的擴大能促進消費、帶動經濟增長，但中國依然需要依賴出口來保持經濟快速增長，為龐大的人口創造就業機會。經濟學家蓋瑞?謝林撰文指出，中國的人均GDP 需達到5,000美元，才會出現顯著的非必需支出。但謝林表示，只有約8%的人口有這樣的經濟實力。而且隨著通脹存在失控的威脅，老百姓也需要上調工資。

????中國正在發生的一切聽起來有些耳熟，它讓我們想起了曾經在美國發生的情況。由于民眾無法分享到經濟推動財富增長帶來的好處，20世紀90年代美國官員放寬了貸款標準。結果：地方政府支出躍增，房地產泡沫讓投資者感到紙面富貴，建設熱潮創造了就業機會，而債務卻無法償還。

????與美國當年的情形類似，證券化使中國的信貸問題進一步復雜化，它將潛在的有毒貸款風險傳遞給了投資者。根據惠譽(Fitch Ratings)去年發布的一份特別報告，所謂的“非正式證券化”在中國大熱(2010年被叫停)。這意味著中國將銀行貸款(而不是有按揭貸款支持的債券)重新打包成投資產品。惠譽的一項聲明稱，這股趨勢“（扭曲了）中國銀行業的信貸數據，包括機構層面和整個銀行體系層面，導致信貸增長和信貸敞口普遍被低估。”

????惠譽的中國銀行業評級主管朱夏蓮當時表示，正如美國，那些希望調整貸款余額的銀行以及那些希望有更高收益率的投資者都歡迎證券化和表外記賬；由于中國對有信貸抵押的投資產品的處理類似于超安全的銀行存款，投資者自然相信它們是有擔保的。朱夏蓮目前對中國的情形仍心存憂慮，近日又稱中國的經濟增長一直依賴寬松的信貸。

????查諾斯的中國觀點最終可能會得到證實；但他說中國正在“做一些絕無先例的事情”，這一點無疑是錯誤的。中國正在進行的“舉債——假裝貸款狀況良好”的賭局與全球一些最大經濟體的所作所為如出一轍。但美國和歐洲的下場告訴我們，這場賭局沒有勝算。問題不是中國是否會撞上債務墻，而是何時撞上。

????Jim Chanos, the hedge fund manager who is famously shorting China, told Fortune late last year that the country was "embarking on something unprecedented." He was referring to the massive construction boom that has been underway for years, and that was supercharged by a 2008 stimulus package that pumped four trillion yuan ($586 billion) into the economy. In his opinion, the speculative bubble in real estate would end in a big pop, empty buildings, and pain for the country's broader economy.

????For those who side with team Chanos, data is seeping out of China that suggests that he may right.

????Most recently, China's top auditor said that loose lending standards and a sharp rise in local government borrowing (for building projects, of course) may have created a mountain of debt that cannot be repaid, reports the New York Times. All it will take is a fall in housing, or some sort of economic slowdown, to reveal an untold number of bad loans.

????In a speech that coincided with the release of the government report, the head of China's national audit office Liu Jiayi said Monday: "The management of some local government financing platforms is irregular, and their profitability and ability to pay their debts is quite weak." Audit officials and Chinese central bankers say that local government debt accounts for between 27% and 30% of China's GDP, and totals $1.7 trillion to $2.2 trillion. Those numbers come in higher than estimated. The Times notes that borrowed money has been used to finance not only real estate construction, but also low-return infrastructure projects like bridges, tunnels, subways, and roads.

????The estimated 6,500 to 10,000 local government investment companies created to borrow money have made a construction boom that has kept China's export-reliant economy from feeling the extreme pain of the global economic slowdown.

????Despite talk of a burgeoning middle class that can support the Chinese economy with consumption, the country still relies on exports to keep the economy growing fast enough to create jobs for its large population. It takes a per-capita GDP of $5,000 to create meaningful discretionary spending power in China, writes economist A. Gary Shilling. But Shilling says only about 8% of the population has that kind of economic clout. And with inflation threatening to run out of control, citizens will need higher wages, too.

????What's happening in China should sound familiar because it is reminiscent of what happened here in the US. Confronted by an economy that couldn't deliver real wealth to the people, our bureaucrats loosened borrowing standards in the 1990s. The result: an uptick in local government spending, a real estate bubble that made investors feel artificially wealthy, a construction boom that created jobs, and debt that can't be repaid.

????China even exacerbated the credit problem with securitization, just like we did, spreading potentially toxic loans around to investors. So-called informal securitization became popular (but was then frozen in 2010) in China, according to a special report published last year by Fitch Ratings. This simply means that the Chinese re-packaged bank loans (rather than mortgage-backed bonds) into investment products. The trend "[distorted] Chinese banks' credit data at an institutional and system level, resulting in pervasive understatement of credit growth and credit exposure," according to a statement from Fitch.

????Just like in the US, securitization and off-balance sheet accounting was encouraged by banks that wanted to adjust their loan balances and investors who wanted higher yields, said Charlene Chu, the head of Fitch's Chinese bank ratings. And since China's credit-backed investment products have been treated like ultra-safe bank deposits, investors believe that they carry an implicit guarantee, according to Chu. Fitch's Chu remains worried about China, and has recently said that the country has been dependent on loose credit to grow.

????At the end of the day, Chanos will probably be proven right on China; but he erred when he said that the country was embarking on something unprecedented. The country is making the same lend-and-pretend-that-the-loans-are-good gamble that the world's largest economies have all made. And as you can see from what has happened in the US and all over Europe, it's a losing bet. The question is not whether China will hit the debt wall, but when.