????希臘國會(huì)已批準(zhǔn)了一項(xiàng)嚴(yán)厲的經(jīng)濟(jì)緊縮計(jì)劃，以便能從歐盟(European Union)和國際貨幣基金組織(International Monetary Fund)獲取資金援助，包括去年敲定的救助方案的其余部分和第二輪救助方案。迄今為止，歐洲官員們已投入近2,700億美元來維持希臘的正常運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)，這意味著他們可能會(huì)不惜一切代價(jià)來阻止一個(gè)喪失償債能力的國家宣布破產(chǎn)。德國和法國銀行業(yè)是希臘最大的債權(quán)人，它們也協(xié)力參與了一系列復(fù)雜的方案，希望推遲債務(wù)到期日。

????希望這些強(qiáng)有力的支持信息能安撫市場，延遲可能摧毀歐盟的財(cái)政崩潰，讓歐洲大陸的高負(fù)債國家在市場定價(jià)較為仁慈時(shí)通過再融資、解決自身問題。

????不幸的是，這不是市場運(yùn)作方式。正如一位研究主權(quán)債務(wù)的對沖基金經(jīng)理告訴我的那樣，1) 無需出現(xiàn)真正的到期違約，收益率就可能飆升至必須重組的水平；2) 市場總是強(qiáng)制重組。市場預(yù)測機(jī)構(gòu)Elliott Wave的分析師布萊恩?魏特曼對此表示贊同，他說“人們會(huì)在某一個(gè)突然醒悟，意識到危機(jī)已大到難以控制。”一開始官員們說不可能發(fā)生債務(wù)危機(jī)，后來他們說危機(jī)可以控制，再然后信心突然憑空喪失，政客們說沒人會(huì)預(yù)見到這會(huì)在一夜之間發(fā)生，而且如此嚴(yán)重。透過希臘最近的權(quán)宜之計(jì)，一些經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家和投資者們認(rèn)為，現(xiàn)在是時(shí)候接受這樣一個(gè)觀點(diǎn)了，即未來幾年內(nèi)我們將看到歐洲主權(quán)信貸危機(jī)爆發(fā)，全球經(jīng)濟(jì)再現(xiàn)衰退。

????不妨回想2008年，當(dāng)時(shí)美國官員們也未能令華爾街?jǐn)[脫末日審判。一開始，美聯(lián)儲(Federal Reserve)拿出了約300億美元來防止貝爾斯登(Bear Stearns)一敗涂地，并將它推入了JP摩根(JPMorgan)的懷抱。美聯(lián)儲主席本?伯南克這一年春天告訴國會(huì)，此舉旨在防止華爾街出現(xiàn)搖搖欲墜的亂象。一旦貝爾斯登的狀況得到控制，其他高負(fù)債金融公司的壓力也會(huì)得到緩解——如果市場停止向這些公司提供短期融資，它們也可能面臨類似的流動(dòng)性問題。“我希望這是偶爾為之，將來無需再做類似的事情。”伯南克在向美國國會(huì)作證時(shí)說道。

????但接下來，債券持有人開始撤出房利美(Fannie Mae)和房地美(Freddie Mac)，迫使當(dāng)時(shí)的美國財(cái)政部長漢克?保爾森宣布由政府為這兩家按揭貸款公司提供擔(dān)保。保爾森將之稱為“火箭筒”，認(rèn)為一旦投資者知道他為此囤積大量彈藥，投資者必然會(huì)平靜下來。但整個(gè)夏季，房利美和房地美的股票和債券都持續(xù)下跌，最后美國政府不得不接管這兩家公司，并立即提供2,000億美元的財(cái)務(wù)支持。

????此后不久，金融機(jī)構(gòu)接二連三地出現(xiàn)觸礁。沒人愿意借錢給GE Capital、雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)、美國國際集團(tuán)(AIG)和美林(Merrill Lynch)等；需要美國政府向這些公司投入資金，出錢拯救券商，就雷曼而言，還要應(yīng)對令人頭痛的破產(chǎn)帶來的影響。

????對于那些能維持流動(dòng)性的公司來說，火箭筒或系統(tǒng)性災(zāi)難威脅都不重要。當(dāng)貸款機(jī)構(gòu)覺得風(fēng)險(xiǎn)過高時(shí)，他們會(huì)一下子立即停掉貸款。畢竟，沒人希望自己是最后一個(gè)撤離的貸款者。

????那么，現(xiàn)在讓我們來看一看歐洲。市場知道希臘、愛爾蘭、意大利和葡萄牙的負(fù)債也已超出償付能力。去年的希臘救助方案并未解決問題，如今已氣勢洶洶地卷土重來。葡萄牙和愛爾蘭的債券利差現(xiàn)處于歷史高點(diǎn)，股票交易和研究公司MKM Partners的首席經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家邁克?達(dá)爾達(dá)認(rèn)為這兩個(gè)國家也需要二次救助。

????“市場呼吁將各方召集到一起，讓股票和債券持有人做出讓步，拿出有意義的重組方案來，”對沖基金B(yǎng)earing Asset Management的聯(lián)合創(chuàng)始人比爾?拉格尼爾表示，“但這會(huì)非常痛苦，特別是對銀行家而言，他們可能不愿這樣做，而官員們也不想讓他們這樣做。”

????希臘國內(nèi)的抗議說明經(jīng)濟(jì)緊縮計(jì)劃的實(shí)際效果可能不如紙面預(yù)期。希臘民眾不滿政府通過削減個(gè)人收入和資產(chǎn)凈值，直接將利益輸送至那些為希臘提供貸款的金融公司。

????而且，一旦債券持有人——包括歐洲銀行業(yè)，美國貨幣市場基金和全球的主權(quán)債券CDS交易對手——最終迫于市場的壓力，不得不承認(rèn)投資虧損之，接下來的情況會(huì)如何？如果政治因素讓人難以決斷，如果金融機(jī)構(gòu)試圖掩蓋損失，如果沒人知道他們的交易對手財(cái)務(wù)上出現(xiàn)了怎樣的問題，“可能造成整個(gè)體系內(nèi)出現(xiàn)傳染性的恐慌情緒，導(dǎo)致情況變得一團(tuán)糟，”拉格尼爾表示。這很可能造成又一次的全球信貸凍結(jié)。

????“到那時(shí)，我們是承受痛苦，還是采取飲鴆止渴的辦法，提升歐洲央行和美聯(lián)儲的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表，”拉格尼爾問道。不管是全球銀行業(yè)、保險(xiǎn)公司和投資者承認(rèn)巨額虧損，還是各國央行們試圖印刷足夠的紙幣來填補(bǔ)黑洞，都會(huì)看到經(jīng)濟(jì)增長放緩(大蕭條第二部?)，并可能出現(xiàn)全球性高通脹。“現(xiàn)在即將進(jìn)入了一個(gè)非常黯淡的時(shí)期，”拉格尼爾表示。

????魏特曼一直預(yù)測會(huì)出現(xiàn)二次探底的經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退，下一階段的熊市將“比上一階段好一些”。這是他預(yù)見的歐洲前景。政府官員們將繼續(xù)把債務(wù)負(fù)擔(dān)從自愿承擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的投資者轉(zhuǎn)移至納稅人身上。還會(huì)出現(xiàn)更多的民眾騷亂。主權(quán)債務(wù)問題將擴(kuò)大至歐洲核心國——法國、德國和英國——然后至美國。他預(yù)計(jì)2014-2016年的某個(gè)時(shí)候?qū)⒊霈F(xiàn)真正的經(jīng)濟(jì)放緩。

????預(yù)測災(zāi)難的言論似乎很難沒有哈羅德?康平的影子，但相比之下，要預(yù)測歐洲如何才能不撞墻難度更大。

????The Greek Parliament approved a tough austerity plan so that the country could get money from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund, including the rest of the bailout hammered out last year and a second aid package. Europe's officials have now spent nearly $270 billion to keep Greece going, signaling that they will spend whatever it takes to keep an insolvent country from declaring the equivalent of bankruptcy. German and French banks, Greece's largest lenders, are also pitching in with complex plans that push off the day when debts come due.

????The hope is that these strong messages of support will calm markets, stave off a fiscal collapse that could destroy the European Union, and let the Continent's highly levered countries refinance their problems away when market pricing is more forgiving.

????Unfortunately, that's not how the marketplace works. As a hedge fund manager who has been studying sovereign debt told me, 1) you don't need an actual maturity default for yields to run so high that they force a restructuring; and 2) the market always forces a restructuring. Brian Whitmer, an analyst with Elliott Wave, agrees. "There is a light bulb moment when everyone wakes up and says that a crisis is just too big to manage," says Whitmer. First officials first say it can't happen. Then they say it will be contained. And then a loss of confidence comes out of nowhere and politicians say that no one could have predicted it would occur overnight or with such severity. Looking past Greece's most recent Band-Aid, some economists and investors think it's time to accept that in the next few year's we'll witness Europe's sovereign credit collapse and be thrown into another global recession.

????Just think back to 2008, when our officials failed to stave off a come-to-Jesus-moment on Wall Street. First, the Federal Reserve put up about $30 billion to keep Bear Stearns from outright failure and pushed it into the arms of JPMorgan. The move was supposed to prevent a "chaotic unwinding" of Wall Street, Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke told Congress that spring. Once the Bear situation was in hand, the thinking went, pressure would ease on other over-levered financial players that could face similar liquidity problems if markets stopped providing them short-term money. "I hope this is a rare event, I hope this is something we never have to do again," Bernanke testified.

????But bondholders next fled Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, forcing then-Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson to declare that the government would back the mortgage companies. Sheriff Paulson called the guarantee his bazooka, and thought that investors would calm down once they knew he was packing so much heat. But Fannie and Freddie stocks and bonds continued to fall throughout the summer, and the government was forced to take over the companies and provide $200 billion in immediate financial support.

????Shortly thereafter, financial institutions hit the skids in rapid succession. No one wanted to lend to the likes of GE Capital, Lehman Brothers, AIG [NYSE: AIG], or Merrill Lynch; and the government needed to throw money at these companies, broker rescues, and in the case of Lehman, deal with the fallout from a very messy bankruptcy.

????Bazookas and the risk of a systemwide castastrophe didn't really matter to the players who were able to keep the liquidity spigots open. Lenders stopped lending almost all at once when they decided that the risks were too high. After all, no one wants to be the last guy giving out money after everyone else has fled.

????So now let's look at Europe. The market knows that Greece, Ireland, Italy, and Portugal have more debt than they can pay. Last year's Greek bailout didn't solve the problem and now it's back with a vengeance. Debt spreads in Portugal and Ireland are near all-time highs, and Michael Darda, chief economist at MKM Partners, thinks these countries will need a second bailout, too.

????"The market is saying, get together and impair the stock and bondholders and come up with a restructuring that makes sense," says Bill Laggner, a co-founder of the hedge fund Bearing Asset Management. "But the pain would be so extreme, mainly for the bankers, that they don't want to do it and the political class doesn't want to make them do it."

????Protesters in Greece are showing us that austerity plans work better on paper that in real life. Citizens aren't embracing the idea of cutting their personal income and net worth so that it can be funneled directly to financial players who loaned to Greece.

????And when those bondholders -- European banks, American money market funds, and credit default swap counterparties around the world -- are finally forced by the market to admit that they've lost money on their investments, what happens next? If politics cloud decision making, financial institutions try to hide losses, and no one is sure how financially dented their counterparties are, "it could create a panic, contagion, total systemic fear, and things start to unravel," says Laggner. That's a formula for another global credit freeze.

????"Then do we take the pain, or do we go with the nuclear option of increasing the balance sheets of the ECB and the Fed," Laggner asks. Whether the world's banks, insurance companies, and investors come clean with big losses, or central bankers try to print enough money to try to fill the hole, you get slow growth (Great Recession part II anyone?) and possibly flirt with the possibility of global hyper inflation. "You go into a very dark place," says Laggner.

????Whitmer has been predicting a double dip recession, with the next phase of the bear market "to be stronger than the last." This is how he sees Europe playing out. Government officials will continue to transfer liabilities onto tax payers from those investors who took the risk willingly. There will be more civil unrest. Sovereign debt problems will spread into the core of Europe -- France, Germany, and Britian -- and then to the US. He expects an actual slowdown to come to pass between 2014 and 2016.

????It's hard to not sound like Harold Camping when predicting a meltdown, but it's harder still to see how Europe does not hit the wall.