????他們回來了。

????在第一次網絡泡沫破裂后棄硅谷而去的華爾街投行家們已全體回到這個科技業的圣地，尋找的當然是幫助初創企業上市的賺錢機會。不然還能是什么？

????然而，華爾街投資銀行界——美國銀行美林(Bank of America Merrill Lynch)、花旗集團(Citigroup)、高盛(Goldman Sachs)、JP摩根(JP Morgan)、摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)和瑞銀(UBS)——的銀行家們這次可能會受到冷遇。這種敵意有點類似翰?休斯的電影里描繪的情形：勤奮的孩子們就是不想讓有錢人從他們的發明中賺錢。此外，投行們是否對IPO交易進行低定價，以便能以低廉的價格賣給機構客戶——損失初創企業內部人士和創始人的利益，硅谷對此也心存疑問。前瑞銀媒體研究全球策略師、現任Minyanville Media副董事長克里斯托弗?迪克森直言，“硅谷對華爾街一直是愛恨交加。”

????迪克森和其他長期關注這一現象的人士表示，現在業界對投行兩頭吃的做法日益反感：IPO前購入看好企業的股份，當這些企業上市時，收取承銷和其他客戶費用。

????例證A：高盛最近與Facebook的交易。1月份，高盛對這家社交網站投資了4.50億美元，并代表其再籌資15億美元，為高盛在美國以外地區的高凈值客戶提供了一個投資Facebook的機會。因此，高盛似乎有近水樓臺的優勢來承銷Facebook的IPO發行。

????有人說，這種層層關系存在的問題是投行總是能穩賺不賠，即便初創企業和個人投資者虧了。同時扮演投資者和承銷商角色的投行往往有能力決定一家公司應何時發行股票——通常是在他們擁有公開上市的財務實力前——收取費用，獲得高額回報，但無需用太多自身資金承擔風險。

????“當泡沫破滅時，受傷的是他們的客戶，因為涉險資金主要是投資者的錢，”肯?馬林表示。馬林在建立自己的咨詢公司為中間市場科技業服務前，曾擔任眾多科技公司的首席執行官。

????迄今為止，承銷市場的大贏家看來是擔任5月份社交網站LinkedIn和6月中旬音樂網站Pandora IPO主承銷商的JP摩根和摩根士丹利，其中摩根士丹利有望從LinkedIn一單IPO中收取700-1，000萬美元的費用(JP摩根和高盛同為Zipcar 4月份的IPO承銷商。)

????租車網站ZipCar、LinkedIn和Pandora首日上市均大幅超越發行價，雖然Pandora現已比發行價16美元低了幾美元。

????為何發行價和二級市場價之間存在差距？許多硅谷風險投資人和融資家表示，這是因為投行家是外來投機分子，他們沒有在硅谷以及他們幫助上市的公司中花費足夠的時間來準確評估公司潛力。

????不幸的是這些初創公司不能像Hambrecht & Quist投資銀行和其他專業小型銀行時代那樣，繞過這些大投行。一些新成立的公司計劃募集的資金達到50-100億美元，數目龐大，只有高盛、摩根士丹利或者JP摩根有辦法完成。而且，正如迪克森所說，“事情不僅僅是公開上市這么簡單；它還涉及到上市后如何為公司提供支持等，這使得大券商有能力把大科技公司玩弄于鼓掌之間。”

????但像Facebook這樣的熱門公司確實有討價還價的砝碼，至少在向承銷商支付費用時是這樣：消息人士預測Facebook將就標準的7%費率進行討價還價，自從谷歌(Google) IPO以來這一標準費率已略降至5%或更低。如果一家投行不愿接受，肯定會有競爭對手愿意為一項大規模發行交易做出讓步。(美國CNBC電視臺最近報道，Facebook正在籌劃估值1,000億美元的IPO發行。) 專業小型銀行MESA的管理合伙人馬克?帕提考夫表示：“由于表現出色或品牌認可度高而處于優勢地位的科技公司顯然已在市場中比投行擁有更高的議價力。資金已經商品化；對這些公司而言，投行只是獲取資金的渠道之一。”

????They're back.

????After all but abandoning Silicon Valley in the wake of the first dotcom implosion, Wall Street bankers have returned to the tech Mecca en masse, in search of -- what else? -- riches to be made taking startups public.

????But the moneymen of the bulge-bracket -- Bank of America Merrill Lynch (BAC), Citigroup (C), Goldman Sachs (GS), JP Morgan (JPM), Morgan Stanley (MS) and UBS (UBS)—can expect a chilly reception. Some of the ill will feels a bit like something out of a John Hughes movie: The studious kids simply don't like the richies making money off their inventions. And there are questions about whether banks are underpricing the public offering deals they covet, allowing them to sell stock to institutional clients cheaply—at the expense of startup insiders and founders. "Silicon Valley has always had a love-hate relationship with Wall Street," says Christopher Dixon, the former global strategist for media research at UBS and current vice-chairman of Minyanville Media.

????Dixon and other longtime observers of the scene say there's now growing resentment over the banks' practice of double dipping: taking pre-IPO positions in promising startups then collecting underwriting and other client fees when those companies go public.

????Exhibit A: Goldman Sachs' recent deal with Facebook. In January, Goldman invested $450 million in the social networking site and presented its non-U.S.-based high net worth clients with an opportunity to invest in Facebook as part of an effort to raise an additional $1.5 billion on the company's behalf. As a result, Goldman would seem to have an inside track to underwriting Facebook's public offering.

????The problem with these kinds of multilayered relationships, some say, is that the bank always wins, even if the startup and individual investors lose. By being both an investor and an underwriter, the banks are often in a position to dictate when a company should do a stock offering -- often before they have the financial strength to be traded publicly -- collecting fees and seeing big returns without putting much of the banks' own money at risk.

????"When the bubble bursts it is their clients who will get harmed because the money at risk is largely investor money," says Ken Marlin, who served as the CEO of numerous tech companies before founding his own advisory shop serving the middle market tech industry.

????Thus far the big winners in the underwriting game appear to be JP Morgan and Morgan Stanley, which served as lead underwriters for LinkedIn's May IPO and Pandora's IPO in mid-June, with Morgan Stanley looking collect $7 to $10 million in fees from the LinkedIn IPO alone. (JP Morgan was an underwriter, along with Goldman Sachs, of Zipcar's April IPO.)

????On the day of their initial offerings shares of ZipCar (ZIP), LinkedIn (LNKD) and Pandora (P) all soared past their offer prices, though Pandora has settled a few bucks below its $16 initial price.

????Why the mismatch between the offering prices and the market values? Many Silicon Valley venture capitalists and financiers say that's because bankers are carpetbaggers who don't spend enough time in the Valley and with the companies they represent to accurately assess their potential.

????Unfortunately for the upstarts, they can't bypass the big banks the way they might have in the days of Hambrecht & Quist and other boutique banks. The sums some new companies are raising -- $5 billion to $10 billion -- are so great that only a Goldman, Morgan Stanely or JP Morgan has the wherewithal to do it. Moreover, as Dixon notes, "it isn't just about getting into the public markets; it's also about being able to support the company in the aftermarket, and that puts these big tech companies right in the hands of the large brokerage firms."

????But hot companies like Facebook do have leverage, at least when it comes to the fees they pay their underwriters: Sources predict Facebook will try to negotiate the standard 7% fee, which has already inched downward since Google's (GOOG) IPO, down to 5% or less. If one bank doesn't like it, there's sure to be a rival that would be willing to take a haircut to be part of what's sure to be a huge offering. (CNBC recently reported that Facebook is planning an IPO that would value the company at $100 billion.) Says Mark Patricof, managing partner at boutique bank MESA: "Technology companies that are in a privileged position through performance or brand acceptance have significantly more leverage than banks in the marketplace. Money is commoditized; the banks are just one source of capital for them."