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如果一切都按計劃進行，打車應用服務公司Uber今年應該可以籌集逾50億美元的“風投資金”。盡管有數十億美元的收入、飛速提升的增長率和一個經久不衰的牛市，這個創紀錄的融資額仍然表明Uber現在非常不想上市。 很難因為不上市而責怪Uber。谷歌（Google）上市也情非自愿。Facebook也是如此。但所謂的“500名股東”規定（即股東人數達到500名的非上市公司要在美國證監會（SEC）注冊）迫使它們必須這樣做。這種局面直到2012年《創業企業扶助法》（Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act）出臺才徹底改變。上市不可避免地會帶來業績壓力，還得跟來自格林威治（康涅狄格州小鎮，美國對沖基金之都）的對沖基金經理進行無休止的會談，而且這些人會覺得他們比你還了解你的公司——對Uber來說，沒有理由這樣做。 另外，有理由相信Uber不會是一家好的上市公司。它的CEO十分好斗，就算按硅谷的標準衡量也是如此。幾乎可以肯定，這位仁兄會以不恰當的方式觸怒華爾街的分析師們。此外，Uber和地方政府的監管糾紛（或者其他更糟糕的問題）可能對其股價產生巨大的不利影響。只有心理最強大的投資者才敢去買它的股票。 唯一的問題是Uber最終必須為股東（包括外部投資者和持股員工）提供變現途徑。他們和別人一樣喜歡看到自己的投資價值飛漲，但最終也會希望落袋為安?？赡苷浅鲇谶@個原因，這家設在舊金山的公司已經開始默默地為首發上市做規劃，它向高盛（Goldman Sachs）客戶定向發行可轉債的安排就是證據。 不過，還有另外一條路可走，即Uber可以把控股權賣給沃倫?巴菲特，從而永遠不用上市。 巴菲特當然買得起這些股份。伯克希爾-哈撒韋公司（Berkshire Hathaway）目前的市值為3700億美元，其中包括近600億美元現金。Uber目前的估值只有400億美元，而且應該沒有任何債務。如果以輕微溢價收購Uber51%的股份，再動用一些杠桿，巴菲特需要的現金將遠少于他目前在富國銀行（Wells Fargo）的投資。 還必須說明的一點是，無論多么讓人驚訝，400億美元這個數字體現了Uber的價值標的。要知道，許多有經驗的投資者按這種估值水平向Uber投資時，都預計這家輕資產的公司的IPO價值將到達至少1000億美元。就在六個月前，富達國際投資（Fidelity）按170億美元的估值向Uber投資時，許多評論人士還說富達國際投資瘋了（2013年夏天德州太平洋集團（TPG）和谷歌創投（Google Ventures）將20多億美元投入Uber時也得到了類似的評價）。 此外，巴菲特會堅持一些特殊要求，從而使伯克希爾-哈撒韋在Uber不斷成熟和克服監管障礙的過程中加強其在公司中的地位。 更重要的是，我認為Uber非常符合巴菲特的投資策略。原因有以下四條： 1.巴菲特可以理解Uber的業務。雖然具有科技公司的種種特點，Uber實際上是一家運輸服務公司，其最終目標是發展成為本地化按需物流服務供應商。實際上，漢堡王（Burger King）等公司的數據密集度可能都比Uber高。此外，如果大家還糾結于Uber的科技特性，請記住，巴菲特持有IBM公司 7.12%股份，是其最大的外部股東。 2.現金流充裕：Uber不是那種收入及其不確定的“軟件即服務”公司。Uber的利潤來源很廣，每一筆生意都能帶來收入。 3.護城河：當然，Uber處于一個高度競爭的市場。但它的資金充裕程度遠遠超過任何競爭對手，在大多數市場中都具有先發優勢，而且已經開始和其他公司簽訂各種各樣的“優先使用”協議。此外，如果大家相信長期計劃，目前Uber是唯一一家業務規模（按地理覆蓋范圍和數據衡量）足以成功進行大批量本地遞送的按需運輸服務公司。 4.管理層的理性：鑒于Uber首席執行官特拉維斯?卡蘭尼克的好斗傾向，以及由此在監管和公關方面惹出的麻煩，證明這一點有點兒困難。但說到底，卡蘭尼克似乎已經有意識地做出了選擇，那就是Uber這樣的公司取得成功的唯一途徑就是要大膽，就算這樣做有時意味著不夠體面。雖然帶來了各種各樣讓人不快的新聞，公司業務似乎并未受到不利影響，而且巴菲特也能很輕松地擺脫媒體的攻擊（請參見《Burger King to Canada》或《horribleness at Heinz》這兩篇文章）。對巴菲特而言，只要能達到要求，沒有人情味地計算得失似乎沒什么關系。 但對巴菲特來說，我可以想到的唯一問題就是透明度。各種各樣的UberUber投資者私下都抱怨過自己不了解這家公司的財務情況和策略，而且有消息稱，在向華爾街投行（高盛并非Uber接觸的唯一投行）推介自己的可轉債時，Uber甚至都不愿意提供相關信息。 不過，現有股東都沒有獲得Uber的控制權，使得他們可以唄排除在公司核心之外。這種情況不可能出現在巴菲特身上，這既是因為他擁有合法權力，也因為他有著“祖父一樣的”氣場。同時，Uber不愿分享信息可能是出于對信息泄露的擔憂，而這種情況在僅有一位外部股東的情況下不容易發生。此外，Uber還可以通過114a終身規則來處理所有債務（請參見文章《Rule 144a for life》），進而實現信息保密。 要知道，Uber有足夠的動力向巴菲特敞開胸懷，因為后者也許能幫助它免于上市。當然，理論上還存在其他買家，比如在本地遞送業務方面抱有夢想的亞馬遜和谷歌。但二者都不太可能給卡蘭尼克太多幫助。 如今，成功的初創型企業幾乎都已經上市，而且也都不再獨立運營。但Uber在很多方面都一直是個例外，再破個例有何不可呢？聯系巴菲特吧。盡管乍看上去這樣做顯得很可笑。（財富中文網） 譯者：Charlie 審稿：Vera Han |
If all goes according to plan, Uber should raise more than $5 billion in “venture capital” funding this year. It’s a record haul that reflects the ride-sharing company’s antipathy toward going public right now, despite billions of dollars in revenue, an exponential growth rate and a bull market that refuses to bear down. And it’s hard to blame Uber for staying private. Google GOOG 0.43% didn’t want to go public when it did. Neither did Facebook FB 2.03% . But both had their hands forced by something called the 500-shareholder rule, which was subsequently eviscerated by the 2012 JOBS Act. Uber, on the other hand, has virtually no reason to make a move that inevitably leads to short-term earnings pressures and endless meetings with Greenwich hedge fund managers who think they know more about your business than you do. Moreover, there is a good case to be made that Uber wouldn’t be a good public company. Its CEO is combative even by Silicon Valley standards, and is almost certain to rub some Wall Street analysts the wrong way. Plus, Uber’s endemic regulatory (or worse) controversies could play havoc with its stock price. Only traders with the strongest stomachs need apply. Only trouble is that Uber must eventually provide liquidity for its shareholders (both outside investors and vested employees). These folks love a good rocket-ship ride as much as anyone, but eventually want their moon rocks. That’s probably why the San Francisco-based company has begun tacitly planning for an IPO, as evidenced by the way in which it structured its ongoing private placement of convertible notes with wealthy Goldman Sachs GS 0.80% clients. But there is another way. Uber could remain private indefinitely by selling a control stake to Warren Buffett. To be sure, Buffett could afford it. Berkshire Hathaway BRK.A 0.51% has a current market cap of $370 billion, including nearly $60 billion in cash. Uber currently is valued at only $40 billion, and isn’t believed to have any debt on its books. Buffett could pay a slight premium, use some leverage and walk away with a 51% stake for much less cash than he currently has tied up in Wells Fargo WFC 0.31% . There also is a compelling case to be made that $40 billion is a “value” price, no matter how wide our collective eyes bulged when we first read it. Remember, plenty of other experienced investors are buying in at this valuation expecting asset-light Uber to be worth at least $100 billion at IPO — and many pundits called Fidelity nuts to invest at a $17 billion pre-money just six months ago (similar accusations were hurled at TPG and Google Ventures for giving it a $2 billion+ mark in the summer of 2013). Plus, Buffett could always insist on some special warrants that allow him to increase Berkshire’s position as Uber matures and overcomes various regulatory hurdles. More importantly, I think that Uber is a decent fit within Buffett’s investment strategy. Here are four reasons why: 1.It’s a business Buffett could understand. For all of its tech trappings, Uber is essentially a transportation company that eventually wants to expand into a localized, on-demand logistics company. In fact, a company like Burger King is probably more data-intensive. Plus, just in case the tech thing still trips you up, remember that Buffett is the largest outside shareholder in IBM IBM 0.35% , with a 7.12% stake. 2.Cash-flow rich: Uber is not some sort of SaaS business whose income statement is full of asterisks about future bookings. It’s a wildly-profitable company that generates revenue with each and every ride. 3.Moat: To be sure, Uber is in a highly-competitive market. But it is by far the best capitalized of any competitor, has first-mover advantage in most of its markets and has begun to sign all sorts of “preferred use” corporate partnerships. Plus, if you believe the long-term plan, it is the only on-demand ride company out there that currently has a large enough footprint (in terms of both geography and data) to pull off local delivery on a mass scale. 4. Management rationality: This is a tricky one, given Kalanick’s antagonistic stance and its consequences in terms of both regulation and PR. Ultimately, however, it seems that Kalanick has made a conscious choice that the only way for a company like Uber to succeed is by being brash, even if that means sometimes crossing the line of decency. While it has generated all sorts of unpleasant headlines, the business itself hasn’t seemed to suffer, and Buffett can easily shake off some media darts (see Burger King to Canada or the horribleness at Heinz). Coldly-calculating seems to be fine in Omaha, so long as the math checks out. The one area where I could see Buffett having a real problem, however, is transparency. All sorts of existing Uber investors privately gripe about their lack of visibility into company financials and strategy, and word is that Uber wasn’t even too forthcoming when pitching its convertible note deal to Wall Street banks (Goldman wasn’t the only one approached). But no current shareholder has company control, which can allow them to be easily excluded from the inner circle. Highly unlikely that happens with Buffett, both because of his legal rights and his grandfatherly gravitas. Moreover, one possible reason for Uber’s reticence to share information is concern over leaks — something which is much less likely when dealing with a single outside shareholder. Plus, any debt could be structured as Rule 144a for life, thus keeping underlying information private. Remember, Uber would have all sorts of incentive to open the kimono to Buffett, because he’d be the one “saving” them from having to go public. Yes there are other theoretical buyers — Amazon AMZN 0.50% and existing Uber shareholder Google GOOG 0.43% come to kind, given their local delivery aspirations — but neither one of them is likely to give Kalanick much rope. Today’s successful startups almost never remain private and operationally independent. But Uber has been the exception to so many other rules, why not one more? Make the call Warren. Even if it sounds ridiculous at first blush. |
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